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Abstract 
Two Ways to Freedom: 
Christianity and Democracy in the Thought qf!stvim Bih6 and Dien"ich 
Bonhoe.ffer 
Andnis Csepregi 
The broad scope of my study is the encounter of Christian theology and 
democratic social theory. Within this area I relate as well as compare to each 
other the thoughts of the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the political 
thinker Istvan Bib6. The possibility of the comparison is supported by the 
fact that both thinkers elaborated a characteristic understanding and concept 
of freedom on whose basis they investigated a viable political order for 
post-war Europe. Their understanding of freedom was significantly different 
and this difference became manifest in the manner ofthe political 
reconstruction they proposed. 
In my analysis of some early writings and wartime considerations of the two 
thinkers, my main concern is to reveal the relationship ofthelogical 
reasoning and political argumentation, both within the two thinkers' own 
thoughts and in their encounter. In the first chapter I create an elementary 
map ofthe development ofthe mutual influence of Christianity and 
democracy. Here I venture to understand democracy from a Christian point 
of view as tradition, vision, system and process. In the second chapter I 
show the relationship between Bib6's concept of freedom and his democratic 
theory. The third and the fourth chapters are devoted to an analysis of 
Bonhoeffer's theology that was determined by definite political values 
already at their roots. I conclude that despite several converging elements in 
their thinking and understanding of the challenge of the times, some 
fundamental differences remain in the political theories ofBib6 and 
Bonhoeffer, which have their roots in their opposing understanding of 
freedom. 
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Introduction 
This study was originally planned as a comparison of a number of 
contextual receptions and interpretations ofBonhoeffer: some Anglo-Saxon 
interpretations, read from a Hungarian perspective and compared to the 
Hungarian interpretation. After two years of research the original plan had to 
be given up, for a number ofreasons. 
First, I realised that the Anglo-Saxon interpretations - British, South 
African and North American- and the Hungarian interpretation are 
incomparable to each other, because the conditions of research and 
theological work have been rather different. From the very beginning of 
Bonhoeffer interpretation Anglo-Saxon scholars could employ all possible 
academic means in their research ofBonhoeffer and enjoyed and ever-
widening circle of readership, interested as well as critical. Hungarian 
scholars, at the same time, worked in a manifold isolation: they could not 
freely organise a working circle and they were, as theological work in 
general in the country, also artificially isolated from a wider circle of 
readers. Contacts were strictly controlled by the co-operation of state and 
church authorities, and even though a natural interest in Bonhoeffer's 
theological legacy emerged here and there - indeed, Bonhoeffer belonged to 
the most frequently quoted theologians - relevant questions were raised and 
serious efforts were made, in the absence of a lively academic and social 
context a substantial scholarship could not have developed. A single datum 
is probably sufficient to characterise the circumstances: the most abundant 
collection ofBonhoeffer's texts that was published prior to 1989, edited by 
the well-known expert, Bonhoeffer's one-time Berlin student Ferenc Lehel, 
is a version of one of Otto Dudzus's short Bonhoeffer readers, whose text 
has been truncated by the unknown censor to such an extent that in several 
instances Bonhoeffer's original argument cannot be identified. Although the 
political control of theological work disappeared after 1989, a new, 
dynamic, theologically as well as socially conscious generation of 
Bonhoeffer-researchers did not appear in Hungary to date. 
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The second reason for giving up the original plan was that I made an 
unexpected discovery with respect to Anglo-Saxon interpretations as well. 
When I started my research I thought that I would find significant 
differences that originated in the different contexts. I found, instead, that the 
contextual interpretations were rather similar. I have found that interpreters 
who belong to different contexts often use the same elements of the great 
narrative ofBonhoeffer's life and work and apply to it aspects of a particular 
understanding of their own context, rather than making the Bonhoeffer-
narrative really con-textual. Since the Bonhoeffer-narrative, based decisively 
on Eberhard Bethge's monumental biography, has a tendency of developing 
a rather simple reading of complex events as the struggle of Good against 
Evil, it may be effective in supporting the same simple reading of the 
complicated social and personal tensions intrinsic in any context. I 
concluded that mainstream Bonhoeffer-interpretation often cannot fi.1lfil its 
declared promise to help in the understanding of a certain situation; on the 
contrary, it may hinder a sensitive understanding by forcing on it the simple 
pattern of the fight between Good and Evil. 
As a result ofthe above findings, as my research proceeded, I felt a 
growing distance within me towards the possible political and theological 
consequences of the contextual interpretations. In short, I felt that if 
Bonhoeffer's message could be understood the way I have encountered it, I 
would rather not promote this message among Hungarian readers. 
Hungarians, similarly to other peoples, have a strong inclination to see the 
world around them in black and white, therefore, they need help in 
understanding their personal and communal history in a way that overcomes 
the friend-enemy or oppressor-liberator dichotomy, an assistance that 
mainstream Bonhoeffer interpretation, I believe, is unable to provide. For a 
long time I thought that my frustration was caused by the interpreters, but 
later I realised that the chief reason for the frustration is Bonhoeffer himself, 
whose own evaluation of the tensions he participated in as well as his own 
role within these tensions dominated Bethge's biography to such an extent 
that, to exaggerate a little, the latter can even be regarded as Bonhoeffer's 
autobiography. Thus, the second year of my research ended in a massive 
disillusionment about the possible relevance ofBonhoeffer's theology in a 
Hungarian context. 
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Nevertheless, by the end of the second year a different process 
reached fruition as well. Having read several contextual interpretations I had 
become captivated by the ability of certain writers to relate Bonhoeffer's 
theological legacy to their own burning questions, and, in a broader sense, 
the possibility of pursuing a theological understanding of social events. I 
thought it would be meaningful to attempt this with respect to the presently 
most demanding questions of my country, that is, to the problem ofthe 
transition to democracy, a theme that also some Bonhoeffer scholars 
addressed in a remarkable way. A study like that, I thought, was meaningful 
even though I was not a Bonhoeffer-enthusiast any more: a critical 
encounter with Bonhoeffer's legacy and the problems of transition would be 
certainly instructive. 
From this point onwards the form of the present study started to take 
shape. After experimenting with several possible perspectives for 
interweaving the challenge ofHungary's transition to democracy with 
Bonhoeffer interpretation, I finally decided to embark upon a comparative 
reading of the political theory oflstvan Bib6 and the theology ofDietrich 
Bonhoeffer. 
Bib6 is widely regarded as the Hungarian political theorist of the 
XX. century who made an unparallelled impact on the clarification of the 
possibilities of Hungarian democracy. I will not discuss Bib6's life story1 
later, but here I must list the most important facts to show that his life can be 
1 For a short but infonnative essay on Bib6's life see Sandor Szilagyi, 'Istvan Bib6, Central 
Europe's Political Therapist', in DRS pp. 527-545. See also Bemard Crick's 'Introduction' in 
Bib6, The Para~vsis oflmernationallnstitutions and the Remedies, Harvester Press. 
Hassocks, 1976, pp. iii-xi. 
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compared to that ofBonhoeffer to a remarkable extent. Bib6 had a broadly 
cultured middle class background. He was born in 1911; he had remarkable 
intellectual achievements at an early age; he spent a couple of years studying 
abroad. He occupied a responsible position in the state administration and 
got involved in anti-Nazi activities as well as taking part in actions on behalf 
of the Jews in 1944. After the war he launched into a large-scale political 
journalism and was silenced by the Communists in 1949. He was a member 
of the Imre Nagy government in 1956; after the revolution he was arrested in 
1957 and got a life-sentence in 1958. He was released by amnesty in 1963 
but he was silenced until his death in 1979. After his death his writings had 
an incomparable effect on Hungarian intellectual resistance. He was a 
devoted Christian. 
By deciding in favour of a substantial incorporation ofBib6 into the 
argument of the study I, in fact, joined the several attempts of comparing 
Bonhoeffer to someone else - in this respect the present work is rather 
typical. The comparison ofBonhoeffer and Bib6, however, could have been 
made in a number of ways, and in this respect I had to make a clear choice. 
Their life-stories offer more than one point of comparison. Documents 
would allow one to do research into their ways of relating to their respective 
heritage; or their road towards involvement in active anti-Nazi resistance; or 
their understanding of the predicament of the Jews, their related actions and 
reflections; or their prison experiences; or their understanding of the role of 
the church and the person of Christ, and so on. Regrettably, none of these 
can be addressed within the limits of this study. Instead, we will follow the 
development of their understanding of the concept of freedom, up to the 
early forties, when both of them were seriously occupied by the same 
question: the political order ofEurope after the Second World War and the 
possible place and role of Germany in the new order. For Bonhoeffer this 
phase meant almost the end ofhis life. Bib6 wrote his more influental and 
well-known writings after 1945; however, as it has already convincingly 
been shown, the fragmentary essay that he wrote from 1942 to 1944 contains 
all the important tenets that characterise his later, mature work2 Therefore, 
while we confine ourselves to the limits of the comparison that is naturally 
determined by Bonhoeffer's early death, we will not lose sight of the 
substance ofBib6's writings that are usually related to the later, better 
known essays. 
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A note on the term comparison should be taken here, to avoid 
misunderstanding. I will compare the thought ofBib6 to that ofBonhoeffer 
not by putting myself into a third, neutral position, equally far from or 
equally close to both thinkers. My deliberate choice ofBib6 and not 
someone or something else is also a way of identifying my own position: I 
have found in Bib6 a source of a relevant answer to the challenge of 
Hungary's transition to democracy. Therefore, Bib6's thought will be the 
starting point of the comparison, and I will draw the appropriate pieces of 
Bonhoeffer's thought into the perspective that will be developed by a critical 
analysis ofBib6's theory. In other words, Bib6 will determine the agenda, 
and I will make Bonhoeffer answer the questions raised by the 
interpretation ofBib6. A treatment like this necessarily excludes several 
possible approaches to Bonhoeffer's theology; at the same time, the 
characteristic challenge created on the basis ofBib6 helps us formulate 
certain questions that mainstream Bonhoeffer-interpretation would not raise. 
Further, the comparison will be uneven in one more sense: I will give more 
space to Bonhoeffer's answer than I will devote to the interpretation ofBib6: 
while Bib6's position can be identified in a rather straightforward way, a fair 
reading of the more complicated argumentation ofBonhoeffer requires a 
more complex effort. 
The comparison of the thought of a political thinker of theological 
relevance to the thought of a theologian full of political implications 
demands some preparation. First I will construct an elementary map for 
understanding the relationship of Christianity, freedom and democracy in 
2 Sandor Szilagyi, 'Bevezeto' [Introduction] in Sandor Szilagyi ed., Bib6 Jstvan, Magyar 
Panteon 11., Uj Mandatum Konyvkiad6, Budapest, 2001, pp. 7-17. 
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general. Christianity will not be presented in a thematic manner within this 
map, rather, the overwhelming presence of Christian theologians 
commenting on social and political topics will represent the Christian 
perspective. Christianity and European social theory can hardly be separated 
from each other within the last two thousand years. Even relatively modern 
concepts of freedom and democracy have easily demonstrable Christian 
roots, and, in turn, modern social thought influences theological thinking. 
I shall start drawing this map by a short analysis of the concepts of 
negative freedom and positive freedom. The relationship of negative 
freedom and positive freedom is not only crucial with respect to the 
understanding of the several ways the sense of freedom can be effective in 
formulating a certain kind of democratic idea; it is also decisive for our 
present comparison, since negative freedom - or freedom .ft·om - and positive 
freedom - or .ft·eedom for- appear as a key pair of concepts both in Bib6's 
social theory and Bonhoeffer's theology. 
As a second step I shall continue drawing this map by outlining the 
understanding of democracy within a Christian perspective. Here I plan to 
create a fourfold approach to democracy: as tradition, as vision, as system 
and as process. Having finished this map I shall conclude that the 
understanding of freedom plays a crucial role in the understanding of 
democracy, and a concept of freedom can be regarded as a possible point of 
encounter for theology and social theory. Within this framework an 
awareness of the importance of the understanding of self or human identity 
emerges: it turns out that the latter has a crucial role in the development of 
the sense of freedom and democracy. This is the subject of chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the analysis ofBib6's understanding of 
freedom and democracy. As a first step I shall make an attempt to clarify the 
relationship between Bib6's Christianity and the coherence of his thought, an 
attempt that, I believe, is original in this field. Within this clarification the 
crucial impact of Max Weber on Bib6's thinking will become obvious. As a 
second step I shall outline the concept of freedom in the early Bib6, 
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established in his first dissertation, Coercion. Law, Freedom. In this work 
Bib6's view of human identity, which stresses the inevitable importance of 
spontaneity, also appears in close relationship with his understanding of 
freedom. Finally, I shall analyse the first large-scale- albeit fragmentary -
essay of the mature Bib6, On the Equilibrium and Peace of Europe, where 
his early findings reach a complex understanding of democracy which could 
be converted into a direct and detailed plan for re-creating a viable political 
order for post-war Europe. In the course of chapter 2 I shall also make a 
number oftentative attempts at a theological reading ofBib6's developing 
social theory. 
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 will be devoted to a close reading of some of 
Bonhoeffer's theological texts, pursuing an understanding of his concept of 
freedom and the latter's political implications as they appeared within 
Bonhoeffer's idea of the political order of post-war Europe. In the course of 
my argumentation I shall utilise some of my findings in chapter 1 and 
chapter 2. With respect to chapter 1 I want to emphasise the importance of 
the concept of self or human identity in a development of an understanding 
of freedom; with respect to chapter 2 I plan to pay attention to Bonhoeffer's 
evaluation ofMax Weber's theory as well as the role of spontaneity in his 
understanding of person. These aspects of my research, I believe, lend some 
originality to my approach to Bonhoeffer's theology. Further, in the course 
chapter 3 and chapter 4 I shall engage in a critical discussion with some 
leading Bonhoeffer-scholars who, I think, are inclined to incorporate 
Bonhoeffer's theology into their own theory to such an extent that the 
characteristics ofBonhoeffer's theology sometimes evaporate. 
Chapter 3, the longest unit ofthis work, is based on a close reading 
of Bonhoeffer's first dissertation, Sanctorum Communio. This first study 
represents a role within the whole work ofBonhoeffer that is similar to the 
role of Coercion, Law, Freedom in the thought ofBib6: although immature 
here and there; the seeds of long-standing important patterns are already 
present. In Sanctorum Communio we can witness how one ofBonhoeffer's 
8 
chieftheological ideas, vicarious representative action and his 
understanding of person and human sociality became intertwinned right at 
the outset. We can also observe a characteristic twofold understanding of 
human identity, as Bonhoeffer sets his concept of person into two different 
perspective, created by two different patterns ofl-You-relations. I-You-
relations pattern 'A', as I call it, is used for the description of theological-
sacramental relationships, while 1-You-relations pattern 'B' is applied to 
social-ethical relations. As Bonhoeffer keeps changing the two patterns as 
his argument proceeds, he connects theological argument to the social ideas 
cultivated by his upper-middle class family, gaining for the latter a 
theological justification at the end. His understanding of sociality, centered 
around the motif of vicarious representative action, is the basis of his 
theological concept of the freedom of God, that, in turn, is the source of his 
idea of human freedom. 
The development of Bonhoeffer's understanding of freedom and its 
social implications shall be discussed in chapter 4. In the first section of this 
chapter I will follow the development ofBonhoeffer's concept of freedom 
from Act and Being to Life Together, showing that on the solid basis set in 
Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer was determined to think about freedom 
one-sidedly as freedom for to such an extent that even obvious experiences 
of negative freedom could not be given a conceptual reflection within his 
theory. The political implications ofthis concept of freedom, necessarily, 
supported the social basis of the concept itself In the second section of 
chapter 4 I will show that while thinking about the post-war political order 
ofEurope, Bonhoeffer was led by the patriarchal values of his own family. I 
reconstruct Bonhoeffer's own view on the basis of some of his writings, 
written during the early forties, and I will show that both a comparison to 
Anglo-Saxon perspectives of the time and to the political idea intrinsic in the 
commentaries ofBonhoeffer's friend and biographer Eberhard Bethge reflect 
on Bonhoeffer's part the peculiar understanding of sociality of Prussian 
leading intellectuals, generally identified as the Sonderweg. In the closing 
section of chapter 4 I shall pursue a tentative reading of the prison theology 
to see whether the last phase ofBonhoeffer's life brought any change in 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of sociality, whose basic assumptions show a 
remarkable consistency from Sanctorum Communio to Ethics. 
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Concluding my work I will emphasise the interrelatedness of the 
concept of person, of freedom and the understanding of democracy again, as 
it becomes apparent in the thought of both Bib6 and Bonhoeffer. With 
respect to the present-day challenges of the transition toward democracy in 
Hungary - and, naturally, not only in Hungary - I shall conclude that while 
Bib6's theory, being compatible with the democratic idea, can be a source of 
a clearer understanding ofthe process oftransition, Bonhoeffer's theology, a 
valuable legacy in several senses, can offer little help in answering this 
particular challenge. 
10 
Chapter 1 
Understanding Freedom and Democracy 
A. The Tw(!fold Understanding of Freedom 
a. Theologians on 'Negative' and 'Positive' Freedom 
"The notion of freedom is central to the vocabulary of moral and religious 
thought in the Western tradition" 1, David Little begins his dictionary entry on 
freedom. He defines freedom first from the perspective of the capacity of making 
the right choice between good and bad, and then he emphasises acting on the 
same choice without being restrained by a coercive force. The idea of constraint, 
he concludes, is generally taken as the standard complement to freedom; the 
connection of the two ideas, however, is a complicated one. "Restraints may, in 
general, be 'internal' or 'external', as well as 'positive' or 'negative'. "2 Further, since 
the relation between freedom and restraint is not simply descriptive but also 
normative, that is, the evaluation of their relation is determined by the preceding 
evaluation of the action they belong to, the character of the relation of freedom 
and restraint cannot be determined by simple, general statements. On this basis 
Little questions the general validity of the well-known definitions ofBertrand 
Russell and John Stuart Mill, such as the one that states that freedom is 'the 
absence of obstacles to the realisation of desires' and 'all restraint qua restraint is 
an evil'. By questioning Russell's and Mill's definitions, David Little, criticises, in 
fact, a one-sidedly negative understanding of freedom, without mentioning this 
characterisation. By doing so, his short evaluation is harmonious with some 
recent theological discourses on the nature of freedom. 
In the following paragraphs we will examine two recent theological 
I David Little, 'Freedom', in Alan Richardson and John Bowden eds., A New Dictionary of 
Christian Theology, SCM, 1983, p. 216. 
2 Little, 'Freedom', p. 217. 
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interpretations offreedom. Both understand freedom as 'negative' and 'positive', 
as 'freedom from' and 'freedom for'. One of the theologians, similarly to David 
Little, refers back to Isaiah Berlin's classical essay, 'Two Concepts ofLibertl; 
therefore, as an outstanding treatment of this issue, we will consider Berlin's 
understanding of negative and positive freedom as well. 
Miroslav Volf offers a fresh reading of the modernist concept of freedom 
in his Exclusion and Embrace4, a remarkable piece of political theology. His 
thesis is that a 'theology of embrace' would provide a broad framework for a right 
understanding of freedom. The 'theology of embrace' is based on the theology of 
the Cross, a trinitarian understanding of God, and a theology ofthe Eucharist. 
'Embrace' consists of four consecutive acts: opening the arms, waiting, closing 
the arms, and opening the arms again5. The right understanding of freedom 
requires - Volf argues, following Gustavo Gutierrez - regarding love as superior 
to freedom: "love, not freedom is ultimate"6 . More specifically, it requires the 
rethinking of the schema of oppression and liberation, in which a modern 
Western understanding of freedom has long been given a characteristic 
interpretation. 
Having Berlin's 'Two Concept ofLiberty' in mind7, Volfbriefly 
summarises the liberal and socialist understanding of freedom and places these 
concepts into the schema of oppression and liberation According to the liberal 
approach, 
" [a ]ll people are equal and all are free to pursue their interests and develop their 
personalities in their own way, provided they respect the same freedom in others. 
( ... ) When this inalienable freedom is either denied by a totalitarian state or 
suppressed by a dominant culture we speak of oppression; when the cage that 
holds people back from doing and being what they prefer is dismantled, we speak 
of liberation. "8 
3 Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford 
University Press, 1969, pp. 118-172. 
4 Miros1av Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Othemess, 
and Reconciliation, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1996 
5 Volf, E'Cclusion and Embrace, Chapter III, pp. 99-165 
6 Vo1f, E'Ccfusion and Embrace, p. 105. 
7 Volf, E'Cclusion and Embrace, p. 102, footnote 2. 
8 Voli: E'Cclusion and Embrace, p. 101. 
Socialist thinkers, however, regard the liberal notion of freedom empty: 
they think that 
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"the concentration on the negative notion of freedom creates the kind of social 
dynamics which empties freedom of meaning. Freedom can therefore never mean 
simply the absence of external interference with the individual's will to do or not 
to do what she or he wants, as the Hobbsian tradition claims; freedom is actual 
power to live life with dignity, to be the artisan of one's own destiny. ( ... )The 
iron gates of social dungeons must be shattered; slaves must become their own 
masters. Every social project built around the notion of freedom tends therefore 
to operate with the stable pair of'oppression' and 'liberation'. Oppression is the 
negativity, liberation its negation, freedom the resulting positivity. "9 
We cannot follow Volfs nuanced argumentation about the problems of 
the application of the oppression-liberation schema in detail, but we shall 
highlight one element of his criticism. The main reason for regarding the 
oppression-liberation schema misleading, Volf argues, is that in most cases it is 
difficult to determine who the oppressor, the victim, and the liberator is. 
People who are familiar with Central-European realities would regard 
rather persuasive the native Croatian author's arguments about each side claiming 
to be the victim, the swiftly changing roles and the fact that the half-beheaded 
martyrs turn out to be prospective great persecutors 10 . The point is that Volf 
relates the question of freedom to the problem of identity; in fact, identity is the 
central issue in his book. 
Let us return to the conceptual appearance of freedom in Exclusion and 
Embrace: the conceptual bridge between the general characterisation of freedom 
and Volfs own use ofthe concept is clearly discernible. Berlin's 'negative 
freedom' and the 'freedom from' used by other thinkers correspond to Volfs 
'liberation' in the above sense of the word, while 'positive freedom' or 'freedom 
for' corresponds to the meaning of 'freedom' given from the perspective of 
socialist thinkers. We leave these findings undiscussed now and turn to the 
treatment of the problem of freedom provided by Reinhard Hiitter. 
9 Volf. Exclusion and Embrace, p. 102. 
10 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace. p. 104f 
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In his essay on 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics: Christian 
Freedom and God's Commandments' 11 Hutter offers a straightforward theological 
criticism of 'negative freedom'. The context of his study is the cultural and 
intellectual situation of the Western world that he regards "the habitat and 
ambiance of relative material affluence, legal security and domestic peace", 
whose idol is, as Hutter believes, "individual freedom" 12 Against the background 
of this context Hutter argues: 
"Christian freedom is the embodiment of practicing God's commandments as a 
way of life. It is necessary to reintroduce this positive and substantive notion of 
Christian freedom because in modern Protestant ethics 'freedom' has come to be 
understood primarily as 'negative' freedom. It is seen as a freedom 'from' and not 
a freedom 'for'. Two complex developments have led to a deeply problematic 
dichotomy between a purely 'negative' freedom and its archenemy, the law, which 
is seen to have a purely legislative and enforcing character. The first development 
is an outgrowth of the 'Luther renaissance' [ ... that] misapplied the doctrine of 
justification by faith alone by making it into the formal principle of Protestantism. 
The second development is associated with the overarching influence Immanuel 
Kant's philosophy - especially his concepts of 'freedom' and 'law' - had on modern 
Protestant ethics. Consequently modern Protestant ethics understands 'freedom' 
primarily negatively as freedom 'from' and views 'law' either as heteronomous and 
thus a threat to autonomy or as mediated through autonomy and thus as purely 
formal. "13 
These two developments, Hutter explains, have led to fatal consequences 
for Protestant ethics in general, such as antinomian tendencies; a concept of 
freedom without a substantive gestalt, which means that even Christ does not 
have a substantive place in freedom; the gospel turns into an impetus for a 
utilitarianism of love directed towards an abstract neighbour; a new moral agent 
who is free to love spontaneously as well as to sin boldly; replacing Luther's 
happy exchange between the person's sin and Christ's righteousness with an 
unhappy exchange between God and the self-sufficient subject; a radical 
ll Reinhard Htit1er, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics: Christian Freedom and God's 
Commandments', in: Karen L. Bloomquist and John R. Stumme eds., The Promise of Lutheran 
Ethics, Fortress Press, Minneapolis. 1998, pp. 31-54. 
12 Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center ofLutheran Ethics' in Bloomquist, Stunm1e eds., The Promise of 
Lutheran Ethics. pp. 3lf 
13 ibid. 
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anthropocentricity; all in all, a fatal impoverishment of Protestant ethics. 
However, the author continues, three twentieth century movements that intend to 
overcome the 'Protestant fallacy' can also be taken into account. 
The first movement can be associated to the theology of the Word of 
God. By reestablishing a theocentic approach, this theology decentered the moral 
agent as the ethical subject. By speaking about God as the only good and the 
only free one, and the human being as finite and mortally wounded by sin, the 
center of Christian ethics became God - or, by taking a christological approach, 
Christ- again. Consequently, the commandments of God and the obedience to 
Christ have emerged as constitutive to Christian freedom. 
The second movement can be related to the Protestant rediscovery of 
Aristotle and of Thomas Aquinas, and originated in the 1970s and 1980s in North 
America. This movement d?fferentiated the moral agent, showing, that the 
ethical subject is a much more complex phenomenon than the nearly 
mathematical point at the cent er of the Kantian ethics. 
"Introducing concepts of character-formation and virtues shows how particular 
goods and practices can direct and form the agent's character in a significant way, 
positively and negatively. 'Freedom' is concretely enabled by particular virtues, 
such as prudence, justice, or courage, and hindered by particular vices, such as 
greed, pride, or impatience. Character and virtue ethics put flesh and bones back 
on the Kantian moral agent ... "14 
The third movement attempted to overcome the abstract universalism of 
Protestant ethics by recontextua/ising the moral agent. It occurred through two 
theological foci: creation and God's economy of salvation. A focus on creation 
emhasises the sociopolitical location of the moral agent as a crucial aspect of 
one's identity and particular struggle: feminist theology and other liberation 
theologies as well as ecologically oriented theologies belong to this possibility. A 
focus on salvation considers the context of God's people as a particular 
community as decisive in making moral judgements. Although the two sorts of 
14 HUt1er, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics' in Bloomquist Stumme eds, The Promise of 
Lutheran Ethics, p. 39. 
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contexts, rooted in a focus on creation and a focus on salvation, are in tension to 
each other - which, Htitter argues, can be resolved in the perspective of the 
relationship of 'freedom and law' - both are effective in enhancing the moral 
subject with a contextually determined substance. 
These three movements, decentering, d(fferentiating and 
recontextualising the moral agent, can be understood as ways of overcoming the 
fatal dominance ofthe concept of negative freedom in modern Protestant ethics. 
We will not follow the specifically Lutheran solution of the problem that Htitter 
elaborates in the rest of his perceptive study. At the end ofthe review ofhis 
article, we may underline that Htitter, similarly to Volf, related the qestion of 
identity to the problem of freedom; moreover, the latter made a rethinking ofthe 
meaning of freedom fundamentally dependent on a renewed interest in a more 
nuanced understanding of identity. 
Regarding the concepts of freedom, it may be interesting to note that all 
three theologians consider it necessary to promote some sort of a positive 
understanding of freedom over against an - allegedly menacing - negative one. 
Having summarised their views, now we may turn to Isaiah Berlin's classical 
treatment of the concept of freedom. 
b. Berlin's '7\-vo Concepts of Liberty' 
In the above review we concluded that both Volf and Hiltter related the 
understanding offreedom to the problem of identity. For Berlin, I think, the 
determinative role of the understanding of identity to the meaning of freedom is 
similarly evident. Within his explanation of positive freedom Berlin writes: 
"This demonstrates (if demonstration of so obvious a truth is needed) that 
conceptions of freedom directly derive from views ofwhat constitutes a self, a 
person, a man. Enough manipulation with the definition of man, and freedom can 
be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes." 15 
15 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 134. 
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Berlin begins his treatment of freedom with an analysis of negative 
freedom. His definition of negative freedom includes a reference to coercion, 
understood exlusively in a social sense, that "implies the deliberate interference of 
other human beings within the areas in which 1 could otherwise act" 16 Negative 
freedom, therefore, is "not being interfered with by others; [t]he wider the area of 
non-interference the wider my freedmn." 17 This area of freedom cannot be 
unlimited, because it would lead to social chaos. A certain minimum of negative 
freedom, however, should be guaranteed: it is necessary for the person "to 
pursuse, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or 
sacred" 18 
Berlin is well aware of the ambiguities of this classically liberal notion of 
freedom. He knows that private and public life cannot perfectly be separated, 
'freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'; he also sees - together with 
socialist thinkers - that negative freedom can be meaningless without adequate 
conditions for using it; and he knows the feeling of guilt of some conscienscious 
Western liberals who rightly think that the negative freedom they enjoy can be 
sustained only at the expense of the vast majority who do not have the same 
freedom. All these ambiguities, however, cannot provide a reason for eliminating 
negative freedom: it should be limited, regulated, some practical compromises 
between freedom and other social goods, such as equality and justice have to be 
found, but giving up negative freedom would lead to self -surrender and self-
defeat. One of the main liberal thinkers whose arguments provide a basis for 
Berlin is John Stuart Mil1 19, who declared that 
"unless men are left to live as they wish 'in the path which merely concerns 
themselves', civilisation cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free 
market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, 
genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the 
16 Berlin, Four Essays on Uberty, p. 122. 
17 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 123. 
18 Berlin, Four Essays on Liber~v. p. 124. 
19 See also Berlin's essay on Mill, 'John Stuat1 Mill and the Ends of Life' in the same volume, Four 
Essays on Liberty, pp. 173-206. 
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weight of 'collective mediocrity'. "20 
Berlin adds three remarks to this characterisation of negative freedom. 
First, he believes, Mill simplifies reality by regarding freedom as good and 
coercion as bad without qualification, and he does the same too by thinking that 
noble values can develop only within liberal circumstances. Second, the sense of 
privacy is a relatively new development of human history. Third, negative 
freedom is neither incompatible with autocracy, nor is it necessarily connected 
with democracy or self-government. This third remark guides Berlin's argument 
towards the discussion of 'positive' freedom by making and important distinction: 
"The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process 
by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that of a free area 
for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same thing. 
So different is it, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great clash of ideologies 
that dominates our world. For it is this- the 'positive' conception of liberty: not 
freedom from, but freedom to - to lead one prescribed form of life - which the 
adherents of the 'negative' notion represent as being, at times, no better than a 
specious disguise for brutal tyranny. "21 
Positive freedom, derived from one's wish to be his or her own master, 
thus enters into Berlin's argument as not only having a distinctly different aspect 
from that of negative freedom, but also as a possibly menacing human desire. 
While explaining the opressive possiblility, Berlin shows the importance of the 
awareness of identity. In the course of a liberating experience, he argues, people 
may become aware of a dominating self and of "something in them which is 
brought to heel"22 The former is regarded as one's 'higher nature', identified in 
various ways, while the latter is considered as 'lower' in comparison to the former 
self The 'higher', 'real' or 'true' self, that can be concieved also as a social entity, 
may allow one to constrain others for their own sake, to make them discover 
their- latent - true self "Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the 
actual wishes of men or societies"23 and may become a tyrant while promoting 
20 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 127. 
21 Berlin, Four Essays on Liber~v. p. 13l. 
22 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 132. 
23 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 133. 
the 'freedom' of others. 
Berlin demonstrates the consequences of distinguishing between two 
selves by relating the two major historical forms which the desire to be self-
directed -directed by one's 'true' self- has taken: 
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"the first, that of self-abnegation in order to attain independence; the second, that 
of self-realisation, or total self-identification with a specific principle or ideal in 
order to attain the selfsame end"24 
The ultimate root of self-abnegation is a search for security, a solid 
ground under one's feet; to act and not to be acted upon. It is "[t ]o rid myself of 
fear, or love, or the desire to conform ( ... ) to liberate myself from the despotism 
of something which I cannot control. "25 This search can lead to seemingly 
contradictory outcomes: a fight for autonomy on the one hand and a happy 
submission to the will of a wise and manipulative tyrant on the other; a disclaim 
of desires as well as a resistence until the bitter end to secure a safe area to live. 
Positive freedom of this kind, therefore, may be radically different to negative 
freedom, an ability to do what one wishes; likewise, a feeling of freedom can be 
the very antithesis of political freedom. 
Self-realisation, Berlin argues, is based on the conviction that " [ t ]he only 
true method of attaining freedom ( ... ) is by the use of critical reason, the 
understanding of what is necessary and what is contingent"26 Understanding the 
world around me and applying my wishes to its possibilities and necessities, is the 
way to freedom. Any interpretation of the world, any 'great narrative' is given a 
crucial role; the key to freedom is knowledge, and the way to freedom is a 
resolute act of turning away from anything that is considered obscure in 
comparison to knowledge. "Knowledge liberates not by offering us more open 
possibilities amongst which we can make our choice, but by preserving us from 
24 Berlin, Four Essays Oil Liberty, p. 134. 
25 Berlin, Four Essays oil Liberty, p. 138. 
26 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 141. 
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the frustration of attempting the impossible. "27 And because the single true 
interpretation of reality is not only true for myself but for anyone else, this 
positive concept of freedom may serve as a basis for all kinds of authoritarian, 
totalitarian and nationalist ways to make people happy and free. If right 
understanding makes true freedom possible, liberty will be identical with 
authority, obedience to superior persons will be the greatest virtue, education can 
be turned, in practice, into compulsion, coercion will be understood as loving 
service toward those who are unable to discipline themselves. All these may be 
the logical outcome of the elevating presupposition that there is a universal 
interpretation of the world that can be understood and followed by everyone, as 
Berlin exemplified it by Mozart's Magic Flute; however, if the original thesis is 
questionable, the whole superstructure will lose its validity. 
Berlin discusses two more related aspects of positive freedom as self-
realisation: the relationship of liberty to her sisters, equality and fraternity, and 
the relationship between liberty and soveregnity. In both cases, as follows from 
the intrinsic logic of positive freedom, the related value may dominate the 
relationship to such an extent that freedom will be understood as identical to it. 
In the first case, the very natural wish to be someone and gain a recognisable 
status may lead people to give up their individual negative freedom for the sake 
of participating in the effort of a group whose success promises an independence 
that is greater than the person felt to have had before. In the second case, the 
drive to acquire authority, a sovereign power may obscure the fact that-
according to the liberal tradition - freedom does not depend on the person who 
possesses power but on the limits of power: "no society is free unless it is 
governed by at any rate two interrelated principles: first, that no power, but only 
rights can be regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever power governs 
them, have an absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanly; and, second, that 
there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be 
27 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 144. 
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inviolable" 28 
Having explained the several possible consequences of a one-sided 
understanding offi·eedom as solely positive freedom, Berlin insists that a clear 
demand for negative freedom has to be sustained if a society wants to avoid the 
possibility of turning into a tyranny. The metaphysical basis for negative freedom, 
Berlin argues at the end of his essay, is the conviction that values and social 
goods cannot be derived from a single harmonious system; on the contrary, 
conflict between different ends, a pluralism ofvalues is natural and unavoidable. 
Berlin does not state that individual freedom or the freedom to choose has to be 
the single or even the dominant criterion of social action, however, he considers 
this aspect a sobering perspective that might be indispensable on the road 
towards maturity. As he finishes his discussion of the two concepts of liberty: 
"'To realise the relative validity of one's convictions', said an admirable writer of 
our time, 'and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilised 
man from a barbarian'. To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable 
metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one's practice is a symptom of an 
equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity. "29 
c. Understanding Freedom - a Summmy 
This short review of the works of the theologians and the political thinker 
shows some important common features as well as differences in their 
understanding of freedom. First, and most significantly, the intrinsic relationship 
between the way of concieving human identity, a concept of the self and a sense 
of freedom has convincingly been shown. Second, all the thinkers maintain a 
differentiation between a 'negative' and a 'positive' aspect within the concept of 
freedom. This formal similarity, however, cannot disguise the great differences 
with respect to the material content of the twofold concept of freedom. We could 
witness two contradictory approaches: two theologians argued that a negative 
understanding of freedom is more dominant, at the same time, it poses a danger 
28 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p . .165. 
29 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 172. 
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for human sociality without a related positive sense of freedom, while the third 
theologian and the social thinker insisted that an overwhelming desire for positive 
freedom can paralise humanity without the balance of negative freedom. Further, 
while an agreement about the meaning of negative freedom could be found, we 
have been given three rather different descriptions of what positive freedom may 
originate in and what it might mean. Thus, even this brief review can provide us 
with a sense of the diverse understanding of freedom within the formal 
characterisation of negative and positive freedom. 
My thesis is that the manifold understanding of democracy can partially 
be traced back to this varied perception of freedom. Having acquired some sense 
of this perspective, now we embark upon an attempt at understanding 
democracy. 
B. Understanding Democracy 
The problem of defining democracy, as John de Gruchy remarks, is 
notorious30; yet, it is not an entirely hopeless task. 
We may begin our attempt at a definition with some classic and succinct 
formulas, such as the words from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address: 
democracy is "rule ofthe people by the people for the people"31 . Nearly a century 
later and reflecting on various experiences Winston Churchill stated: 
"Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time. "32 
Reinhold Niebuhr bases his definition onto his theological and 
anthropological conviction: 
30 John de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy: A Theology for a Just World Order, 
Cambridge University Press, 1955, p. 6. 
3l 'Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, November 19, 1863', in 
Abraham Lincoln, Great Speeches, New York, Dover Publications, 1991. Quoted by de Gruchy, 
op. cit. p. 6. 
32 Winston Churchill, November 11, 1947. Quoted in Robert I. Fitzhenery ed., Bames & Noble 
Book of Quotations, New York, Harper & Row, 1983, p. 85. 
"Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to 
injustice makes democracy necessary."33 
E. B. White presents a comprehensive definition: 
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"Democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half the people are right 
more than half the time. It is the feeling of privacy in the voting booths, the 
feeling of communion in the libraries, the feeling of vitality everywhere ... It is an 
idea that has not been disproved yet, a song the words of which have not gone 
bad'' 34 
Within a comparison of Germany and Switzerland at the immediate 
aftermath ofthe Second World War Carl Gustav Jung arrived at the following 
definition: 
"True democracy is a highly psychological institution which takes account of 
human nature as it is and makes allowances for the necessity of conflict within its 
own national boundaries. "35 
Reflecting on the recent process of global democratisation, Waiter Wink 
remarks: 
"Ideally, democracy is non-violence institutionalised( ... ) a system for the non-
violent resolution of conflict and disputes through representative forms of 
government and civil life. "36 
With respect to the recent development ofworld-wide democracy, Pope 
John Paul II claims that 
"Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of 
a correct conception ofthe human person"37 
As a next step, we may consider a recently formulated theory that 
pictures the process of global democratisation in three waves, each of which 
might correspond to endeavours on the part of Christianity. Just after the 
collapse of Eastern European state socialism, Samuel Huntington published his 
33 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. New York, 
Scribner's, 1944, p. xiii. 
34 E. B. White, The Wild Flag, Boston, l-loughton Mifllin, 1954, p. 31. 
35 Cad Gustav Jung, Civilization in Transition, Routledge and Kegan PauL London, 1964, p. 225. 
36 Waiter Wink, Engaging the Powers, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 171. 
37 John Paul 11., Centesimus Annus, published in Catholic Truth Society, 1991, p. 34. 
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view ofthe three waves38 As John Witte Jr. summarises it, 
"[t]he first wave built on the English, American, and French Revolutions and 
swept over more than thirty European and British Commonwealth countries by 
the end of World War I. The second wave, following World War II, restored 
democracy to much of Western Europe and brought new democratic 
governments to several nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The third 
wave, building since the early 1970s, has swept over more than thirty African, 
Latin American, and Eastern European nations. These three waves of political 
democratisation, Huntington shows, have been 'cumulative', one building on the 
momentum and advances ofthe other. They have also been 'regressive', invariably 
experiencing anti-democratic backlashes and undertows. "39 
Witte adds his own contribution to Huntington's theory, suggesting, that 
"[t]hree waves of Christian democratic impulses( ... ) have anticipated and 
accompanied these three waves of political democratisation. The first was a 
Protestant wave that broke into political form in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries principally in Western European nations and their colonies. The second 
was a missionary wave that broke in Africa and Asia and a related Christian 
political wave that broke in Europe and Latin America in the middle third of the 
twentieth century. The third is a Roman Catholic wave that has emerged since 
the Second Vatican Council and effectuated political change principally in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe. These three waves of Christian democratic 
impulses, like their political analogues, have been both 'cumulative' and 
'regressive'. They provided an important, even indispensable, impetus to the three 
waves of political democratisation. "40 
A systematic treatment of our problem, however, requires more than 
succinct definitions or overall theories, however exact and expressive they may 
be. In his attempt to understand the relationship between democracy and 
Christianity, de Gruchy makes a distinction between democratic system and 
democratic vision. 
"By democratic 5ystem we mean those constitutional principles and procedures, 
symbols and convictions, which have developed over the centuries and which 
have become an essential part of any genuine democracy whatever its precise 
historical form. When we speak about the democratic vision we refer to that 
hope for a society in which all people are truly equal and yet where difference is 
respected; a society in which all people are truly free, yet where social 
responsibility rather than individual self-interest prevails, and a society which is 
38 See de Gmchy, Christianil_v and Democracy, p. 2. Also see Jolm Witte Jr. ed., Christianity and 
Democracy in Global Context, Westview Press, Boulder. 1993, pp. 4f 
39 Witte ed., Christianity and Democracy, p. 4. 
40 Witte ed., Christianity and Democracy, pp. 4f 
truly just, and therefore one in which the vast gulfbetween rich and poor has 
been overcome."41 
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Democracy as system and as vision can be related to Christianity, I 
believe, by using the tools and terms of systematic theology. An explanation of 
the democratic system may correspond to a systematic treatment of Christian 
social ethics, the norms and values of community life; while an interpretation of 
democratic vision could be achieved from the angle of Christian eschatology. 
However, a comprehensive approach to democracy from a Christian viewpoint 
cannot be limited to a strictly systematic investigation. Thus, I suggest, we should 
add two more ways in which democracy can be interpreted and related to 
Christianity, ways which are implicitly present in de Gruchy's study as well. 
Besides democracy as system and vision we shall examine democracy as tradition 
by pursuing an historical and contextual approach as well as a process, looking 
for the relationship of democracy in the making to Christian doctrine, life, 
practice and spirituality. 
Thus, for preparing an encounter between Christianity and democracy, I 
will try to explain the meaning of democracy in four consecutive ways. First, I 
will summarise the historical lesson of democracy as tradition. Second, I will 
introduce the promise that democratic vision offers. Third, I will explore the 
system, that is, the norms and values democracy employs while trying to turn its 
vision into reality. Fourth, I will investigate the way, process or development in 
whose course democracy is gradually able to utilise its norms and values for 
achieving its goals. 
41 de Grucby, Christianity and Democracy, p. 12. 
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a. Democracy as Tradition 
When we approach democracy as a tradition we shall distinguish between 
three main historical legacies: that of liberal democracy, social democracy, and 
Christian democracy. 
Liberal Democracy 
Liberalism, as David McLellan introduces this expression, 
"is based on a concept offreedom ofthe individual which has two main sources. 
The first is the Protestant Reformation with its opposition to traditional Catholic 
notions of hierarchy and its emphasis on dissent and freedom of conscience; the 
second, and later, is the secular Enlightenment which advocated government by 
consent, the idea of social contract and the use of calculative reason in politics. In 
the latter, particularly, an analogy was drawn between the emergence of market 
relationships and the growth of modern liberal democracy. "42 
Liberalism, as it appeared at the time of the transition of Medieval Europe 
into the modern era, was both reactionary - in the literal meaning of the word -
and revolutionary at the same time. It 
"appealed to reason and conscience rather than to tradition, it advocated 
resistance to tyranny and affirmed individual human rights. Society was no longer 
conceived of in organic terms. The individual rather than the collective was a 
priori. "43 
It took a long time before liberalism became crystallised as the 
characteristic worldview and way of life we know today. Luther, the powerful 
advocate of the 'Freedom of a Christian' still lived in an organic society, 
answering to social challenges mostly in terms of Augustine's theology. 44 A 
generation later Calvin, although much closer to modern thought-patterns than 
42 David McLellan ed., Political Christianity: A Reader, SPCK, 1997, p. 171. 
43 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, pp. 95f 
44 See the succinct summary ofLuther's social thoughts in Ulrich Duchrow, Two Kingdoms- The 
Use and Misuse of a Lutheran Theological Concept, Lutheran World Federation, Geneva, 1977, 
pp. 311 
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Luther, still can be seen as "an adversary ofmodem democracy, believing neither 
in popular sovereignty nor in individual rights" 45· Neither was the encounter and 
association of liberalism and democracy a natural process. The terror of the 
French Revolution made the idea of popular sovereignty suspicious in the eyes of 
many who advocated personal liberty. Liberty, however, 
"required a civil society in which individuals were able to pursue their personal 
goals free from the constraints of state control. The means to achieve this was 
through insisting that the power of the state was not based on divine right, but on 
the sovereign will of the people themselves. This led inevitably to an espousal of 
democracy. "46 
According to McLellan's selection, the four major representative agents 
ofliberal democracy are John Locke (1632-1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778), Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) and Michael Novak (1933-)47 . 
In his Two Treatises on Government ( 1690) Locke rejects the idea that 
"Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction" would be the source of all 
power which, consequently, would legitimise the constant power-struggle as 
normal and necessary. Instead, Locke suggests, we must derive political power 
from the natural state of the human being, that is, "a state of perfect freedom to 
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions" and a "state of equality, 
wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal". The state of freedom must 
not end in "an uncontrollable liberty"; it is governed by law and reason, given by 
the "one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker" whose "workmanship" people 
are. The demand that "there cannot be supposed any such subordination among 
us that may authorise us to destroy one another" for Locke is absolute. Thus, 
although he endorses civil government as "the proper remedy of the 
inconveniences ofthe state of nature" on the basis of God's will "to restrain the 
partiality and violence of men", he would limit the absolute power of even such a 
45 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 76. 
46 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 96. 
47 It has to be noted here, that in John Atherton ed., Christian Social Ethics. A Reader, The 
Pilgrim Press, Cleveland, Ohio, 1994, which we will employ later, Novak is regarded as a 
representative of conservative political thinking. I think, however, that McLellan's classification is 
more accurate; Novak's dependence on the classical liberal theory, namely on Locke and on 
Rousseau, seems to be more than obvious. 
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government, arguing that no one could be expected to judge rightly in his or her 
own case. For this reason, the "governors of independent communities" have to 
be limited by contracts "of agreeing together mutually to enter into one 
community, and make one body politic"- But even in the community "truth and 
keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society". 48 
While religion (Christianity, to be exact) is the starting point for Locke to 
achieve the necessity of contracts, the same for Rousseau (in the form of 
Romantic deism) is just a useful means that may guarantee the stability of The 
.S'ocial Contract (1762). In Locke's case the strength of the contract is based on 
the same faith of the natural state of human being of governors and subjects, 
Rousseau's Sovereign, however, is interested only in the moral outcome of any 
religious belief of the people. To be sure, "it matters very much to the community 
that each citizen should have a religion; that will make him love his duty". While 
for Rousseau Christianity "is entirely spiritual, occupied solely with heavenly 
things" and, in the most likely situation when not all the members of the 
community are devoted Christians it is ultimately useless in resolving 
power-conflicts ("in this vale of sorrows, what does it matter whether we are free 
men or serfs?"), "a purely civil profession of faith" would be effective enough to 
discipline the "anti-social being". 49 Rousseau summarises his rather simple idea 
of religion this way: 
"The dogmas of civil religion ought to be few, simple, and exactly 
worded, without explanation or commentary. The existence of a mighty, 
intelligent, and beneficent Divinity, possessed offoresight and providence, the life 
to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of 
the social contract and the laws: these are its positive dogmas. Its negative 
dogmas [would be] one, intolerance, which is a part of the cults we have 
rejected"50 
While the spirit of(Christian) religion and the spirit of freedom were 
48 This paragraph is a summary of John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernmellt, Dent, 1993, pp. 
115-122. 
49 This section is based on Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed. and trans. G. D. H. 
Cole, Dent, 1913, pp. 304-308. 
50 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 308. 
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"marching in the opposite direction" in France and industrial Europe during the 
Enlightenment and after the Great Revolution, in America, as de T ocqueville 
observes in his Democracy in America, (1835-40) "they were intimately united 
and ( ... ) reigned in common over the same country". He found in America a form 
of Christianity that he described as a "democratic and republican religion". This 
religion played a role of a basis of fixed and determinate moral principles, held by 
"universal consent", which would encourage as well as frame and limit the 
"enterprising spirit" of the pioneers of the New World. "Thus, while the law 
permits the Americans to do what they please, religion prevents them from 
conceiving, and forbids them to commit, what is rash or unjust." 
De Tocqueville was most fascinated by the solution Americans had 
achieved in relating religion and the secular realm to each other. "Religion in 
America takes no part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as 
the first of their political institutions"; and those of the clergy de Tocqueville had 
asked, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, had all agreed that the "peaceful 
dominion" of religion was due to "the separation of church and state". This 
solution fits into the inclusive character of Christianity, since "[w]hen a religion 
founds its empire only upon the desire of immortality that lives in every human 
heart, it may aspire to universal dominion; but when it connects itself with a 
government, it must adopt maxims which are applicable only to certain nations." 
In the latter case, the church would share "a portion of that animosity which [the 
state] excites; becoming almost as fragile a thing as the powers of earth". On the 
other hand, "as long as a religion is sustained by those feelings, propensities, and 
passions which are found to occur under the same forms at all periods of history, 
it may defy the efforts of time" 51 
In The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism ( 1981) Novak creates a contact 
between the practice of liberal capitalism and the Christian tradition through the 
enterprising individual. In a pluralist society, he believes, the mission of 
51 This section is based on Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Knopf, 1945, pp. 311, 
345-346. 
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Christianity is "uniquely difficult": neither the political system of democratic 
capitalism, nor a market system can be a Christian system. Christian values are, 
on the one hand, "counter-natural": "no intelligent human order( ... ) can be run 
according to the counsels of Christianity". On the other hand, "economic liberty 
means that all [people] must be permitted to establish their own values and 
priorities"; since even the consciences of Christians are different, Christian 
doctrine or counsel must not limit the practices employed in the service of the 
free market. 
However, there are some areas that remain for Christianity within the 
spirit of democratic capitalism. Christianity is to be a source of bold inventions, 
creativity and economic activism: the profit motive, illustrated by the parable of 
the talents, "is designed to inspire a higher level of common benefit by respecting 
the individual judgement of economic agents". Furthermore, the doctrine of 
original sin can serve as a reminder that neither moral-cultural nor economic 
systems are perfect. Here Novak builds up a full parallel: "at the heart of Judaism 
and Christianity is the recognition of sin, as at the heart of democratic capitalism 
is a differentiation of systems designed to squeeze some good from sinful 
tendencies". Finally, Christianity may suffuse "the highest goal of the political 
economy of democratic capitalism", that is, the desire "in each and every citizen 
to become all that each can become" with the spirit of caritas. Caritas, which, 
contrary to collectivist ideas, must not encourage dependency or limit individual 
insights, seems to be the heart of the spirit of democratic capitalism: 52 
"Caritas is at one at the same time an ideal of individual autonomy -
respecting the good of the other as other- and an ideal of community. It is the 
spiritual ideal which attracts from afar the only approximating drives of a 
democratic polity, a capitalist economy, and a liberal pluralist moral-cultural 
system. It is the spiritual ideal whose betrayal most injures the system in its every 
part. It is not an easy ideal to realise. That is why the institutions which try to 
approximate it in practice are best guided by the motto 'In God we trust', for no 
lesser source suffices for its self-realisation. Renewal, reform, and 
self-transformation are, in the light ofthat transcendent ideal always called for" 5 3 
52 This section is based on Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, Instih1te of 
Economic Affairs, 1991, pp. 351-353, 355-358. 
53 Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, p. 358. 
30 
Social Democracy 
Similarly to that of liberalism and democracy, the encounter and eventual 
connection of socialism and democracy was not a natural process. Socialism or at 
least fragments of socialistic ideology can be regarded as old as Christianity itself: 
'they held all things in common' (Acts 2,44). This vision of community life 
appeared in the course of Christianity time and again: many of the early Church 
Fathers, the Franciscans, Thomas Munzer, the Diggers and Levellers in England, 
the Jesuits in Paraguay are important proofs of the power of socialistic ideas 
before socialism as an explicit politico-economic doctrine first appeared, as a 
response to the social and economic dislocations produced by the industrial 
revolution in the early nineteenth century in France; and even there it was 
identified with Christianity. But this happy equation, McLellan writes, 
"came under increasing pressure as the nineteenth century progressed. As 
capitalist social and economic relations spread, forms ofProtestant Christianity 
closely associated with capitalism and based on an individualist ethos began to 
gain the upper hand: the more collectivist Catholicism (which in any case became 
dramatically reactionary under Pi us IX) was seen as distinctly passe. And 
socialism, too, became increasingly dominated by a rigid Marxist interpretation. 
The message of Marx and his followers was that socialism is a strictly secular 
doctrine which made Christianity irrelevant. Socialism might give substance to 
certain Christian ideals, but it thereby abolished the Christian religion. "54 
Since McLellan begins the introduction of the socialist tradition with Karl 
Marx ( 1818-1883 ), I will also note Marx's influence here. However, although 
Marx's program has determined the socialist agenda on the European continent 
and, by the mediation of world Communism, in several places of the world, there 
are living heritages within the socialist tradition which are either independent 
from Marx or have given his legacy only a limited space. Therefore 1 intend to 
pay more attention to two traditions, the tradition ofBritish social Christianity 
and North American Christian socialism. For this reason, I will turn to John 
54 McLellan ed., Political Christianity, pp. l85f 
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Atherton's Christian Social Ethics: A Reader55 as well. 
Probably the most important characteristic ofMarx's critical social theory 
is that it is based on a general criticism of religion. Expressed by the 
basis-superstructure framework, human consciousness is the product of people's 
relations to each other, that is, their place in their society, and "religion is the 
self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or 
has already lost himself again". Religion is a "reversed world-consciousness" 
produced by a reversed world; "the fantastic realisation of the human essence 
because the human essence has no true reality. The struggle against religion is 
therefore mediately the fight against the other world, of which religion is the 
spiritual aroma." Accordingly, "the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of 
the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of right and the criticism of 
theology into the criticism of politics. "56 While criticism of religion served Marx 
as the starting point of his critical social theory, its success may signify also the 
success of the social transformation: 
"The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish, 
when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly 
intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and to nature". 57 
British social Christianity started to develop through a growing 
solidarity with industrial workers as well as a theoretical reflection on their 
conditions, but was neither revolutionary, nor democratic at the beginning. 
Frederick D. Maurice ( 1805-1872), the promoter of co-operatives and adult 
working-class education, represented a Christian socialism that was intended as a 
response to the political revolutions and economic disruptions of 1848, sharing 
the belief in social ranks. 58 
In 1890 Brooke Foss Westcott (1825-1901), Bishop ofDurham, spoke 
about socialism that had been "discredited by its connection with many 
extravagant and revolutionary schemes, but it is a term which needs to be claimed 
55 See footnote 4 7. 
56 Karl Man:, FriedJich Engek On Religion, Moscow, 1957, pp. 41-42. 
57 Karl Marx, Capital: A New Abridgement, Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 50. 
58 Atherton ed., Christian Social Ethics, p. 54. 
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for nobler uses". For him socialism was "a theory oflife and not only a theory of 
economics", which, contrary to individualism, regards humanity "as an organic 
whole, a vital unity fanned by the combination of contributory members mutually 
interdependent". He did not think that socialism could be "committed to any one 
line of action, but every one who accepted its central thought would recognise 
certain objects for immediate effort" 59. 
During the time of the immediate aftermath ofthe First World War, in 
1921, R. H. Tawney ( 1880-1962) wrote about the radical rejection of the 
"Acquisitive Society". He championed social principles in the teaching as well as 
the practice of the Christian Church, hoping to make it effective in building a 
society that is based on functions rather than rights. Admitting that his own 
theory may be regarded as a "sentimental idealism", Tawney nevertheless argued 
that a society could be organised by principles, namely the principle oflimitation, 
unity and distribution, rather than chance or bare power. 60 
The careful consideration of economic conditions is particularly apparent 
in William Temple's book, Christianity and Social Order (1942). As the 
backbone of his theory, Temple ( 1 881-1944) laid down a set of principles. The 
primary principle is the "respect for every person simply as a person" 
independently of his or her usefulness to society, since "the person is primary, not 
the society". As a next step Temple derived three additional principles from this 
primary principle, that offreedom, social fellowship and service. Freedom for him 
is both freedom for something and freedom.from something, "the actual ability to 
form and carry out a purpose", or in other words, "self-control, 
self-determination and self-direction". By social fellowship he means the smaller 
social units or intermediate groups between the individual and the State, the 
necessary circles in which freedom can be actualised, since "actual liberty is the 
freedom which people enjoy in these various social units". He saw as the 
59 See Brooke Foss Westcott, Socialism, The Guild of St Matthew. London, 1890, quoted by 
Atherton ed., Christian Social Ethics, pp. 81-82. 
60 SeeR. H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, Bell, 1921. Chapter 6: 'Porro Unum 
Necessarium ... ' 
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"common failing of revolutionary politics to ignore or attempt to destroy these 
lesser associations". Drawing on Roman Catholic social thought from Rerum 
Novarum to Maritain's works, Temple emphasised personhood, which meant an 
inevitable relationship both to God and the neighbours. "A democracy, which is 
to be Christian, must be a democracy of persons, not only of individuals. It must 
not only tolerate but encourage minor communities as at once the expressions 
and the arena of personal freedom; and its structure must be such as to serve this 
end". The third derivative principle is service, ushered in by the combination of 
the principles of freedom and fellowship. Building up the set of ethical principles 
Temple was able to demonstrate to what extent unemployment, malnutrition, bad 
housing, lack of proper education and poverty in general could prevent people 
from realising their life in terms of freedom, fellowship and service; in other 
words, how far those conditions may hurt their person. His suggestion about the 
church's manner of interfering with the social order thus corresponds both to his 
principles and the lack of necessary economic conditions in fulfilling them 61 
In his later works, Ronald H. Preston (1913-) wrestles with the social and 
economic tensions of our time. In Atherton's words, "[!]earning from a careful 
appraisal of the strengths and limitations of free market capitalism and command 
economies, [Preston] has recognised the important contribution to human living 
of the mixed economies of social democracy and democratic socialism. "62 
At the level of anthropology, Preston tries to establish a balance between 
self-affirmation and self-sacrifice: "without a proper self-affirmation it is not 
possible to relate adequately to others, or even to have a proper self to lose when 
it is necessary". This anthropological position may become a part of an economic 
program, as he quotes Temple: "the art of government in fact is the art of so 
ordering life that self-interest prompts what justice demands"63 . This direction 
leads Preston to establish the desire of an ethical socialism: 
61 This paragraph is based on William Temple, Christianity and the .Social Order, SPCK, 1976, 
pp. 29-98. 
62 Atherton ed., Christian Social Ethics, p. 130. 
63 These thoughts- together with Temple's words- are from Ronald H. Preston, Church and 
Society in the Late Twentieth Centzuy, SCM Press, 1983. pp. 45-52. 
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"The easiest line for [governments] is to bypass the problems of injustice by 
economic growth, but when international factors do not permit the buying off of 
competing claims, the next easiest policy is to resort to inflation, which makes 
matters worse. The lucky and the unscrupulous in the use of power are the ones 
who benefit at a time of inflation. Yet government cannot easily deflate because 
of the danger of creating an unacceptable level of unemployment. ( ... ) We all 
want stable prices and full employment and most of us want free collective 
bargaining. How to achieve the right mix between the three calls for the highest 
art of government. There is no reason to suppose, however, that it is inherently 
impossible to achieve, and therefore no reason to suppose that either social 
democracy or democratic socialism is necessarily unworkable. "64 
As far as the church's role to support a government in its "highest art" is 
concerned, Preston reconsiders the use of "middle axioms", first suggested by J. 
H. Oldham at the Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State in 
193 7. 65 When expressing her contribution to social and economic matters, the 
logic of "middle axioms" would enable the church to keep a healthy balance 
between general assertion and detailed proposition, as well as to enter into an 
encounter to experts of certain secular areas, while keeping the theological 
emphasis ofher own argumentation. 
While British social Christianity has found its democratic framework in 
the course of a gradual process, in North America the affirmation of democracy 
preceded social Christianity, and socialism has appeared as an inevitable 
perspective which was to serve true democracy. 
Waiter Rauschenbusch ( 1861-1918) in his Christianising the Social 
Order (1912) affirms freedom, the basic principle of democracy as "the condition 
of a Christianised social order", but acknowledges the relative failure of 
democratic practice: "political democracy without economic democracy is an 
uncashed promissory note, a pot without the roast, a form without substance". 
The formulation of the terminology here can be followed closely: Rauschenbusch 
spoke about the democracy oflabour, or industrial democracy, in the words of 
John Stuart Mill "the association of the labourers themselves in terms of 
64 Rona1d H. Preston, Religion and the Persistence of Capitalism, SCM, 1979, p. 40. 
65 See Rona1d H. Preston, Explorations in Theology 9, SCM, 1981, Chapter 3. 
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equality", whose more radical realisation is socialism while a less radical one is 
trade-unionism. Socialism, he said, "stands in the midst of capitalistic society like 
a genuine republican party in a monarchical State, and seeks to lead the working 
class from the kingdom of compulsion into the republic offreedomn For 
Rauschenbusch, socialism is an option which may give a better answer to the 
challenge of the day: "in some future social order democracy may possibly stand 
for the right to be unequal; in our present social order it necessarily stands for 
more equality between man and man"· To fulfil this aim, "democracy aids in 
Christianising the social order by giving political and economic expression to the 
fundamental Christian conviction of the worth of man". In turn, "a Christian 
Church will constantly enter the departments of politics and of economic 
relations, because it is only a bad modern convention which allows men to forget 
that these things, as much as personal conduct, are the sphere of the spirit and the 
expression of character"66 . 
More recently, John Cort entered the discussion about the social order in 
relation to mixed economy. Engaging himself in a direct argument with Michael 
Novak in his Christian Socialism ( 1988), Cort expressed his doubt about the 
meaningfulness ofNovak's term "democratic capitalism" (by calling it an 
oxymoron) as well as questioning the latter's right to refer to John Stuart Mill as 
its forerunner. Mill, Cort argues is rather a representative of pre-Marxian 
socialism and he may also become influential for a post-Marxian socialism. For 
Cort, the engine of the implementation of the social gospel is neither revolution 
nor the vanguard of the proletariat, but the democratic process. The democratic 
process, on the one hand, as Cort uses this term, "is based on the assumption that 
given the facts, the ordinary person will make the right decisions most of the 
time" and also they have "enough intelligence" and "enough basic human 
decency"67. Socialism, on the other hand, "is the extension of democratic process 
66 This paragraph is based on W. Rauschenbusch, Christianising the Social Order, Macmillan, 
1912, pp. 353-364. 
67 See John Cort, Christian Socialism, Orbis, 1988, p. 353. 
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from the political to the economic sphere"68 . Socialism, therefore, 
"is the vision of a pluralist society in which the advantages of competition, a free 
market and political democracy are reconciled with the maximum socialisation of 
production and the demands of justice, full employment and the realisation ofthat 
minimum of worldly goods for all which Thomas Aquinas told us is necessary for 
a life of virtue". 69 
To the question: "if Christian socialism is grounded ultimately on faith, 
how is that socialism viable in a pluralist, secular society" Cort offers a simple 
answer. In human nature there is an unwritten law of human decency, and "all the 
basic tenets of Christian, democratic socialism can find some motivation and 
support in that unwritten law" 70 
We have seen that liberalism's emphasis on negative freedom is the 
necessary precondition of socialist theories, either in their Marxist form, as 
freedom for a general critical attitude, or its less radical variations, which regard 
the analysis and transformation of social conditions as an inevitable stage in 
actualising the promise offreedom. Also, the capitalist economic order, as a 
consequence of liberal way of thinking and lite, with all its effect of people's 
consciousness that previously lived in a feudal or organic society, is an essential 
basis on which a pluralist democracy and a related welfare state may be built 71 
The task itself is extremely difficult and no wonder that both the liberal and the 
socialist experiments have been burdened by several shortcomings, some of them 
painful and cruel. Christian democracy, the third of the three main democratic 
traditions, has emerged as an intended correction of the mistakes which liberal 
democracy and social democracy had made. 
68 Co1t. Christian Socialism, p. 355. 
69 Cott, Christian Socialism, pp. 355-356. 
70 Cott, Christian Socialism, p. 356. 
71 See A1istair Kec's argument about the contemporary relevance ofMarx's thoughts, in hisMarx 
and the Failure of Liberation Theology, SCM. London, 1990; especially in the concluding pari, 
'Confmnation of Historical Materialism' and 'The European Way'. pp. 2681I 
37 
Christian Democracy 
The Christian democratic movement was born into a twofold conflict. On 
the one hand, it was a part of the reaction of the Roman Catholic church to the 
liberal and industrial revolutions - the second of which gave rise to the so called 
"social question"' which soon led "to a triangular conflict between Christianity, 
liberalism and socialism, a conflict in which the third element is always present 
even when only two elements are being discussed" 72 . On the other hand, 
Christian democracy has developed as a lay movement of religious, social and 
political reform, an alternative to the Roman Catholic hierarchy. "It was not easy 
for the church to recognise an independent worldly reality that was still part of 
the Kingdom of God, and a democracy of lay Christian inspiration led by lay 
Christians was a most alarming challenge to a church that was opposed to 
making distinction between the temporal and spiritual spheres. "73 Therefore, 
Christian democracy as a mediating movement has retained a conservative 
character while formulating its answers to the social and political challenges of 
the day. Thus, before we turn to some significant documents of Christian 
democracy, it is perhaps wise to consider what McLellan means by conservatism, 
the third important ... ism besides liberalism and socialism. 
McLellan points out six interlinked elements in conservative political 
thought: 
"First, an emphasis on the importance of custom, tradition itself, the inherited 
wisdom of previous generations, and the reliability of experience. Second, while 
there is recognition that change and adaptation are necessary, there is approval 
for the slow, incremental, organic nature of this change, as opposed to the 
abstract blueprint for radical reformation. ( ... ) Third, conservatism wishes to 
stress the value ofprivate property the possession and use of which is both a 
defence against too much state power and a useful school of practical experience 
for those engaged in public affairs. From these follows, fourth, a sense of 
72 Roberto Papini, 'Clnistianity and Democracy in Europe: The Christian Democratic Movement', 
in Witte ed., Christianity and Democracy, pp. 48f 
73 Roberlo Papini, 'Christianity and Democracy in Europe', in Witte ed., Christianity and 
Democracy, p. 48f 
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hierarchical order in society since individuals are very differently equipped with 
the culture necessary for governance. ( ... ) Fifth, conservatives typically wish to 
anchor their political thought in the transcendent, the work of God of which 
human laws can only be an imperfect manifestation. (. .. )Lastly, there is a 
pessimism about human nature which fits well with the Christian doctrine of 
original sin: corrupt human nature needs the force of tradition and hierarchy to 
prevent its running out of control. More generally, conservative thought 
emphasises the importance of ideas and values, unlike approaches which prefer to 
anchor themselves in individual rights or more worldly notions of economic and 
social justice." 74 
If we observe the relationship of Christianity and democracy from the 
point of view of the Roman Catholic Church, as Roberto Papini does, we may 
regard it 
"as one chapter in the much wider relationship between the Church and the 
world, which can be roughly divided into three phases: ( 1) medieval 
Christendom, in which the Church assumed above all the burden of the rights of 
God; (2) the modern age, in which the Church defended its own rights in its clash 
with the state; and (3) our own age, in which the Church defends the rights of 
man tout court, and in defending these rights also defends the rights of God and 
His Church. The Church's acceptance of democracy is by far the most important 
event of the third phase. It had also begun to defend the rights of man during the 
second phase, but these were still mainly social rights. Only in its fight against 
totalitarianism did the Church come to realise that the dignity of the person 
should also be defended and nurtured at a political level." 75 
With these phases in mind we may mention the papal encyclicals Mirari 
Vos (1832) and Quanta Cura (1864) with its appended S)J/labus Errorum in 
which popes condemned the 'modern liberties'; we can refer to Pope Leo XIII's 
Rerum Novarum ( 1891) as the first significant address of the social question and 
its embodiment in Don Luigi Storzo's successful, but short lived political party, 
the Partito Pop/are Italiano, established in 1919 in Sicily; we shall also refer to 
the works ofHenri Bergson and Jacques Maritain in which the modern 
expression of Christian democracy has appeared and the role these ideas played 
not only in Europe but also in North and Latin America. It also needs to be said 
that after the Second World War Lutheran and Calvinist Protestant authors have 
74 McLellan ed., Political Christianity, pp. 157f 
75 Papin.i, 'Christianity and Democracy in Em·ope' in Witte ed., Christianity and Democracy, p. 
53. 
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also contributed to a more articulated concept of Christian democracy, 
particularly in Germany and Holland. Finally we should highlight the 
breakthrough ofthe Second Vatican Council, and the application of Christian 
democratic ideals in the latest papal encyclicals 76. For a closer look at Christian 
democratic thinking, we turn to a short essay of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), a 
German Lutheran reflection on Christian democratic policy by Helmut Thielicke 
( 1908-1986), and the encyclical Centesimus Annus of Pope John Paul Il ( 1920-). 
Maritain's Christianity and Democracy was first published in French in 
1943, when the defeat of Germany already seemed inevitable and an outline of a 
new world order expressed a realistic hope. The very structure of the short essay 
reveals a lot about Maritain's thinking. He started his treatise with a discussion 
about "The End of an Age", the modern world which had been shaped by 
Machiavelli, Luther, Descartes, Rousseau and Hegel, embodied in the ambiguous 
French Revolution and later in the murderous German New Order, but may be 
renewed on the basis of the Judeo-Christian tradition and classical antiquity. Part 
ofthe crisis ofthe modern world is "the Tragedy of the Democracies", that is, 
"that they have not yet succeeded in realising democracy" 77 This statement is 
followed by "Three Remarks" on the nature of democracy, and an explanation of 
the "Evangelical Inspiration" which underlines secular democratic conscience. 
After preparing his way by these steps, Maritain finally arrives at an exposition of 
"The True Essence of Democracy". "Wherever a religion other than the Christian 
religion holds sway, there slavery is sanctioned, and wherever the Christian 
religion weakens, the nation becomes, in exact proportion, less capable of general 
liberty". 78 The heart of his exposition sounds like a hymn to freedom: 
"The essential characteristic ofthe democratic philosophy of man and society, or 
of the humanist political philosophy stand forth with the greatest clarity in their 
76 See the following essays in Witte ed., Christianity and Democracy: J. Bryan Hehir, 
'Catholicism and Democracy: Conflict, Change and Collaboration', pp. 15-30.; Robet1o Papini, 
'Christianity and Democracy in Europe: The Christian Democratic Movement', pp. 47-64.; Paul E. 
Sigmund, 'Cluistian Democracy. Liberation Theology, the Catholic Right, and Democracy in Latin 
America', pp. 187-206. 
77 Jacques Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, London. 
1945, p. 17. 
78 Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, p. 41. 
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opposition to the slave philosophy. This humanist political philosophy may be 
identified by the features which I stressed above: the inalienable rights of the 
person, equality, political rights of the people whose consent is implied by any 
political regime and whose rulers rule as vicars of the people, absolute primacy of 
the relations of justice and law at the base of society, and an ideal not of war, 
prestige and power, but ofthe amelioration and emancipation ofhuman life- the 
ideal of fraternity. For this philosophy the political task is par excellence a task of 
civilization and culture; it tends above all to provide the common good of the 
multitude in such a way that the concrete person, not only within the category of 
the privileged, but in the whole mass, truly accedes to the measure of 
independence which is compatible with civilized life and which is assured alike by 
the economic guarantees oflabour and property, political rights, civic virtues and 
the cultivation of the mind. "79 
Nevertheless, Maritain's explanation offers also pragmatic insights as 
well, such as the following: 
"The principles of the democratic philosophy of man and society can adjust 
themselves to a (constitutional) system of monarchic or oligarchic government. 
But by right, and in fact, it is to the republican system that these principles tend 
as their most normal expression. "80 
He also stresses the difficulties that those who wish these ideas turned 
into reality must face: 
"[The democracies] must triumph over Hitler and over their own 
self-contradictions in the social and spiritual realms. And not only must they 
recover on the one hand their genuine social and political impulse, and on the 
other hand their genuine spiritual impulse, but they must reconcile the two - and 
to that end get rid of bitter prejudices and ill-will. "81 
To serve this end, Maritain enumerates the requirements "The New 
Leadership" has to fulfil; he discusses "The Communist Problem" in an excursus 
(while he rejects Communism as a totalitarian ideology, he wishes to reintegrate 
Communists, including the Russian people as a whole, into a regenerated 
Western democratic community); finally he invites his reader to "An Heroic 
Humanism". 
79 Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, p. 45. 
80 Maritain. Christianity and Democracy, p. 46. 
81 Mmitain, Christianity and Democracy. p. 49. 
Helmut Thielicke's Theological Ethics was first published in its German 
original in 1958 and 1959. The Lutheran theologian's observations about 
Christianity and party politics, written in a West Germany led by Adenauer's 
Christian Democratic Union82 can be read as a Protestant contribution to a 
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predominantly Roman Catholic view of Christian democracy. These remarks are 
placed into Thielicke's discussion of "The Roman Catholic view of Church and 
State". Although the Roman Catholic view of the relationship between theology, 
church and politics is based on the doctrine of natural law, which Protestants 
cannot accept, 
"[t]his difference in theory between the Protestant and Roman Catholic views of 
church and state should not be exaggerated in respect of its practical effect, at 
least as regards the modem situation of the secularised state. ( ... )For though the 
theocratic tendency ofRoman Catholicism and the two kingdoms doctrine of the 
Reformation are very differently constructed, both lead in the end to a common 
front against secularism, i.e., against a world which seeks to transcend its 
worldliness by self-exaltation through ideologies, utopias, and philosophies. ( ... ) 
[T]he concrete implications of an ecclesiastically controlled natural law, and 
those of a conscience which though oriented to the kingdom of the left hand is 
also aware of its responsibility before God, may be very much the same. Thus the 
wisdom of papal encyclicals with respect to matters of political, social, and 
international affairs may often be admired on the Protestant side ... "83 
Nevertheless, a significant difference remains, which best expresses itself 
through a discussion of a "Christian" party. While the Roman Catholic natural 
law 
"carries within it the general outlines of a political program, and hence also an 
impetus toward the building of a political will in keeping with that program ( ... ) 
[Protestant] theological ethics does not contain in principle any such program but 
is content ( ... ) simply to indicate the concrete forms of natural law-lessness. ( ... ) 
What is more in accord with Protestant ethics is not to declare a specific 
institution (in this case a party) particularly Christian, but to have Evangelical 
Christians in all the various parties. According to the Protestant way of thinking, 
the adjective 'Christian' applies, not to institutions, but to men. On the basis of 
their own maturity, and in responsibility to the commandments of God in the 
82 For Thielicke's view of Adenauer see his autobiography, Helmut Thielicke, Notes ji-om a 
IYaxfarer, trans. David R. Law, James Clark & Co, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 340ft' 
83 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, Volume 2: Politics, ed. William H. Lazareth, Adam & 
Charles Black, London, 1969, pp. 558f 
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kingdom on the left hand, these men have to act independently and on the basis 
of the facts, deciding in favour of a specific program of action, whether by ballot, 
by active membership in a party, by helping to draw up party programs, or by 
representing the parties in government. ( ... )In principle, i.e., in terms of their 
faith, they can belong equally well to Socialist, Liberal, or other parties. "84 
However, there may be situations of political emergency in Christian 
affairs of two kinds: either the other parties may be in no position to implement 
certain Christian concerns, or there may be a historical catastrophe when the very 
foundations of life are so radically threatened that a return to Christian substance 
must be ventured and politically affected in a direct way. 
"If all other authorities break down- as happened in Germany in 1945 -the 
church itself may feel called, vicariously as it were, to spring into the breach on 
behalf of the kingdom on the left hand which has become totally ineffective. ( ... ) 
[In case of emergency] the forces of Christianity, as the only remaining power of 
resistance, should be mobilised with a political directness which does not accord 
with the indirectness demanded in normal times. "85 
If a case of emergency results in a permanent party which calls itself a 
Christian one, as it happened in the context of Thielicke's discussion, the 
question may not be whether it is desirable or not, but whether its policies are 
acceptable or not. 
"Here the decision depends on two things: first, whether one can accept the 
foreign, social, and other policies of such a party from the standpoint of their 
political utility, and second, whether the implications of the term 'Christian' in its 
title are obviously intended to remain an open question, so that there will be no 
doctrinaire appropriation of the word and so that justice will be done to 
Christians in other parties, and the body of Christ will not be rent by the claims of 
one party that alone is Christian. "86 
The immediate context ofthe encyclical ofPope John Paul 11, Centesimus 
Annus ( 1991) is the aftermath of the sudden collapse of the Eastern European 
Communist regimes and the world-wide hope for a new world order which was 
to replace the deadlock of the Cold War. The indirect context, the one hundredth 
84 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, pp. S60f 
85 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, pp. 563f 
86 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, p. 564. 
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anniversary of Rerum Novarum has been emphasised by a reference to Pope Leo 
XIII's awareness "of the need for a sound theory of the State", expressed by "the 
organisation of society according to the three powers" that is, legislative, 
executive and judicial, and although their mutual balance is stressed in the 
document, it is legislation which is clamed to be "capable of protecting the 
freedom of all". Thus, law "which is sovereign and not the arbitrary will of 
individuals" becomes the ruling principle within a theory of the State in the 
encyclical, put into obvious opposition to the practice of the totalitarian state, 
which has been short of an acknowledgement of objective law as well as 
objective truth as its basis. The demand for objective law and objective truth 
meets in the succinct definition of democracy: 
"Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of 
the correct conception ofthe human person. ( ... )As history demonstrates, a 
democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised 
totalitarianism." 
Truth is defined as Christian truth and is set in opposition to ideology; 
while the latter may 
"claim the right to impose on others [its] own concept of what is true and good, 
( ... ) Christian faith does not presume to imprison changing socio-political realities 
in a rigid schema, and it recognizes that human life is realized in history under 
conditions that are diverse and imperfect. Furthermore, in constantly reaffirming 
the transcendent dignity of the person, the Church's method is always that of 
respect for freedom, [nevertheless] freedom attains its full development only by 
accepting the truth." 
In other words, democracy must be realised by "the explicit recognition 
of [human] rights", which are listed as follows: 
"the right of the child to develop in the mother's womb from the moment of 
conception; the right to live in an united family and in a moral environment 
conducive to the growth of the child's personality; the right to develop one's 
intelligence and freedom in seeking and knowing the truth; the right to share in 
the work which makes wise use of the earth's material resources, and to derive 
from that work the means to support oneself and one's dependants; and the right 
freely to establish a family, to have and to rear children through the responsible 
exercise of one's sexuality." 
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In a certain sense, the document concludes according to the underlying 
logic of the whole text, "the source and synthesis of these rights is religious 
freedom, understood as the right to live in the truth of one's faith and in 
conformity with one's transcendent dignity as a person." On this theoretical basis, 
the encyclical offers several points of criticism as well as advice with respect to 
contemporary moral, cultural, political and economic issues. 87 
Having looked over the three main democratic traditions, we may 
conclude that the central question of all of them is human freedom. Liberal 
democracy, social democracy and conservative Christian democracy all consider 
themselves as promoters of the freedom of people both as individual persons and 
as members of a community. The reason for their most characteristic differences 
is the difference between their understanding of human identity - individual as 
well as social; the same reason we noted with respect to the different senses of 
freedom itself. Notwithstanding the differences, however, all the three democratic 
traditions show a decisive similarity: they all operate with a certain combination 
ofboth negative and positive freedom. To put it in a simple way, negative 
freedom is more dominant in the liberal tradition and more balanced by - with 
different emphases- in the socialist and the conservative tradition. Nevertheless, 
neither social nor Christian democracy, as we witnessed in the case of some of 
their representatives, can afford to entirely neglect negative freedom. According 
to these traditions, no democracy can be conceived without a dynamic interplay 
of negative and positive freedom. 
87 This rather long review of Centesimus Am1us is based on Sections 44-52. Source: Catholic 
Tmth Society. 199 I. pp. 33-38. 
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b. Democracy as rrision 
As we have seen in the course of our overview of the main traditions of 
thinking about democracy, all of them are informed by a vision as an aim to be 
achieved. The core of the vision is more or less the same, regardless of the 
tradition around it: its aims are the fulfilment ofhuman dignity, the full 
achievement of equality, freedom and justice within the human communitl8 . 
From a theological point of view, a vision can be brought into connection with 
God's shalom, the Kingdom of God, the realisation of Christian faith as the 
objective truth, or the consummation of creation. The short formulas are usually 
similar to each other, yet the way they have been shaped and the underlying logic 
of their development is often typical to the tradition they belong to. 
Utopia 
Before we turn to some of the visions which may be regarded either as 
representatives of one of the three main democratic traditions or that of other 
concerns which cannot be identified with any one of the traditions, we have to 
clarify what vision means. 
John de Gruchy has introduced the term as distinct from system, that is, 
while the democratic system indicates the way democracy works, democratic 
vision reveals both its purpose and the driving force behind it. This definition 
inevitably makes it necessary to clarify the meaning of vision with respect to 
utopia, as de Gruchy does. Anticipating the very vision he is going to offer - a 
characteristically socialist vision of democracy 89 - he says: " [ u ]to pian as it may 
be, it is this vision which has been, and remains, the driving force behind the 
struggle for democratic transformation across the world, even if it can never be 
88 See for example John de Gruchy's shot1 fonnula in his Chrisrianity and Democracy, p. 7. 
89 de Gmchy, Christiani~v and Democracy, pp. 40ff 
46 
fully realised and embodied in democratic systems of government"90 . Later in the 
same book, de Gruchy returns to a more detailed discussion of the meaning of 
utopia. Following Karl Mannheim, he makes a distinction between "abstract 
utopianism" and "concrete utopianism"; the former designates "a form of 
escapism", while the latter "engenders socially transformative action and enables 
the achievement of penultimate anticipations of what may be ultimately 
unattainable"91 By a reference to Pope Paul VI's call for a "rebirth of utopias" de 
Gruchy asks for a "concrete utopian vision of reality" which is "the only way 
whereby we can break free of the circularity of a closed ideology, express 
judgement upon it, and pursue the goal of a more just world order"92 
However, a differentiation between "abstract utopianism" and "concrete 
utopianism" is just as notorious a task as a differentiation between ideology and 
faith. "All systems of thought," de Gruchy writes, "including theologies, are 
ideological in the broad sense." Ideology in a pejorative sense, however, means 
"uncritical rationalisations of a closed worldview which claims ultimacy in the 
protection of self- or group interest" 93 Nevertheless, a decision about which 
worldview is closed and which one is open is usually a personal one, highly 
influenced by the tradition a thinker belongs to and may regard as the broader 
framework ofhis or her own biography. Similarly, a judgement on a 
rationalisation of a thought form, that is, whether it is critical or uncritical, or the 
recognition of particular interests within the struggle of several groups and 
several contradictory interests may be an intellectual act which is very difficult to 
verify. 
Therefore, a distinction between "abstract utopianism" (escapism) and 
"concrete utopianism" (creative, transformative imagination) as well as between 
faith and ideology is a highly personal act which must be carried out very 
carefully if one wishes to avoid to bring about judgements on a - negatively 
90 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 7. 
91 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 230. 
92 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 231. 
93 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 230. 
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understood - ideological basis. 94 Ideological wars sometimes turn into real wars 
and wars may have the most negative effect on a democratic process. For this 
very reason it is vital to let the other nurture a vision which may be different from 
mine. Moreover, it may be important to develop a democratic vision that directly 
reflects on the needs of areas that have been exhausted by long-lasting ideological 
war. 
Ideology 
In the next paragraphs, we will examine some typical democratic 
visions that are rooted in a distinct democratic tradition, liberal, socialist or 
Christian democratic. We will see that all of them could be understood as 
ideological not only in the broad sense of the attribute, but also in its negative 
sense. For the sake of a clearer critical approach, I will briefly introduce an idea 
ofNicholas Lash before we turn to the texts. 
In the article 'Ideology, Metaphor and Analogy' Lash offers some 
observations on the form of Jewish and Christian religious discourse, which, in 
my opinion, may be extended also to the "political discourse" we are dealing with 
in this chapter. Lash suggests that 
"the paradigm or 'focal' forms of Jewish and Christian religious discourse are not 
simply narrative, but are, more specifically, autobiographical. They are 
autobiographical both in the sense that they are self-involving ( ... ), and in the 
sense that, as self-involving, they locate the speaker (or the group of which he or 
she represents) in a particular cultural, historical tradition"95 
From the autobiographical character ofthe narrative four consequences 
follow. First, however truthfully a spokesman tries to tell his story, the narrative 
94 I think even John de Gruchy provides us an example of the practice of a not careful enough use 
of the label "ideology" in the negative sense. ln p. 230 in his Christianity and Democracy he 
regards liberal democratic capitalism as an ideology alongside with Marxism-Leninism and 
Fascism, which the prophetic witness of the church is expected to munask. The identilication of 
liberal democratic capitalism as an ideology probably serves him as a tacit background some pages 
later in his book, where he criticizes Ronald Preston and John Athetton, both known as Christian 
Socialists, for their "surprising" reassessment of the market, pp. 271ff 
95 Nicholas Lash, 'Ideology, Metaphor and Analogy', in B. Hebblethwaite and S. Sutherland eds., 
The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 74. 
48 
is subject to ideological distortion. Second, it "tends to attribute an unwarranted 
universality to the particular forms in which, in particular circumstances, it finds 
expression". 96 Third, the narrative is designed to make sense ofthe facts, but this 
very effort threatens the veracity of the tale. Fourth, as a variation of the former 
point, the storyteller is "tempted, for the coherence of the story (which is the 
coherence of his human ... experience) to claim a clearer apprehension of the 
'plot' then the evidence wan·ants"97 Therefore, this autobiographical narrative is 
threatened by "self-indulgence and even dishonesty"98 With regard to Christian 
religious discourse, Lash suggests that it has to be challenged by reflections from 
various perspectives from outside, that is, philosophical considerations, literary-
critical considerations and historical considerations, and, equally importantly, it 
has to keep its ability of internal correction alive. As far as the latter is concerned, 
while the expression of Christianity is often verbal, ritual and iconographic, it can 
also be silent, simple and iconoclastic. The same is true for a political discourse. 
The political thinker has to be aware of the autobiographical character of his or 
her narrative, which is claimed to be a political theory. Therefore, the political 
theorist has to try to reflect to his or her theory from perspectives outside of the 
tradition he or she belongs to, and has to keep the self-critical potential of his or 
her discourse alive. 
The Vision of the Three Traditions 
Our chosen contemporary representative of the liberal tradition, 
Michael Novak puts into the centre of his vision the free individual as God's 
creature. 
"To look upon human history as love-infused by a Creator who values others as 
others, who sees in those originating sources of insight and choice which we have 
come to know as 'persons' the purpose of his creation; and who in loving each as 
an individual creates of the contrarious many an unseen, hidden, but powerful 
96 ibid 
97 Lash, 'Ideology, Metaphor and Analogy', in Hebblethwaite and Sutherland eds., The 
Philosophical Frontiers ofChristian Theology, p. 75. 
98 ihid 
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community, is to glimpse a world in which the political economy of democratic 
capitalism makes sense. In order to create wealth, individuals must be free to be 
other. They are not to be understood as fragments of a collective, members of a 
kinship group or ethnic enclave, but as individual others; originating sources of 
insight and choice. Such persons are not isolated or alienated from one another. 
Sympathy, co-operation, and association are to them as natural, and as necessary, 
as breathing air. Yet when they form communities, they choose them, elect them, 
contract for them. The natural state of political community for persons is arrived 
at not by primordial belonging but by constitutional contract. Before the human 
race chose its communities, it had only a form of pi etas, a type of amor, love of 
country. It had not yet glimpsed the possibility of dilectio. Even primordial love 
of country is good. But choice, contract, election is better. ( ... ) In the economic 
sphere, creation is to be fulfilled through human imitation of the Creator. "99 
·To prevent Novak's vision from being or becoming a piece of 
ideological discourse, one must ask whether "sympathy, co-operation and 
association" are really "natural" to the subject of democratic capitalism. Likewise 
his assumption that the same subject will share his or her profit liberally100 seems 
an exaggerated expectation, or a premature anticipation of the fulfilment of 
God's plan for the person, "the purpose of his creation", rather than everyday 
empirical reality. 
For a socialist vision of democracy we may turn to the anticipation 
which John Cort offers. The "spirit of Christian love", he insists, 
"cannot be reduced to a political imperative, granted, but it most certainly has a 
political dimension. Feeding the hungry and clothing the naked are not precisely 
identical with a systematic redistribution of wealth, but in the present situation of 
gross inequality, obscene wealth and wretched poverty, they most certainly cry to 
heaven for both systematic and unsystematic redistribution. ( ... ) [Therefore, [ t]ull 
implementation of the economic democracy calls for democratic structures at the 
level of the individual enterprise, such as the producer co-operative, but at many 
other levels as well, the industry level, the state, regional and national economic 
level. ( ... ) Every trade union, incidentally, every union contract, is an 'engine' for 
the implementation of the social gospel. ( ... ) Socialism is the vision of the 
pluralist society in which the advantages of competition, a free market and 
political democracy are reconciled with the maximum socialisation of production 
and the demands of justice, full employment and the realisation of that minimum 
of worldly goods for all which Thomas Aquinas told us is necessary for life of 
virtue.( ... ) [T]here is in human nature an unwritten law of decency( ... ) [and a]ll 
99 Micbael Novak., The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, p. 355. 
lOO See Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, pp. 356f 
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the basic tenets of Christian, democratic socialism can find some motivation and 
· h · l nlOJ support m t at unwntten aw. 
It seems to me that Cort refers to the "unwritten law of decency" as an 
axiomatic fact that is the basis of the viability of democratic socialism. 
For a Christian Democratic vision of democracy, we turn to the 
encyclical Centesimus Annus. In promoting charity as the main mechanism of 
redistributing wealth, the vision of the encyclical is similar to the liberal 
democratic one. At the same time, its definition of the human being with respect 
to his/her surrounding culture is significantly different. 
"All human activity takes place within a culture and interacts with culture. For an 
adequate formation of a culture, the involvement of the whole man is required, 
whereby he exercises his creativity, intelligence, and knowledge of the world and 
of people. Furthermore, he displays his capacity for self-control, personal 
sacrifice, solidarity and readiness to promote the common good. Thus, the first 
and most important task is accomplished within man's heart. The way in which 
he is involved in building his own future depends on the understanding he has of 
himself and of his own destiny. It is on this level that the Church's specific and 
decisive contribution to tnte culture is to be found. The Church promotes those 
aspects of human behaviour which favour a true culture of peace, as opposed to 
models in which the individual is lost in the crowd, in which the role of his 
initiative and freedom is neglected, and in which his greatness is posited in the 
arts of conflict and war. The Church renders this service to human society by 
preaching the truth about the creation of the world, which God has placed in 
human hands so that people may make it fruitful and more perfect through their 
work; and by preaching the truth about the Redemption, whereby the Son of 
God has saved mankind and at the same time has united all people, making them 
responsible for one another." 102 
Thus, by the way of changing hearts the Church wishes to be at the 
frontline ofhuman development, which the encyclical calls the other name of 
peace, as a most reasonable way to avoid war. By discussing what the promotion 
of development may mean the encyclical gets close to the socialist vision. 
"Just as within individual societies it is possible and right to organise a solid 
economy which will direct the functioning of the market to the common good, so 
too there is a similar need for adequate interventions on the international level. 
For this to happen, a great effort must be made to enhance mutual 
101 John Cort, Cl11istian Socialism, pp. 353-356. 
102 John Paul II. Centesimus Annus, published in Catholic Truth Society 1991, p. 37. 
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understanding and knowledge, and to increase the sensitivity of consciences. 
This is the culture which is hoped for, one which fosters trust in the human 
potential of the poor, and consequently in their ability to improve their condition 
through work or to make a positive contribution to economic prosperity. But to 
accomplish this, the poor- be they individuals or nations- need to be provided 
with realistic opportunities. Creating such conditions calls for a concerted world-
wide effort to promote development, an effort which also involves sacrificing the 
positions of income and of power enjoyed by the more developed economies." 103 
In terms of traditional opinions, the encyclical expresses an eloquent 
flexibility. On the one hand, it promotes charity, but on the other hand, through 
the employment of the medieval Catholic teaching of subsidiarity the encyclical 
finally reaches the idea of the redistribution of wealth on an international level. 
The centre ofthis program, however, is the change (conversion?) of human heart 
and behaviour, inspired and controlled by the teaching ofthe (Roman Catholic) 
Church. Nevertheless, the encyclical's obvious claim that the Christian faith (as 
proclaimed in the Roman Catholic Church) is fundamentally different from 
ideologies, is an essential weakness behind the carefully designed social vision. 
The claim sounds like a solemn confession: 
"[T]he Church [does not] close her eyes to the danger of fanaticism or 
fundamentalism among those who, in the name of an ideology which purports to 
be scientific or religious, claim the right to impose on others their own concept of 
what is true and good. Christian truth is not of this kind. Since it is not an 
ideology, the Christian faith does not presume to imprison changing socio-
political realities in a rigid schema, and it recognises that human life is realised in 
history in conditions that are diverse and imperfect. Furthermore, in constantly 
reaffirming the transcendent dignity of the person, the Church's method is always 
that of respect for freedom." 104 
lf"ought" and "is" are placed so close to each other, where will the 
necessary self-critical distance, in the manner of Lash, find a place? 
I 03 John Paulll., Centesimus Ann us, p. 38. 
104 John Paulll., Centesimus Amms, p. 34. 
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c. Democracy as System 
Although, as we have seen, the way democratic visions are pictured and 
the priorities they stress may be different according to the tradition they were 
born into, there is a general agreement about what a democratic system should 
mean. De Gruchy offers a summary of the basic principles and procedures which 
comprise the democratic system: 
"universal adult suffrage or the right to vote; free and fair elections; 
representation of a fair proportion of the electorate in a legislative body; 
decisions reached by a majority vote on all major questions of policy; equality 
before the law; an independent judiciary; equality of opportunity; freedom to 
organise political parties; freedom of speech, conscience and dissent; the freedom 
of the press and of assembly; the rule of law and therefore freedom from arbitrary 
arrest or punishment ('due process'); the separation of church and state; the 
freedom of religion and individual liberty consonant with social requirements." 105 
However impressive the list of principles may be, however, a basic 
contradiction of democratic practice remains unsolved, between "the democratic 
need to participate in the political process, including the right of individuals to 
choose their own representatives" and "the need to ensure competence and 
efficiency in govemment" 106. The number of solutions that have been offered to 
this problem, represent some alternative priorities within the same general 
democratic system. 
Albert Weale presents a systematic overview107 of this problem. He 
distinguishes two broad classes of opinion about democracy: according to the 
first democracy is principally about holding accountable a government for its 
honesty, efficiency and competence, while according to the second democracy is 
a form of participatory or self-government. For the first opinion, the essential 
function of democracy is to select government, but it is equally important to 
105 de Gmcby, Christianity and Democracy, p. 19. 
106 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 18. 
107 The following two paragraphs are based on Weale, 'Democracy' in Paul Barry Clarke and 
Andrew Linzey eds., Dictionmy of Ethics, Theology and .Society, Routledge, London and 
New York, 1996, pp. 2261J 
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prevent the government from using its position of pre-eminent power to tyrannise 
over society or misuse its power in any other way. One of the virtues of 
democracy, in this conception, is that it allows for the peaceful transfer of 
political power. For the second opinion, democracy is a form of life in which the 
members of society participate, and the merit of democratic government is that it 
expresses the ideal of people's self-government, while representing the popular 
will. In turn, the exercise of the virtues of citizenship has a high place in the 
participatory conception of democracy. 
The distinction between democracy as an accountable government and 
democracy as self-government may be related to the distinction between direct 
democracy and representative democracy. Participatory accounts of democracy 
favour direct democracy, but this form is conceivable only in small-size 
communities. A different way of expressing the distinction is in terms of whether 
the function of democratic institutions is seen primarily as restraining the 
arrogance of power of those in government or primarily as enabling the 
government to act in accordance with the will of the people in the formulation of 
public decisions. Behind these contrasting accounts of democracy there typically 
lie contrasting accounts of human interests and human motivation. The first 
opinion holds a pessimistic view of human nature and attributes to politics an 
instrumental role in making collective arrangements between conflicting interests. 
Those who support the second opinion usually hold an optimistic view of the 
ability of citizens to have an intelligent and dispassionate intention about public 
affairs, and to internalise a sense ofthe common good. 
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Genuine Democracy, Elitist Democracy 
With respect to the efficiency of a government, and in relation to the 
above distinction, another way to approach the same problem is to speak about 
"genuine democracy" and "elitist democracy" 108 The first stresses the broad 
participation in political decisions, based on the optimistic view of human nature, 
while the second emphasises the expertise and skills of those in charge. Looking 
at the difference from another angle, the genuine democrat fears the rule of an 
elite while the elitist democrat fears popular rule. 
De Gruchy emphasises the fundamental difference between the two kinds 
of fear; nevertheless, whether the difference is fundamental or rather an option 
that is based on different circumstances and different previous experiences, is, for 
me, an open question. In societies of long-standing democratic culture it is 
conceivable that people usually make the right decisions, out of their personal 
experiences and with the help of the democratic culture that nurtured them 
(without being ontologically different to other people). However, in the so-called 
young democracies people have to familiarise themselves with the liberating 
experience that they can really participate in decisions about themselves and to 
use this possibility wisely without the support of a democratic culture and 
previous experiences at once. Thus, in a young democracy, the role of a leading 
elite is crucial, and since usually more than one elite emerge and try to control the 
society, the real question for the people is not whether they want a "genuine 
democracy" or an "elitist democracy" for themselves (it might be an academic 
question for them at best), but which elite they may trust. 
Moreover, even in a long-standing democracy doubts may emerge about 
the thesis that "ordinary people are competent to make political decisions", not 
because the human, moral, or intellectual competence of people is questioned, 
but because of the complexity of the decision-making process itself Arne 
108 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 19. 
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Rasmusson points out some problems is this regard, of which I will refer to four. 
First, voters usually do not have definite preferences over the whole range 
of alternatives that affects them, and by choosing one option or the other, within 
certain material limits, the issue then becomes how to relate votes to alternative 
cots and to willingness to pay the costs. Second, there is no procedure, even in 
principle, by which all sets of expressed preferences can be aggregated into a 
social decision that guarantees an optimal solution to the task of reconciling 
them. Third, practical social decision-making requires negotiations and the 
number of parties in a fruitful negotiation process is limited. Consequently, most 
decisions have to be left to representatives with a large degree of freedom, which 
makes the role of voting or direct participation small. Fourth, concerning 
referendums, due to the possibility that a relatively apathetic majority might block 
a proposal that is of great advantage to a minority simply out of distaste for 
change or because it involves some relatively trivial adjustment on their part, 
people ought to be given votes in proportion to the degree in which they are 
affected by the decision. Determining this is of course very difficult. Therefore, it 
might be that a smaller, well-informed body often makes better decisions than the 
I bl. 109 genera pu IC. 
These problems do not indicate that democracy itself should be doubted, 
but do testifY to the fact that the contrast between popular rule and elitist 
leadership must not be considered to express moral or qualitative differences 
between those who hold one or the other opinion, as the very expression of 
'genuine' democracy might suggest. De Gruchy offers a paradoxical solution to 
this problem: " [ t ]he weakness of democracy, which is the danger of incompetent 
and inefficient government is, paradoxically, indicative ofits strength, namely, 
that such government is regarded as legitimate and remains accountable" 110 . 
Within extreme circumstances, however, the cost of this legitimacy may be the 
109 Ame Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political Theology to Theological Politics as 
Exempl(fied by Jurgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas, Lund University Press, 1994, pp. 358ff 
llO de Grnchy, Christianity and Democracy p. 19. 
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imminent danger of the failure of democracy itself, together with the whole social 
order for which democracy has taken up responsibility, to which the probably 
most well-known example is the fall of the Weimar Republic. 
Legal Positivism and Value-Based Lmv 
If we regard democracy as system as the outward order of society, we 
may ask about the way this order is organised and rationalised. This question 
leads us to the problem of law making, which is closely connected to the rise and 
the present formulation of democratic order in Europe and North America. In his 
book Theology of Reconstruction, Charles Villa-Vicencio pays substantial 
attention to the two main schools of law making, which I will now briefly 
summarise. Villa-Vicencio distinguishes between two main traditions of the 
process, legal positivism and the search for value-based law. Historically, legal 
positivism belongs to the time of the religious wars ofthe late sixteenth century, 
to the time when 
"the primary political question shifted away from what constituted true religion 
and the absolute 'good' to how people of different religious and ethical 
persuasions could co-exist. The demand was for a sovereign authority capable of 
transcending these differences and holding crumbling nations and communities 
together." 111 
According to Jean Bodin's classical words, "law is nothing else than the 
command ofthe sovereign, in the exercise ofhis sovereign power" 112, or, in Hans 
Kelsen's' more recently formulated position, "law is that which can be effectively 
imposed" 113 . The assumption oflegal positivism is "that parliamentary supremacy 
in an open democratic society [is] morally and responsibly used" 114, thus it does 
not lack a moral concern. However, 
" [ c ]onflicting interests have at times given rise to a sterile, adjudicating, 
111 Charles Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconstl'llction: Nation-building and Human Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 86f 
112 Villa-Vicencio. A Theology of Reconstruction, p. 87. 
113 Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconst/'l/ction, p. 91. 
114 Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconstruction, pp. 92f 
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balancing, non-promotional notion of legal positivism. Eager to offend no one, 
the sovereign has sought simply to balance conflicting interests without affirming 
any one set of values in preference to another. Without a clear sense of direction 
legal positivism has often left people in panic ( ... ) without direction in life." 115 
Therefore, the alternative of value-based law has to be kept open. Rooted 
in the old natural law theory, and in this sense reaching back behind the rise of 
legal positivism, 
"value-based law is an attempt to articulate a minimum set of values which apply 
to the rights of individuals within a social union. If law is not legitimated by the 
acceptance/efficacy of sovereign command, as legal positivists suggest, then what 
is it that provides this legitimacy?" 116 
Nevertheless, this question is much easier to ask than to answer. In a 
pluralist society, in which not only conflicting material and cultural interests but 
also rivalling ethical principles and value-systems divide the people, "{wfhose 
values and priorities are to be relied on beyond the letter of the law?" 117 The 
solution of the 'legal positivism - value-based law dichotomy' gives a significant 
characteristic to any concrete democratic system. 
Civil Society 
Within a discussion of democratic system we must mention the concept 
of civil society. Civil society, de Gruchy writes, 
"is of key importance in relating representative and participatory forms of 
democracy. If political society refers to the structures of government of the state, 
including the civil service, then civil society is that network of non-governmental 
organisations, churches and other religious communities, trade unions and 
voluntary associations, which in modern societies provide the means whereby 
people can participate in pursuing social goals and protecting particular interests. 
When it is functioning best, civil society provides an intermediate layer of 
governance between the individual and the state that is capable of resolving 
conflicts and controlling the behaviour of members without public coercion. A 
strong civil society is necessary if democratic transition from authoritarian rule is 
115 Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconstmction, p. 94. 
116 Villa-Vicencio, A Theology ofR.econsti7Jction, p. 96. 
117 Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconstntction, p. 97. 
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to be sustained, reversals resisted, and democratic transformation pursued. "118 
To put it in a different way, civil society designates those communitarian 
approaches that 
"focus on the life-giving, natural and thus more genuine communities (the family, 
the neighbourhood, the collective) and contrasts these with the artificially created 
and basically parasitic state community (a community made possible by positive 
law), thus, distinguishes the social order from the state and from the market" 119 
The idea of civil society appeared first at the eighteenth century, and 
although mostly disappeared later, it can be recognised under different names, for 
example, in William Temple's references to "lesser associations" or "minor 
communities" 120 It is probably not incidental, that it is Central and Eastern 
European intellectuals, reflecting their experiences about the so-called "people's 
democracies", who are regarded as chiefly responsible for the recent renaissance 
of the idea. 121 The reference to the importance of civil society within a democracy 
may lead us directly to the last section of our exposition of democracy. 
d Democracy as Process 
The three approaches to democracy we have discussed so far can also 
be understood in temporal terms: democracy as tradition is the past, democracy 
as vision is the future and democracy as system is the present. The 
interrelatedness of the past, future and present with respect to the three 
approaches to democracy might aptly be expressed with the words of Paul 
Lehmann about the emergence of values: "one generation tells another how the 
future shapes the present out of the past" 122. The expression democracy as 
process intends to describe the way the present is being shaped; the way one 
generation tells about the future with respect to the past, that is, the human factor 
118 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, pp. 20f 
119 Ame Rasmusson, The Church as Polis, p. 361. 
120 See William Temple, Christianity and the Social Order, SPCK, 1976, pp. 29-98. 
121 Ame Rasmusson, The Church as Polis, p. 361. 
122 Quoted in Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconst111ction, p. 110. 
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of pursuing a democratic social order. If democratic tradition, vision and system 
were understood as text, democratic process would be subtext; if the former were 
regarded as content, the latter could be called the style. Within this circle of 
reference we could even risk to say that while democracy as tradition, vision and 
system may be called "democracy consciously conceived", democracy as process 
might be regarded as "democracy unconsciously promoted"- Without the proper 
style even the most appropriate references to tradition, vision and system might 
be merely empty lip-service; a confused subtextual attitude may also confuse 
those texts which, in a different context, could be revealing in themselves; and we 
know how influential our unconscious in our visible deeds may be. Therefore, 
the proper process in creating a democratic order is a crucial factor with respect 
to the outcome. 
Naturally, each distinct way of democratic thinking discloses something 
about the process it intends to inspire as well as to follow, as the most subjective 
or most personal hallmark of itself Speaking about the process as such, a thinker 
may reveal a great deal of his or her personal conviction about what democracy 
should mean within a concrete situation that the thinker wishes to address. Thus, 
speaking about democracy as process, I cannot help anticipating a great deal 
about the challenges which the present transition ofHungarian society is 
expected to meet. Nevertheless, as we will see, the preferences which have risen 
out ofthe Hungarian situation may have some broader validity as well. 
Jung and the "Fight lvith the Shadmv" 
I start my explanation of democracy as process with a reference to a 
short talk of Carl Gustav Jung, broadcasted by the BBC in 1946, 'The Fight With 
the Shadow'123 . After he had addressed the political turmoil of the time on some 
123 Car! Gustav Jung, 'The fight with the Shadow' in Car! Gustav Jung, Civilization in Transition. 
Routledge and Kegan PauL London, 1964, pp. 218-226. 
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occasions 124, Jung applied his well-known shadow theory- which might be 
considered the secularised version ofJesus' parable of the speck and the log- to 
the description of the moral and political challenge the post-war world faced. 
Jung tried to understand the German National Socialist revolution as well as the 
similar mass movements as a collective neurosis, a miscarried compensation of 
the collective unconscious for the disorder of the conscious side of the collective 
psyche. The Germans, Jung thought, were not the only nation in which the 
violent and primitive forces had become dominant, their onslaught was more or 
less universal. 
"The only difference lay in the German mentality itself, which proved to be more 
susceptible because of the marked proneness of the Germans to mass psychology. 
Moreover, defeat and social disorder had increased the herd instinct in Germany, 
so that it became more and more probable that Germany would be the first victim 
among the West ern nations - victim of a mass movement brought about by an 
upheaval of forces lying dormant in the unconscious, ready to break through all 
moral barriers." 125 
Thus, the failure of the German nation as a collective can serve as a 
typical example of a more general danger for the observer. Masses of Germans, 
feeling weak and even non-existent, compensated for their conscious feelings "by 
the hitherto unknown desires for power" 126· Unfortunately, Jung believed, 
"there were no values in the conscious mind of the individual which would have 
enabled him to understand and integrate the reaction when it reached 
consciousness. Nothing but materialism was preached by the highest intellectual 
authorities. The Churches were evidently unable to cope with this new situation; 
they could do nothing but protest and that did not help very much." 127 
Thus, while the Germans were longing for a new world-order, they were 
as much greedy for power, and chose Hitler as their leader for themselves, the 
exponent ofboth of their expectations, who represented the shadow, the inferior 
124 See especially his article 'Wotan', 1936, (pp. 179-193) about the psychological background of 
the German "awakening" and his 'After the Catastrophe', 1945, (pp. 194-217) about the way post-
war Germany and the rest of the Western world should face German guilt, both published in Car! 
Gustav Jung, Civilization in Transition. 
125Jung, Civilization in Transition, p. 219. 
126 Jtmg, Civilization in Transition, p. 222. 
127 Jung, Civilization in Transition, p. 223. 
part of their personality. Their falling victim to their own shadow is the pitfall 
that everyone has to learn to avoid. 
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It is the picture of "the fight with the shadow" that Jung extends into a 
short exposition ofwhat democracy may mean. Speaking about Switzerland, he 
thought they had built up the "prefect democracy" where their warlike instincts 
expend themselves in the form of domestic quarrels called "political life". "We 
fight each other within the limits of the law and constitution, and we are inclined 
to think of democracy as a chronic state of mitigated civil war." 128 Switzerland 
may have succeeded in locating the warlike instincts of her citizens into domestic 
affairs, yet, there is still a lot to be achieved. 
"[E]ven our national, mitigated state of war would soon come to an end if 
everybody could see his own shadow and begin the only struggle that is really 
worth while: the fight against the overwhelming power -drive of the shadow. ( ... ) 
Our order would be perfect if only everybody could direct his aggressiveness 
inwards, into his own psyche." 129 
Arguing this way, Jung is able to point out the possible common 
responsibility of the psychologist and the politician, and finally achieves a 
psychological description of democracy. The most a psychologist is able to 
effectuate in the life of others is to make them aware of their complexes and to 
encourage them to start a conscious conflict within themselves. "Anything that 
disappears from your psychological inventory", Jung's message says, "is apt to 
turn up in the guise of a hostile neighbour, who will inevitably arouse your anger 
and make you aggressive. It is surely better to know that your worst enemy is 
right there in your own heart." 130 His definition of democracy, therefore, is based 
on both his understanding of human nature and the awareness of its fragile 
character: 
128 Jung, Civilization in Transition, p. 224. 
129 ibid. It shall be noted here, however, that Jung's advice that everyone should direct his or her 
aggressiveness inward into his or her psyche must not be taken as an absolute nonn; its context is 
the world of hopelessly confused mutual projections. It would be a mistake to perceive this 
suggestion as a general appeal to suppress one's aggressiveness. The "creative role of aggression" 
(see Wink, Engaging the Powers, pp. 288ft) has been finely worked out within Wink's theory, as a 
part of his rejection of the "fight or tlight" alternative. 
130 Jtmg. Civilization in Transition, p. 225. 
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"Man's warlike instincts are ineradicable- therefore a state of perfect peace is 
unthinkable. Moreover, peace is uncanny because it breeds war. True democracy 
is a highly psychological institution which takes account of human nature as it is 
and makes allowances for the necessity of conflict within its own national 
boundaries" 131 
Two Examples of Democratic Process 
In his Christianity and Democracy de Gruchy offers two contemporary 
examples which, in my view, can be read as illustrations for the thesis I have 
presented above. One of the examples is his discussion of the problems of the 
transitory process ofNicaraguan society after the end of the Cold War; the other 
one is his exposition of the tensions between traditional social ideas and Western 
democratic thoughts in sub-Saharan Africa. Both Nicaragua and some sub-
Saharan Mrican countries can be regarded, with some simplifications, as areas 
where Western democratic ideas and related outward political and economical 
interests have waged a war against each other, dividing the population of the 
countries and finally leaving behind a mixed legacy and a still fragile, so-called 
low density democracy, whose ability to establish itself still has to be proven. In 
situations like these the nature of democratic process is of crucial importance. 
Within his discussion of the transitory process in Nicaragua, de Gruchy 
pays considerable attention to a document, Nicaraguan Revolutionary Christians 
Face the Crisis of Civilisation, issued by the Sandinista aligned Antonio 
V alvidiesco Ecumenical Center in Managua as a self-critical evaluation of the 
role of the popular church and liberation theology within the democratic 
revolution in 1991. 132 The direct reasons for their self-criticism was the electoral 
defeat of the Sandinista Liberation Front, the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe and the emergence ofthe United State as the only superpower. The 
positive propositions, which have been born out of their self-criticism, are 
131 Jung, Civilization in Transition, p. 225. 
132 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, pp. 159ff 
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significant. They proposed 
"a search for new ways ofbeing a revolutionary movement, and new models of 
society independent of the dead legacy ofEuropean Communism. This meant the 
abandonment of the armed struggle, and an acceptance of the loss of political and 
military power; conversely, it meant the espousal of non-violence as 'the 
historical force of truth, right, justice and love'. Christians could help the 
revolutionary movement recover its original non-violent inspiration and make 
Nicaragua a laboratory in which the revolutionary and the non-violent traditions 
of struggle could create a new cultural synthesis, thus contributing to 'humanity's 
search in the crisis of civilisation ... 133 
In their emphasis on the rediscovery of non-violent methods, these 
Nicaraguan liberation theologians show a remarkable convergence with the 
legacy of Martin Luther King 134 After overcoming, at least in their intention, the 
classical ideological differences, and having reached some deeper sources of 
struggle, Nicaraguan theologians may turn to their more urgent common task. 
The re-evaluation of the importance of national sovereignty is a clear sign of a 
change, that is, a renewed identity that is able to represent their difference within 
global ideological fronts and economic interests. They realised that 
"[a]n imposed process of democratisation might bring about a new sense of 
freedom to some, but it might also accentuate recession and deepen the economic 
crisis as the economy opens further to the competitive winds of the world and 
global capital. Thus an emphasis on national sovereignty by a small and weaker 
country may be an appropriate means of defending democratic rights and 
freedoms against dominant powers, even though the doctrine of national 
sovereignty has serious drawbacks in other respects for word peace and global 
democratisation." 135 
Finally, de Gruchy stresses the importance ofNon Governmental 
Organisations and the churches, that is, the civil society within the democratic 
process. 
"Democracy requires educating people to participate in the political process, the 
need to develop a culture of human rights and tolerance, and an ability to break 
out of dogmatic ideological positions in seeking solutions to the problems which 
d. 'd ,1~6 lVI ea country. -
133 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 161. 
134 de Gmchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 162. 
135 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 162f 
136 de Gmchy, Christiani~v and Democracy, p. 163. 
The examination of the process of transition in some sub-Saharan 
African countries provides us with a similar lesson. 
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"The sorry tale of failed political orders in much of sub-Saharan Africa since 
independence indicates that systems of government, whether liberal democratic, 
socialist, or Marxist-Leninist, foisted on the people of Africa, cannot be expected 
to work. Democracy has to grow from within in ways appropriate to Africa and 
each nation's particular history and political tradition. "137 
Thus, a gathering of Mrican church leaders in Kenya in July 1993 tried 
to relate African traditional insights to contemporary political problems. As de 
Gruchy reports, 
"[r]eflecting on the extent to which competition and conflict are built into 
European political systems, [the church leaders] stressed the contemporary 
importance ofthe traditional African insistence on consensus-making. 'If, they 
argued, 'the goal of political change is harmonious community', then 'it does not 
necessarily follow that the politics of competition provides the means'. They 
urged the churches 'to become actively involved in the search for alternative 
democratic models appropriate to the respective countries, taking into account 
the African heritage, the colonial legacy, and post-colonial pressures'." 138 
This task, however, is an enormous one. Traditional African society may 
be best understood as an organic society, similar to that of Medieval Europe, 
with its strict hierarchical order and its sacralised notion of authority, fairly 
incompatible with the idea of modern pluralist democracy. In this respect, 
Christianity is expected to challenge the tradition. Nevertheless, traditional 
Mrican understanding of person, embedded into the organic social order, that is, 
"a person is a person through other persons" 139, would pose a positive challenge 
over against possessive individualism, therefore this part ofthe legacy has to be 
strengthened. The creative evaluation of the mixed Mrican cultural legacy would 
require a strong cultural theology, which, in turn, ought to be able to co-operate 
with socially conscious critical theologies. However, as de Gruchy observes, a 
137 de Gruchy, Christianity and DemocracJ', p. 188. 
138 de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, p. 189. 
139 de Gruchy, Christianity and Dernocracy, p. 141. 
balanced co-operation between prophetic liberation theology and culturally 
focussed theology in sub-Saharan Afiica is yet to come. 
e. Democracy and freedom -a Summary of their Relationship 
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At the end of our discussion of democratic traditions we have already 
noted that each of the three main traditions, the liberal democratic, the social 
democratic and the Christian democratic approaches have been seeking the 
solution of the problem of human freedom. The proposal that democratic 
traditions can be read as attempts to answer the question of freedom, may easily 
be drawn out to the fourfold exposition of democratic theory. Traditions are the 
living legacies of the quest for actualised freedom, with all the binding force as 
well as inspiration a living legacy can offer. Here the bearer of a tradition has to 
be able to handle the real tension between continuity and change, and has to be 
aware of not only the richness but also the limits of his or her tradition. A 
detailed analysis of the concept of freedom within a particular tradition, 
therefore, may be a helpful contribution to the preservation of this delicate 
balance. A critical clarification of democracy as vision, as we have seen, requires 
an accurate conception of ideology, an ability to distinguish between ideology in 
a general sense and ideology as a distortion, or, following Mannheim's thought, 
between a concrete utopia and an abstract utopia. Again, a concept of freedom is 
presupposed in these distinctions, or, to put it differently, a particular concept of 
freedom might be determinative in making particular distinctions. Democracy as 
5ystem can be understood as a description of how institutionalised freedom 
works. The different opinions about the democratic system, hence, might be 
translated into questions about which part of freedom should be institutionalised 
and how, or how differing or even opposing claims based on the demand for 
freedom should be organised into a single social order. Finally, democracy as 
process can be conceived as "the way to freedom". 
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Cltnaqpter 2 
From Spond:menty to BaB.aiDce: 
Bibo's Underst.anndillllg of JF'reedlom and ][))emocracy 
The Purpose and the Method of this Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to show the development ofBib6's thought 
from the beginning to his essay 'On the Equilibrium and Peace of Europe". This 
essay was written during the years 1942-44, with the strong intention of having it 
translated and sent to those who were to be responsible for the territorial and 
social reorganisation of Europe after the Second World War. The essay he 
planned was eventually left unfinished, neither was a translation of the finished 
parts possible for the peacemakers to read. The completed material, however, 
contains- in a more or less final form- the ideas that were to have an important 
role in Bib6's essays written after 1945. Several important parts of the original 
essay were turned into individual studies that became famous pieces ofBib6's 
public activity from 1945 onwards; some ofthem have been published in foreign 
languages. 2 
The essay 'On the Equilibrum and Peace of Europe' is particulary 
important for us in view of the fact that Bib6 here deals with questions that 
occupied Bonhoeffer's thoughts in the same period and appeared in his writings 
as well. From the perspective of the future ofEurope, Bib6 assigned great 
importance to the reintegration of Germany into the new order of postwar 
Europe and to the stabilisation of the so-called "middle zone countries", Hungary 
among them. Therefore Bib6 deals extensively with the situation in Germany: he 
1 Its original Hungarian text is titled 'Az eur6pai egyensulyr61 es beker6l', published in VT-I. pp. 
295-635. 
2 Ideas that were first elaborated in 'On the Equilibrum and Peace of Europe' reappeared in some 
of Bib6's post -war essays. Two of them have also been published in English: The Distress of the 
Eastern European Small States' (1946), DRS pp. 13-87 and 'The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy' 
(1945) DRS pp. 89-183. The treatment ofGennan political hysteria, which is the most important 
part of the essay in the perspective of this study, unfortunately has not been published in English. 
Gemmn translation: Die deutsche Hysterie: Ursachen und Geschichte, trans. Hans-Henning 
Paetzke, Inse1 Verlag, Fankfurt am Main- Leipzig, 1991. French translation: Misere des petit 
Etats d'Europe de !'Est, trailS. Gyorgy Kassai, L'Hannattan, Paris, 1986, pp. 7-129. 
analyses the process that led to the development of national socialism and the 
catastrophe caused by it, and he offers his vision of the recovery of German 
social and political life. Germany thus appears as one of the major themes in 
Bib6's essay, which can be directly compared to what Bonhoeffer wrote about 
the state of his own national community and the possibility of her restoration. 
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In the development of the ideas ofthe two thinkers, their particular image 
of freedom plays an important part. Consequently, the ideas that lead to their 
vision of a post-war Germany and Europe may be detected by following the 
development oftheir respective images of freedom. Furthermore, by looking at 
their ideas about freedom we can follow the development of their thinking with 
respect to democracy, in Bib6's case quite directly, and in Bonhoeffer's in a more 
indirect manner. 
Bib6's and Bonhoeffer's images of freedom, naturally, are not isolated 
components of their thinking but are deeply embedded into their wider theory, 
their Weltanschauung. In Bib6's case Weltanschauung means a dominant social 
theory that has some theologically relevant elements; in Bonhoeffer's case it is a 
theological theory that has been intertwinned with a characteristic social theory 
from the very outset. Bonhoeffer's theology ofsociality has been described in a 
comprehensive way and Bonhoeffer scholars usually agree that his theology and 
its social implications are in a mutually influential connection to each other. Bib6 
scholarship, however, has not yet explored the concrete contents of the 
theological relevance ofBib6's social theory. Therefore, one of the tasks of this 
chapter is to compensate for this shortcoming: to clarify the concrete contents of 
the theological relevance ofBib6's social theory as accurately as possible. 
A. Bibo's Christianity and the Coherence of his Thought 
Interpreters ofBib6 usually occupy three typical positions according to 
their starting point from where they approach Bib6's text's: a liberal position3, a 
3 For example: Bela Farag6, Nyugati !iberalis szemmel, Les Livres des 'Cahiers Hongrois', 
Volume 10, Dialogues Europeens, 1986 
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Marxist socialist position4 or a non-Marxist, that is, a popular or Third Way 
socialist position5 . All ofthese aspects reveal some contradictions in Bib6's 
written heritage, being unable to demonstrate the fundamental unity of his 
thought. However, there is a fourth possibility, that, as far as I know, appeared as 
only a tentative attempt in Bib6 scholarship to date. In the Bib6 Congress, held 
in Szeged in the annus mirabilis, 1989, Peter Kende argued that "the liberal and 
socialistic elements of Bib6's image of society can be viewed as a harmonious 
complex only by the mediation of Christian thought"6 
Although this statement seems to be a rather trivial assertion, its concrete 
content cannot easily be explained with respect to Bib6s texts. Interpreters agree 
that Bib6 was a Christian thinker and his Christianity naturally marks his social 
theory7. However, it is not easy to indentify the concrete shape and content of 
Bib6's Christianity. He never spoke about his personal faith or the characteristics 
of the Christianity he personally identified with. Even a rather dramatic 
expression of his faith was not related by him but by an earwitness more than 
two decades after his death8 In his studies Bib6 did not argue theologically and 
left only rather infrequent references to theologians whose writings he read. 
Thus, his presentation of the person and work of Christ within the introductory 
section of his late essay 'Reflections on the Social Development of Europe' 
appears as a surprise without any apparent precedents. This picture of Christ9 is 
incomplete against any systematic theological standard and so unusual in some 
ways that we may resonably argue that here Bib6 created his personal image of 
Christ. Within the same period he wrote another piece in which the unusual 
argumentation frames a discussion of the personal faith of others. Here Bib6 
analysed the poems of two well-known Hungarian poets about their experience 
of "the eclipse of God" and he finished his study with a long quotation from 
4 For example: Tibor Huszar, 'Bib6 Istvan - a gondolkod6, a politikus' in: Istvan Bib6, Vatogatott 
tanulmimyok, Volume Ill. Magvet6, Budapest, 1986 pp. 386-534. 
5 For example: Zoltan Szab6, 'Bib6 Istvanr61' in: Istvan Bib6: Osszegyiijtott munkai, Volume I. 
EPMSZ, Bern, 1981 pp. 8-35. 
6 See Gyorgy Litvan, 'Jaszi Oszkar es Bib6 Istvan', in: Gyorgy Litvan, Oktoberek ilzenete, Osiris, 
Budapest, 1996, p. 371. 
7 Arpact Goncz, 'Bib6i magatartas- bib6i eletmii', in ED, p. 9. 
8 I think of a radio talk of Imre Mecs, broadcasted in the auhnm1 of 2000. 
9 DRS pp. 43lfi 
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Bonhoeffer's famous 16 July 1944letter10 . Similarly to Bib6's picture of 
Christ, we may be right in assuming that the unusual approach was intended to 
reveal Bib6's own thoughts about the suffering God who was with him 
especially when he had forsaken him. Nevertheless, these two particular texts of 
the late Bib6 have to be regarded as rare exceptions: indirect expressions of his 
personal faith. Whatever richness of theological thought may be attributed to 
them, these exceptional texts cannot serve us as a solid ground for reconstructing 
the shape and content ofBib6's Christianity. The starting point for this 
reconstruction lies elsewhere. If a solid ground can be found, the expressions of 
Bib6's personal faith can be associated to it. 
The Influence of Max Weber 
My thesis is that it was Max Weber's sociological theory of Christianity 
that exercised the most important individual influence on Bib6's image of 
Christianity and on his view ofthe impact of Christianity on social development. 
My argument is built on Bib6's first public address and his later comment on it. 
As a student in his final year at Gymnasium (grammar school) Bib6 was asked to 
give a talk on the day of the Reformation, 31 October, 1928. Thus, the Reformed 
student of the Roman Catholic Gymnasium addressed his audience with a talk 
titled 'What has the Reformation Meant to Humankind?' 11 In the 
autobiographical interview, recorded during 1977 and 1978, he remembered the 
address like this: 
"Regarding Max Weber I also need to tell that in my eighth year as a Reformed 
young man I had to give a memorial talk about the Reformation, that I held on 
the basis of the famous article ofMax Weber, given into my hand by my father. 
It was my first encounter with Max Weber who excercised a great influence on 
me then and ever since" 12 
This statement remains the only direct reference to the influence of 
Weber on Bib6. Bib6 never mentioned Weber's name in the interview again, and 
10 Istvan Bib6, 'Ket verselemzes' in Confessio, 4 (l979) pp. 75-80. 
11 lstvan Bib6, 'Mit jelentett a reformaci6 az emberiseg szamara?' in: EgyhOzi Hirado, 1928 
november 10, pp. 2-3, also in: ED pp. 85-86. 
12 ED p. 216. 
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only very few marginal references to Weber's works can be found in Bib6's 
studies as well 13 . Apart from this statement and the address that Bib6 reffered to 
in it, I know only two important writings of Bib6 with which a connection to 
Weber's theory can be built. 
The first writing is an extensive review ofKarl Mannheim's Diagnosis of 
our Time14, published in 1943 and reviewed by Bib6 in the same year. In the 
seventh lecture ofhis collection of his essays, 'Towards a New Social 
Philosophy', Mannheim refers to Weber's theory and applies it to his own 
research in a rather characteristic manner. The way Mannheim underlines the 
characteristics of Weber's scholarly approach may closely be associated to the 
Weberian impact reflected by Bib6's writings from the very outset. 
The second text is a passage from the late essay, 'Reflections on the 
Social Development of Europe', that contains some comments on the Protestant 
Reformation15 . These comments also reflect the Weberian background that 
appears behind the student address. The student address, the review of 
Mannheim's study and the comments on the Reformation will serve us as a 
literary basis for elaborating our hypothesis of Weber's impact on Bib6. 
The literary evidence for the statement of the late Bib6 is rather weak. 
Nevertheless, I think, the statement should be taken seriously. A careful reading 
ofBib6's writings will not only justify its weight but also help us identify the 
way Bib6 approached Christianity and theological theory. First we will see the 
contents ofthe address and then we will examine the emphasis given by 
Mannheim to Weber's theory, and finally we will review the comments on the 
Reformation. 
In his student address Bib6 spoke of "great thoughts" of the Reformation 
that were to reshape the face of the world. These great thoughts are: returning to 
the basis of the Gospel; the free search for the truth instead of being determined 
by dogmas; the focus on humans as individuals instead of regarding them as 
13 VT-I. p. 26. and p. 66., references to Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellscha.ft (Tubingen, 1922) in his 
Coercion, Law, Freedom. 
14 Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis o_four Time: Wartime Essays a_[ a Sociologist. Kegan Paul. 
London, 1943 
15 DRS pp. 469f. 
members of social orders; putting the grace of God into the centre instead of 
the outward means of salvation; active faith instead of contemplative religion. 
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Returning to the basis of the Gospel meant to evaluate Chrisian teaching 
and practice in the light of the Scripture again and allow laypeople to be nurtured 
and strengthened by daily Bible-reading. Bib6 stressed that this blessing was 
accessible for rich and poor alike. Free search for truth, secondly, was practiced 
first only within theology, but this practice later was extended to the areas of 
natural science and culture as well. The medieval understanding of the human 
being as collective person, thirdly, was replaced by the focus on individual 
values, and, although individual evaluation of people sometimes reached extreme 
forms, it was still the basis ofEuropean culture that needed a special attention at 
a time when Communism wished to degenerate people into a mass. Fourthly, the 
Reformation created a self-conscious, disciplined type of person by stressing the 
gracious election of God and abandoning the use of outward means of salvation: 
this new type embodies a great moral strength and capability of perseverance. 
Finally, however, 
"[i]t was the Christian world-view (Weltanschauung) that has changed by the 
Reformation to the highest degree. According to medieval thinking, the ideal 
Christian life could be pursued only in isolation from the world. According to the 
Protestant world-view, however, perfect Christian life can be pursued only in the 
world, among sinful people and real temptations to sin, since perfect Christian 
life is not only the means of our own salvation but also a witness to Christ in the 
world, whose way is continouos labour in the world and the faithful completion 
of our calling. The word "calling" appeared first in Luther's translation of the 
Bible and remained significant for the whole of Protestantism to our days. While 
according to medieval ideology work for those who did not have to pursue it for 
providing their daily bread by it meant only an aid in fighting against 
temptations, Protestantism made the Pauline sentence important again: those 
who do not work should not eat. "16 
In his closing sentences Bib6 spoke ofthe "eternal ideas" of the 
Reformation. They are a permanent feeding on Scripture, an untlagging search 
for the truth, a high evaluation of work, the development of our talents to put 
them into service of "the idea of Christ" that are to be realised in our own life 
and our own circles. 
16 ED p. 86. 
What the "famous article" of Weber that Bib6 relied on was, cannot 
exactly be determined now, still, we may identify the possible source. The 
argumentation of the address closely reminds us to the train of thoughts of lhe 
Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. The "great thoughts" that Bib6 
identified as significant fruits of the Reformation are leading topics of Weber's 
study. Bib6 could even read the study in a Hungarian translation- or at least a 
review of it -before 1928. 
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The student Bib6's reception of Weber's argumentation shows a tendency 
to simplification and concentration at the same time. Simplification is probably a 
most natural treatment in a case like this: fine distinctions as well as 
presentations of complex connections between causes and effects simply 
evaporated from Bib6's text. The concentration, however, is more than a mere 
compression of Weber's thoughts into a telegram-style text. Bib6 presents all the 
"great thoughts" in a form that reflects the structure of a pronouncement of 
freedom. 
Although freedom appears literally only in the reference to the "free 
search for truth", all the "great thoughts" express a content that can be described 
as an event of freedom: both freedom from something and freedom for 
something. Returning to the basis of the Gospel is understood as returning to the 
source of freedom, that, as its social consequence, sets lay people free from the 
tutelage of the clergy for pursuing a responsible life in their own right. Free 
search for truth means freedom from the rule of preconceptions and freedom for 
relaxed observation of experiences. Emphasising individual values means setting 
people free from their social order and making them free for building up their 
own identity. Further, the Reformation freed the believer from the control ofthe 
outward means of salvation, possessed by the medieval church, for being able 
and ready to accept the strengthening grace in a direct relationship with the 
gracious God. Finally, the new world-view proved to be effective enough in 
setting people free from a legal evaluation of this-worldly work and free for the 
acknowledgement ofwork as God's calling. Whatever reflections and 
evaluations these statements may receive - even Bib6 made a critical remark on 
the possibility of extreme individualism - it is clear that the student Bib6's 
general assertions reflect his understanding of freedom as both freedom from and 
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freedom for something. The presence of these two aspects of freedom seems to 
be finely balanced; all the "great thoughts" are structured by the balanced 
togetherness of the aspects of "from" and "forn 
The element of"free search for truth", however, has a greater significance 
than being merely one item among others. Within Bib6's order it stands at the 
second place, following the first element, "returning to the basis of the gospel". 
By beginning his presentation of the influence of the Reformation with this 
element Bib6 expressed his awareness that the original causes of the 
Reformation were theological ones. By putting "free search for truth" at the 
second place he emphasised, I think, the most important consequence ofthe 
theological breakthrough. Let us remember the development of this thought 
again: free search for truth was practiced first only within theology, but this 
practice later was extended to the areas of natural science and culture as well. 
Originating from the theological event, free search for truth became the source of 
the secular fruits of the Reformation. 
By concentrating on this aspect ofBib6's argument I not only suggest 
that, having encountered the scholarship of Weber, Bib6 was aware of the social 
impact oftheological thoughts and forms of piety that continuously played a part 
in his own scholarship later. It is true in itself, but I emphasise a more important 
correspondence of their thoughts. Highlighting the element of a free search for 
truth Bib6 prepared the ground for following an experiential method in his own 
research. I am not sure whether or not the seventeen-year-old student was aware 
of the significance of the direction he had taken; however, as we will shortly see, 
years later he made a conscious decision for the experiential method to which he 
adhered until the end ofhis life. 
At this point, and as the second piece of writing in our literary evidence, I 
present Mannheim's application ofWeber's theory that renders the utmost 
significance of the experiental method both for theological and sociological 
research. Here I wish to display the perspective Bib6 turned to when he had 
chosen the experiential approach. The development of his thought will be easier 
for us to understand if we see its epistemological framework as well as the 
possibilities the framework is able to offer. The framework and its possibilities 
are nowhere described in Mannheim's concentrated manner in the works ofBib6, 
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therefore I make Mannheim speak for Bib6 here. Apart from Bib6's thoughts 
that can be fitted into this framework, our indirect literally evidence for ascribing 
Mannheim views to Bib6 is the latter's enthusiastic review of the Mannheim 
study. 
Within a comparison ofthe positions ofProtestantism and Catholicism 
with respect to a planned democratic order, Mannheim wrote: 
"The genuine contribution of Protestantism is bound to come from its emphasis 
on the freedom of the individual, its self-determination, its emphasis on 
voluntary co-operation, self-help and mutual aid. These will always be the great 
antitheses to the coming forms of authoritarianism, centralisation and 
organisation from above. It would be misleading to interpret our appreciation of 
the significance of systematic thought in Thomism as an attempt to ignore the 
contribution Protestantism has made to the growth of modern rationalism. Just 
the opposite is true. Max Weber's historical investigations have shown how the 
spirit of modem Capitalism - foresight, calculation, systematisation of life -
developed as an answer to the challenge of the Calvinist doctrine of 
predestination. Let us add to this that the attempt to replace the Church-dictated 
interpretation of the world by sects and individuals represents a continuous effort 
to reinterpret the world in terms of one's own peculiar experiences. Those 
reinterpretations equally make use of rational thinking, but in a completely new 
sense. It is as if one were to look at a previously established universe from the 
angle of one's own, i.e. from the individual's perspective. ( ... )Rationality 
becomes individualised rationality, departing very often from the authoritatively 
established universe of discourse to lend expression to the experience of the 
world as it presents itself to struggling smaller groups or to the lonely individual. 
( ... ) [M]odern experimentalism is born out of this individualised rationality 
which does not accept a pre-established system of metaphysics, but is ready to 
change the hypothesis if new facts and unexpected experiences do not fit into the 
scheme." 17 
Here Mannheim drafted an outline of a comprehensive critical theory on 
the basis ofMax Weber's investigations. The subject of this theory is the self-
determined individual. The theory begins with the experience of individuals or 
marginal groups- "Protestant sects" in the setting of Weber's research; it 
emphasises the rationalistic understanding of these experiences to question the 
validity of "grand theories" of any kind, pre-established and imposed in an 
autoritative way from above. I have mentioned earlier that Bib6 adhered to the 
experiential method until the end of his life. Here I can add that the method 
served as a critical theory for him. Now we will take an unchronological step to 
17 Mamlheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. l07f. 
see how Bib6 formulated his claim for this critical theory at the end of his last 
significant work, 'Reflections on the Social Development ofEurope': 
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"It is said that Moltke once advised a young soldier to turn to the classics if he 
wanted to read good writing on the science of strategy, because the classical 
authors had not yet lost their instinct to look for the intrinsic causes of things. 
Public thinking in today's Europe is, by and large, lacking this instinct. This is 
not exclusively the fault ofMarxism. Originally, it may have been Christianity-
with its ideologised cosmic explanations - that for centuries eroded the ability of 
Europeans to follow simple phenomena back to their own causes, instead of 
trying to force them into special stereotypes, be they the schematics of salvation 
and divine providence or class interests and class society" 18 
The expression of the "instinct to look for the intrinsic causes ofthings" 
may be understood as the inclination to give preference to experiences over 
grand theories; thus the late Bib6 seems to represent the critical theory we 
identified in Mannheim's words. From a theological point of view and even from 
a purely epistemological aspect "experience" and "intrinsic causes ofthings", 
however, are highly problematic expressions. I will be unable to pursue a 
comprehensive analysis and evaluation ofthese notions within the limit ofthis 
study. The most I can do is to clarify later as closely as possible what Bib6 meant 
by these expressions, and what role they play with respect to his social theory 
and its theological relevance. This clarification will prepare his theory for a 
comparison to that ofBonhoeffer, that is, the ultimate aim of this study. 
The third text of the few pieces of literary evidence is the late comment 
on the social significance of the Protestant Reformation. The argumentation of 
the text follows the fundamental conviction of the late Bib6, that European 
history is part of the "Christian experiment" of eliminating the spasms of fear, 
hatred and violence 19, and Weberian elements have been inserted into this 
framework. In accordance with his fundamental conviction, Bib6 regarded as a 
negative consequence ofthe church schism that "the medieval sructure ofthe 
Christian Church's organisation was eliminated ( ... ), the universal credibility of 
the Church's moral-ideological teaching-power rooted in the papacy ofRome 
(capable of much greater achievements) was also eliminated( ... ), and in the 
18 DRS pp. 52 If. 
19 DRS p. 453. 
76 
German Low Countries" an absolutist rule had been developed. At the same 
time, he continued, "regardless of how many dangerous side effects Puritanism 
and Pietism had, we must qualify as a positive development the greater 
seriousness, bordering on deadly earnestness, with wich moral requirements 
were treated in the Protestant countries"20 His emphasis on moral values is an 
unmistakable sign of the impact of Weber. Similarly, he emphasised "that the 
modern rationalist thesis, according to which Reformation in itself was a special 
propagator of political liberties, is not valid for Lutheranism, or even Calvinism; 
it is applicable, at most, only to the non-affiliated free sects. The true effect of 
the Reformation was not in its direct striving for political liberties, but in its 
influence in creating a morally demanding type of people, who subsequently 
increased their requirements for political liberties. "21 We can see that the late 
Bib6 modified his rather uncritical first adaptation of Weber's evaluation of the 
impact of Protestantism, and he highlighted the particular attention Weber payed 
to the role of "free sects". 
Having reviewed the literary evidence ofWeber's lasting impact on Bib6, 
and before we proceed to explore into Bib6's texts, I should record one more 
problem that may make the common view of Weber, Mannheim and Bib6 
troublesome in the perspective of today's Western Protestant theologians. Weber, 
Mannheim and the young Bib6 seem to share the unquestioned view that the 
subject ofProtestant ethics and, consequently, sociologically relevant 
Christianity is the self-determined individual. This liberal view was radically 
criticised by early twentieth century neo-orthodox theologians - Bonhoeffer 
among them- and is still regarded by many as a failure of Protestantism. Against 
this background the starting point ofBib6's critical theory would seem a 
hopelessly anacronistic one, so much so that one would not even consider it is 
sensible enough to engage into a critical discussion with it. 
To bridge the gap between this liberal view and contemporary theological 
awareness, I refer to Reinhard Hiitter's study, 'The Twofold Center ofLutheran 
20 DRS p. 469. 
11 DRS p.470. 
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Ethics- Christian Freedom and God's Commandments'22, that I briefly 
reviewed in chapter 1. We have seen that Hi.itter listed three theological answers 
to the challenge of "the modern theological impoverishment of Protestant 
ethics", caused by the overemphasising ofthe idea of the self-determined 
individual. We will keep in mind the three possible answers to the fallacy of 
modern Protestant ethics, decentering, differentiating and recontextualising the 
moral agent while we will discuss the development ofBib6's concept of freedom. 
B. Bib6's Understanding of Freedom in his Dissertation: 
'Coercion, Law, Freedom'23 
a. The Method: the Empirical Way of Developing a Concept 
There are basically two ways of developing a concept of any phenomena 
of human society or the human spirit: the rational way and the empirical way. 
The rational way means defining a concept first then classifying and analysing 
the raw material of experience later by approaching it through the pre-defined 
concept. According to the empirical method, however, the first step is the 
classification and analysis of empirical facts until finally a concept emerges. A 
choice between the two ways is not a question of the logical priority of 
experience or concept but, first of all, a question of terminological practicability. 
Nevertheless, a decision about a terminological question is related to the 
fundamental question of epistemology. 
The rational method is apparently clear: if we define a concept in 
advance, it is sufficient to subsequently draw its conclusions, that is, describe the 
experiences that belong to the concept. This process is, however, a dangerous 
one. The defined concept may happen not to match the experiential facts. 
22 In Karen Bloomquist and Jolm R. Stmmue, eds., The Promise of Lutheran Ethics, Fortress Press, 
Minneapolis, 1998, pp. 31-54. 
23 
'Kenyszer, jog, szabadsag' [Corecion, Law, Freedom] was written in 1933 and won a 
competition for its author that year that made Bib6 qualified to apply for a state-sponsored 
scholarship. First publication: Istvan Bib6, Kenyszer, jog, szabadsag, Szeged Varosi Nyomda es 
Konyvkiad6 Rt., Szeged, 1935. (Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum Reg. Universitatis Hung. 
Francisco-Josephiane. Sectio: Juridico-Politica, 8.) The new critical edition was published in: 
VT-I. pp. 7-147. Nmnbers in parentheses in this section refer to the page numbers of this edition. 
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Moreover, the defined concept may step into the place of the experiential facts 
and an inversion may take place between them. 
The empirical method, contrary to the rational method, apparently suffers 
from an inner contradiction: it aims to develop a concept by the completion of 
the investigation; however, it cannot even start the process of developing it 
without creating some concept about the phenomena in question. A process of 
investigation that begins with an - albeit provisional - pre-defined concept is 
unable to avoid to have some rational or even dogmatic elements in it. The 
dilemma may be solved, however, if we insist that the pre-defined concept is, by 
its nature, different from the concept that is finally to be developed. The pre-
defined concept is created not logically but merely grammatically: it is a 
grammatical description of irrational empirical facts as well as related 
spontaneous reflections and primary notions. Thus, while operating with pre-
defined concepts, which is a grammatical necessity in itself, one has to bear in 
mind that they are not logical definitions. At the same time, while marking off 
and naming the piece of empirical reality that is to be investigated means using 
rational tools, it is far from being a rational process. On the contrary, it is the 
most appropriate way of empirical cognition: it seeks to grasp the empirical 
reality of the phenomenon. Therefore, the empirical method of developing a 
concept is not a deduction from a rational standpoint, but a critical treatment of 
an irrational standpoint that is gradually developed into a piece of conceptual 
knowledge (VT-1. 7-9). This is the way Bib6 wishes to proceed in his 
investigation. 
Bib6's choice of his method, naturally, reflects more about the character 
of his thinking than being merely an answer to "a question of terminological 
practicability". On the one hand, he does not express any deliberation with 
respect to the trustworthiness of experience. He regards it as necessary to 
identify a piece of empirical reality as the object of an investigation, and he 
seems to be certain that empirical reality can be appropriately investigated. On 
the other hand, he expresses a radical distrust towards pre-defined concepts that 
may obscure empirical reality before it can be fully investigated. It seems to be 
clear that he wishes to set the empirical facts free from the rule of concepts and 
not vice versa. He does not want to suspend the use of rational concepts; his 
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readiness to use pre-defined concepts as "grammatical necessities" and also his 
purpose to reach "a piece of conceptual knowledge" makes him different from a 
merely empiricist thinker, showing that Bib6's main purpose is rather to establish 
a priority between concept and empirical facts, even if he tries to deny it. 
It is striking to remember here the already quoted sentences that ten years 
later Mannheim wrote with Weber in his mind, because they throw light on the 
social significance ofBib6's decision that Bib6 was most likely unaware of in 
1933: 24 As the train ofthought ofthe study develops, we will see how "empirical 
fact" will gain the concreteness of"one's own peculiar experience". 
b. Coercion 
Bib6 found it necessary to investigate the phenomenon of coercion as a 
starting point. Scholarly literature, he argued, discussed freedom and law 
extensively: freedom had often been regarded as an opposite of coercion and law 
as something related to coercion, but few words were spent on coercion itself 
Although coercion as an experience had been rather clearly described, a 
conceptual knowledge of coercion had not been developed, because different 
authors emphasised different components of the phenomenon of coercion ( VT-1. 
1 0). 
1. Coercion as an Inner Experience; Three Preliminary Obsen,ations; 
the Appearance of the Fundamental Concept qf Bib6 's Study 
Following his self-chosen method, the empirical mode of developing a 
concept, Bib6 stated that coercion isfirst of all an inne,-25 phenomenon (VT-1. 
11 ). Coercion has to be manifested as the personal experience of someone who is 
capable of taking up a position of will. Therefore, the centre of gravity of 
coercion as an inner experience is to be found on the part of the constrained 
24 Mannheim, Diagnosis o.lour Time, p. 108. 
25 The Hungarian word that is trJnslated as inner here is /elki that might be translated as mental 
or psychological as well. 
person. Lived experience provides the first and basic information about 
coercion, and other components, such as where or in whom the origin of 
coercion can be found are only of a secondary importance (VT-1. 12). 
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The second characteristic of coercion as an inner experience is that the 
coercive phenomenon always appears as an opposing, alien power against the 
will of the constrained one. Whether they are outward or inward forces, even 
ethical principles that someone follows without identifying with them, are alien 
to the spontaneous will of the constrained person (VT-1. 12). Here spontaneity, 
the decisive concept ofBib6's study appears in his argumentation. 
The concept of spontaneity is the starting point of B i b6' s train of thought. 
The concept itself is taken from the work of Henri Bergson26, whose decisive 
influence is reflected also in the main text ofBib6's dissertation (VT-1. 58). 
Bib6's fundamental conviction that the spontaneous self is independent from 
causal determination, which appears in the subsequent argument in several 
forms, shows Bergson' s influence too. However, as the Editor of the Selected 
Works notes, it makes the understanding ofBib6's dissertation rather difficult 
that the author himself did not elaborate the concept of spontaneity right at the 
beginning of his study27 
The third characteristic of coercion is that it is not identical to either the 
phenomenon in which it originates or the will that suffers from it; coercion is 
rather a certain relationship of the originator and the receiver. Therefore, a 
constrained will appears as a phenomenon that is dependent on, preconditioned 
and caused by the constraining phenomenon. Thus, coercion is more than being 
affected, it is rather being determined. Here the original experiential description 
turns into a conceptual definition, as being determined may be related to the 
category of causality (VT-1. 13). 
26 Bergson, Henri: Zeit und i'reiheit, Jena. 1911 
27 See editorial note I., VT -I. p. 638. 
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2. Coercion as v'inved under the A.spects qf Causality and Spontaneity: 
the Introduction of the Synoptic Method 
These three observations relate coercion both to the category of 
spontaneity and causality. Bib6 regards these categories as aspects under which 
phenomena can be viewed and observed. When speaking about coercion as 
viewed under both the aspects of causality and spontaneity, Bib6 applies the so-
called ~ynoptic methocf8, developed by his teacher, Barna Horvath. In Horvath's 
theory of the sociology oflaw the synoptic method means a method of 
observation that applies the normative and the factual approach in a parallel way. 
The observer views facts not only according to the factual approach but also the 
normative approach and vice versa: norms are viewed according to the factual 
approach besides the normative approach. Thus, both norms and facts are viewed 
according to approaches that are characteristic to them on the one hand and alien 
to them on the other. The result of this method is a knowledge of social reality in 
which facts appear as touched by norms and norms appear as related to facts. 
When Bib6 finally reaches his first short definition of coercion, he 
applies the structure provided by the synoptic method: 
"Coercion is nothing else than a synoptic view of the phenomena of spontaneity, 
that is, their view under the aspect of spontaneity as their characteristic approach, 
and the aspect of causality as their alien approach." (VT-1. 17) 
The definition contains three important statements. First, coercion 
appears primarily in human spontaneity (cf. the second preliminary observation 
above); therefore, second, the characteristic approach of viewing coercion is the 
aspect of spontaneity; third, although coercion can be viewed under the aspect of 
causality, causality always remains an alien approach to viewing coercion. From 
these statements a decisive assertion follows: 
"The relationship of the coercive force and the constrained person never turns 
into a causal relationship, even if extreme coercion occurs, because a position of 
28 For a detailed description of the synoptic method see editorial note 7., VT -I. pp. 643f. 
will [on the part of the constrained person] is always wedged in this 
relationship as an indispensable phenomenon of coercion." UT-/. 17-18) 
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This is the core ofBib6's understanding of coercion, and his fundamental 
conviction works as an organising force in the course ofthe discussion of further 
details. First he discusses coercion as subjective experience, then as social 
objectivation. These sections are followed by a summary of the traditional 
differentiation within the concept of coercion, an inquiry into the ethical aspects 
of coercion, and finally a re-statement of the unified concept of coercion. 
Disregarding several details, now we turn to Bib6's treatment of coercion as 
subjective experience and as social objectivation. 
3. Coercion as Subjective Experience 
Since coercion is, first of all, a psychological experience, its most direct 
manifestation is the experience of being constrained. There are two components 
of this experience. The first one is the awareness that the constrained person's 
position of will is dependent on the coercive force: this component seems to 
represent a causal necessity. The second one is the awareness that the view of the 
position of the same will under the aspect of causality is alien to it. When Bib6 
applies the category of causality, he stresses that it may be used to a great extent 
with respect to the phenomena of nature (although its absolute value had been 
questioned by Heisenberg, whose discoveries Bib6 was aware of), but when it is 
related to social phenomena, its alien character must not be overlooked29 . Two 
important statements arise from this distinction. Any foreseeable or seemingly 
necessary event will not be regarded as coercion, if someone considers it 
harmonious with one's spontaneous will. In turn, any force outside or inside the 
constrained person's psyche, whatever positive meaning it may have, if it 
opposes the spontaneous direction of the will, will manifest itself as a source of 
coercion. That may be observed at an experimental level: any coercion that 
would force some high moral standard or a good outcome is in need of some 
justification. This very need shows that coercion has to legitimate itself over 
against the will that regards it as an opposing force. Finally, the need of 
29 See Bib6's extensive footnote 15 .. VT-I. pp. 15f. 
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legitimisation reflects the relative evaluation of coercion: it is regarded as had 
on the part of the constrained one ( VT-1. 19). 
Thus, the innermost core of coercion as a subjective experience is the 
position of will, reacting against an alien force. Only after the resisting direction 
of personal will has been born can we speak about coercion as a subjective 
experience. Therefore, a distinction between effective and ineffective coercion is 
nonsensical, since we cannot speak about coercion before the will has reacted 
against it: coercion begins with its effect on the will. Further, since it is totally up 
to the constrained person to say whether he or she feels constrained, a high 
degree of relativity is characteristic of coercion as subjective experience. A 
spontaneous act of will may be turned into the effect of irresistible coercion, or 
an alien force may be regarded as the spontaneous choice ~~the will by 
conscious or unconscious judgement, depending on what effecting factor appears 
as alien or as characteristic to the personality later. This relative character of 
coercion as a subjective experience is intrinsic, and it may even become 
outwardly objective to some degree ( VT-1. 21 ). 
4. Coercion as Social O~jectivation 
The primary manifestation of coercion, as stated, is a subjective 
experience. However, if members of society become mutually aware of each 
other's experiences ofbeing constrained, ifthey are able to recognise the 
constrained character of outward acts, if they are capable of deducing the typical 
features of coercion from similar features of several constrained acts of 
behaviour and identifying the peculiar contents of constrained behaviour, thus 
finally creating an objective social institution out of the experience of coercion; 
if members of society follow this direction, then as a result, the subjective 
experience of coercion will turn into a socially significant phenomenon, a 
relational concept qfsocial relevance, or, in short, a social ohjectivation ( VT-1. 
22). 
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Bib6, accordingly, explains the development of a social objectivation30 
in four steps. First, the experiencing subject turns his or her experiences into 
objects by reflective thinking. Second, repeated experiences serve as a basis for 
abstraction; their common characteristics can be named and identified. Here the 
objectivation of a personal experience is completed. The social objectivation 
starts when, as a third step, our personal experiences will be related to acts of 
outward behaviour. Finally, the generalisation ofthis outward behaviour allows 
us to relate it back to the personal experiences of other people. Thus, social 
objectivation is a process with manifold aspects that proceeds from lived 
experience to reflected knowledge, from the unique to the repeated, from the 
concrete to the abstract (VT-I 23). 
A comparison of a unique experience to a social objectivation reveals a 
certain fictional character of the latter. Objective expressions like 'a people likes 
its ruler' do not refer to every possible personal experience, but presuppose their 
likely existence until their opposite will does not become objective as well. 
However, if objectivations become empty of their respective personal 
experiences, they will become fictitious assertions and loose their social reality. 
Acts of social coercion may be very different with respect to the degree 
oftheir objectivation. Only some social rules reach a high degree of 
accountability, like certain conventions, moral practices and, especially, written 
Jaw. Nevertheless, absolute coercion is a contradiction in terms, since an 
expression like that would regard coercion as a necessity that resembles the law 
of nature, and would deny the indispensable role ofthe resisting human will (VT-
1. 25). 
30 Similarly to the synoptic methocl Bib6 took the concept of social objectivation from the works 
of his teacher, Bama Horvath. Bib6 uses some - but not all - of Horvat' s distinctions within his 
own work, such as fonnal and material objectivation, but generally he applies the concept 
according to the need of his own order of ideas. Formal objcctivation may happen in case of the 
similarity of individual - both psychological and biological - acts, but it does not have any 
distinguishable contents. Material objectivation. however. has a content, such as granmw, or 
cultural and social phenomena. For a detailed presentation of the original use of the concept of 
objectivation in Horvath's works see editorial note 10 .. VT -I. pp. 645f.. 
5. A Working Definition of Power, Originating.from 
the Concept of Coercion 
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At this point ofhis investigation ofthe phenomenon of coercion Bibo 
offers a working definition of power. Arguing that really significant socially 
objective coercion comes from socially objective phenomena (e.g. rules of public 
action), Bibo states that people usually attribute power to those social 
phenomena that are capable of overcoming resistance. Thus, power is a 
potentiality of practising coercion (VT-J 26). When reaching this definition, 
Bibo immediately challenges his own view by mentioning a different 
understanding of power just to express his own view even sharper. It is 
customary, he says, to define the phenomenon of power so broadly that the 
generation of the positive, non-resistant answer of the spontaneous will is also 
regarded as power. However, a definition like that forgets that inward resistance 
refers to coercion not less than open resistance does. While the free participation 
of some is an indispensable factor of power, it creates power only because it 
makes it possible to constrain others. Whenever we speak about the power of 
convention or moral rules, we do not regard them as phenomena that call the will 
to spontaneous following, but that overcome inward or outward resistance (VT-1. 
27). 
Bibo's definition of power reveals a fundamental characteristic of his 
thinking. His concept of coercion is as broad as possible: he regards even a short-
term inward resistance ofthe will against whatever positive effect as coercion. 
To coercion, broadly understood in this way, also a relative evaluation is added, 
since coercion represents something that is bad (VT-1. 19). This broad 
understanding - and also the related evaluation- is also applied when he defines 
power as effective coercion. However, if power is defined with respect to a 
broadly understood coercion, the concept of power turns into a rather narrow 
one. Here Bibo's strange statement, that although the free participation of some 
people is an indispensable factor of power, it creates power only because it 
makes it possible to constrain others, seems to come home: already at this point 
of his argumentation Bib6 tries to exclude a possible definition of power from 
the perspective of freedom. Within our analysis ofBib6's understanding of 
freedom we will pay particular attention to what he might say about the 
relationship offreedom and power. 
6. A Tentative Theological Reading of Bib6's Understanding [!{Coercion 
86 
By starting his investigation into the complex phenomena of the 
interrelationship of coercion, freedom and law with coercion, and by identifying 
coercion as an inner psychical experience that is alien to the spontenous will of 
the person, Bib6 stabilised the ultimate locus of his research that is to provide the 
decisive information for his developing theory. The ultimate locus is the human 
psyche and the ultimate information originates in the spontaneous reaction of the 
psyche to outward events. With this decision Bib6 asserts no less than that the 
spontaneous attitude ofthe human being is an ultimately decisive, unavoidable 
factor for any attempt to build a theory. This conviction can be detected in a 
rather implicit way throughout the later phases ofBib6's studies, and not earlier 
than in the introductory part of the 'Reflections on the Social Development of 
Europe' it appears in an explicit and a thematised manner. Here Bib6 starts his 
theory "with the existentialist thesis that man is the only living being aware of 
his mortality" 31 . 
The phenomenon of coercion is described in a relational manner, a 
relation of the spontaneous position of the will to an outward effect. This 
relational description makes room for basic theological insights. Let us highlight 
the twofold thesis ofBib6's argumentation again: any event will not be regarded 
as coercion, if someone considers it harmonious with his or her spontaneous will, 
however, any force outside or inside the constrained person's psyche, whatever 
positive meaning it may have, if it opposes the spontaneous direction ofthe will, 
it will manifest itself as a source of coercion. The first thesis resembles Luther's 
31 DRS p. 425. The translation uses gender-exclusive language throughout; and although I would 
rather use gender-inclusive language, I do not want to change the translatioR because I think that 
Bib6 in the late sixties - early seventies was not aware of this problem. 
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description ofthe 'prelapsarian life' of human beings, and also the life ofthe 
believer, who has been placed 'back to paradise' by his union with Christ, and 
who is capable of doing 'intrinsically good acts' that are born out of Christian 
freedom32 . The Christian, pictured this way, will not consider God's 
commandments as coercion, since the direction of his or her spontaneous will is 
identical to that of the commandments, they are not considered as alien forces. 
The second thesis resembles the sate ofthe human being post lapsum, outside of 
the union with Christ: God's commandments, that are positive in themselves, are 
perceived and regarded as alien, constraining forces. 
Notwithstanding these resonances, there is a fundamental difference 
between Luther's and Bib6's understanding of the human situation: the latter does 
not pass an a priori and general judgement on the spontaneous position of the 
human will, stating that it is radically sinful. Nevertheless, Bib6 does not say that 
the spontaneous will is right either. Instead of constructing a formal evaluation, 
he stays within the limits of his empirical method when he speaks about the 
relative, that is, the unreliable character of subjective experience. The human 
psyche is capable of deceiving itself and also the other about one's own 
spontaneous experiences. Therefore, while Bib6 does not say formally that the 
human psyche is sinful, he does say that it is capable of sinning, pointing at the 
possibility of lying. We may emphasise here that according to much traditional 
theology lying is one of the most fundamental forms of sin; likewise, we may 
also think that the way Bib6 expressed the unreliable character of subjective 
experience may be a reaction to a contextual background that is implicit here. 
The closing thought of his argumentation, that this relative character of coercion 
as a subjective experience is intrinsic, and it may even become outwardly 
objective to some degree, reflects both his awareness of the radicality of sin and 
its capability of developing into a supra-personal organism. Nevertheless, Bib6's 
awareness of the unreliable character of subjective experience does not distract 
him from insisting that for the empirical method the thorough investigation of 
subjective experience is an unavoidable task 
32 Cf. Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics: Christian Freedom and God's 
Commandments', in: Bloomquist and Stumme eds., The Promise of Lutheran Ethics, pp. 40f. 
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This last comment is also important with respect to the identification of 
Bib6's description of the development of a socially relevant phenomenon or a 
social objectivation. He pictures this development as a process from below, 
starting from subjective experience, in which subjective experience remains 
active even at the more abstract level. Bib6 stresses that if subjective experience 
evaporates from a developed social objectivation, the objectivation will loose its 
social reality. We can read it as a yet another argument for the unavoidability of 
subjective experience, even for a complex social theory, and, consequently, for a 
theology of sociality. 
I think we can risk a fundamental insight about a possible theological 
reading ofBib6's texts already at this point of our research. We have seen that 
the empirically perceptible human self forms the basis for the reflections that are 
constitutive in the development ofBib6's social theory. Consequently, we are 
looking for possibilities of a theological reading that provide a creative role to 
this empirically perceptible human self Among the three movements that are 
gathered together in HOtter's study as endeavours to overcome the fiasco of 
modern Protestantism, both differentiating and recontextualising the moral 
subject seem to provide a framework for a reading like this. As we continue our 
reading ofBib6's texts, we will try to answer the question whether Bib6, if 
interpreted in these frameworks, can provide some viable way out of the fallacy 
of modern Protestantism as identified by Hutter.. 
c. Freedom -a Preliminmy Definition 
Generally speaking, Bib6 understands the concept of freedom as the 
opposite of system, determination or necessity. However, a more accurate way of 
speaking would require us to avoid the expressions of determination or necessity 
as varieties of system33 , since they are burdened by confusing connotations, thus 
it is proper to use only system instead of them. Thus, a preliminary definition can 
33 l have translated the Hungarian word tarvenyszerii.w?g as system. The closest translation of the 
word is lawfulness in English. Since this word is closely associated with the theory and practice 
of the law in English, I have chosen system for its more general meaning, as Bib6 understood this 
expression. 
be formulated as follows: freedom is a kind C!f exemption from a kind C!f 
system, to which a question is to be added: tvhat kind of exemption from what 
kind of system (VT-1. 38)? 
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If we are inclined to assign system to the world of nature and, 
alternatively, exemption from system to the world of spontaneous human will, 
we may tend to conclude that freedom cannot be found in the natural world and 
the law of human will is freedom itself Neither conclusion is true. We cannot 
say that there is no authentic understanding of freedom outside of the human 
will. We cannot say either that freedom simply means all kinds of exemption 
from all kinds of system. On the contrary, the unconditional rule of some kinds 
of system may also mean the realisation of freedom U-T-1. 39). Therefore, it is to 
be decided which system effects freedom and which one causes captivity. To 
formulate a more refined preliminary definition, we may speak about freedom 
when a phenomenon is effected by a system of a corresponding nature, while a 
phenomenon under the influence of a system of an alien nature can be regarded 
as being in non-freedom. According to spontaneous evaluation, something is free 
if it is determined by an adequate or proper system or, speaking negatively, if it 
is exempt from an alien system. 
When, discussing the concept of coercion, Bib6 introduced the notion of 
the ,'jynoptic view, he showed a possibility of observing a phenomenon according 
to different aspects. Arguing that since things can be viewed under the rule of a 
certain system, therefore system, in fact, may be understood as a certain aspect 
from the point of view ofthe observing person, he applies the synoptic view by 
saying that phenomena can be effected by different kinds of system at the same 
time. A proper distinction between different kinds of aspects (or systems), 
however, is crucial. There is a difference between an aspect that is applied to the 
relationship of phenomena that are already known and another aspect that is of 
fundamental importance of primary cognition. In the latter case the aspect 
becomes a ruling system that is inseparable from the phenomena in question, 
while in the former case the alien aspect stands against the phenomena, even if it 
is applicable for their observation. Therefore, we will not call a phenomenon free 
for standing apart from the order of other things, but for being related to other 
things in a way that is completely understandable according to aspects or 
systems that are characteristic to it ( VT-l 41 ). 
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Having reached this distinction, however, Bib6 defines freedom as being 
exempt from the rule of alien systems and not as the status of phenomena ruled 
by systems which are characteristic to them. He argues that a rule of any system 
does not mean freedom if this ruling is undisturbed, that is, if even the mere 
possibility of an interfering alien system is excluded. Freedom means not a state 
of an undisturbed being but is born out of a situation when the reflecting 
consciousness relates the rule of a characteristic system to the presence of an 
alien system. Thus, freedom is a relational concept that is based on a negative 
viewing of the constellation of aspects. Therefore, its most general definition is 
created in a negative way: freedom is being exempt from any alien system (T-T-I 
41). 
The preliminary definition of the concept of freedom reveals an 
unresolved tension at the very heart ofBib6's understanding of freedom. At one 
point of the working out of his definition Bib6 allows for the possibility that the 
rule of a characteristic lawfulness can be regarded as freedom ( VT-1. 39), but 
later on he insists that the most general definition must be a negative one34 This 
conceptual dilemma sheds a sharp light on the character ofBib6's understanding 
of freedom whose significance we will discuss later. 
1. Freedom and Coercion 
When Bib6 starts discussing freedom and coercion in their direct, 
opposing relationship, he first asks the question whether this relationship is 
contrary or contradictmy (VT-1. 41 ). By contrary he means a mutually exclusive 
relationship, while contradictmy means an encounter that excludes a third 
possibility (principium exclusi tertii). His answer to this question is more than 
interesting. 
34 A certain swinging movement in Bib6's use and understanding of the concept of freedom was 
already noted by the opponents of Bib6's study, Professor Horvath and Professor Ereky. See their 
evaluation in ED pp. 94ff. 
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Concerning the whole natural and social world in general, Bib6 argues, 
the opposition of coercion and freedom is contrary and not contradictory. At the 
same time, in the world of human behaviour, that is, in the purely social world, 
their relationship is contradictory. The argument that Bib6 offers here is so dense 
that it is beyond intelligibility, however, his motives and purposes seem to be 
clear enough to reconstruct them. 
The framework ofthe understanding of reality within which Bib6 
organised his thoughts was informed by Nicolai Hartmann's ontology35 and the 
relatively new developments of quantum-theory. Both represented a world-view 
that presupposed a certain relatedness of the natural and the social world. 
Hartmann considered reality as a gradual organism of several strata from the 
inorganic level to the highest intellectual one. Similarly, the discovery of the 
statistical possibility within the world of nature questioned the unconditional rule 
of causality, which made the distinction between the natural and the social world 
a more relative one. Bib6 took consideration of these theories but wanted to 
avoid a possible consequence of them (in accordance with Bergson's social 
theory): to allow laws of the natural world to be applied to the world of human 
sociality. That is why he declared such a sharp difference between contrary and 
contradictory relationships. In the world of human sociality, whose characteristic 
system is spontaneity, it cannot happen that in some cases spontaneity could 
contrast with and exclude causality and in other cases causality would be strong 
enough to contrast with and exclude spontaneity. Spontaneity is always present 
as a characteristic system, and freedom is born out qf spontaneity's victorious 
contradiction to causality, the system that is alien within the world of human 
sociality. Therefore, the preliminary definition of freedom is completed as 
follows: 
"When the phenomena of the human soul and human society are considered, all 
forms ofbehaviour are to be regarded as free that are not constrained and vice 
versa. Consequently, different forms and variations of the concept of coercion 
that were discussed before, presuppose the same forms of freedom. Subjective 
experiences of coercion are opposed by subjective experiences of freedom, 
35 As the Editor of the Va/ogatott tanulmanyok notes, Bib6's reception ofHartmanns's theory 
was rather selective: that is why we cannot say that he followed Hartmatm's ontology, he was 
only informed by some of its elements. See editorial note 2., VT -I. pp. 638ff. 
objectivations of coercion stand against objectivations of freedom as well." 
(VT-1. 43) 
2. Freedom as Subjective Experience 
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The experience of freedom, similarly to the experience of coercion, is 
rooted in the psyche of the acting person. Freedom is a personal, individual, thus 
a relative phenomenon. It may mean both an effective resistance against the 
constraining force of an alien system and the unconditional acceptance of the 
characteristic system of human soul, that is, spontaneity. Thus, the broadest 
definition of freedom is a negative one: it contradicts the rule of any alien 
system (VT-1. 44). 
The relative character of freedom reveals itself in the possibility of 
'liberation of a certain group of people against their own will' (VT-1. 45). Since 
the characteristic system of social reality is spontaneity, there is no freedom that 
has a social reality apart from experienced freedom. Any other sort of 'freedom' 
is nothing else than postulated freedom. 
Personal experience is capable of testing the efficiency of an alien system 
as well. If it is debated whether a rule is regarded by a person or a group of 
persons as an effectively constraining, alien one, an experience of liberation that 
comes out of an exemption from the rule will affirm the coercive character of the 
latter. 
3. Freedom as Objectivation 
Freedom as a subjective experience may become objective in two forms: 
as a personal and negative freedom or positive freedom. The two forms are 
related to each other, but their relation is other than a gradual one: differences in 
their contents remain even at the highest grade of their development. 
Freedom grows into a personally objective phenomenon when unique 
experiences that belong to different situations and different decisions of the will 
become not only repeated ones but also related to each other. A person may 
consider his or her different experiences as part of the same freedom, and assign 
freedom as an objective, discernible reality to his or her personality. Objective 
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personal freedom will be recognised by others and compared to their own 
personal freedom. As a result, society itself can be characterised by free spheres 
of action that have been developed out of objectivations of personal freedom. 
The way from subjective freedom to objective personal freedom may be 
characterised by the difference of inward and outward. Likewise, this 
development can be recognised by reflecting on the gradual difference between 
an unwritten ethical rule and written law. Written law represents the strongest 
constraining force among ethical rules, and law is the most effective force also in 
providing the space for objective personal freedom by setting its limits. If 
everything is free that is not against the law, solid limits are effective in defining 
a space for personal freedom. Moreover, if limits are developed into a system of 
law, the institution of human rights appear as the highest objectivation of 
personal freedom (VT-1. 48). 
So far Bib6 has defined freedom as negative; now we can turn to his 
understanding of positive freedom. If we argue, he asks, that freedom means 
being exempt from causal determination, does it also mean that all sorts of 
calculable and foreseeable positions ofthe will that depend on outward factors 
should be regarded as constrained will? Experience shows that people whose will 
is determined like this do not always feel constrained. Here Bib6 returns to his 
earlier statement that freedom can be defined not only as freedom from an alien 
system but also as adherence to a rule that belongs to the system that coheres to 
the will (VT-l. 39). Positive freedom is a detailed description of this possibility. 
Following the logic of his empirical method, Bib6 first asks which rule 
means coercion and which one does not. All rules or value judgements that 
appear to the active person at first are regarded as an alien system and probably 
remain the same afterwards as well. However, a requirement that is expressed by 
the rule may meet the acceptance of the person, and merge into one's 
spontaneous way of action, thus becoming one's characteristic system ( VT-1. 50). 
Positivefreedom, in other words, is coercion that has been turned into freedom 
UT-I. 51). Bib6 regards positive freedom the most intensive experience of 
freedom, since the theoretical - or reflected - presence of coercion is the 
strongest, while the experience of being exempt from the same coercion is the 
most direct. The positive contents of this freedom are consciousness and 
activity that are related to ethical standards. 
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Within the category of positive freedom Bib6 distinguishes ethical 
freedom as "positive freedom that is opposed to and created by ethical rules"(VT-
1. 51) However, if ethical freedom is regarded as coercion that has been turned 
into freedom, it should be questioned whether this understanding meets the 
general requirement of the autonomy of ethical action, that is, that ethical action 
has to be exempt from coercion. Bib6's answer is that ifthe broad understanding 
of coercion is applied, the requirement of autonomy cannot be fulfilled. Thus, he 
affirms the possible heteronomy of ethical action, making at the same time a 
clear distinction between ethical action and an action that springs from ethical 
freedom. This answer leads him to an important insight. 
Bib6 argues that even a pure ethical rule that is claimed to be void of the 
element of coercion may exercise coercion against the spontaneous will of the 
person. The only difference between the coercion of pure ethical rules from that 
of other social rules is that the former cannot become a social objectivation. A 
pure ethical rule claims an absolute, unconditional validity, thus it requires 
identification to such a degree that makes objectivation impossible, since 
objective coercion presupposes an empirical ethical rule or law instead of a pure 
ethical rule. In other words, objectivation suspends a pure ethical rule. A pure 
ethical rule, at the same time, may be the source of the most intensive subjective 
experience of coercion, since the mere existence of the rule and its opposite 
direction to the will necessarily includes its positive following. Although the 
outcome of this form of coercion may be very similar to the result of ethical 
freedom, they are not identical. People who regard pure ethical rules as 
something merciless and coercive may never experience what the spontaneous 
following of a rule might mean. Thus, Bib6 concludes, the highest ethical rules 
are the ones whose following makes a positive freedom the hardest to attain. If 
people contrast duties and obligations with their inclinations, it is revealed that 
coercion still has not been turned into freedom. Only when ethical rules become 
united with the spontaneity of the acting person, if "bad inclinations" are 
opposed by "good inclinations", that is, spontaneity is enriched by ethical values, 
can we speak about ethical freedom. Not following the rules itself, not even 
convinced following of the rules means positive freedom, only the following 
of the rules that is embedded in spontaneity does so (VT-I. 52). 
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Approaching his most complete definition of positive freedom Bib6 puts 
an emphasis on its unidirectional character, saying that the final unification of 
the original coercion and the spontaneous will makes positive freedom especially 
effective. Therefore, besides generality and repeatedness as criteria of 
objectivation, effectiveness of action becomes a special criterion that applies to 
positive freedom. And since the basis of positive freedom is the final agreement 
of constraint and spontaneous will, Bib6 builds this element into its definition 
and coins the phrase of positive freedom based on agreement or common consent 
(VT-1. 53). 
At this point Bib6 formulates the logic of the development of positive 
freedom again. The objectivation of positive freedom, its generality, 
repeatedness and effectiveness, may be ascribed to the agreement of the 
constraining one and the constrained one. The agreement may appear also in an 
objective way, therefore agreement means the objectivation of the sources of 
positive freedom. If defined like this, agreement corresponds with the objectivity 
of the source of constraint, that is, power. (VT-I. 53) 
At this point it becomes obvious why Bib6 insisted on a narrmll 
understanding of power earlier in his study. He stated that power is effective 
coercion and belongs only to coercion (VT-I. 26) to prepare the way for a related 
development of the understanding of agreement, that is, in fact, effective 
freedom. Power and agreement, therefore, appear at the top ofBib6's ideological 
construction: the first on the side of coercion, the second on the side of freedom, 
just to represent their inevitable contradiction at the highest level. Power and 
agreement are made essential for the definition of coercion and freedom in 
human sociality; the description oftheir relationship, however, requires a move 
forward from the areas related to either coercion or freedom. 
4. Reinforcing his Characteristic Understanding of Freedom 
Having established the concept of negative as well as positive freedom, 
Bib6 reinforces the two decisive characteristics ofhis understanding of it. He 
stresses again that freedom is to be understood primarily as a negative and a 
relative phenomenon. He achieves his aim by two short discussions. 
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In the first discussion, 'Review of the Theories of Freedom', Bib6 
presents the most fundamental thoughts about freedom of a number of scholars, 
such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Comte, Boutroux, Hartmann and 
Bergson. We are especially interested in his reflections on the theories ofHegel 
and Bergson, who, in Bib6's view, represent two clear examples of distinct 
possibilities. Hegel's theory, Bib6 says, denies any possibility of a negative 
understanding of freedom, freedom for him is exclusively a positively 
understood ethical freedom. Negative freedom leads, according to Hegel, to 
arbitrariness and accidentality, the very opposites of freedom (VT-1. 56). On this 
basis, Bib6 concludes, Hegel could regard law and the state the very realisation 
of freedom, freedom itself As a result ofthe understanding of freedom within 
German idealism in general, Bib6 adds, the image of freedom in real life and the 
philosophical concept of freedom have become entirely unrelated to each other. 
The philosophers' rejection of an everyday, negative understanding offreedom 
was expressed, consequently, by an ethical scepticism as well; therefore Bib6 
considered it important to show how ethical freedom can be developed on the 
basis of a negative concept of freedom ( VT-1. 57). 
Turning to Bergson's theory, Bib6 praises it for showing the basic relation 
of freedom to spontaneity. For Bergson freedom is the relation of the concrete I 
to his or her action; therefore freedom is one of the clearest facts oflife. 
According to this description, Bib6 adds, Bergson actually makes freedom and 
spontaneity identical, thus his concept requires some corrections. While it is 
decisive to stress the spontaneous character of freedom over against ethical 
speculation, it is similarly decisive to show that freedom is relative and may be 
applied to phenomena other than the human soul (VT-1. 58). 
At the end of the review Bib6 restates: 
"After the consideration of the significant landmarks of theories of freedom we 
can insist that it is only the negative definition of the most general concept of 
freedom that is capable of involving all the practical images as well as the 
philosophical descriptions of freedom. However, this most general negative 
definition allows that certain manifestations of freedom, like ethical, intellectual 
and practical freedom may be given positive contents and significance too." (VT-
1. 59) 
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The relative character of freedom is stressed in the second discussion, 'On 
Absolute Freedom'. Bib6 argues that absolute freedom, although thinkable as a 
theoretical possibility, cannot become an experience, moreover, it cannot even 
have a real meaning. In this passage Bib6 narrows down his own earlier 
definition of freedom, as he excludes the possibility of freedom as the 
unconditional rule of a characteristic system ( cf VT-1. 39) and defines it simply 
as exemption from an alien system. If viewed together with possible alien 
determinations, freedom cannot be anything but a relative phenomenon, that is 
relational and resistant to opposing forces. On this basis Bib6 rightly concludes 
that "as soon as freedom loses its relativity it loses its meaning too" (VT-1. 60). 
Nevertheless, the change ofthe definiton of freedom referred to above is a 
precondition of this conclusion. 
5. Theological Comments on Bib6's Concept of Freedom 
Having reviewed the development ofBib6's concept offreedom, we are 
now able to comment upon it theologically in a more concrete manner. 
The first comment concerns the peculiar shifts in Bib6's concept of 
freedom, with respect to the possibility of defining freedom as the state of an 
undisturbed rule of a characteristic system. We have seen that although some of 
his statements would allow this possibility, more often he resolutely excluded it. 
Freedom, he writes, means not an undisturbed existence but is born out of a 
situation where the reflecting consciousness relates the rule of a characteristic 
system to the presence of an alien system. Spontaneity, he argues later, is always 
present as a characteristic system, and freedom is born out ofthe victorious 
contradiction of spontaneity to causality, the system that is alien within the world 
ofhuman sociality. Speaking about positive freedom, Bib6 calls it a kind of 
coercion that has been turned into freedom, and he regarded positive freedom the 
most intensive experience of freedom, since here the theoretical -or reflected-
presence of coercion was the strongest, while the experience of being exempt 
from the same coercion was the most direct. We have also seen that this specific 
limitation of the concept of freedom was a means in Bib6's hands to formulate 
the most fundamental definition of negative freedom, that was also reinforced 
by the purposeful presentation ofHegel's and Bergson's theories. Now we 
consider the theological consequences of his decision 
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Against the background of Lutheran theology characterised through the 
study ofHi.ittei6, we can now say without doubt that Bib6's concept of freedom 
cannot include the possibility that Luther assigned to the 'prelapsarian life', or 
later to the status of the believer, who, in union with Christ, can go 'back to 
paradise'. Bib6's expressions of freedom rather presuppose a life post lapsum in 
which the believer is confronted by God's commandments as ethical rules, and 
where his or her sinful spontaneity regards the commandments as part of an alien 
system, and, for this reason, a source of coercion. However, in Bib6's view 
ethical rules can become united with the spontaneity of the acting person, 
spontaneity may become enriched by ethical values, and "bad inclinations" may 
be opposed to "good inclinations" within the same person. The ethical values that 
have been embedded into the spontaneity of the person represent the realm of 
ethical freedom that makes the person capable of following ethical rules 
spontaneously. Bib6's theory raises two theological problems. 
First, Bib6 does not say how the unification of ethical values and human 
spontaneity may take place. We will see later that Bib6 regarded this problem as 
being outside of the limits of his empirical method, and it would be improper to 
risk any guesses here about what the private person, even the Christian behind 
the scholar might have thought in 1933. 
Second, Bib6 seems to allow the possibility that ethical values do not 
penetrate the totality of human spontaneity: he speaks about spontaneity enriched 
by ethical values and an opposition between good inclinations and bad 
inclinations. From an ethical perspective, thus, he seems to think of two different 
qualities of spontaneity; nevertheless, he does not seem to allow thinking of two 
distinct spontaneities within the same human being, a good one and a bad one, an 
ethically penetrated and an ethically untouched one. All of his references to 
spontaneity present the core of the human psyche as a unified whole. 
36 Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics' in: Bloomquist and Stumme eds., The Promise 
of LuTheran Ethics pp. 31-54. 
99 
This sketch ofBib6's understanding of the subject of ethical freedom 
clearly shows its partial incompatibility with Luther's picture of the free 
Christian. On the one hand, they would agree that following ethical values, or 
obeying to God's commandments may originate in freedom, that is, a 
spontaneous agreement with the value or the commandment. On the other hand, 
their identification of the subject ofthis freedom is radically different. For 
Luther, the subject of freedom is the inner person who has been made by Christ 
his own in a "happy marriage"; and a "happy exchange" oftheir properties has 
taken place. Thus, the subject of freedom is Christ himselfwho lives within the 
believer and fights a deadly fight against the outer person, urging him to obey the 
commandments, with varying success. The pattern of inner and outer person had 
been taken over by Luther from Paul, and provided him with a useful means to 
interpret the extreme tensions within a single human being. Contrary to Paul and 
Luther, Bib6 does not distinguish between the spontaneity ofbeing ready to do 
the good and the spontaneity of being able to oppose the good; thus he leaves the 
tension unresolved. With respect to the commandments, it can even be said that 
Bib6's pattern would allow the co-existence of the spontaneity that freely obeys 
the commandments with the spontaneity that freely disobeys the commandments 
in one and the same person. Positive, that is, ethically valuable freedom does not 
replace negative freedom but completes it, and negative freedom remains the 
basic possibility of the human being even if it is aware of positive freedom to 
some extent. 
This solution is certainly unsatisfactory against the background of 
Lutheran theology. However, it sheds light on a latent, albeit intrinsic 
characteristic ofBib6's view ofthe human being. He is reluctant to attribute a 
negative ethical evaluation to human spontaneity, even if explicit ethical values 
cannot be perceived in relation with it. He is reluctant to assign a negative ethical 
evaluation to the negative freedom that springs from an ethically unidentified 
spontaneity, contrary to Paul, Luther, and Hegel. On the contrary, he ascribes an 
intrinsic value to negative freedom, simply on the basis that the human being 
experiences its manifestation, that is, a resistance against the coercive force of an 
alien system as good. For Bib6 this value does not require any ethical affirmation 
or justification. This high, even transmoral evaluation of negative freedom as the 
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ability ofhuman spontaneity represents the centre ofBib6's anthropology and 
social theory. While it is open to criticism from outside and also from a 
theological standpoint, it seems to be the unquestionable point of origin for him 
that he would be unable to explore from an objective distance. Using an 
expression of contemporary theological language, it was Bib6's faith-decision 
that he could not possibly go beyond. 
Bib6's high evaluation of spontaneity makes the human self an 
unmovable subject of ethical action, that is a self able to make free decisions 
even if they are ethically wrong, and whose integrity would not change if ethical 
values became embedded into it. Such a selfwould certainly resist the attempt of 
decentering, the way Luther solved the problem of sinful human life and also the 
way neo-orthodox theologians tried to overcome what they saw as the fiasco of 
modern Protestantism. Our question now is whether Bib6's image of the human 
self as ethical subject, if it resists the radical transfiguration of decentering, will 
remain under the judgement that it is capable of only a "freedom from" and its 
freedom remains essentially without gestalt. 
Having become familiar with Bib6's description of the different forms of 
positive freedom, we can confidently answer that an ethically valuable freedom, 
a "freedom for" is equally important for Bib6. His picture of the nature of the self 
shows an unresolved tension from the perspective of a Pauline-Lutheran 
theology, but this very picture makes it possible for him not to place "freedom 
from" and "freedom for" into an antagonistic opposition. He can speak of 
"freedom for" without suspending the validity of "freedom from". Moreover, his 
mature work suggests the same harmonious correspondence of the two kinds of 
freedom that the structure of his student address indicated. 
At the end of the theological reading ofBib6's discussion of the concept 
of coercion, I have said that among the three corrective movements it is possibly 
differentiating and recontextualising that may be related to Bib6's image of the 
development of the moral agent. Having familiarised ourselves with his concept 
of freedom, we may speak in a more concrete manner. Since in Bib6's view 
positive freedom is created by the agreement ofthe spontaneous will with a 
system that is characteristic to the will, and requires consciousness and activity 
that are related to ethical values, the development ofpositive freedom is 
inevitably in touch with those characteristics and virtues that the movement 
of differentiating the moral agent has rediscovered for Protestant ethics. 
Therefore, it is this endeavour to which Bib6's theory, despite its theologically 
unresolved tensions, can be most closely associated. 
d. lhe J7Jeological Signtftcance of Bib6's Understanding~~ Freedom in 
Connection to Lm11 
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We do not have the space to discuss Bib6's treatment of the relationship 
of coercion and freedom to the law in detail, but I may summarise it briefly. In 
the course of the development of positive freedom we have seen how the 
possibility of "freedom for" appears on the basis of a negatively identified 
freedom. Bib6 speaks about coercion that turns into freedom by becoming 
embedded into human spontaneity. Regarding ethical freedom Bib6 mentions 
that the requirement of the autonomy of the ethical element cannot be 
maintained, since the ethical first appears in a heteronomous position as a source 
of coercion. The autonomous character of positive freedom, however, is finally 
upheld by involving it into the realm of spontaneity and identifying all the 
impacts originated from outside of spontaneity as coercion. The discussion of 
law, nevertheless, opens the way towards a heteronomous understanding of 
freedom. 
Bib6 discusses law as the most objective coercion as well as the most 
objective freedom. Both formal and material objectivations of freedom may 
reach a high degree of objectivation. The highest degree of the formal 
objectivation of negative freedom is the system of human rights. The highest 
degree of material objectivation of positive freedom is political freedom. ( VT-1. 
102f) Therefore, objectivations ofboth positive and negative freedom may be 
understood as components of the theory and practice of a balanced parliamentary 
democracy. 
The category of ethical freedom is given a creative interim position 
within the development of objective freedom. Ethical freedom, on the one hand, 
is positive freedom that is contrasted and created by ethical rules, and on the 
other hand, it is the starting point in the definition of political freedom: a high 
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degree of ethical freedom that is manifested in political institutions. Thus, 
ethical freedom represents a stage of a qualitative leap within the course that 
begins with negative freedom and ends up in political freedom. Most 
remarkably, Bib6 was unable to give a satisfactory interpretation ofthe essence 
of this leap; he acknowledged that it was beyond the capacity of his empirical 
method to say what really happened when ethical freedom came about (VT-1. 
1 07). Bib6, in other words, left the crucial turning point of the development of 
political freedom empty for explanations other than observations based on 
empirical analysis; he made room for metaphysical, philosophical or theological 
arguments at this crucial point. 
In relation to law, freedom and coercion do not merely appear as 
antagonists of each other but as phenomena that mutually support and strengthen 
each other. According to their static relationship in law, they act as limiting 
forces to make law effective. In their dynamic relationship in law, coercion in the 
form of power and freedom in the form of agreement engage in a functional 
relationship to each other. The concept of common consent is straightforwardly 
created as a free agreement supported by coercion. Finally, proper law is 
described as a balance of the proper distribution of social coercion, that is, order, 
and proper distribution of social freedom, that is, righteousness. ( VT-1. 125f) 
By bringing together freedom and coercion into a mutual and functional 
relationship in the law, Bib6 lays the foundation of a heteronomous 
understanding of freedom. The final development and completion of freedom 
requires the presence of some kind of coercion. For human spontaneity coercion 
never appears as an abstract phenomenon; it is always experienced as the power 
of others, be it brutal force or a different value judgement. The point is that 
coercion is always tied to the different other, therefore it is the different other 
who is to make some contribution through its coercive capacity to the freedom of 
the self During this process, however, the other would preserve its otherness, 
just like the selfwould experience its presence as coercion, in spite of the other's 
constructive contribution to the freedom of the self 
No wonder, therefore, that at the end of his discussion of the law Bib6 is 
able to sketch the contours of a democratic system of checks and balances, or, 
using a different metaphor, the art of living together. As a theological parallel of 
this development, we may add that the constructive presence of the other 
through its coercive power makes Bib6's concept of freedom appropriate to be 
discussed within the framework of a theology of sociality. 
Bib6's detailed treatment ofthe law can be regarded as his genuine 
contribution to the complex understanding of freedom from our point of view. 
Law is the form of freedom, Bib6 argues, that may represent its most mature 
development, political freedom. At the same time, law is the most mature 
manifestation of coercion, and neither freedom nor coercion would be able to 
reach their highest manifestation without the effective presence ofthe other. 
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Within the treatment of the phenomenon ofthe law the characteristics of 
Bibo's understanding of power get their proper place. We have seen that power 
was derived exclusively from coercion, and Bib6 was adamant in excluding any 
organic relationship between power and freedom. We have also seen that 
coercion and its derivative, power, were regarded as bad, while, at the opposite 
end of the argumentation, freedom and its derivative, agreement were considered 
as good. This preliminary value-judgement goes through a complex 
transformation within the area of law, where it turns out that neither power nor 
agreement are good or bad in themselves, but a certain mutual relationship of 
them can be regarded as good or bad. The technical term for a good relationship 
of power and agreement is proper law. It is obvious, however, that Bib6 wishes 
to say something more general by the application of this term. The key value that 
is to qualify law as proper law is balance, and it is the balance of order and 
righteousness that assigns the final value to a legal system. 
Against this background it is particularly telling how Bib6 evaluates the 
new forms of state organisations, that is, Soviet Communism and German 
National Socialism. Both started with a revolution that promised a 
counterbalance of disproportional power, but both ended up in a denial of the 
institutions of political freedom. However, Bib6 found some pieces of truth in 
both endeavours, that allowed him to hope that both may be capable to complete 
their institutions of freedom and finally acquire a balance ( VT-1. 128f). 
Finally we may ask what Bib6's real purpose might have been: to reach a 
more complex understanding of law by analysing coercion and freedom, or to 
reach a more complex understanding of freedom, by showing its ultimate 
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contradiction with coercion and its relatedness to coercion within the realm of 
law. Our purpose is to understand his interpretation of freedom and we read the 
dissertation from this point of view; but is it possible to determine which 
phenomenon stayed at the focus ofBib6's interest? I think Bib6 focused his 
attention on freedom rather than law. Although the formal topic of his 
dissertation is the philosophy of law, and the order ofthe discussion ofthe issues 
moves from coercion through freedom until law, he seems to venture to show 
how far freedom can be developed if objectivated as law. Similarly, coercion is 
explored to show how the antagonist of freedom may turn into the creative 
counterpart of freedom, ifthey are related to each other in the law. Therefore, the 
investigation into the nature of both coercion and law may have a functional role 
to express the meaning and intrinsic possibilities of freedom all the more sharply. 
To put it in a different way, the study can be read as a presentation of how 
spontaneous inclinations can turn into good inclinations and become 
institutionalised as politicalfreedom. The order of the issues in the title of the 
study, therefore, may mark the direction Bib6 himself thought his train of 
thought was taking. 
e. Highlighting the Empirically Inaccessible A5pect 
of Bib6's Social Theory 
At this point we may ask whether the charge of thinking etsi Deus non 
daretur, as if God did not exist can be applied to Bib6's thinking. We can see that 
within the net ofBib6's empirically approached world that he investigates in his 
study there is no place for God: neither spontaneity as the primary locus of 
freedom, nor coercion as the presence of an alien system or the development of 
law would require any reference to God. Bib6's argumentation, as an abstract 
construction of ideas, is perfectly immanent. However, Bib6 himself pointed at 
the unsatisfactory character of his argumentation at a point that has a decisive 
significance with respect to the functioning, the very life of his ideological 
construction. This point is the coming into existence of the subject of ethical 
freedom. The existence of this subject is a fundamental condition of ethically 
valuable positive freedom; consequently, both Bib6's construction ofthe concept 
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of law and the system of democracy as the latter's derivative would be an 
abstract framework of thought that lacks any perceptible content without this 
subject. According to Bib6's empirical method, every new step of the 
development of his thought has to be empirically affirmed to avoid building 
merely fictious elements into it: as he builds on the presence ofthe ethical 
subject he refers to its empirically perceptible being that he is unable to explain 
in an empirical way. 
If we consider Bib6's fundamentally Christian orientation that he 
witnessed to in his student address, we may risk the presumption that the ethical 
subject whose existence he is unable to explain is the Christian. This statement 
suggests a different answer to the question whether or not Bib6's argumentation 
may be characterised by the etsi Deus non daretur to the one we gave above. 
Although God does not appear explicitly in Bib6' construction ofthoughts, the 
decisive role of the ethical subject, the Christian cannot be explained without 
God. From the perspective ofthe logic of his empirical argumentation Bib6 
places God beyond the limits of the field he ventures to investigate; at the same 
time, the very requirement of the empirical reality of higher ideological 
constructions gives the ethical subject, or the Christian a central role within the 
argumentation, therefore, God's effective presence is given a central role. In 
other words, the logical order ofBib6's ideological construction can be 
maintained etsi Deus non daretur. Its empirical reality, however, cannot be 
preserved as if God did not exist. Without God Bib6's image ofthe development 
ofboth coercion and freedom within the law and the democratic system turns 
into a merely fictious construction. 
On the basis of the few words that Bib6 said to explain the event that 
transcends the limits of his empirical method it is difficult to determine what 
kind of Christian might have been on Bib6's mind. lfwe turn to the exact 
description of this event, we may get two pieces of information. 
We can see that Bib6' rather tentative explanation- two dense and 
grammatically not impeccable sentences - allows two interpretations: it is either 
the coercion of the law that sets a person free from the coercion of the law and 
presents him or her with an ethical freedom, or it is a change that may be 
effected by the follower of a norm, an inner event that is not accessible to 
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objective observation ( VT-1. 1 07). In both cases law or norm is given a 
constructive role: in the first case it is law itself that establishes freedom for the 
subject, in the second case it is the subject who gains freedom by following a 
norm. These explanations may be associated to discussions of the role of law in 
the process of becoming a Christian. Here it is sufficient to refer to the "three 
uses" of the law that is charactersitic of Protestant theological tradition. The 
"first use ofthe law", summarised in the Ten Commandments and the double-
love commandment, informs the person about the form and contents (gestalt) of 
freedom that is in accord with God's intention. The "second- or theological- use 
of the law" confronts the person with his or her radical sinfulness, preparing the 
one to accept the liberating gospel. Bib6's wording of the coercion of the law that 
sets the person free from the coercion of the law seems to present something of 
the paradoxical meaning ofthe second use of the law. The "third use ofthe law" 
(developed in the Calvinist tradition) reflects the role of the law in the life of a 
Christian who is already justified and, with the help ofthe Holy Spirit, tries to 
adjust his or her life to restore God's image or to fulfil his or her God-given 
vocation. Bib6's image of the follower of the norm who is an active agent of the 
development of ethical freedom seems to be associated to the figure of the 
Christian who guided by the law, proceeds on the way of sanctification. 
This attempt to create a link between Bib6's rather tentative sentences and 
the Protestant theological tradition of the uses of the law, naturally, is open to 
criticism. I cannot require theological correctness from Bib6 and also I may not 
turn his expressions into correct theological statements. My only purpose here is 
to show the possible place in Bib6's argumentation where, had he aimed at 
theological correctness, he might have developed a theologically accessible 
argument. 
C. The Social Dimension of Freedom: 
'On the Equilibrium and Peace of Europe' 
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In the second section of our investigation into Bib6's texts we will 
consider two ofBib6's studies. The two studies represent a rather different 
quality, however, from our perspective they belong closely together. The first 
one is a review, the second one is a large-scale study. The first one intended to 
inform a wide readership and was published immediately, the second one was 
hidden from the public and Bib6 even carefully concealed the names of those 
whose thoughts contributed to its ideas. The book that Bib6 surveyed landed on 
his desk later than he had begun the study, however, as regards the final study, 
the book and its review may be considered as a methodological introduction to it. 
The writing of the study was finally finished- albeit the study itself remained 
unfinished - a year later than the review had been published. The review deals 
with the art of and inevitable need for planning in a mass society, the study 
comprises the plan itself, Bib6's plan for the regeneration of European values 
after the Second World War. 
a. A Theory of Planning: 
Bib6's Reception of Mannheim's Diagnosis of our Time 
A few months after the publication ofKarl Mannheim's Diagnosis C?f our 
Time Bib6 published a detailed review37 The common denominator of the seven 
essays, as Bib6 makes clear, is the crisis of social values and community 
education. Of the reviews of the seven lectures we are concerned here with the 
first and the last. 
37 Istvan Bib6: 'Konmk diagn6zisa' in: Tarsadafomtudomimy, 4-5 (1943) pp. 454-474. Also in 
VT-1. pp. 243-269. 
The dangers of mass society had often been drawn attention to before, 
but it is evident that mass society can be led not only in the direction of 
mechanistic uniformity but also of freedom and variety Leadership in a mass 
society 
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"does not necessarily lead to dictatorship; it can be realised in a democratic 
framework as well, but this democracy needs to be deepened through social 
justice, which does not necessarily mean a mechanistic equality. ( ... ) The new 
democracy, if it wants to survive, must transform itself into a militant democracy 
and it cannot remain neutral, because a prerequisite of its functioning is that an 
agreement is sustained concerning certain fundamental values, inherited in a 
smaller part from antiquity and largely from Christianity. At the same time the 
achievement of liberalism has to be sustained, concerning the freedom of 
individual choice and experiment in the area of the more detailed and complex 
values that are beyond the fundamental values." ( VT-1. 246)38 
According to Mannheim, Bib6 says, the war brought about a synthesis of 
this kind, in which the most important values ofWestern civilisation could be 
preserved by the most up-to-date techniques designed for organising the masses. 
These new social techniques, by making social revolution against the state 
ineffective, make space for evolutionary methods. These methods, especially if 
they include alternatives by which representatives of the former ruling classes 
can take part in the organisation of the new societl9, would amount to a 
"planning for Freedom", which is the task ofthe current generation. If they fail, 
and one group or another succeeds in monopolising the new social techniques in 
its own interests, it would make dictatorship inevitable. (VT-1. 247)40 
The seventh lecture was given to an audience of Christian thinkers with 
the title Towards a New Social Philosophy: A Challenge to Christian Thinkers 
by a Sociologist. In accordance with the first lecture, Mannheim argued that at a 
time when the significance of social planning, responsibility for the whole 
community and long-term decisions had increased, it became clear that powers 
of integration with religious roots are needed. In Mannheim's view, the church in 
38 Cf. Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time. p. 4ff; 
39 Bib6 turned this thought into action in the summer of 1944, when he wrote his 'Bekeajanlat' 
[Peace Proposal] (see EO pp. 204-211), a detailed plan for the possible agreement and 
cooperation between the Hungarian middle class and the organised workers. The 'Bekeajanlat' 
belongs to Bib6's activity concerning Hungarian home policy that blossomed after 1945, 
therefore it is outside our field of investigation. 
4
° Cf. Mmmheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. lOf. 
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the Christian middle ages was able to connect ultimate values and everyday 
activities by means of "paradigmatic experiences", as the Hero, the Wise Man, 
the Virgin, the Saint, the Penitent, Baptism, Absolution, Eucharist, the Good 
Shepherd, the Cross, Salvation.(VT-1. 260)41 Without such images, or the similar 
paradigmatic experiences offered by rationalist humanism, personal and 
community life falls apart. Traditional Christianity living in a secular Europe, 
however, will be capable of full filling this role only if it is able to connect its 
tradition and institutions to these ultimate experiences, and renew herself at the 
same time. Since Mannheim (and Bib6) approach this question as social 
theorists, he addresses the possibility of a co-operation between theology and 
social theory. He thinks that theology must allow complete freedom to 
sociological inquiry, so that it can reach the farthest limits of its method, and it is 
only at this point, and not before, that the theologian should voice his own 
concerns based on his deeper experiences. A theology that summarises its truths 
in terms oftimeless and sharply defined statements, has no place for sociological 
research in practice (262f)42 . The essence of a Christian moral stance, however, 
appears not in abstract statements; rather, in images and paradigms. The task of 
the Christian is not an imitation ofthe concrete image, which may not even be 
possible because s/he lives in a different world, rather, 
"s/he should try to transport the intention of Christ to all sorts of different 
situations, and, amid the changing social circumstances, should creatively 
understand and enact the content expressed by the fundamental paradigms and 
patterns of Christian teaching." (T-T-I. 263 )43 
It may be debated, Mannheim says, whether the basic Christian 
experience is original sin, redemption, the liberating and creative power of love 
or the Cross, or the deeper meaning of suffering. The point is that they are those 
ultimate roots - as paradigmatic experiences - to which one can reach back to 
become capable of reinterpreting the patterns of conduct and right behaviour 
UT-I. 264)44 
41 Mannheim Diagnosis of our Time, p. 135. 
42 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. 115ff 
43 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. ll7f. 
44 Mmmheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. 134f. 
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In Mannheim's view, "planning for Freedom" and the contemporary 
demands of Christian ethical thinking may coincide in the attempt to resolve the 
crisis ( VT-1. 263f)45 . In this co-operation, the spirit of service, which is a most 
valuable heritage of medieval Christianity may acquire a profound meaning for 
the secular thinker as well ( VT-1. 266)46 
At the end ofthe review Bib6 gives a short evaluation ofMannheim's 
ideas, stressing that when Mannheim discusses the relationship of facts and 
values, he relates it to the ultimate experience of life, and thus avoids the ossified 
Central-European notion of German idealism, that of "absolute value". This way 
of thinking enables Mannheim to appreciate the Christian ethical heritage in a 
secular environment as well, which, according to Bib6, is the greatest merit of 
his work. Mannheim's political program, the "Third Way" as he understood it, 
can be situated against this wider spiritual and social background. 
Having surveyed Bib6' review ofMannheim's book now I will add four 
comments to it to clarify its significance for the Christian character ofBib6's 
social theory. 
a. We have already discussed the role ofMax Weber's theory as a 
possible common denominator behind Mannheim's and Bib6's view of 
Christianity. They approach Christianity with the interest of a sociologist, 
investigating it first of all as an empirical phenomenon, with special reference to 
its social influence. Weber's particular understanding of (Protestant) Christianity 
affected Bib6's concept of freedom in a significant way: the section I have 
quoted in the introductory part of this chapter47 indicates that Weber's influence 
may have been formative in Bib6's basic conviction that freedom has to be 
understood most generally as a negative freedom. 
b. Against this background it is particularly telling how far Bib6 seemed 
to be captured by Mannheim definition of a sociologically approachable 
Christianity as "paradigmatic experience". Bib6 may have regarded this 
definition as one that expressed his own identification of Christianity: his 
fondness is reflected by his repeated return to the part of Mannheim's study 
45 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, p. 139. 
46 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, p. 163f. 
47 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. 107f 
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where the latter explained the meaning of paradigmatic experience (cf. VT-1. 
260, 261, 264). Mannheim's concept of paradigmatic experience offered a 
conceptual framework to Bib6, within which he was able to interpret his earlier, 
rather formless views about the relationship of Christianity and sociologically 
approachable empirical reality. We have already discussed the significance ofhis 
awareness ofthe limits ofhis empirical method, reflected in the 1933 
dissertation, and also made some guesses about the possible contents of the 
"behind" that Bib6, faithfully to his self-chosen method, left empty. In the 
Mannheim study Bib6 was offered a structure that helped him to relate the 
sociologically approachable realm to its "behind", at the same time, the logic of 
this structure retained its relation to experience at its heart. Moreover, Mannheim 
offered to Bib6 several possible contents for this previously empty area of the 
"behind", that Bib6 eagerly made available to his Hungarian reader. Among and 
above the several possible paradigmatic experiences (Mannheim's wording is 
rather loose, he sometimes speaks about basic experiences, archetypes or 
primordial images, but it is paradigmatic experience that seems to be his final 
and most general version) it is the "intention of Christ" that Bib6 regarded as the 
most inclusive one (VT-1. 263). Nota bene: not directly Christ, but the intention 
of Christ whose influence to human sociality can be sociologically approachable. 
c. We will pay attention to a seemingly marginal note ofBib6, that, I 
think, bears greater significance. Beginning his review Bib6 mentions that 
especially in Continental Europe churches are inclined to ally themselves with 
the ruling classes ( VT-1. 259). This note refers to a piece of argument of 
Mannheim that reads: 
"To [the] loss of a foothold in society at large by the Churches very often 
corresponded a readiness on the part of their leaders to co-operate with the ruling 
classes and to identify themselves with their vested interests both in a spiritual 
and in a material sense. Still even here there seems to exist an important 
difference between the basic situation on the Continent and England. As the 
emergence of Capitalism and the corresponding social revolutions occurred at a 
very early stage in England, when religion was still alive and permeated society 
as a whole, both the conservative and the progressive forces developed their 
philosophies within the set framework of religion. For that reason it is in this 
country still possible to be progressive and religious at the same time, whereas 
on the Continent, where the social antagonisms were formulated before and 
during the French Revolution, the dominant polarity (with some exceptions) is to 
be either progressive and atheist and rationalist, or conservative and very 
likely religious. "48 
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Mannheim's analysis of the difference between England and the 
Continent may help us to interpret Szilagyi's- otherwise enigmatic- argument 
that Bib6 was an "independent socialist"49 Bib6 was independent in the sense 
that he did not accept the "dominant polarity" that was (and still is) characteristic 
in the Continent, as he managed to be "progressive" and "religious" at the same 
time. In his mature works he frequently argued that it was England and the 
Netherlands where an organic social development happened, and countries of the 
Continent suffer by unecessary false antagonisms of several kind. As Szihigyi 
rightly points out, it was the overall program oftheMarch Front to overcome 
these false antagonisms50, and Bib6's social Christianity was formed in relation 
to it. From this angle it is obvious why Bib6's socialism cannot be identified with 
Christian Socialism, since the latter represented a conservative reaction to 
Marxism and Social Democracy in the Continent, especially in Germany and 
east of Germany. 
d. Finally I will show that the way Mannheim perceived the social crisis 
in 1943 and what Bib6 also stressed in his review (VT-1. 259±) is akin to the way 
Hurt er characterised the fiasco of modern Protestantism. Hutter argued that one 
of the reasons for Protestant ethics had lost its gestalt was the dominant influence 
ofKantian ethics51 . Mannheim approaches formalistic ethics or Gesinnungsethik 
as a sociologist, explaining both its original setting and contemporary influence. 
In Kant's time, Mannheim argues, 
"society was completely in the re-making; [it was] based upon expansion and 
constant dynamics, pioneering and exploration of new fields. This is the world of 
early Capitalism and Liberalism, in which free competition and individual 
adjustment defined the scope of relevant action, and where a concrete pre-
determination of the patterns of right action would deprive man of that elasticity 
48 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, p.l 0 1. 
49 The argument reads: "Bib6 was a socialist thinker; not in the social democratic, even less in the 
Marxist Cmmnmtist sense of the word, and not in the Christian Socialist tradition either - even 
though he frequently alluded to the social organising power of Christianity and the moral 
example offered by Jesus. One ntight say that Bib6's principles were those of an independent 
socialist." Szihigyi, 'lstv:in Bib6, Central Europe's Political Therapist', in: DRS p. 536. 
50 ibid. 
51 Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics' in: Bloomquist and Sturnme eds., The Promise 
of Lutheran Ethics, p. 34. 
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which is the main requirement of survival in a rapidly changing world. ( ... ) 
Kantianism ( ... ) is historically nothing more than an elaboration of the Protestant 
idea that conscience is the essential thing in action. ( ... ) [It corresponds] to a 
stage in which the ethical and the active person is bound to remain society-blind, 
because there is less scope for pre-calculation than in a society which is nearing 
the stage of planning or which is already planned. "52 
The way Mannheim expresses the remedy for this situation closely 
corresponds to the effort that we identified as the differentiation of the moral 
agent: 
"We must establish a set ofbasic virtues such as decency, mutual help, honesty 
and social justice, which can be brought home through education and social 
influence, whereas the higher form of thought, art, literature, etc., remain as free 
as they were in the philosophy of Liberalism. It must be one of our main 
concerns to establish the list of those primary virtues without which no 
civilisation can exist, and which make for that basic conformity which gives 
stability and soundness to social life. "53 
To sum it up, in the review the characteristics ofBib6's Christianity 
reveal themselves and decisive features of the theological aspects of his social 
theory seem to come together. These features are part ofthe methodological 
arsenal that was to be creative in the working out of Bib6's concrete plan for the 
future of Europe. 
b. Bib6's Plan: 'On the Equilibrum and Peace ofEurope~c;.J 
1. The Forewords as Bib6's Self-Identification 
Bib6 wrote two versions of the possible 'Foreword' of the book. The one 
he considered the final version says that it is obligatory for all scholarly work to 
acknowledge the influences that have enriched it, in a more or less detailed way. 
This work, however, refers to a relatively small number ofworks, and a 
complete list of influences would include lots of friendly discussions apart from -
not only scholarly - books. It is, nevertheless, not sensible to name those who 
52 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, pp. lllf. 
53 Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, p. 110. 
54 For some introductory thoughts see Szihigyi's 'Istvan Bib6: Central Europe's Political 
Therapist', DRS pp. 532ff. 
114 
inspired the book at the moment (VT-1. 295i5 Bib6 therefore named only 
one inspirator, Guglielmo Ferrero, his former teacher in Geneva whose influence 
on Bib6 cannot be overestimated. 
The other version of the Foreword is more outspoken: 
"Since nowadays it is a general habit to inquire into the hidden interests behind 
all written works, I prefer to provide the necessary data in advance. The writer of 
these lines is Hungarian, who loves his country deeply, but who cannot identify 
with the demands for supremacy that some of his compatriots make in relation to 
neighbouring countries. He is a democrat, and his most fervent wish is to see the 
peoples ofEastem Europe set out on the road towards democratic development; 
nevertheless, he does not shrink from suggesting a monarchic solution to a 
number of countries, while at the same time rejecting the most often 
recommended monarchic solution, the Danube-side Habsburg monarchy. He is a 
professing socialist, and a believer in the classless and oppression-less society of 
the future, and yet declares that the end of this war must not be the moment of 
the simultaneous realisation of socialist regimes, rather, it should be the moment 
of stability, lawfulness and the reestablishment of the primacy of European 
models. Finally, he is devoted to a Federal Europe, but he still does not cease to 
analyse- in sixty percent of this book- the territorial questions of the old Europe 
divided into independent states, because he firmly believes that an European 
federation does not render the solution of territorial problems superfluous, on the 
contrary: the stabilisation ofterritorial issues is a prerequisite ofthe functioning 
of an European federation." ( VT-1. 604) 
2. Freedom and Democracy 
in the Perspective ~~Political Hysteria and Political Equilibrium 
This long essay which takes up more than 300 pages in the first volume 
ofthe critical edition even in an unfinished form, contains a vast amount of 
information and data. In what follows, we cannot attempt to review and evaluate 
all the important ideas in this essay; we must confine ourselves to the 
examination of the two issues that have the closest connection to Bib6's ideas 
about freedom: the idea of political equilibrium and the idea of political hysteria. 
The fundamental pattern of Bib6's argumentation is that the essence of the crisis 
leading to war is the upsetting of political equilibrium. The reason for this 
imbalance is a few interrelated hysterias. The first step out ofthe crisis is thus an 
55 The Editor notes that Bib6 might refer to members of the Association of Artists. Writers and 
Researchers (Miiveszek ir6k, Kutat6k Szovetkezete. MIKSZ) that continued the activity of the 
March front until Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941. vr -I. p. 680. 
understanding of the nature of these hysterias, to be followed by their 
effective cure, which would result in the foundation of the new political 
equilibrium. 
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What does Bib6 mean by political equilibrium? Although, as he notes, it 
was fashionable in his day to speak about the obsoleteness of the system of 
political equilibrium, and some forms ofthe equilibrium had indeed proved a 
fiasco, Bib6 insists that equilibrium is a fundamental condition of all community 
life. 
"It is a basic necessity for all creative life, especially in community, that the 
fundamental principles and relations of power be neither too rigid nor too fluid. 
A too rigid system shows too strong an opposition to change and development, 
so that it can change only by means of a catastrophe, while a too fluid one does 
not show any resistance to the outside world, which means a lack of a minimum 
of identity and therefore security which is a condition of all fruitful individual 
and community life. Equilibrium is the proportional presence of agility and 
stability, a situation in community life when the principles and power relations of 
the community enable the community to find its place between the extremes of 
rigidity and fluidity with an optimum of flexibility and stability." (VT-1. 300) 
This description of political equilibrum can directly be related to Bib6's 
early definition of freedom. In 'Coercion, Law, Freedom', as we have seen, law 
was regarded as the form of freedom, that may represent freedom's most mature 
development, political freedom. Law, however, was also understood as the most 
mature manifestation of coercion, and as Bib6 concluded, neither freedom nor 
coercion would be able to reach their highest manifestation without the effective 
presence of the other. The law that is able to provide these possibilities to both 
freedom and coercion Bib6 called the proper law. 
As Bib6 built up the concept of proper law he used the image ofbalance 
in several aspects. First, he made it the requirement of proper law that outward 
institutions of coercion and freedom should be in balance with both inner 
experiences of coercion and freedom and concrete forms of behaviours that come 
from these experiences. Second, and more importantly, he explained the value of 
the process of objectivation as the proper distribution of coercion, that is, order, 
and the proper distribution of fi·eedom, that is, righteousness. He posited order 
and righteousness as mutually limiting values, concluding, that with respect to 
law's characteristic standards of value, order and righteousness should be in 
balance with each other. Although Bib6's formal concept of freedom is extended 
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into the concept of righteousness and formally not related to order, the 
balance of order and righteousness is seen as both a fiuit and a condition of 
freedom. lt is not only the disproportional strengthening but also the 
disproportional weakening of order that is precarious to freedom: the chaos that 
makes its way in the place of order finally threatens the institutions of political 
freedom too. 
This is the background against which the expressions of the 'On the 
Equilibrium' gain their place in the structure ofBib6's concept of freedom. 
"Neither too rigid, nor too fluid", or the "proportional presence of agility and 
stability" as well as "the optimum of flexibility and stability" reflect directly to 
the structure of political freedom that Bib6 thought through in his dissertation. 
When he explains his program of creating equilibrium in the next passage, 
however, it becomes clear how far the originally formal expression of balance 
has become rich in meaning to express more than a narrow understanding of 
political equilibrium might allow: 
"To create equilibrium in the life of a community means to prevent a limitless 
concentration of power that demoralises both those who exercise it and those 
who are subordinated to it. It means to place the organisations of power and 
spheres of competence next to one another in a way that makes it possible, in an 
event of destructive forces erupting from one or the other, to confront it not only 
with principles and precepts, but also with the strength of the others. It means to 
provide organisations of power with moral fibre and the dignity oftheir role to 
make them gain in stability and lose in brutality. It means to increase the feeling 
of security in the active and passive agents of power by a clear division of 
objective and territorial spheres of competence. It means to find methods and 
procedures for the continual changes of life, lest the explosion of the rigidified 
framework destroy the whole system. It means to create possibilities and models 
of brave and magnanimous action and thus free individuals from the fear that the 
others will use the full range of possibilities in their hands. It means to nurture 
the kind of person who preserves the conventions and traditions of the whole 
system, lest the intellectual laziness of people take for granted what requires a 
constant moral exertion. It means to awaken, with all the above, the sense of 
security in people against chimerical fears, and a matter-of-fact bravery in the 
face of real dangers. It means to engage the powers of destruction, confusion and 
barbarity and facilitate a rich flowering of creative energies." ( VT-1. 300-301) 
The notion of freedom and democracy had occurred together in Bib6's 
previous writings as well, but in this essay they were actually conjoined. For him 
European democracy is none other than the embodiment of the program of 
freedom inspired by Christianity. 
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"Humanity have, for millennia, lived in social and political systems- apart 
from isolated or blocked experiments - which were based on the power of man 
over man, and on the fact that this rule could be obtained by birth, moreover, 
could mostly be obtained as a birthright. Western civilisation first tamed this 
hereditary and power structure, then, starting from the Christian idea of the 
inalienable dignity of the human soul, it dared to deduce the secularised demand 
of the equal dignity, freedom and equality of all people. Also, it dared to set, as a 
practical goal, the spiritualisation ofpower, self-government and merit-based 
selection. "(italics mine) (VT-1. 306) 
Bibo's thesis is that the development of democracy had its hitches and 
upheavals in Western and Northern Europe as well but within a stable political 
framework these societies could develop into mature democracies. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, however, amid the disorders of political frameworks these 
upheavals led to a lasting deformation ofpolitical culture. The deformation 
peaked in political hysteria, and the crisis that started in 1914 can be traced 
directly to these types of hysteria. According to the logic of the essay Bibo first 
describes this crisis, and then shows the way out of it. The notion of democracy 
has a key role in this argumentation, as well as the description of those factors 
that threatened democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. In what follows, we 
will concentrate on these aspects ofBibo's argumentation. 
3. Political Hysteria in Perspective: 
Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe56 
In Bibo's view, the development of democracy has a long prehistory in 
the life of European societies. It was the French Revolution that brought about a 
decisive change in this process: it attacked hereditary aristocracy, tamed but at 
the same time sanctified by Christianity. By this it freed the political and social 
development of Europe from a great dead weight. At the same time it released a 
fear that continental Europe has not been cured of ever since. The dislocation of 
the organisms of community life created a void that "were filled by new, fearful 
and disorderly structures of the community spirit"-(VT-1. 308) 
56 The argument of this section can be found in 'The Distress of the East European Small Nations' 
DRS pp. 13-87. 
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Bibo lists the following phenomena ofthese new creatures of 
community spirit. With the elimination of hereditary aristocracy society was 
overcome by a feeling of disorganisation and lack of leadership. From this the 
false romanticism of the genius leader was born, with Napoleon as its archetype. 
"For him power is not a vocation and a system of roles, but a romantic, heroic 
and grandiose individual enterprise'' (VT-1. 309) The second phenomenon is 
modern nationalism. While up to 1789 it was the aristocracy that consciously 
represented national interests, afterwards the nation was triumphantly taken over 
by the third order, and it was "invested with all the warm and direct emotions 
that the bourgeois had hitherto lavished on his immediate environment". (VT-1. 
31 0) From this emotion the third phenomenon was born, the romantic ideal of 
the patriot, "the person who is qualified for sympathysing with all the glory of 
the fatherland and bearing all its burdens, not because of his birth, rank or office, 
but solely by the fervour and purity of his feelings". ( VT-1. 311) Fourth, there is 
the belief in the romanticism of the people, according to which the risen people 
are capable of managing their affairs spontaneously and wisely. Another 
disquieting legacy ofthe French Revolution is the romanticism ~[revolution 
itse(f The desire for change at all costs and an overblown fear as a reaction to it 
created two opposing, deformed and barren types: the professional revolutionary 
and the professional reactionary. Finally, all these developments came together 
in the fact that after the French Revolution it was no longer the aristocracy that 
fought limited wars, but whole nations, who endowed war itself with the mass 
emotion of democracy, making it much more difficult to finish wars afterwards. 
Bibo argues that these phenomena created a crisis in all countries of continental 
Europe, and ony those countries could resolve this crisis "where the development 
of democratic political culture and education could catch up with the surge of 
democratic mass emotions" (VT-1. 316). In Central and Eastern Europe this did 
not happen. 
By Central and Eastern Europe Bibo means the area extending from the 
Rhine to Russia. In a detailed historical analysis he shows that while in Western 
and Northern Europe a stable state organisation came about, built on the national 
community, these stable state systems failed to materialise in Central and Eastern 
Europe, for various reasons. Thus when, following the French Revolution, these 
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democratic mass emotions and principles reached these areas, the new elites 
were uncertain about the national and state framework that these mass emotions 
ought to occupy. The creation of a stable national framework, simultaneously 
with the reception of democratic ideals proved to be a task that was impossible to 
fullfil. This fiasco is the root of the deformation of political culture in these 
countries. 
The people (peuple) that simply represented the dynamics of social 
betterment in Western Europe, became at the same time the decisive carrier of 
national traits (Yolk) in Central and Eastern Europe. It is only against this 
background that linguistic nationalism could be born, which provided the most 
important arguments in the territorial disputes of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Linguistic nationalism made the borders fluid, and the framework of 
national life chronically insecure. These insecure frameworks could not endure 
the pressure of democratic ideals, and stabilised the emotion born in earlier 
clashes with great empires: the existential fear for the community even in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "The existential fear for the community was 
the decisive factor that made the situation of democracy and democratic 
development unstable in these countries." (T"T-1. 334) 
It is at this point in Bib6's train of thought where he first expresses the 
antagonistic opposition of fear and democracy. It is here that we can read the 
definition of democracy that later became famous and much quoted. In our 
argumentation the immediate environment of this quote is also significant: 
"Mature democracy corresponds to the psychological state of adulthood, and the 
historical shocks that befail a nation correspond to the individual shocks that 
involve the not sufficiently resistant, non-adult psychic types in all kinds of 
hysterics. Accordingly, the political culture and morals of mature, democratic 
societies are not undermined by historical shocks, but rather strengthen them 
even more. On the other hand, they upset the development of communities that 
are at the beginning of the road to democracy, and involve them in spasms of 
communal psychology that are difficult to release. To be a democrat means first 
of all not to be afraid: not to be afraid of those with different opinions, different 
languages, of a different race, of revolution, of conspiracies, the unknown, evil 
designs of the enemy, hostile propaganda, derogation, and altogether of all the 
imaginary dangers that become real dangers because of our fear of them. The 
countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe were afraid because they were not 
mature democracies, and since they were afraid, they were unable to become 
ones." (PT-J. 334-33Si7 
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Perhaps the most original part ofBib6's study is where he describes the 
deformation of political culture caused by this vicious circle. He creates the idea 
of the false realist, who is a characteristic type of Central and Eastern European 
politics. He relates how the national inteliigentsia became politically important. 
He analyses the role of militarism and shows how the insecurities of national life 
are expressed by obscure political philosophies. 
For a systematic approach the most tangible aspect is the way Bib6 shows 
how the consequences of the French Revolution, endured by heaithy nations, 
became aspects of a permanent deformation of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
romanticism of the leader-genius became the dictator embodying the hysteria of 
the community in these countries. The romantic patriot was deformed into the 
anti-democratic nationalist. The romanticism of the people has also undergone 
change: the infantile psychic state of national communities became permanent, 
the idea of the mature, sovereign people was discredited, and an aristocratic 
tendency of contempt for the people was renewed. These societies, however, 
could not return to hereditary aristocracy, thus the absurdity of popular contempt 
of the people came about, embodied by the leading elite that is deeply 
pessimistic about the moral worth of people, feels contempt for the infantile 
character of the crowd, "and does not notice that they share fully the infantile 
psychic state and infantile desires of the people under their leadership". (VT-1. 
344) Further, the romanticism of revolution as an end in itselfturned into the 
absurdity of reactionary revolution in Central and Eastern Europe. This 
revolution stands up for the traditional values of the family, the past etc. in a way 
that also appeals to revolutionary feelings and rejoices at the destruction of 
traditional methods and conventions. Finally, the war involving whole nations 
was deformed into a campaign of extinction of nation against nation. These 
products of the deformation of Central and Eastern European social development 
came together in the ideology of fascism. ( VT-1. 34 7) 
57 Cf. DRS p. 42. 
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4. Poiiticai Hysteria: the Example ofGermany 
It is the analysis ofthe core of the German problem within which Bib6 
gives a detailed account ofhis understanding of political hysteria. In Bib6's 
argumentation the concept of political hysteria appears in several positions: it is 
the root ofthe crisis that led to war (VT-1. 299), a central phenomenon of the 
deformed political culture of Central and Eastern Europe (VT-1. 343), or a status 
that is counterproductive to a balance, that is, creative freedom. A community 
that fell into political hysteria was one way Bib6 described Nazi Germany, but 
he also presented Nazism as a distorted democratic revolution. While the first 
way applies the central metaphor that Bib6 employs in describing Germany's 
status, the second way helps him to list those contents that would take part in a 
possible regeneration of the German nation. Both portraits are fundamentally 
important with respect to Bib6's suggestion to the restoration ofGermany within 
post-war Europe. 
The starting point of political hysteria in the life of a community is 
always a shocking historical experience which the community is unable to 
stomach. While a well-balanced community is able to face a historical shock and 
mobilise her political and moral strength to cope with it, a community without 
the necessary inner balance rather evades the problem and chooses political 
hysteria instead of a costly long-term solution. A hysterical community, simiiariy 
to a mentally hysterical person, becomes fixated on a single historical 
experience. She gradually iooses her ability to find the real causes of events, 
loosing sight of reality in and around her, trying to create consistency out of 
inconsistency, thus building up a false and all-embracing system of reference. A 
worid-view that is developed by a hysterical community is perfect and offers a 
clear answer to every possible question, exactly what the members of the 
community want to hear. Because she lives in a false relationship with reality, a 
hysterical community is going to be sooner or later bankrupt: after a catastrophe 
there comes either healing or a more severe hysteria. 
As far as Germany was concerned at the time of writing the essay, the 
specific historical burden of Germany had been her repeated failure to establish 
her territorial status. The defeat of the Holy Roman Empire by Napoleon'a army 
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in 1806 happened to be the historical shock that became the starting point of 
the process of political hysteria. The bankruptcy came with the fall of the 
Wilhelmine Empire at the end of the First World War; the Versailles Treaty, 
however, proved to be an even more severe shock - instead of an opportunity of 
facing the disease - and thus the starting point of a fully developed hysteria. ( VT-
l. 376-382) 
By applying the metaphor hysteria Bib6 refused to treat the German 
problem as a moral problem. He argued that "we could not do worse to a 
hysterical state of mind than passing moral judgement on it" (VT-1. 447). Moral 
judgement makes a hysterical self even more closed; the only hope to break 
through it lies in its confrontation with bare facts. These facts, however, may not 
only be negative, that is, a summary of what the Germans did; they consist also 
of positive elements, referring to the goodwill of the winners. Today, Bib6 
finished his account of German political hysteria, 
"the regeneration of German political life depends upon the clear sight, 
fearless composure and humane wisdom ofthe world around Germany. 
Germany's disease is not incurable and organic, it is nothing but a kind of social 
spasm of the whole social organism; to loosen and release it will be one of the 
great tasks of the future" (VT-1. 482) 
5. On the Basis of the Political Regeneration of Germany 
I think that the application of the metaphors hysteria and disease has also 
a theological significance, to which we will return later. Now we will turn to 
Bib6's concrete suggestions about Germany's political regeneration. One element 
ofthe basis ofhis suggestions is his understanding ofNazism as a distorted 
democratic revolution. Bib6 summarised the preliminaries this way: 
"The German democratic movement which had progressed so hopefully towards 
democratic and socialist evolution until 1918, suffered a terrible breakdown after 
the war. The past and authority ofthe German social democrat party could obtain 
as a last result the abdication of all the dynasties and the declaration of the 
German Republic. But after the breakdown of the old political authorities, no 
new authority grew out ofthe German democratic forces. True, there could be no 
question ofthe old, discredited system ofterritorial principality claiming its old 
position in the political vacuum thus created. Territorial principality was 
superannuated and decayed and it had no chances to be revived. But it was 
possible to revive its most dangerous moment: personal rule. Germany did not 
posess real democratic forces and democratic experience and she had therefore 
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no occasion to learn the most essential part (if the lessons of democracy: the 
art of governing and obeying without person~fied rule and power. After 1918 
Germany felt as if she were ruled, governed and guided by nobody at all. That is 
why, on the first occasion presenting itself, she preferred Hindenburg to any 
democratic statesman; that is why she addicted herself so easily to the romantic 
folly to expect redress of all her grievances from a pretended political genius." 
(italics mine) (VT-1. 450f) 
The fact that Hitler came to power in the course of a democratic mass 
movement and the will of the majority of the voters, and at the same time he 
applied anti-democrtatic measures from the very outset, confused many ofthe 
observers. Bib6 referred to the "curious game" about the definition of Fascism 
played by conservatism and radicalism in Europe. 
"The adherents of European tradition consider Fascism simply a kind of 
revolution which, in their eyes, is always destructive of values; they see only the 
common features ofFascism and Communism. The partisans ofprogress, on the 
other hand, see in Fascism a revolution of hirelings, backed by obscure, 
reactionary and feudal elements. That is to say: the Right blames Fascism as a 
movement of the Extreme Left, the Left sees in it the machinations of the 
Extreme Right. This is no mere chance, but deeply inherent in the essence of 
Fascism." (VT-I. 465f) 
Bib6 points out three elements of progressive politics, or, in other words, 
the system ofEuropean values as he understood it, which were absorbed and also 
distorted by Hitler's program and practice: the right for self-determination, 
democracy and equality. 
The right for self-determination had been denied to the Germans at 
Versailles and also during the time of the Weimar Republic. Therefore Hitler's 
claim that the Allied Powers approved at Munich in 1938, was considered as a 
just one by many Germans. However, this very event and what came shortly 
after it revealed that Hitler himself never took the principle of self-determination 
seriously, being led by his cult of power. Cult of power thus appeared as a real 
content of the principle of self-determination, or the latter as an alibi of the 
former. Consequently, "[t]he movement and the leader who had promised 
Germany moral satisfaction were the main causes of Germany's moral 
degradation, they justified post facto all that Germany had once suffered 
unjustly". UT-I. 4 75) 
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The second element of the sytem of European values is democracy, 
which, for reasons we discussed above was coupled with the practice of personal 
rule that appeared in Nazism as the Filhre1prinzip. 
"The people was longing for democratic leadership and oppressed by a feeling of 
not being guided: the tension was solved by the Ftihrerprinzip ofHitlerism 
which gave a definite and seemingly satisfactory answer: dynastic personal rule 
is dead for ever, instead you have obtained the up to date, most advanced, the 
most popular rule, the personal rule of the Filhrer ... " (VT-1. 476). 
Nevertheless, Bib6 thought, even this deeply infected "democracy" might 
bring good fruits for Germany. Democracy starts where a mass movement begins 
and a mass emotion occupies the people: 
"The German people accepted the Fiihrer, but was more and more disgusted by 
all that went with him. ( ... ) In Hitlerism - paradoxically though this statement 
may sound - the German people went through the experience that a European 
nation cannot live under boundless personal rule and without spiritualised power. 
However devastating Hitlerism has been to the democratic forces of German 
society, it was the first to teach the German people, always too loyal and 
submissive to personal rule, to be truly and with the force of a real community 
emotion disgusted with personal rule, which is a primary condition of 
democracy." (VT-1 476f) 
The third element of the system of European values is equality, connected 
to racialthemy. In Bib6's view, Germany was the European country where 
privilege by birth represented the heaviest burden on social development. 
Hitlerism brought about a change in this respect: 
"[b]y radically denying any difference ofbirth or social standing within the 
German nation, it succeded in casting off the terrible burden of social 
organisation based upon birth privileges. At the same time, it overshadowed all 
the old worn-out privileges by the promise of a new one, exalted without 
measure and glorified in mystical splendour: the privilege ofbeing born 
German." (VT-1. 478) 
Nevertheless, since this theory was not proved true in practical life, as a 
worker was more interested in being equal to a Betriebsfiihrer than superior to a 
British aristocrat, and he was disappointed in this respect, the inner insufficiency 
of this theory became obvious even for many Germans. In the long run, 
therefore, Bib6 thought, equality would gain a greater significance for German 
society than its negative relation, racial themy. 
Accordingly, the balance of the situation that would come after Hitlerism 
is not entirely negative. This statement does not suggest that Hitlerism has any 
merit or the damage that Hitlerism caused to the world could be relativised in 
any way. Apart from its own intention, Hitlerism played a peculiar role in 
Germany's social development: 
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"References to 'true' self-determination, true democracy, true socialism were 
mere tactical tricks to the leaders ofHitlerism engrossed in their dreams of 
power and racial mythology, but they were ensnared by their own tricks: the 
strength and the success of Hitlerism lasted until it really represented self-
determination, democracy and socialism. When it discarded these ideas as 
tactical weapons that had done their duty and were considered superfluous in 
future, it became evident that Hitlerism had no ideological weapons of its own: it 
was defenceless. It is lasting insofar only as it was really based upon self-
determination, democracy and socialism. Its durable results are: that it was the 
first to outline clearly the frames of the German nation; that it was the first to 
demonstrate with the convincing force of experience to the German people the 
absurdity ofpersonal rule; and that it abolished the superannuated privileges of 
birth.( ... ) Deep and irresistible currents of the social psyche were realised in it 
which are stronger than any kind of ideology, slogan or propaganda." ( VT-1. 
479f) 
Bib6 presented his analysis of Germany's place in the crisis with an 
optimistic overtone. This optimism would be the tenor of his suggestions about 
the way out ofthe crisis. 
6. ''European Methodr/' and the Possible Factors of Power in their Sen,ice 
There are five essential tasks to be performed on the road out of the crisis 
of Central and Eastern Europe. The first of these is the restoration of the 
dominance ofEuropean methods in this region. The second is leading Germany 
back into Europe from a political and psychological point of view. 
At the start of his train of thought, Bib6 notes three aspects of his study to 
which he expects a critical reaction. First of all, he does not assign great 
importance to economic questions, because he thinks that the restoration of 
socio-psychological conditions would eventually bring about economic 
prosperity. Secondly, despite the fact that he himself is a socialist, he does not 
think that postwar exhaustion would allow for the introduction of socialism. 
Finally he explains what he means by European methods. 
He admits the one-sidedness of his own train of thought, inasmuch as he 
uses the word Europe consequently in a morally positive sense. This expression 
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has no exclusive sense that contrasts with any other continent or culture. "The 
frequent use of the word "European" has no importance and meaning other than 
the fact that there is no better word to be found even today for the complex of 
attributes and modes of behaviour that are usually described as humane, decent, 
Christian, liberal etc. in the Anglo-Saxon world." (VT-1. 551) 
Expounding what he means by the restoration of European methods, Bib6 
first claims that the debate between the traditional left and right is fruitless in this 
respect. As a second step, he enumerates "the political and social factors of 
power in Europe". He divides these factors into three groups: the church and the 
army as conservative factors, organised workers as the progressive factor, 
bureaucracy and the peasantry as static factor. He argues separately for 
discounting the aristocracy and capitalism as conservative factors, and the free-
thinking intelligentsia as a progressive factor. 
7. Germany's Reintegration into the Political L{fe of Europe 
After this consideration of factors of power, we turn directly to Bib6's 
ideas about Germany: what the most desirable peace treaty with Germany, as 
well as the most desirable form of government in the new Germany would be. 
The tasks concerning Germany have two aspects: she must be reintegrated in the 
framework ofEuropean cooperation, and must make her return to the abandoned 
line ofEuropean political development. (VT-1. 585) 
The reintegration of Germany into European political life stands or falls 
on one question in Bib6's view: whether the spirit of objective responsibility can 
be awakened in Germany. Responsibility must be born by the whole of Germany 
as a nation, at the same time this responsibility must be bearable. Keeping this 
goal in mind, Bib6 considers the desirable content of the future peace treaty 
parallel to the peace treaty of Versailles. 
First he thinks that calling Germany a war criminal should be avoided. 
The statement to this effect had caused resentment towards the Versailles peace 
treaty as well, and the aim is for the German people itself to make this judgment, 
not the winners or the treaty. Furthermore, asking the question of war crime 
makes the issue of war unnecessarily and dangerously moralistic. The end of 
the war will cause a huge moral crisis in Germany anyway, 
127 
"for whose healthy course it is imperative that Germany be faced not with 
moral tenets but with facts. The main content ofthe German moral crisis will be 
a revulsion from moralising turned upside down, and of suspicious political 
motivation. This revulsion will cover, and will reach its high point in the face of 
the moralising of the victorious side." (VT-1. 587) 
Bib6 thinks that an allusion to the mere fact ofvictory will suffice, in 
view of the German cult of power. In relation to the punishment of concrete war 
criminals, Bib6 warns that a possibility of the German people to consider them 
martyrs should be avoided. (VT-1. 589) As far as disarmament is concerned, he 
notes that the spirit of German militarism was strengthened by the one-sided 
demand for disarmament in the Versailles treaty (VT-1. 591). With respect to the 
reparation he warns that it should be worded unambiguously, and should not aim 
at revenge, but should be determined in view ofEuropean reconstruction. (FT-I. 
592) All these injunctions should be defended from the pretences of a peace 
dictate: "All such scenes are unnecessary that the self-esteem of the winners does 
not need, but may have a catastrophic effect on the psychological regeneration of 
the loser." (VT-1. 593) 
At the end ofthe enumeration ofthe elements of peace Bib6 stressed that 
a possibility must be left open for the areas populated by the Germans to unite in 
one country. (VT-1. 595) 
8. On the New German Government 
Finally Bib6 asks the question what conditions must be met by the 
German government that has to make peace in the name of Germany at the end 
of the war, and has to govern Germany before, during and after the peace 
negotiations. Bib6's answer can be summarised as follows: this government must 
ensure the supremacy of the European methods (as discussed earlier). He thinks 
that a democratic liberal government of the Weimar kind could not meet this 
condition. In his view there are still few people in Germany who believe in the 
suitability of liberal democracy for ensuring the European methods. Germany 
experienced the Weimar Republic as a fiasco, while she did not fight for the 
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conditions of liberal democracy. It does not follow from this, Bib6 thinks, 
that, as the British Howard Cole suggests58, a Soviet-type socialism should be 
introduced. In his detailed analysis, Bib6 shows that Stalinism is merely an 
arbitrary historical form of Socialism that would lead to the development of 
dictatorship under German conditions. He refers back to his general conviction 
that a defeat in war is not a suitable psychological situation for the development 
of Socialism. Finally, he sees the basic mistake in H. Cole's thinking in that 
"he can and wants to imagine only a Socialist Germany after the fall of 
Nazi Germany, and he turns away in aversion from the third possibility: 
reactionary, or at least more or less conservative Germany. The aversion might 
be justified, but the turning away is not: if we agree that the first task in Germany 
is the restoration ofEuropean methods, then those European factors must be used 
that can be found in Germany, be they progressive or not. Progress should be left 
to the Germans after the hegemony of the European methods had been 
reestablished." (VT-1. 598f) 
Thus the two "reactionary" solutions must be considered: military rule 
and the monarchy. 
As far as military rule is concerned, although it does not lack European 
values, distrust of criticism would not make it suitable for encouraging the 
necessary self-critical attitude in Germans. Moreover, the legitimacy of such a 
military government can easily be called into question, and this would destabilise 
the government. Bib6 therefore sees the monarchy as a special possibility, and he 
carefully weighs the dangers and the promises ofthe monarchy. 
The first drawback is the political form of the monarchy based on 
hereditary selection, and the second is the tendency of the monarchy as an 
institution on the defensive, to ally itself with static interests. A future monarchy 
needs to mimimalise the dangers of these drawbacks as far as possible. 
The greatest advantage of the monarchy is that it represents "not a raw 
and elemental, but a developed, spiritualised form of personal rule that is capable 
to be spiritualised further". (VT-1. 601) For a community that has just escaped 
from the rawest and most personal dictatorship, this monarchy may represent a 
useful transition towards growing into impersonal rule, and it also ensures that 
58 Bib6 refers to the book of George Douglas Howard Cole: Europe, Russia and the Future, 
London, 1942, 143-156. CfVT-I. pp. 727( editorial note 212. 
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the community experiences the presence of a leader. Moreover, Bib6 thinks 
that in the case of Germany the monarch, more than any other form of 
government, is capable of becoming the instrument of moral responsibility. 
Finally, the monarchy would make the Germans feel historical continuity, and 
could be capable of representing the new beginning from where, since 1806, the 
five deadlocked political developments, up to and including Hitlerism have 
started. 
The last question is who could represent this suitable monarchy. It can 
only be a dynastic monarchy, since the monarchy of a personal hero would be 
identical to dictatorship. It can only be the monarchy of a German dynasty, a 
foreign monarch would not be able to solve the problems. The head of the house 
ofHohenzollern, since the Hohenzollerns are a part ofthe deformation of 
German politics, is not suitable either. Therefore, "in the sense of the only useful 
legitimacy, there is no legitimate German monarchy". (VT-1. 603) 
D. An Outline ~~a Possible Theological Evaluation~~ Bib6's Plan 
Let me begin the outline with a comment on the rather disturbing ending 
ofBib6's thoughts about the ideal German government. One of its possible 
readings is that there is no good solution. However, it has an alternative reading 
too: there is a good solution, even though its conditions do not seem to be at 
hand. In this case the tension between the ideal solution and the possibilities is 
especially sharp: there is no legitimate monarch, and a monarch cannot be 
created. Nevertheless, it is just the sharpness of the tension that particularly 
highlights an important feature ofBib6's view of history: although the factual 
conditions are entirely missing, the lack of conditions cannot prevent him from 
thinking about really good solutions. 
This incurable optimism reveals itself also in the way Bib6 observes the 
historical past. For him events did not necessarily happen, they happened, but 
they could have happened also differently. 
History for Bib6 reveals a great possibility for human society, a 
possibility that in most cases has not been fulfilled, but in some cases it has, so it 
could have been fulfilled other times and it can be fulfilled again. This view 
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makes it possible for him to regard the past couple of centuries in the history 
of Central and Eastern Europe a detour, a detour from the ideal that these 
countires and communities may be able to return to. In his late essay he will call 
this ideal the social development of Europe. 
Similarly to his understanding of the European methods in 1944, his 
image ofthe social development of Europe is not exclusive either: he refers to a 
possibility that has developed into a social experience in Europe but it is 
accessible for all communities in the world. In this sense the late Bib6 may be 
regarded as an early representative of the notion of global democratisation, 
which he thought through in the middle of the Cold War, both in the temporal 
and the spatial sense of the latter word. For Bib6 the entertaining ofthis idea was 
not merely an intellectual adventure: the same aspect of history appears in a 
painfully concrete way in his evaluation ofthe 1956 revolution: 'The Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956: Scandal and Hope59. The publication ofthis article created 
the main charge against him for which he was given a life sentence in "socialist" 
Hungary. 
In the title of the above article a word appears that may be the focus of a 
tentative theological evaluation ofBib6's social theory: hope. It was a 
perspective of hope in which he organised the data of historical past and assessed 
the possibilities of the present. However, the theological content ofthis hope is 
rather different to that of dominant theologies of hope in the twentieth century, 
characterised by, for example, the work of Jiirgen Moltmann. To this difference 
we will return later. 
The second point ofthe outline could be the investigation of the 
theological significance of using the metaphor of sickness- and, in natural 
relation to it, health- in the description ofthe status of Germany and the rest of 
Central and Eastern Europe with respect to European methods and the European 
social development. Sickness, as we have seen, replaces sinfulness in Bib6's 
view, as his conscious intention of avoiding moralisation and acting as a 
therapist instead requires. The metaphor of sickness allows one to see a -
probably tiny- healthy core in the other that may be the starting point of his 
59 DRS pp. 33lff. 
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recovery (as we have seen in Bib6's evaluation in the status of Germany). 
Also, it allows me to recognise a similar sickness - even at a different level - in 
myself, that creates a consciousness of relatedness not only with respect to the 
common hope but also to the common predicament. Although it is implicit in 
Bib6's texts, the social context clearly indicates that Bib6 writes and counsels as 
a member of a similarly sick, that is, a hysterical community, who is also a 
potential victim as well as a bearer of the very sickness he wishes to cure. The 
realisation of sickness as a common predicament may give concrete content to 
the process of recontextualisation: while placing myself into the context of the 
other I will finally recognise myself in the apparently different and even 
disturbing characteristics of the other. There may be two effects of this 
possibility: a greater understanding of the other and a liberation from misplaced 
roles, such as being a judge of the other. The significance of Jesus' application of 
the metaphor of sickness to sinners may be considered here, just like Bernard 
Crick's 1970 characterisation of the nature of Bib6's scholarship as well as 
Szihigyi's decision of calling Bib6 a therapist. 
The third point of the outline would focus on the very roots ofBib6's 
Christianity and would explain their theological significance. Here we can return 
to Mannheim's study to ask, what "paradigmatic experience" among the several 
may the most closely describe Bib6's Christianity. Among those that Mannheim 
mentions - original sin, redemption, the liberating and creative power or love, the 
Cross as the deeper meaning of suffering, it is obviously the liberating and 
creative power of love that most closely matches Bib6's image of Christianity. 
(This point is extremely important to raise, since Bonhoeffer's Christianity can 
be described differently, related to the deeper meaning of suffering, and this 
difference may hide behind the difference between their social theories as well.) 
From this point through the expression of "the intention of Christ" we can arrive 
at Bib6's image of Christ that he did not describe earlier than in the essay 
'Reflections on the Social Development of Europe'. Here60 he pictures a Christ 
who embodies the possibility ofthe victory of nonviolent love over all the 
60 DRS pp. 431-434. 
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consequences of misunderstood and misdirected power that is rooted, finally, 
in human fear. This picture of Christ opens up Bib6's social thoughts for a 
theological evaluation from the perspective of the Christus Victor tradition. Also, 
this picture of Christ reveals why the theological interpretation of the dominant 
motif ofBib6's social theory, hope, is troublesome to relate to twentieth century 
theologies ofhope, since the latter are reflections of the picture of the crucified 
Christ. 
Thus, a broadest possible framework for a tentative theological 
evaluation ofBib6's social theory- reflected by his writings up to 1944- may be 
created around the perspective of hope, the significance of the metaphor of 
sickness and the image of Christ as Christus Victor. This framework may 
provide a theological perspective for his understanding of freedom and its social 
dimensions. 
Chapter 3 
Vicarnoans Representative Actnolll: 
the Orngilllls of lBollllhoelffer's 1IJ nderstandnng of lFreedom 
A. Identifications ~lthe Political Character ~l Bonhoeffer~"> Theology in 
Contempormy Bonhoe.ffer Scholarship 
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At the beginning of our investigation ofBib6's social theory I briefly 
mentioned that interpreters pass different judgements on it according to the 
interpreters personal convictions: for liberals Bib6 is not liberal enough, while for 
socialists his socialism is far from being an orderly socialism. From the point of view 
that we decided to take, that of Bib6's Christianity, both criticisms seemed to be 
justified. What we see in the identification of Bonhoeffer's theory by interpreters of 
different political conviction, is partly similar, partly radically different. Similar, 
because different interpreters attribute different political characteristics to the same 
theory. Different, because different interpreters claim that Bonhoeffer's theological 
legacy may be interpreted according to their own reading (1 human sociality: liberals 
tend to think that Bonhoeffer was close to liberalism, socialists discover a socialist 
thinker in him, while conservatives argue that Bonhoeffer was one of the unmistakable 
representatives of genuine conservativisrn. While in Bib6's case it is possible to agree 
both with the liberal and the socialist critics, since they speak about the same Bib6 and 
the same written scholarly heritage from different points ofview, it is, obviously, 
impossible to agree with all who claim that Bonhoeffer would strengthen their own 
ideological position in today's ideological struggles. Since this research aims at the 
clarification of the political implications ofBonhoeffer's theological legacy, it has to 
face this wide plurality of evaluations as one of the basic problems in this field of 
research. 
In what follows, we wilt list some typical and significant pieces of argument 
that represent this pluraity of evaluations. First we listen to Clifford Green who argues 
for a liberal Bonhoeffer. 
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Green has added an editorial note to a piece of a conversation beween two 
figures ofBonhoeffer's prison novel, Ulrich (the character for Bethge) and Christoph 
(the character for Bonhoeffer himselt). The conversation is about equality and 
distinction between people. Christoph wonders about the contradiction that although 
according to Christianity all people are equal, they (the two friends) think that the 
same Christianity has to help to set up a new upper class, an elite. Having listened to 
Christoph, Ulrich speaks to him about Christoph's grandmother: 
"She certainly takes Christianity seriously and understands it better than most pastors. 
Do you think she does not make any distinction between people? Doesn't she think 
just as we do that some people must be in higher and others in lower position, and that 
everything depends on the right people having authority"? (FTP 107t) 
To this text Green adds the following note: 
"See especially the recently discovered letter of September 20, 1941, from Bonhoeffer 
to Paul Lehmann. Probably reflecting the views of his eo-conspirators, Bonhoeffer 
states that after a successful coup Germany would need "an authoritarian 
'Rechtsstaat"'as a basis for justice, lawfulness, and the freedom of the church. As much 
as he would personally prefer in the aftermath ofNazism an Anglo-Saxon liberal 
democracy, Bonhoeffer believed 'that short of thing would throw Germany right into 
the same abyss'." 1 
We will analyse the letter2 referred to above in detail at the end of this study. 
Here it is sufficient to observe that Green attributes to Bonhoeffer a social conviction 
compatible to Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy, which is different to that of his eo-
conspirators. The liberal Bonhoeffer, however, wishes for his post-war Germany an 
authoritarian government, because in the present state of Germany it would provide 
the proper order within wich life can begin again. The position Green attributes to 
Bonhoeffer here closely resembles Bib6's position that he himself announced: as a 
socialist he would have favoured a socialist Germany, but right after the war a 
monarchy seemed to be a more viable road to a new beginning. Bib6's words about his 
position cannot be misunderstood; whether Green understands Bonhoeffer properly, 
however, is a question we should leave open here. 
1 FTP p. 108. note 46. 
2 The letter is published in Clifford Green, Bonhoe.!Je: A Theology ofSociality, Eerdmans, Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, Cambridge U.K. 1999, pp. 345f. 
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The arguably socialist Bonhoeffer is presented by John de Gruchy "The 
political position which most accords with Bonhoeffer's theology lies somewhere, I 
suggest, along the spectrum between social democracy and democratic socialism. "3 To 
be sure, de Gruchy does not suggest that Bonhoeffer thought of himself to be either 
socialist or democratic, this view expresses the impact or influence of his theology in 
the context ofthe nineties, as de Gruchy evaluated it. In the introductory part ofhis 
article on Bonhoeffer's possible contribution to a better understanding of present 
transitions to democracy, under the heading of A Theological de Tocqueville,4 de 
Gruchy shows in a most perceptive manner the extent to which Bonhoeffer's 
politically comprehensible thoughts do not correspond to liberalism and democracy as 
we understand these words today. Rather, he thinks through some relevant pieces of 
Bonhoeffer theological legacy as a criticism of liberal democracy, both for 
Bonhoeffer's own time and the present. De Gruchy begins to approach his conclusion 
by asking why Bonhoeffer distrusted liberal democracy. Among other things, de 
Gruchy argues, "Bonhoeffer was aware of the connection between liberal democracy 
and capitalism and of the failure of Weimar to provide economic security for the 
masses. Unless this was planned for in the new world order, the result would be as 
catastrophic as the failure ofWeimar, opening the way for bolshevistic 
totalitarianism. "5 This suggestion presupposes a genuine interest on Bonhoeffer's part 
in economic matters and strategies to overcome poverty, a political position that 
corresponds with that ofBib6 in a remarkable way. The same suggestion is repeated 
with respect to present-day divisions among political standpoints, by turning 
Bonhoeffer into a contemporary to an extent that, I think, is not necessarily justifiable 
on the basis of his written heritage: 
"Bonhoeffer's critiques of democracy had to do, first of all, with the fact that, for him, 
democracy was tied to liberalism and capitalism. His problem with democracy was not 
its insistence on human rights and the rule of law, which he strongly affirmed, but the 
equation of democracy with the protection of the possessive rights of individuals and 
an economic policy which had little regard for the common good. ( ... ) [Bonhoeffer] 
3 Jolm de Gruchy, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy in the Gennan Democratic 
Republic and South Africa', In: 1Vfodern Theology, 12:3, July 1996, p. 359. 
4 de Gruchy, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy', pp. 348-351. 
5 de Gruchy, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy', p. 350. 
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rejected both individualism and collectivism, liberal capitalism and communism, and 
called for a society in which persons related to each other in responsible freedom, and 
therefore a society in which the interests of the weak rather than the strong were 
protected. "6 
This Bonhoeffer could hardly be interpreted apart from the possibility of social 
democracy and democratic socialism. It is a crucial element within de Gruchy's 
argument, however, that the latter doesn't derive this position from Bonhoeffer's 
political conviction but from his Christology. "What motivated him, however, was not 
a political ideology, but a concern for the weak, a concern for justice. For this reason, 
the political order which he sought was always a penultimate one which corresponded 
with reality understood in the light of Christology. "7 The implicit statement in this 
suggestion may be that Bonhoeffer's explicitly expressed political convictions do not 
necessarily correspond with the political implication that may be derived his 
Christologically centered theology. Whether or not it may be the case, and whether or 
not Bonhoeffer's theology may be read as an impulse for a socialistically characterised 
democracy, are questions that we have to leave open here. 
The first reference to a possibly conservative Bonhoeffer is taken from Keith 
Clements in a form of a rather gentle criticism. Whether or not he had de Gruchy's 
article in mind, we cannot know; however, Clements' study on Bonhoeffer's 
understanding of community published some months after de Gruchy's essay had 
appeared might partially be regarded as a reaction to the latter. Clements shows the 
distance not only between Bonhoeffer's time and ours but also Bonhoeffer's 
perspective of community and community as we understand it amongst current 
political changes. He believes that "Bonhoeffer himselfwould have been aghast at any 
treatment of him so reverential that any criticism was ruled out of court" 8. Here we 
take the first of his three critical questions: 
"[O]nce Bonhoeffer moves beyond the community of the church, does he really tell us 
much about community as such, or does he remain at the level of the individual 
subject relating responsibly to other subjects? What does he have to say about the 
shaping and structuring of society, beyond the very generalised 'mandates' of family, 
6 de Gruchy, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy', p. 359. 
i ibid. 
8 Keith Clements, 'Community in the Ethics ofDietrich Bonhoeffer', in: Studies in Christian Ethics, 10. 
(1997) p. 29. 
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work, government and so on? Social ethics surely has to do with political and 
economic ordering, with social stmctures and power relationships. After Marx none of 
us can be innocent of such issues. Does Bonhoeffer really move beyond an essentially 
bourgeois position of individual responsibility, albeit always responsibility to others in 
the public sphere? Or, as some might want to put it, can we be sure that in modem 
Germany he would not simply be voting with the Christian Democrats?"9 
Clements does not state that Bonhoeffer was a conservative thinker, he only 
asks this question to express his opinion that it is not at all a simple task to identify the 
political character of Bonhoeffer's theology. His criticism remains within the limit of 
critical co-operation with scholars of different opinions. Others, however, argue for a 
conservative Bonhoeffer in a more resolute way, as can be seen in Georg Huntemann's 
picture ofBonhoeffer. 
The explicit purpose ofHuntemann's book, Dietrich Bonhoe.ffer: An 
Evangelical Reassesment is to reclaim Bonhoeffer's honorable theological legacy for 
the conservative-evangelical movement. Bonhoeffer's conservative interpretation, he 
thinks, may be cmcial for the evangelical movement itself: "[Bonhoeffer] is very close 
in spirit to the evangelicals, for whom this book was chiefly written. He will be their 
church father in the future - or else the evangelicals will have no future. "10 (It may be 
interesting to quote here Dorothee Solle's appreciation ofBonhoeffer, printed on the 
back jacket of the volumes of the new Fortress edition ofBonhoeffer's works: 
"Dietrich Bonhoeffer is the one German theologian who will lead us into the third 
millennium." It may be an important question why theologians from the opposite 
corners of today's theological landscape can shout Bonhoeffer's name as a battlecry; 
what is the nature of a theological legacy that recieves such emphatical echoes from 
theological camps, so contradictory in their objectives.) 
Huntemann doesn't only present a radically conservative Bonhoeffer in his 
book, a picture he builds onto an analysis of a rich selection ofBonhoeffer's texts, he 
also determines Bonhoeffer's place with respect to present-day ideological stmggles: 
"The patriarchal figure Bonhoeffer, for whom the assigned place of the woman was 
the household of her husband and to whom it was cmcial that the wife be subject to 
9 Clements, 'Community in the Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer' in: Studies in Christian EthicJ~ 10. (1997) 
p. 29. 
10 Georg Htmtemann, Dietrich Bonhoeffir: An Evangelical Reassessment._Baker Books, Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, 1996. p. 12. 
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the husband, this Bonhoeffer who fought for an ethos 'from above' and for a 
governmental authority 'by God's grace'- this Bonhoeffer was no comrade of the 
Nazis nor fitting contemporary of his times. Neither does he fit the spirit of our times. 
On the contrary, this consciously 'Christian Westerner' is a witness against our times. 
Furthermore- and this is a very important aspect of this book for me- all ofthe anti-
Christian elements ofthe Nazi period continue to be at work precisely among those 
who count themselves, often with such careless disregard of history, part of the 
progressive or left-wing scene. This is the case in spite of the fact that these anti-
Christian elements appear in a different conceptual raiment than the garments they 
wore during National Socialism. The more or less matriarchal, socially utopian, and 
merely selectively biblical theology in Germany (and not only in Germany) cannot 
appeal to Bonhoeffer to suport its claims. Moreover, its stands in complete 
contradiction to that which Bonhoeffer wanted to accomplish through his thought and 
his life." 11 
Huntemann's political position and his conviction that he can count on 
Bonhoeffer as his comrade, I think, is unmistakable. Besides his insistence on the 
fundamentally conservative character of Bonhoeffer's theology, his evaluation of 
Nazism is a yet another distinctive point that contrasts Huntemann with other scholars. 
Theologians ofthe International Bonhoeffer Society usually agree that one of the 
distinctive contents ofNazism is racist ideology and racism is a typical reaction to 
complex political and economic situations on the part ofthe political right: this is the 
lesson the twentieth century teaches us. Bonhoeffer's attack on the Nazis began with 
his criticism of the way the Nazis treated the Jews, and this concern remained alive in 
Bonhoeffer throughout his life, and his concern with the Jews creates a fundamental 
distance between Bonhoeffer and the political right. If these elements are part ofthe 
agreement, the only remaining question is how far Bonhoeffer's thoughts and actions 
against the racist Nazi state and on behalf of the Jews were complex and consistent 
enough12, but the question whether he could be interpreted as belonging to the political 
11 Huntemann, Dietrich Bonhoe.ffer, p- ll. 
12 The scholarly literature that discusses the significance ofBonhoeffcr's stance for the Jews in Nazi 
Gemmny is abundant and well known. Recently even the controversial opinion appeared that the 
ultimate motivation behind Bonhoeffer's participation in the resistance was not patriotism, as for his eo-
conspirators, but his wish to rescue Jews whom destiny he wanted to share. See Andreas Pangritz, 
'Sharing the Destiny of his People'_ in: John de Gruchy ed., Bonhoejfer fur a New Day, Eerdmans 1997, 
pp. 258-277. Recent literature, however, also reveals the limits ofBonhoeffer's commitment to the 
victims of the Nazi state, both in theoretical and in practical terms. See Kenneth C. Barnes, 'Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and Hitlers's Persecution of the Jews:,_ in: Robert P. Ericksen and Susa.rmah Heschel eds., 
Betrayal, German Churches and the Holocaust, Fortress, Mim1eapolis, 1999, pp. 110-128. 
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right cannot be raised. Huntemann, however, turns the underlying logic of this 
argumentation upside down by arguing that the Nazi revolution has to be regarded as a 
revolution from below, therefore, a leftist revolution. He sets into a parallel 
relationship the 'Marxist-Socialist revolution' and the 'National Socialist one' by 
calling them a 'revolution against fatherhood and order', and even relating both of 
them to Freud's scholarship. 13 
I cannot engage in a critical evaluation ofHuntemann's view oftwentieth 
century history here; now I only recall Bib6 who already in the early forties spoke 
about the 'strange ballgame' between the left and the right concerning the evaluation of 
Nazism. It seems that the ballgame lives on, and, naturally, the position one occupies 
in it fundamentally influences one's opinion about the political character of 
Bonhoeffer's theology. This ideological confrontation cannot be solved by the means 
that are provided by an interpretation of a theological heritage, like that ofBonhoeffer. 
What would be within the sphere of competence of Bonhoeffer scholars, however, is 
to show why Bonhoeffer's texts are capable of supporting reconstructions of the 
political character ofBonhoeffer that are diametrically opposed to each other. 
As far as I know, this challenge have not been answered yet. First, I have not 
met a thorough study ofHunteman's interpretation ofBonhoeffer's texts that would 
create a basis for either justifying or refuting the picture of Bonhoeffer he has created. 
Moreover, it seems to me that the problem itself is minimised. John de Gruchy devotes 
a section to the problem of diversity in the reception and interpretation of Bonhoeffer 
in his recent study on 'The Reception ofBonhoeffer's Theology'. Huntemann is given a 
footnote among several writers who are grouped by de Gruchy as being 
representatives along different confessional lines: thus Huntemann is placed between a 
Catholic writer (his work was published in 1967) and an anabaptist writer (with a 
study from 1971) as a representative of'conservative evangelicalism'. 14 This 
judgement is mistaken for two reasons. Huntemann does not represent a confession as 
a Lutheran writer, for example, but a complex and radically anti-modernist ideological 
13 See the first chapter ofHuntemaJm's book, 'Challenged by a Revolution', in Huntemann, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, pp. 15-26. 
14 John de Gruchy, 'The Reception ofBonhoeffer's Theology', in: John de Gruchy ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoe.ffer, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 95. 
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standpoint; and Huntemann does not simply write from a different standpoint, but also 
presents a rather different Bonhoeffer who is at odds with the dominant and widely 
accepted figure. This challenge should not have been ignored. 
This unanswered challenge leaves a question with me that I cannot avoid while 
trying to identify the political implications ofBonhoeffer's theology: how is it possible 
to present such opposing pictures on the basis of the same text? Is it posible that the 
nature of the text itself allows such a diverse interpretation? 
Besides this question that comes from the above analysis of contemporary 
ventures of determining the political character ofBonhoeffer's theology, our purpose 
to compare Bonhoeffer's legacy to the political thoughts of the young Bib6 will, 
naturally, also guide the following analysis. A conversational partner with whom we 
are already familiar, Bib6 will be kept within our perspective throughout the coming 
argumentation. 
B. The Relationship between Bonhoeffer's Concept of Freedom and his 
Understanding of Vicarious Representative Action; 
the Rationale of the Following Analysis 
Unlike Bib6, Bonhoeffer never turned to the theme of freedom as a central 
topic of one of his studies. Nevertheless, his interest in the meaning of freedom both at 
a theoretical and a practical level penetrated several of his writings from the beginning 
to the end. The scope ofhis interest in investigating into the meaning of freedom 
gradually widened. In Sanctorum Communio an explicit treatment of freedom occurs 
only with respect to the empirical church15 . Act and Being, however, is much more 
detailed on freedom: the text begins with a reference to God's freedom 16 and ends with 
a discussion ofthe freedom ofthe child17, containing several substantial analyses of 
divine freedom and human freedom in between. In Creation and Fall the investigation 
continues, describing created freedom 18 In Christology, Christ the Center is described 
15 se pp. 2sotr. 
16 AB p. 25. 
17 AB p. 161. 
18 CF pp. 63ff. 
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as the new creation, the fullfilment of fallen creation's expectant waiting for a new 
freedom 19 . In Discipleship Bonhoeffer points at complete freedom as the fruit of 
simple obedience20 In the experience of community depicted in Life Together the 
other's created freedom from me shows itself as a burden and an unavoidable realitl 1. 
In Ethics freedom is discussed as a condition of responsible life, that is, in turn, 
described in the form of deputyship22 Finally, as a prisoner Bonhoeffer explained the 
way and direction of his own life as Stations on the Road to Freedom23 
With respect to the explicit topics ofBonhoeffer's individual theological works 
freedom appears as one ofthe sub-themes. These sub-themes, however, are related to 
each other as referring to one of the basic motives ofBonhoeffer's theology. My thesis 
is that Bonhoeffer's understanding ofvicarious representative action (Stellvertretung) 
provides the immediate theological context of his explanation of the nature of 
freedom. Vicarious representative action, as the basic structure of divine-human and 
human-human relationships, had already been elaborated in Sanctorum Communio in 
detail 24 Its significance for the understanding of freedom was not explicitly explained 
in the first dissertation. The train of thought of Act and Being, however, carries 
forward the "being acted upon"25 aspect ofvicarious representative action, deriving 
from it the characteristic understanding of freedom as not "freedom from" but 
"freedom for" 26 . Later in Ethics freedom is placed into correspondence with 
deputyship, the expression that refers to the structure of vicarious representative 
action27. In prison even Bonhoeffer's most personal approach to freedom has a 
christological as well as an ecclesiological character: it refers to Jesus who "is there 
only for others" and the church that is "church only when it exists for others". The 
christological and the ecclesiological dimensions meet in the description of human 
19 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology, Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1978, p. 64. 
2
" D p. 168. 
21 LT pp. 95ff. 
22 E p. 224. 
23 LPP p. 3 70f. 
24 In a sununary form see se p. 178. 
25 AB pp. I 16, 121, 126. 
26 AB pp. 90f. 
27 E pp. 224f. 
existence: "our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for others' through 
participation in the being of Jesus"28 
142 
Vicarious representative action as one of the leading motifs- or even the 
leitmot?f- of Bonhoeffer's theology has been recognised by Bonhoeffer scholars for a 
long time. 29 Its significance with respect to our present research is outstanding, since it 
is not simply a motive ofBonhoeffer's theology but also provides an organic link 
between his theology and the related social theory. Vicarious representative action 
describes the structure of both divine-human and human-human relations. The 
persistent focussing on vicarious representative action makes Bonhoeffer's theology a 
theology of sociality - Clifford Green's well-know expression - from the very outset. 
There is no need to create an artificial link between his theology and the references to 
social theory that appear in his writings here and there; the link is already provided in 
the very heart of his theology. This, however, does not make an attempt to analyse and 
evaluate the social implications of his social theory unnecessary. The social theory that 
he incorporated into the structure of vicarious representative action has had distinct 
social characteristics right at the beginning, and the presence of these characteristics 
can be recognised during the whole development ofBonhoeffer's theology. These 
characteristics create a sound basis of reference with respect to the social implications 
ofBonhoeffer's theology, and provide us with information about the possible 
democratic impact ofBonhoeffer's theological legacy. 
We have already seen that the concept ofvicarious representative action, the 
permanent attendant of Bonhoeffer's concept of freedom, had already been formed in 
Sanctorum Communi a. In Sanctorum Communi a the concept of freedom plays only a 
28 LPP pp. 381f. 
29 It was John Godsey who first revealed that the above mentioned ex:pressions can be related to 
Stellvertretung, elaborated in SC. See: John Godsey: The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,_SCM, 
London, 1960, pp. 260f. See also Clifford Green, Bonhoe.ffer: A Theology ofSociality,_Eerdmans, 1999. 
In the first edition of his book, (The Sociality of Christ and Humanity: Bonhoeffir's Ear(v 
l11eo/ogv.Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1972) Green showed the link beetween Bonhoeffer's 
early theology and the prison letters with respect to vicarious representative action. In a purposeful 
follow-up of Green's work, Mark S. Brocker presented the constructive role of vicarious representative 
action bettl'een the early theology and the prison literature, namely, in Ethics. Mark S. Brocker: 'The 
Comnuutity of God, Jesus Christ, and Responsibility: The Responsible Person and the Responsible 
Commm1ity in the Ethics ofDietrich Bonhoeffer~ Unpublished PhD-dissertation, Chicago, 1996. See 
also Joachim von Soosten's editorial 'Afterward' in SC, pp. 303ff, and Keith Clements' 'Community in 
the Etltics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer', in Studies in Christian Ethics, 10. ( 1997). 
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marginal role, the argument related to vicarious representative action, however, is all 
the more detailed, rich and complex. It is also Sanctomm Communio where the 
structure of the relationship of sociological and theological elements within 
Bonhoeffer's theology can most clearly be revealed. This structure has a decisive 
importance for the social consequences of the concept ~[freedom, our primary interest 
in this study. 
On the basis ofthis sociological-theological structure, Bonhoeffer's concept of 
freedom has received its final shape within a relatively short period, as is documented 
in Act and Being and Creation and Fall. Act and Being has determined God's freedom 
as "freedom for", while Creation and Fall has extended the nature of God's freedom to 
human beings by applying the analogia relationis. From that time onwards 
Bonhoeffer answered the ever-renewing challenges of his life according to this pre-
determined concept of freedom. His famous statement written in his 22 April 1944 
letter from prison that he had not changed very much30 refers also to his concept of 
freedom. 
The material unity in Bonhoeffer's use ofthe concept offreedom in the course 
of the early, the middle and the late period of his theological work is not difficult to 
demonstrate. The question ofthe material unity ofthe complex social consequences of 
his concept of freedom, however, is a more difficult one. Can we apply his above 
statement about the basic permanence of his life to his social theory and socially 
relevant convictions too? Or might the change that Bonhoeffer designates in the same 
prison letter, from the 'phraseological to the real', be understood as a change especially 
in the way he was perceptive towards human sociality? 
In answering these questions a thorough analysis of Sanctorum Communio has 
a crucial importance. It is this study where the web of social and theological elements 
is first worked out; therefore its detailed knowledge is unavoidable for a clear 
understanding of what continuity and change mean in the development of 
Bonhoeffer's social and theological perception. The analysis of Sanctorum Communio 
will be disproportionally long so it will occupy the present chapter; the application of 
30 LPP p. 275. 
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the findings we will gain from it will be carried out in a relatively straightforward way 
in the next chapter. 
C. Theology of Sociality in Sanctorum Communio 
While it is unmistakable that, from a hermeneutical viewpoint and because of 
their dominant way of reasoning, the dissertation can be placed within the area of 
ecclesiology and dogmatic theology, the contents of the train of thought reveal a much 
broader perspective. As Clifford Green has convincingly argued, Bonhoeffer's early 
theology, beginning with the dissertations, establishes a widely conceived theology of 
sociality. Green was successful in going beyond the general understanding of previous 
Bonhoeffer scholarship that considered either ecclesiology or Christology the central 
topic ofBonhoeffer's early theology and, consequently, his whole theological 
development. Green recognised that Bonhoeffer's Christology has been informed by 
his soteriology that, in turn, relied on his theological anthropology31 In the first 
edition of his work Green extends his investigation beyond the limits ofthe early 
theology, to Discipleship and the prison letters and literary fragments. In the second, 
enlarged edition he adds a similar analysis of Ethics, thus Bonhoeffer's theology of 
sociality is given an even broader literary basis32 A summary form of Green's view of 
Bonhoeffer's theology of sociality is available also in a recent article that suggests that 
it is human sociality that informs Christian community in Bonhoeffer's works33 . 
On the one hand, Green's discovery that the whole corpus ofBonhoeffer's 
theology and, more inclusively, his literary work has a dominant social character, is a 
decisive factor from the perspective of the present research. The very possibility that 
Bonhoeffer's theology can be drawn into correspondence with democratic social 
theories, and also with Bib6's social theory in particular, is based on the intrinsic social 
character ofBonhoeffer's theology. Therefore, the argumentation below is based on 
31 Green, The Sociality of Christ and Humanity, p. I. 
32 Green, Bonhoe.lfer, A Theology ofSociality, p. xiii. 
33 Clifford Green, 'Human Sociality and Christian Community~ in: de Gruchy ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoe.lfer pp. 113-133. 
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the fundamental insight provided by Green. On the other hand, this basic indebtedness 
must not mean that we follow Green in his particular assumptions and judgements in 
the course of our investigation into the character ofBonhoeffer's social theology. 
Although Green's work seems to be unanimously praised by the international circle of 
Bonhoeffer scholars34, I am not convinced that his reconstruction ofBonhoeffer's 
social theology, including its underlying psycho-social factors, is the only proper 
medium for the identification of the social character ofBonhoeffer's works. Rather, I 
think, Green is inclined to read his own sociality into Bonhoeffer's texts uncritically 
and the picture of Bonhoeffer he eventually offers bears his own image as well, to the 
extent that the two faces are not always distinguishable from each other. Criticism of 
some of Green's insights will be offered as my argument proceeds - I regret that I 
cannot undertake a comprehensive critical treatment of Green's interpretation of 
Bonhoeffer within the limits of the present study. Here it is sufficient to note that 
Green's work is considered but also critically considered. Interpreting Bonhoeffer on 
his own terms means, right at the beginning, that while I basically agree with Green 
that the hermeneutical key to Bonhoeffer's theology is his peculiar anthropology, I 
disagree about the characteristics that he attributes to it. For a clearer picture of the 
focal point ofBonhoeffer's theological thoughts I will rather let him speak for himself 
first. 
In the following investigation we will not undertake a comprehensive 
examination of all the important concepts - not even in a summary form - of 
Sanctorum Communio. It is neither possible nor necessary within the framework of the 
present study. Rather, the analysis is dictated by the intended comparison ofBib6's 
and Bonhoeffer's social theory that focusses on their respective understanding of 
freedom. As a first step we will consider Bonhoeffer's method and compare it to that 
ofBib6. Keeping in mind the formative influence ofMax Weber upon Bib6's social 
theory and general way of thinking, we will search for ways in which Max Weber's 
sociology is reflected in Bonhoeffer's sociological thoughts. This search is intended to 
create a link between the intellectual background ofBib6 and Bonhoeffer. We will 
34 TI1e latest review has been written by Jean Bethke Elshtain in the Newsletter of the International 
Bonhoeffer Society's English Language Section, Number 76 June 2001, pp. 16-18. 
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also determine the type of social anthropology behind the basic presuppositions of 
Bib6's understanding of freedom, and gather together some references that Bonhoeffer 
made to it, creating another link, now moving from Bonhoeffer's dissertation towards 
that ofBib6. 
After these steps we will devote a detailed examination to the social-
anthropological rootedness ofthe principle ofvicarious representative action. Finally 
we will test our findings on Bonhoeffer's discussion of the relationship of the church 
and the proletariat. 
a. Three Preliminary Observations 
Bonhoeffer, just like Bib6, begins his study with a clear statement of his 
method. The ultimate aim of the study is to gain "a conceptual understanding of 
Christian community, the sanctorum communio" (SC 33). This conceptual 
understanding is approached from three different angles, using three different 
methods, that of"theology, social philosophy and sociology" (SC 33). However, these 
approaches have a clear order: the study "does not properly belong to the sociology of 
religion but to theology. It will be carried out on the foundation of Christian theology 
and will make fruitful for theology the fundamental insights that derive purely from 
social philosophy and sociology" (SC 32£). 
He starts his study with a distinction between social philosophy and sociology. 
They are related disciplines in a distinct epistemological subordination as "sociology 
relates to social philosophy by building on its theoretical constructs ... [and] social 
philosophy provides the continuing norm of sociology" (SC 25ft). Due to their order 
within the epistemological process, their subject matter is clearly different. 
The order of the epistemological process can be reconstructed as follows: it 
begins with the church, participating in its life with passionate zeal (SC 33), then it 
considers social philosophy as the normative study "of the primordial mode-of-being 
of sociality per se" (SC 29). The latter provides the guideline for the interpretation of 
empirical sociological data. At the third place comes sociology. Its data, however, are 
not considered either historically or merely in themselves, but in a further 
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subordination of the study of the constitutive structural principles of empirical social 
formations, yet another systematic discipline. In other words, although sociology itself 
has already been subordinated to theology at the first place and social philosophy at 
the second, it is still not regarded as merely a study of 'relations and interactions' of 
empirical data. On the contrary, its concern "is to trace the many complex interactions 
back to certain constitutive acts of spirit that comprise the distinctive characteristic of 
the structure" (SC 30). The structure of community is composed by three 
determinants: "original social relationships, the structures of empirical communities 
and the personal units who are centers of agency"35 . It is the third 'determinant' and the 
very last unit within the epistemological process that represents some kind of 
empirical data- a presence ofthe perceiving human spontaneity (if we recall Bib6's 
method here)- but it is already surrounded by several walls oftheoretical 
considerations. Therefore, even if we had not been informed by Peter Berger's view 
about the real weight and role of empirical data in Bonhoeffer's study of the sanctorum 
communio36, we could estimate it on the basis of his method. 
lfwe recall now Bib6's method ofthe empirical way of developing a concept, 
the fundamental difference between the method of the two scholars is not difficult to 
recognise. Bib6 begins with experiences and proceeds gradually towards more and 
more fundamental concepts, while Bonhoeffer starts with the discussion of speculative 
notions to prepare a framework within which experiences may be investigated. Bib6 
obviously trusts experience rather than speculative frameworks, while Bonhoeffer 
regards concepts more reliable than experience. However, this difference in 
'intellectual taste' has a far-reaching consequence concerning the underlying social 
character of the investigation they pursue. While everyone has experiences, conceptual 
knowledge belongs to the learned minority. Many people can be fellow-travellers and 
eo-thinkers with respect to a study based on the empirical method, since findings may 
be discussed continuously on the basis of individual experiences as the investigation is 
pursued. Conversely, the mere demand that the appropriation of certain conceptual 
structures are inevitable right at the outset, ab ova select those who can participate in 
35 Here we accept the help of the Editor, SC p. 30. note 8. 
36 Peter Berger, 'The Social Character of the Question Conceming Jesus Christ' in: Martin Marty ed., 
The Place ofBonhoeffer: Problems and Possibilities of his Thought, SCM, London, 1963, p. 59. 
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the intellectual venture. Briefly, while Bib6's method has intrinsic democratic 
implications, Bonhoeffer's method is characteristically elitist. We have seen that 
Bonhoeffer set up several conceptual gates that his reader has to get through to reach 
the empirical content that, at least in theory, awaits to be discovered. Importantly, the 
first precondition oftravelling along is being a passionate member ofthe church. This 
condition sine qua non, theoretically, could refer to accessible and broadly shared 
experiences. How far Bonhoeffer's concept of the church is empirically graspable, 
however, remains to be seen. 
In the next step we will examine the influence, the presence, or, rather the 
absence ofMax Weber's theory from Bonhoeffer's intellectual horizon. We have 
already seen the decisive influence of Weber on Bib6 that established the latter's first 
appropriation offreedom as bothfreedomfrom and.f1·eedomforthat finally became 
constructive in the development ofBib6's democratic theory. Regarding Bonhoeffer, 
"Weber's sociology of religion and his exploration of the question of church and sect 
appear to be no more [to him] than a foil against which [he] developed his theological 
interpretation of the church and community"37 Weber was highly influential in the 
intellectual milieu in which Bonhoeffer grew up, and he himself studied his works 
early on38. The results of this encounter are some reflections to Weber's theory that 
appear in Sanctorum Communio as focal points in which the author could demonstrate 
the fundamental difference between his approach and that ofWeber. Bonhoeffer 
distanced himself from Weber already in the methodological section. When he defined 
sociology of religion as a "research phenomenologically [on] the structural 
distinctiveness of religious communities", he passed a critical remark on Weber, 
accusing him of discussing several different aspects of culture in a historical 
perspective, under the rubric of"sociology ofreligion".39 Bonhoeffer's main objection 
against Weber is based on the latter's historical method that results in a genetic 
sociological approach. "The task of sociological study is not to demonstrate the 
37 Martin Rmnscheidt, 'The Fonnation ofBonhoeffer's TI1eology', in: de Gruchy ed, The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 66.; see also Berger, 'TI1e Social Character of the Question 
Concerning Jesus Christ', in: Marty ed., The Place ofBonhoeffir, pp. 58, 73. 
38 See editorial note 24 in SC p. 7. 
39 se p. 31, note 4. 
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thousands of motives and their many variants that led to the genesis of a social 
structure( ... ) rather, its task is to study the acts of will that are constitutive of a social 
structure." (SC 89) Similarly, Bonhoeffer rejected Weber's (and Troeltsch's) 
distinction of church and sect, saying that "there is no essential sociological difference 
between the two" (SC 267). In view ofBonhoeffer's method it is not surprising that he 
could not employ the significant elements of Weber's theory- although in some 
marginal cases he made affirmative references40 It is also only of a secondary interest 
for us whether Bonhoeffer was always correct in understanding Weber 41 . The main 
point is that Bonhoeffer remained untouched by two characteristics of Weber's 
scholarship that exercised a decisive influence on Bib6. First, it was Weber's 
historical-empirical method that was able to demonstrate the interrelatedness between 
theological thoughts and experienced freedom, second, Weber's concrete analysis of 
the political impact of the Protestant sects as voluntary religious associations. Both 
Weber's points made a contribution to Bib6's image of historically manifested 
freedom, while Bonhoeffer was not open to these influences. 
With the discussion of the role of Weber's influence with respect to 
Bonhoeffer's theory we created a concrete link between Bib6's and Bonhoeffer's social 
theories. Another possibility to create a link is to find a place for the basis ofBib6's 
social theory on the 'map' of several possible bases that Bonhoeffer displayed for 
identifying the fundamentals of his own social theory. We can find the 'map' in 
Bonhoeffer's exposition ofthe four conceptual models ofbasic social relations in 
chapter 2. Before entering this 'map', I will briefly summarise what we may 
understand by the basis in Bib6's case. 
We have seen that Bib6 did not provide a detailed account ofthe social-
anthropological fundamentals of his examination of the relationship of coercion, 
freedom and law. His field of study was the philosophy of law, and a discussion of the 
fundamentals of human sociality were involved in the argument only with respect to 
the human subject of the experience of either coercion or freedom. (Sociality appears 
4
° For exapm.le: SC p. 227. 
41 On tltis topic see Berger, 'The Social Character of the Question Concerning Jesus Christ', in: Marty 
ed., The Place ofBonhoeffer, p. 73; and Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology ofSociality p. 27. 
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in a detailed manner as the social effects of coercion, freedom or law.) Regarding the 
human subject, the only information we are given that both coercion and freedom can 
be identified with reference to human spontaneity, spontaneous experience and 
spontaneous will. Bib6 depicts human subjects as entities that influence each other, 
feel constrained, feel free from or free for each other. Later, as he discusses social 
objectivations, he understands them as aggregrations of several personal wills and 
experiences. Objectivations of coercion or freedom, like power or agreement, are 
generated by several individual experiences of coercion or freedom, and the 
objectivations can keep their 'social reality' only if the individual experiences still 
exist. On this basis we can confidently say that Bib6, even if he did not state it 
explicitly, held an atomistic view of human sociality. 
This atomistic view appears on Bonhoeffer's 'map' as the third type of the antic 
basic-relations, that he calls Epicureanism. According to it, " [ s ]ocial formations ( ... ) 
have a purely utilitarian basis, arising only from a ~yntheke [agreement] and so are 
inconcievable as natural community" (SC 38). Natural community, as the Editor notes, 
is a key concept here: it refers to those communities that Bonhoeffer will explain as 
real: "original" or "primal" community, or "community as an end in itself''. 42 Most 
importantly, 
"[t]he Epicurean position is characterised by its deficient concept of spirit. The 
deficiency can be construed as a doctrine of basic-relation holding that there are no 
essential or meaningful relations between human beings that are grounded in the 
human spirit: connections to others are not intrinsic but only utilitarian. One person is 
fundamentally alien to the other." (SC 39) 
Bonhoeffer holds that this is the doctrine that the Enlightenment took up and 
developed further. He relates it to Hobbes' status hominum natura/is est helium 
omnium contra omnes, adding, that all social forms created on this bases "should be 
interpreted as purely contractual. This and the next chapter contain my implicit 
argument with this theory. "(SC 40) 
To sum it up, we have found three important differences between the social 
theories of Bib6 and Bonhoeffer at their fundamental level right at the outset: in their 
4~ se p. 38, note 12. 
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method, in their consideration ofMax Weber's scholarship, and in the social-
anthropological basis of their theories that Bonhoeffer calls social-basic relation. 
Having sharpened our comprehensive investigation, now we proceed to identify the 
meaning of vicarious representative action. 
b. The Concept <~[Person and Vicarious Representative Action 
1. Towards the Concept of Person- the Role of ]-You-relations 
Vicarious representative action appears in Bonhoeffer's train of thought within 
the discussion of sinful or broken community, the community represented by 'Adam'. 
(SC 120) The three decisive concepts that lead to vicarious representative action from 
the starting point, that is, the antic basic-relations, are the Christian concept qf person, 
collective person and ethical collective person. These concepts of person are 
continuously informed by the concept of God and the concept of community (SC 34), 
but the decisive assertions are worded with respect to the concepts of person: vicarious 
representative action is a characterisitic form of acting as well as being together of 
persons. 
Before we embark upon the detailed examination ofBonhoeffer's 
understanding of person, we should specify our attention with respect to the 
comparison ofBonhoeffer's and Bib6's image of freedom once again. We have found 
that Bib6 understood freedom first of all as negative freedom, freedom from some 
coercive force; and we have already noted that Bonhoeffer argued that freedom was-
using Bib6's term here- positive freedom, freedom for, embedded into an ethical 
responsibility for the other. We have also seen that the antropological basis ofBib6's 
understanding of freedom is his unconditional affirmation of human spontaneity: 
negativefreedom is rooted in the rule of spontaneity, the characteristic system ofthe 
human subject, over any alien, coercive force. The spontaneous act and its reflection 
in the human consciousness is, therefore, the anthropological core ofBib6's 
understanding of freedom. Thus, a comparison of Bib6's and Bonhoeefer's image of 
freedom inevitably begins with an examination ofBonhoeffer's concept ofpersonhood 
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with respect to its relation to human spontaneity. In the following exploration we will 
pay special attention to the possible role that spontaneity plays in Bonhoeffer's 
understanding of personhood. 
In the course of the examination of the three concepts of person, that is, the 
Christian concept of person, collective person and ethical collective person, 
Bonhoeffer discusses the relationship ofthe I and the You first with respect to the 
Christian concept of person. The pattern of the I-You relation developed here will be 
taken up again at the beginning of the treatment of the broken community in chapter 4: 
"The essential task of this chapter is to expose the new social basic-relations between I 
and You, as well as between I and humanity, that are inherent in the concept of sin. 
The concept ofthe Christian person presented in chapter 2 will be central to this 
discussion." (SC 1 07) 
However, before we arrive here, Bonhoeffer discusses the nature of the "primal 
state" or "original community" in chapter 3, where several ofhis basic concepts, 
collective person among them (SC 77), first emerge. In this section he filled the I-You 
relation with a content different from what he worked out in chapter 2 and 
reintroduced in chapter 4. The clear recognition between the different contents of the 
l-You relations discussed in different respects is decisive for a proper understanding of 
the structure of vicarious representative action. 
The place and function ofvicarious representative action can be depicted as a 
sort of medium between the broken community and the restored community, the 
community of Ad am and the community of Christ. Vicarious representative action 
arises in the fallen world, where the first pattern ofi-You relations, developed in 
chapter 2, is valid. In fact, as we will see, this pattern ofl-You relations was designed 
to house the social-theological content of vicarious representative action. However, 
the vicarious representative act is possible only with reference to the restored 
community in Christ, whose I-You relations are depicted in accordance to that ofthe 
"primal" or "original" community. Vicarious representative action, therefore, reflects 
both patterns ofl-You relations at the same time. 
This simultaneous position of the two patterns of the I-You relations is in full 
accord with the simultaneity ofthe broken community and the restored community, 
concieved in a characteristically Lutheran manner. 
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"The world of sin is the world of'Adam', the old humanity. But the world of Adam is 
the world of Christ reconciled and made into a new humanity, Christ's church. 
However, it is not as if Adam were completely overcome; rather, the humanity of 
Adam lives on in the humanity of Christ." (SC 1 07) 
Bonhoeffer clearly marked the shift from one pattern ofl-You relations to 
another. At the beginning of chapter 3 he wrote: 
"First, as a matter of principle, when in the following we speak of 'I' and 'You' and 
their relations, it is in a fundamentally different sense from the second chapter." (SC 
65f) 
Our first task now is to analyse the different natures of the I-You relations as 
constructed one after the another. The different types ofl-You-relations we will 
identify as I-You-relations, pattern 'A' and !-You-relations, pattern 'B'. 
I regard the distinction between the two patterns ofl-You-relations as a 
decisive element for a clearer identification of the subject of the vicarious 
representative action. This distinction I have not encountered in Bonhoeffer 
scholarship so far. Rather, it seems, Bonhoeffer scholars refer to I-You-relations in 
Sanctorum Communio as a given pattern with a fixed meaning. Clifford Green, for 
example, writes: 
"Given this concept ofthe person whose individual existence essentially consists of 
historical, socio-ethical relations with others, Bonhoeffer concludes that for Christian 
theology the relation ofi and You is the 'social basic-relation'. 'You' is the specific 
designation for 'other' in Christian thought. By 'social basic-relation' he means that 
fundamental perspective in which relations between individual persons, between 
individuals and groups, and between corporate bodies are all to be envisaged. To 
choose the I-You relation as the social basic-relation is not to deny the mutations, so to 
speak, which are involved in the contexts of creation, sin and redemption. It is rather 
to decide the basic perspective in which these several human 'states' are to be 
viewed" 43 
My point is that it is not only the social context that changes with respect to 
the shifts from created community to broken community and restored community, but 
the very content of the I-You relation itself Without this basic recognition the peculiar 
character ofBonhoeffer's image of vicarious representative action as well as freedom 
cannot be grasped. 
43 Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology ofSociality, p. 34. 
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The observation that we are dealing with two distinct patterns of I-You-
relations should in the following investigation be combined with our specific 
perspective, provided by the purpose of the comparison of the anthropological core of 
Bib6's and Bonhoeffer's social and theological theories. We have already seen why the 
possible role of spontaneity is important in determining whether a concept of negative 
freedom might be conceivable. Therefore, we will pay attention to the place and 
possible influence of spontaneity with respect to an understanding of person in three 
subsequent instances. First we will examine spontaneity that is related to the concept 
of person characterised by I-You-relations pattern 'A'. As a second step, we will do the 
same examination with respect to !-You-relations pattern 'B'. Thirdly, we will look at 
the place and influence of spontaneity in the life of the person whose being is formed 
by the theological content of vicarious representative action. These three steps provide 
the framework of the following investigation. 
2. !-You-relations Pattern 'A' and the Christian Concept of Person 
In the second chapter, as we have seen, Bonhoeffer takes his first step in the 
investigation of the Christian concept of community. He chooses the concept of person 
as a starting point. Specifying the content of the Christian concept of the person first 
he examines the four ontic basic-relations that pose both the norm and the limit to all 
empirical sociality. Having shortly discussed three versions of the ontic basic-relations 
-the third of them is the 'Epicurean' type in which we identified the possible basis of 
Bib6' social theory- he arrives at the subject-object relation from the point of view of 
German idealism. His main concern is to demonstrate that the subject-object scheme is 
unable to host the Christian concept of person, because it cannot show the concrete 
barrier over against the person. Bonhoeffer demonstrates the lack of barrier in several 
ways. In order to enter the social sphere, the intellect of the knowing subject has to be 
confronted by some fundamental barrier in the intellectual sphere before, but 
"idealism's object is ultimately no barrier. What is important is not the nature of the 
barrier, but the fact that it is experienced and acknowledged as a real barrier. But what 
does it mean to experience and acknowledge a barrier as real?" (SC 46) Bonhoeffer 
thinks that idealism, lacking a concept ~~reality, cannot answer this question. The 
absence of a concept of reality is demonstrated by the idealist thesis that essential 
reality is "the self-knowing and self-active spirit, engaging truth and reality in the 
process, [thus p ]ersons have at their disposal their own ethical value" (SC 46). 
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The fact that self-imposed ethical motives cannot pose a real barrier is further 
explained by involving the concept of time in the discussion. Bonhoeffer confronts the 
person by the absolute ethical demand to see how the one "enters a state of 
responsibility or, in other words, a decision" (SC 48). This person is 
"existing [not] in timeless fullness of value and spirit, but in a state of responsibility in 
the midst oftime; not one existing in time's continuous flow, but in the value-related-
not value-filled-moment. In the concept ~{the moment, the concept ~{time and its 
value-relatedness are eo-posited The 'moment' is the time of responsibility, value-
related time, or, let us say, time related to God; and, most essentially, it is concrete 
time. Only in concrete time is the real claim of ethics effectual; and only when I am 
responsible am I fully conscious of being bound to time." (SC 48) 
It is very telling to see how, as the argument proceeds to clarify the barrier, the 
element ofthe ethical that has been included is accompanied by such attributes as 
"absolute", "concrete", "real". But Bonhoeffer is able to increase the tension even 
further: 
"[I]dealism has no understanding of the moment in which the person feels the 
threat of absolute demand. The idealist ethicist knows what he ought to do, and, what 
is more, he can always do it precisely because he ought. Where is there room, then, for 
distress of conscience, for infinite anxiety [Angst] in the face of decisions?" (SC 49) 
In the course ofthe proceeding argument a peculiar interchange ofthe "ethical" 
and the "divine" can be observed. According to "a Christian insight" a person is born 
out of "passionate ethical struggle, confrontation by an overwhelming claim"; but the 
human person originates also "only in relation to the divine; the divine person 
transcends the human person, who both resists and is overwhelmed by the divine" (SC 
49). Some sentences later we meet "the concrete ethical barrier of the other person" 
(SC 50) that helps us to grasp the social antic-ethical basic-relations of persons. The 
Editor comes to the aid of the bewildered reader by explaining that Bonhoeffer's 
understanding of person "presupposes the theological axiom that the human person 
always exists in relation to an Other, namely God, and that human relations are in 
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some way analogies of this fundamental relation" 44 . It is exactly the indefinite 
character ofthe analogy, some way, that makes Bonhoeffer's argument difficult to 
follow, and, also, his concept of person problematic. This problematic aspect is 
revealed right in the next section where Bonhoeffer introduces the I-You-relationship 
pattern 'A'. 
Bonhoeffer, naturally, recognises the problem. "One could object that so far 
'other' has been understood as referring to God, whereas now a concept of social 
relation has suddenly been introduced, in which 'other' refers to another human being." 
(SC 50) In the following pages of his study Bonhoeffer ventures to maintain his 
conviction that the pattern of the same I-You relationship can be applied both to God-
human and human-human relationships, and in both cases the I becomes a person by 
being confronted by the barrier created by the You. 
Bonhoeffer completes his argument in two steps. First he asks what the 
concrete You- inevitable for the existence of the concrete I- means in philosophical 
terms. Aswering this question Bonhoeffer doubts that this concrete You needs 
necessarily to be an "other" I. With respect to the recognition of the "other" he 
distinguishes epistemological knowledge and ethical-social knowledge. 
"The other can be experienced by the I only as You [in terms ofthe ethical-
sociological knowledge] but never directly as I [in terms of epistemological 
knowledge], that is, in the sense of the I that has become I only through the claim of a 
You'' (SC 51) 
Although the You, as a thinking and acting mind should be understood as an I 
"in the general sense", the "two !-forms [ethical and general?] should be strictly 
distinguished" (SC 51). Bonhoeffer calls the You a "reality-form", that is "by 
definition" independent while it encounters the I in the ethical spere. To be sure, 
independence means that the encountering You is not immanent to the knowing I, that 
is, the I cannot approach it through epistemological knowledge. If the knowing I 
thought that (s)he would still know the 'other' as an I, Bonhoeffer does not delay the 
warmng: 
44 SC p. SO. note 56. 
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"what was said above about the distinctive spheres was not understood: the 
transcendence of the You says nothing at all about epistemological transcendence. 
This is purely ethical transcendence, experienced only by those facing a decision ... " 
(SC 52) 
What happens here is nothing else than a radical reductionism: the concept of 
person can be concieved solely in ethical terms. In accordance with the previous 
argument, this reductionism is extended also to the Christian concept of the person: 
"Thus everything that can be said about the Christian concept of person can only be 
grasped directly by the person who is facing responsibility." (SC 52) 
To avoid any misunderstanding, Bonhoeffer also offers the counter-test of this 
argument. On the one hand, "I can never become a real barrier to myself', and I cannot 
"leap over the barrier to the other" (SC 52). I cannot know the You who confronts me 
as the 'other': the other may be an I or not, or may even be God. By giving up the 
possibility ofknowing the "other" who confronts me as a You Bonhoeffer intended to 
move the Christian basic-relation beyond the epistemological subject-object relation. 
At the same time, by arguing that the You is 'deprived of its I-ness' from an 
epistemological point of view, Bonhoeffer made a place for God, "an impenetrable 
You whose metaphysical personhood, which presupposes absolute self-consciousness 
and spontaneous action, implies nothing at all about God being an I as described 
above" (SC 52), (that is, God's I-ness does not need a You in order to be born). This 
way the You has become able to 'house' God, while it remains deprived of its I-ness. 
Bonhoeffer, however, is able to face this loss. He asks: "[d]oesn't the statement that 
the You is not necessarily an I militate against the concept of community comprised of 
persons?" (SC 53) Before his reader could give an affirmative answer, he answers by 
posing a second question: "Is the person not completely isolated, in effect?" (SC 53 f) 
The answer sounds like a verdict: 
The person arises only in relation to a You, and yet the person stands in complete 
isolation. Persons are unique and thus fundamentally separate and distinct from one 
another. In other words, one person cannot know the other, but can only acknowledge 
and 'believe' in the other. Psychology and epistemology find their limitation here; the 
ethical personhood ofthe other is neither a psychologically comprehensible fact nor an 
epistemological necessity." (SC 54) 
158 
What is striking to consider is the epistemological basis ofBonhoeffer's 
understanding ofthe persons's uniquness. The ethical perspective serves as a basis of 
the intrinsic relatedness of human beings, the epistemological perspective establishes 
their uniquness and individuality. The epistemological factor, however, works by its 
absence towards this purpose. The other one is not unique to me because I know his or 
her unique characteristics, on the contrary, the other is unique because I don't know 
anything about him or her. Within the pattern of the relationship of the I and the You 
uniqueness does not mean positively affirmed, acknowledged, let alone celebrated 
otherness, no, uniqueness is separation, complete isolation. I am unique because the 
other - for whom I may happen to be the ethical You - does not know me, and the 
other is unique, because - although born as an I because of my You-ness - I do not 
know him. Bonhoeffer's understanding ofthe I and You relationship between human 
persons carries this deficit on its way to the encounter with the concept of God. 
So, the task ahead ofBonhoeffer is, again: to maintain the pattern of the I-You 
relationship in both God-human and human-human relationships, and, at the same 
time, to uphold the difference between God and the human being. His awareness of 
this problem is reflected in his question: "this [pattern] seems to make one human 
being the creator of the ethical person of the other, which is an intolerable thought. 
Can it be avoided?" (SC 54) The answer is in accordance with the previous argument 
that deprived the You of its epistemologicall y accessible I -ne ss: "The person-creating 
efficacy ofthe You is independent ofthe personhood ofthe You." (SC 54) But 
Bonhoeffer goes even further: after depriving the You of its 'personhood', a great loss 
in a conceptual level in itself, he thinks it necessary to deprive it also of its 'will'. Thus 
the conclusion follows: 
"One human being cannot of its own accord make another into an I, an ethical person 
conscious of responsibility. God or the Holy Spirit joins the concrete You; only 
through God's active working does the other become a You to me from whom my I 
arises. In other word"i, eve1y human you is an image of the divine You. You-character 
is in fact the essential form in which the divine is experienced; every human You bears 
its You-character only by virtue ofthe divine." (SC 54f) 
Thus, the human You is eventually made an image ofthe divine You. The 
problem is solved this way: God, the "impenetrable You" is given a place within the 
---------·- ----
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pattern of the I-You relationship in the position of the You, since the human You is 
per de.finitionem a creature, an image of the divine You. However, this conceptual 
'success' has made the character ofthe You hopelessly fluid. Who is the You, after all? 
Regarding the human-human relationship, Bonhoeffer deprived the You of all of its 
attributes except its ethical being, that is, in fact, the You is nothing more than a 
barrier. Now this mere barrier has been made the image ofthe divine You, the image 
of God. Bonhoeffer argues that it "is not to say that [being an image of God] is a 
borrowed attribute of God, and not really a you. Rather ( ... ) it is a real, absolute and 
holy You, like the divine You." (SC 55) Here the fluidity reaches its zenith: the You, 
who is not even neccessarily an I, bears the reality, the absoluteness and the holiness 
of the divine You. 
This fluidity of the You makes, finally, both the person of God and the person 
ofthe human being, participators in the I-You relationship, peculiarly fluid too. It can 
be observed in two directions. 
On the one hand, since " [m ]y real relationship to another person is oriented to 
my relationship to God" (SC 56), I get to know the other person in the way I get to 
know God. Contrary to my relationship with the other person whose I is not accessible 
for my epistemological knowledge, I do have access to know God as an I "in the 
revelation ofGod~5love, so too with the other person; here the concept ofthe church 
comes into play." (SC 56) So, in the church I can know not only God's I but, 
analogically, the I of the other. God's self-revelation makes him an I to me, an I that 
transforms his You-ness into an I: "it will become clear that the Christian person 
achieves his or her essential nature only when God does not encounter the person as 
You but 'enters into' the person as I" (SC 56). God's You-ness turns into an I-ness this 
way. Bonhoeffer does not say whether this transformation may happen to the human 
You after, in the peresence of the revelation, I get to know him/her as an I; however, 
in a deleted section he tries to distance his view from mysticism. 45 In any case, the 
fluidity of the You appears as its capacity to flow into the I, thus the distinction 
between the I and the You, on which Bonhoeffer has built his concept of person, 
looses its meaning. 
45 se p. 56. note 79. 
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Besides the lack of a clear difference between the I and the You, on the other 
hand, Bonhoeffer's concept of You is also fluid in the sense ofbeing unable to mark 
the difference between God's person and the human person. We have followed the 
way the deprived human You, the merely ethical barrier to the other, the not-
necessarily I has turned into the real, absolute and holy image of the divine You. In 
terms of the content of identitiy, this You moves unhindered between zero and the 
absolute. Bonhoeffer seems not perfectly satisfied with this solution, since at the end 
of this section he worded an objection: "when discussing content we were quite one-
sidedly oriented toward the ethical and ignored the 'human spirit' that was at issue in 
idealism, as if it were not part of the person" (SC 56). His answer is difficult to 
understand on the basis of the preceeding argument: "we reply that human 'spirit' with 
its moral and religious capacities is certainly an indispensable presupposition in order 
for the ethical person to come to be" (SC 57). 
My purpose in the analysis ofBonhoeffer's understanding of the I-You 
relationship, as it has been depicted in chapter 2 as pattern 'A', was certainly not to 
discuss every important aspect ofthe problem. In the perspective ofthe present study, 
there are two significant findings we discovered here. First, the ethical in the 
relationship of the I and the You (pattern 'A'), and, similarly, in the creation of the I as 
a person, plays an inevitable structural role. The ethical, primarily, plays the role of 
the barrier, over against the I as a person is being born. Thus, the ethical in this respect 
is not necessarily the identifiable ethical deed or influence that refers to the other 
person's identity, will or intent, the ethical is a formal barrier without which the person 
cannot be born. Likewise, the category 'other', who represents the You for the I within 
the vital and fundamental I-You relationship, marks a rather formal entity for the same 
reason. The second finding comes from the first. Since Bonhoeffer concieved the I-
You relationship in purely ethical terms (contrary to his later objection), the identity of 
the You became rather fluid. Since the same formal ethical structure has been applied -
through the I-You relationship- to both the God-human and human-human 
relationships, the You, housing God as a You and the other person as a You at the 
same time, created a sphere where God and the human other are not clearly 
distinguishable. The lack of a clear distinction between God and the human person 
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may lead, finally, to the suspension ofthe difference between the You and the I. Since 
God, the 'impenetrable You' is able, in his revelation, enter into my I as an I, his You 
therefore may turn into an I, and the same may happen also to the human You. 
At this point of our investigation we can diagnose the entire lack of spontaneity 
in Bonhoeffer's understanding of person involved in 1-You-relations pattern 'A'. The 
very existence ofthis person is dependent on an other, a You who appears as an 
ethical barrier to make the person a real one. This person doesn't have a life of its own, 
its identity is rather fluid, its self-awareness doesn't play any role in its interpersonal 
relations. The activity ofthis person is not motivated by its self-awareness- that, as we 
have seen, Bonhoeffer regarded as an idealist illusion- but the recognition of the 
other, and nothing happens to this ethically defined person before and without the 
recognition ofthe other. We have also seen his adamant rejection ofthe idea of any 
psychological or epistemological accessibility of the person who participates in 1-You-
relations pattern 'A': both are ways that would be relevant to reveal a person's 
spontaneity. His only reference to spontaneity with respect to God's 'metaphysical 
personhood' cannot be transferred to human persons. 
With respect to a deeper understanding of vicarious representative action the 
detailed analysis ofthe structure and the content ofthe 1-You relationship pattern 'A' 
is inevitable. Vicarious representative action as a topic, in fact, has been introduced 
within the final section of the discussion of this I-You relationship: 
"[o]ne might then speak here ofthe human being as the image of God with respect to 
the effect one person has on another ( cf the later discussion of the problem of 
community of spirit and how one person becomes Christ for the other)." (SC 55) 
The second reference to vicarious representative action has been made at the 
end of chapter 4, where, as we have seen, the I-You relationship pattern 'A' were 
already reintroduced. By that time, the concept of Christian person had been enriched 
by the considerations of the collective person, to which had also been added the 
perspective of the ethical collective person. The discussion of the ethical collective 
person is the immediate context ofthe second reference to vicarious representative 
action, "which will be treated later" (SC 120). The fundamentaly ethical character of 
the 1-You relationship pattern 'A' is reflected in the ethically conceived collective 
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person here. The real discussion of vicarious representative action, nevertheless, does 
not begin before the positive explanation of the nature of the restored community, the 
sanctorum communio, the church. At this point the other pattern of the I-You 
relations, originally concieved in the context ofthe primal community, will also be 
effective. Now we turn to the analysis of I-You relations pattern 'B'. 
3. !-You-relations Pattern 'B' and the Collective Person 
At the start of our attempt to explain the content ofl-You relationship pattern 
'B', first we return to a piece of argument in the previous section, that, I think, was not 
entirely understandable within that context. In stating that "[w]hen discussing content 
we were quite one-sidedly oriented toward the ethical and ignored the 'human spirit' 
that was at issue in idealism, as if it were not part of the person", Bonhoeffer made an 
objection against his own theory, but also provided the answer: 
"human 'spirit' with its moral and religious capacities is certainly an indispensable 
presupposition in order for the ethical person to become. This assertion has already 
been made above and will be elaborated further in discussing the doctrine of the 
primal state in the next chapter." (SC 57) 
We have seen that "human spirit" and any of its moral and religious capacities 
did not play any role in characterising the nature ofthe I-You relation pattern 'A'. 
However, the case with I-You relation pattern 'B' is quite different. 
In the following section we will examine Bonhoeffer's argument about the 
social significance of spirit, in which I-You-relations pattern 'B' have been 
interwoven. Already in chapter 2 Bonhoeffer emphasised the inevitable role of the 
concept of spirit in establishing a concept of person. 46 It is this section where the 
origins ofl-You relations pattern 'A' and pattern 'B' are referred to and from where the 
ways will part. Pattern 'A' belongs to the "Christian concept of person", worked out in 
chapter 2 and reintroduced in chapter 4. Pattern 'B' belongs to the 'general concept of 
personal spirit' that takes shape in chapter 3. For the time being, it remains to be seen 
46 se p. 44. 
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what Bonhoeffer might have meant by the statement that pattern 'A', created for the 
"Christian concept of person", necessarily builds upon the fact ofthe human spirit. 
The programmatic statement of the introduction of the theme of spirit into the 
train of thought of the study reads: 
"The social-philosophical problem in this section is the relation between human spirit 
and sociality per se. It will be demonstrated that human beings, as spirit, are 
necessarily created in a community - that human spirit in general is woven into the 
web of sociality. Such knowledge is very important for our argument because it 
clarifies fundamentally the problematic relationship of individual and community. 
This knowledge gives us the correct perspective for our typology of community. 
Ultimately, both are necessary to clarify the problem of religious community and the 
church." (SC 65) 
We have already reffered to Bonhoeffer's clear reference to the change 
between the meaning ofl-You relations within the "Christian concept ofperson" and 
the concept of person in the primal state. Bonhoeffer's full statement runs as follows: 
"First, as a matter of principle, when in the following we speak of 'I' and 'You' and 
their relations, it is in a fundamentally different sense from the second chapter. The I is 
not the person called upon by You and only thereby awakened to become I; the You is 
not the unknowable, impenetrable, alien other. On the contrary, we are in a different 
sphere altogether. It will be shown that the whole nature of human spirit, which 
necessarily is presupposed by the Christian concept of person and has its unifying 
point in self-consciousness, (ofwhich we will also be speaking in this context), is such 
that it is only conceivable in sociality. Though we must show that self-consciousness 
only arises in relation to the other, one must not confuse this interaction with the 
Christian I-You-relation. Not every self-conscious I knows of the ethical barrier of the 
You. To be sure, it does know of an alien You -this may even be the necessary 
presupposition for the ethical and real experience of the You. However, it does not 
know the You as an utterly alien being, as pure claim, as erecting barriers. This is to 
say, it does not know the You as real, but as irrelevant in the last analysis to the I 
itself The following, then, is to be understood in this sense, as the necessary general 
account of human spirit that is the presupposition of the foregoing and following 
argument." (SC 65f)47 
We will briefly summarise the conceptual development that originates from the 
concept of spirit, keeping in mind that this is the set of concepts that offers the 
framework to Bonhoeffer both to clarify the relationship of the individual and 
community and to set up a typology for social communities. "In terms of its form, 
47 A similar argument can be found in SC p. 7 L note 31. 
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spirit in a person is the bond~~ se~f-consciousness and se~f-determination that 
documents its structural unity; this spirit can be formally defined as the principle of 
receptivity and activity. In terms of its function, spirit is effective in acts of thinking, 
self-conscious willing, and feeling. We can conceive of these acts only as based upon 
human sociality; they arise simultaneously from, with, and in such sociality". (SC 67) 
From this statement Bonhoeffer derives his twofold definition of personal being: as 
structurally open and as structurally closed. 
The decisive argument for a concept ofperson that is structurally open is based 
on the priority of spirit before the individual person. "People find themselves 
immersed in an infinite richness of possibilities for expression and understanding. 
Before humanity was aware of it, a stream of spirit entered into millions of veins, and 
one can only notice it when standing in the middle of the stream." (SC 68) The "stream 
of spirit" is further specified as intellectual act and language, that are manifestations of 
sociality: "with language, a system ofsocial spirit has been built into human beings; in 
other words, 'objective 5pirit' has become effective in history." (SC 70) The concept of 
objective spirit receives an extensive treatment already with respect to the primal state 
of being 48, it is the social-philosophical concept that is going to be the counterpart of 
the theological understanding of the Holy Spirit within the discussion ofthe sanctorum 
communio49 . What is important to see now is, that Bonhoeffer understands by 
objective spirit a "spirit of sociality, which is distinct in itself from all individual 
spirit," "extending beyond every individual" (SC 74). !-You-relations pattern 'B' is 
introduced against this background. 
The priority of objective spirit becomes manifest also in other instances of the 
explanation of the I-You-relation. Summarising the discussion of personal being as 
structurally open compares I-You-relation to the life of a family of great traditions: 
"[H}uman spirit in its entirety is woven into sociality and rests on the basic-relation~~ 
I and You. 'Only in interaction with one another is the 5pirit of human beings ever 
revealed; this is the essence of 5pirit, to be oneself through being in the other.' In 
infinite closeness, in mutual penetration, I and You are joined together, inseparable 
from one another forever, resting in one another, intimately participating in one 
48 se pp. 97ff. 
49 se pp. 2ostr. 
another, empathising, sharing experiences, bearing together the general stream of 
interactions of spirit." (SC 73) 
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The relationship ofthe individual and the objective spirit becomes more 
dialectical in the section where Bonhoeffer explains personal being as structurally 
closed, since here he focuses on the self-determined individual, but the image of great 
family traditions can also be recognised: 
"[H]uman beings really know their I only in the You-relation. Thus, they clearly are 
not only reservoirs or receptive organs for a certain quantity of objective spirit, but 
much more they are spontaneous 'bearers', active members ofthe great social nexus. 
Otherwise there would be no 1-You-relations at all - and thus in turn no spirit. The 
more the individual spirit develops, the more it plunges into the stream of objective 
spirit, the more it becomes a bearer of objective spirit, and this immersion is precisely 
what strengthens the individual spirit." (SC 73±) 
This paragraph is one of the few where Bonhoeffer refers to sponteneity. The 
context is crucial: he speaks about human beings who are spontaneous bearers, active 
members of the great social nexus. Spontaneity thus focuses on and is motivated by 
the great heritage nurtured and provided by the objective spirit. Objective spirit, 
therefore, is prior even to spontaneity. 
In the section about personal being as structurally closed, nevertheless, 
Bonhoeffer insists that there is no priority, let alone subordination, of either personal 
or social being, since ''personal and social being have equal weight" (SC 76). 
Bonhoeffer does not think, however, that the problem of the relation of the individual 
and community would be thereby solved. After asking several questions about this 
peculiar relationship, he concludes: 
"Ifthe equal weight of social and personal being is to be maintained, what is the 
meaning of community as a metaphysical unit [mine italics] in relation to the 
individual person? We maintain that community can be interpreted as a collective 
person with the same structure as the individual person." (SC 77) 
To avoid the Platonic idea of the subordination of the individual to the whole 
Bonhoeffer introduces the phrase individual collective person. Bonhoeffer applies the 
concept of collective person to 1-You relations: "I-You relations are also possible 
between a collective person and an individual person" (SC 78). Moreover, the concept 
of collective person deepens the meaning ofl-You relations: 
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"[T]he collective person is, after all, also an individual person; only when collective 
persons are included in social intercourse can its richness be fully grasped. Thus to 
postulate a collective person does not mean to limit the sociological basic-category of 
I-You relations. Rather, one must articulate the similarity of structure of the collective 
person and the individual person in the eyes of the universal person of God: 
closedness and openness, mutual enrichment, social and inward intentions within this 
structural unity." (SC 78f) 
It seems that he concept of "God's universal person", used only in this section 
of the study, is introduced here only to establish an ultimate reason for operating with 
the concept of collective person as an unavoidable one. The concept, however, is in 
need of further specification, and while identifying its character, Bonhoeffer is careful 
with the attribute of real. "Yet we still hesitate to declare the reality of the collective 
person. Since the problem of reality can be solved fundamentally only from the 
perspective of ethics, we must first consider the degree to which ethical categories can 
be applied to a collective person, in the sense of ethical personhood." (SC 79) The way 
to the phrase ethical collective person thus has been prepared. 
After the summary of the development of the two key terms, objective spirit 
and collective person, we can see the extent to which Bonhoeffer relies on idealism 
while pursuing these ideas. When he developed the Christian concept of person in 
chapter 2, he proved to be an adamant critic of idealism, especially by making a sharp 
distinction between an epistemological and a social approach to the concept of person 
(SC 45). The concepts of objective spirit and collective person, however, are 
inconcievable without a solid idealistic basis. In some cases Bonhoeffer is quite 
explicit: idealism's "monumental perception, especially in Hegel, was that the 
principle of spirit is something objective" (SC 74). In a deleted section he wrote: 
"our turning against idealist theory is clear; equally clear, of course, is what we have 
to learn from it" 50 . 
The idealist concept of spirit, however, has also been subordinated to an 
understanding of revelation and the church. In the methodological section of chapter 3 
Bonhoeffer writes: 
50 se p. 75, note 43. 
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"If the revelation in Christ speaks of the will of God to create from the old humanity 
of Adam a new humanity of Christ, i.e., the church, and ifl know myselfto be 
incorporated into this church of Christ, then it follows that we should project the idea 
of the unbroken community with God and with human beings back to the doctrine of 
the primal state as well." (SC 62) 
Likewise, 
"the concept of person in the primal state must be understood differently [to the 
concept of Christian person], corresponding to the idea ofthe new humanity" (SC 63). 
Here Bonhoeffer states the ultimate theological content that, in the first place, 
informs the concept of person: 
"The formal and general concept of person should be thought of as fulfilled by 
positive Christian content, i.e., established by God and oriented toward God. Willing 
and thinking come from God and go toward God; that is to say, community with God 
is completed in love and truth. The miracle of the Christian concept of community is 
that love for God involves submission, but that God's love, in ruling, serves." (SC 63) 
This is the "positive Christian content" that the concept of person should 
house. We have seen that in the analysis of the person of the primal state of social 
being, within which the 1-You relations pattern 'B' was constructed, a general account 
of human spirit has also been given a key hermeneutical role. We may conclude, 
therefore, that the shape of the "human spirit" will finally match the "Christian 
content". As we proceed in exploring the nature ofi-You relations pattern 'B', we will 
also follow the way the generally concieved human spirit takes shape. 
4. The Sociology ~f the Primal State of Being 
Having completed the social-philosophical section, Bonhoeffer turns to the 
sociological problem of the primal state of being. The first concept he takes up is will: 
community is not commonality, "rather, reciprocal will constitutes community" (SC 
83). The reciprocal will ofthe separate I and You includes strife that makes unity 
relative, as regards its content. Since difference within individuals is willed by God, 
"strife is recognised as a fundamental sociological law and basically is sanctified. 
Concretely, this implies the necessity and the justification of partisanship in every 
community relation. Genuine life arises only in the conflict of wills; strength unfolds 
only in strife." (SC 84f) 
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After the Fall the conflict of wills has lost its concrete and productive 
character; however, even in evil conflict "the most intimate social bond ofthe human 
spirit becomes visible" (SC 86): the other will is recognised. The opposition of wills 
may be resolved only in the cooperation of wills: this principle 
"is just as valid for the relation between God and human beings as it is for that 
between persons. Through conflict, the will of the sinful human being is forced into 
the holy will of God and thus community is established" (SC 86) 
The second sociological problem, typology of social communities, originates 
from the problem of will. Bonhoeffer examines the nature of the bonds between wills. 
It can be considered from the standpoint of the relation between the willed goal and 
the will to communal formation, or the relation of strength of the wills to each other. 
(SC 86f) 
Both ways of interpretation lead through an additional consideration: wills 
within a community may be meaningfully depicted only as wills together but not 
beside or against one another. Togetherness of wills can be understood in two ways: 
"Being-with-one-another [Miteinanderj can be willed as an end in itse!f(this also 
includes willing-for-one-another [Fi.ireinander-wollen]. Being-with-one-another can 
also be willed as a means to an end." (SC 88) 
In the first case we speak about a will to meaning that corresponds with a 
structure of meaning, while in the second case we have a rational pwposive will that 
corresponds with a structure a_{ purpose. Following Tonnies' terminology, the first 
type of will and structure Bonhoeffer relates to community while the second one to 
society. According to their simpliest distinction, "[i]fcommunity is essentially a life-
community, then a society is an association of rational action" (SC 90). 
If the bond between wills is considered as the relationship ofthe strength ofthe 
wills to each other, we can distinguish a relation o.fforce and a relation of rule. The 
relation afforce, again, is associated with society, while the relation ofrule is made 
into a characteristic of community. 
"[I]n the association of force community is not possible anymore. By contrast, a 
genuine association o.f authentic rule not only makes community possible, but in most 
cases realises it." (SC 92) 
So far we have rewieved the conceptual development of the sociological 
factors of the primal state of being. Now we take a look at some particular social 
insights that are woven into the conceptual framework. First we will consider 
Bonhoeffer's characterisation of community and society, then we will turn to the 
nature of authentic rule. 
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In distinguishing community and society Bonhoeffer avoids the genetic 
approach again that would identify the former as grown and the latter as made. The 
task of a sociological study, he argues, is "to study the acts ofwill that are constitutive 
of a social structure". (SC 89) Accordingly, a community is willed by its members as 
an end in itself, while society is willed as a means to a specific purpose. Although 
psychological differences are not constitutive for a distinction between community 
and society, it is meaningful to consider them and speak about the closeness and 
looseness ofthe bonds ofwill. 
Following Scheler, Bonhoeffer argues that all communities are life-
communities, since "human beings, intended for vital and personal existence, can live" 
in them. The subsequent characterisation of community is of utmost importance in the 
perspective of our research: 
"The first act of affirming that one belongs to a community is usually embedded in a 
concrete, living, nm?formal act such as conscious participation in the work of the 
community. Thus even young children can sense it, for example, through an act of 
love, trust, or obedience. Unlike the society, a community can support young children 
as well. This is not to introduce the genetic concept of community; rather, young 
children in a community are a part of their parents' will until they can will for 
themselves- a thought that would be absurd in a society. This insight will be very 
important for the sociological concept of the church. Common feeling, common 
willing, and eo-responsibility are forces of inmost cohesion. The basic attitude is 
mutual inner interest. This takes visible shape, for example, in the household 
community as a community of table, living space, festivities, shared culture through 
tradition, custom, usage and order; for such forms of community, memory and custom 
are intellectual, vital qualities of human spirit. Only in community is such education 
possible. "51 
51 SC p. 90, a deleted section provided in note I 0 I is also included. 
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For an understanding ofthe full significance ofthe above characterisation of 
community we will consider the following explanation of the nature of society in this 
context: 
"If a community is essentially a life-community, then a society is an association of 
rational action. It appeals to human beings' ability to use their reason most effectively, 
as demonstrated in the search for the most appropriate means to a willed purpose, and 
in using the society itself extensively to this end. The only reason this is not called 
unethical is that it is based on consent and applies equally to all. Moreover, the other 
person must be treated with utmost consideration, precisely in order to be used to full 
advantage. This is the basisfor the inner self-preservation of a society. The voluntary 
act of joining a society must be directly expressed and contractually secured. 
Everything intimately personal is excluded here. In the system of means, complete 
isolation of spirit goes hand in hand with communication between purposeful wills. 
People accept responsibility for the society only in their very own interest. In principle 
a society has no tradition. The basic attitude is expressed in mutual inner indifference, 
in strictest caution toward one another, and thus in simultaneous reserve and personal 
self-assurance- and finally, insofar as it suits one's purpose, in conventional 
amiability. The organised structure of purpose has its basis in the contract, which is the 
origin and measure of the association; the organisation then develops into an 
elaborate system of means and is fixed in written documents and agreements." (SC 
90f) 
The introduction ofthe distinction between community and society follows 
from the explanation of the relationship ofwills, Bonhoeffer's starting point ofthe 
sociological problem of the primal state of being. I think, however, that it breaks the 
fundamental logic of the discussion. The central problem of chapter 3 is the 
relationship of person and community in the primal state of being. I-You-relations 
pattern 'B', as we have seen, are given a constitutive role in describing this 
relationship. The description of community as an end in itself is harmonious with the 
1-You-relations of persons, both as structurally open and structurally closed. However, 
the description of society as a means to an end is difficult to understand in terms ofi-
You-relations pattern 'B'. 
It is obvious from the comparison ofBonhoeffer's descriptions of community 
and society that he regards community as a worthy and constructive type of human 
togetherness while society is regarded as a negative possibility that is destructive for 
personal life. Community represents cohesion, society is nothing else than organised 
selfishness, a well-balanced mutual inner indifference. Although Bonhoeffer argues 
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that no pure type exists in concrete form, since, as he states, every community includes 
the connection of wills that is typical in a society and every society has some remnants 
of community, since it is rooted in community (SC 91 ), community and society are 
structurally clearly to be distinguished. At this point Bonhoeffer's way of reasoning 
and Scheler's way of reasoning, based on two distinct methods, have been joined to 
each other. 
For Scheler, the connection between community and society is a genetic one: 
"No society without community (but, to be sure, community without society in some 
cases). All possible society is necessarily based on community. "52 This genetic 
connection allows the possibility to regard community as the social type of intact!-
You-relations and society as the social type of distorted I-You-relations53 For 
Bonhoeffer, however, this way of reasoning is not possible: the difference in the 
directions ofwill makes community and society phenomenologically different with 
respect to their constitutive characteristics. The tiny alteration of Scheler's thought in 
Bonhoeffer's reception reveals their fundamentally different approach. Scheler allows 
the existence of community without society, that is, the possibility of community in a 
pure form in which I-You-relations have not been distorted to create a society. The 
genesis of society is a likely possibility, but not a necessity. Bonhoeffer, on the 
contrary, does not allow the concrete existence of a pure community even in the 
primal state of being. He rejects the possibility of a transition from community into 
society and maintains their fundamentally different characteristics. 
The other reason why a genetic view that would include an intact as well as a 
distorted phase would not be possible in Bonhoeffer's system is that both community 
and society is discussed in relation to the primal state of being, that is, the social life of 
human beings prior to the Fall. No distortion ofl-You-relations can be considered 
before the Fall, therefore, I-You-relations pattern 'B' simply can not be applied to 
52 se p. 91. note 105. 
53 Bonhoeffer is aware of the fact that Scheler's - and also Tonnies' - method can be understood as a 
genetic one. However, he regards it as a mistake and believes that Scheler consciously strives for a 
phenomenologicalmethod. Bonhoeffer's main objection against the genetic method is that its 
consequences, he thinks, are w1acceptable with respect to the church (as conuuwlity and not society). 
Bonhoeffer's debate with the genetic method and his reference to the church in se p. 87. note 29. does 
not invalidate my criticism as regards the w1certain role of I-You-relations in the society type of the 
primal state of social being. 
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human relations in a society. Statements such as "everything intimately personal is 
excluded here" do not fit into this pattern. Further, I-You-relations pattern 'A', 
elaborated with respect to the Christian concept of person according to an exclusively 
ethical understanding, does not suit society either. Bonhoeffer seems to regard society 
as fundamentally unethical; the way he offers a saving grace, "[t]he only reason this is 
not called unethical is that is based on consent and applies equally to all" suggests that 
apart from this ethical content society does not represent any ethical character. 
The ethical evaluation of society is further complicated by the fact that, 
according to his general theory, Bonhoeffer places the ethical after the Fall, alongside 
with human history. In this view any mention ofthe ethical is simply meaningless in 
the primal state ofbeing. 54 After the Fall, then, the ethical is interpreted according to 
the logic ofl-You-relations pattern 'A', as being encountered by a You as an ethical 
barrier: the general application of the demand of consent as an ethical value, again, 
simply does not correspond to Bonhoeffer's understanding of the ethical. The above 
assertion is clear enough to express Bonhoeffer's low evaluation of society, at the 
same time, it strengthens the possibility of the discussion of society as being outside of 
the main line ofBonhoeffer's argument, outside the realm ofl-You-relations. As a 
result, society, as Bonhoeffer understood it following and partly altering the social 
theories ofTonnies and Scheler, would not be considered as the social framework of 
freedom either. 
Two more observations should be considered here. Bonhoeffer finishes the 
explanation of the primal state of social being with a discussion of objective spirit. The 
way he connects the significance of objective spirit to the distinction between 
community and society affirms the above statement that Bonhoeffer does not regard 
54 It has to be noted that my statement, "any mention of the ethical is simply meaningless in the primal 
state of human being" is only one possible reading of Bonhoeffer's application of the epithet ethical. 
Bonhoeffer's own application of this decisive epithet, however, seems to be so fluid that it is difficult to 
determine its meaning with respect to the difference between the primal and the fallen state of social 
being. Se p. 58, note l. and Se p. 59, note 1. support my reading of Bonhoeffer's application of the 
ethical (that is also valid for the historical). In contrast to these sections see se p. 61. note 1. It is more 
than obvious that the two applications of the ethical logically exclude each other, nevertheless, this 
contradiction is meaningful to the understanding ofBonhoeffer's usage of this epithet. What I mean by 
the 'tacit reference to the intrinsic ethical character of conmmnity', even in the primal state, is rooted in 
this logical contradiction, that bears, naturally, significance to the ethical evaluation of community also 
after the Fall. 
society as a social framework meaningful for freedom. Bonhoeffer explains their 
ditl'erence with respect to time. Community reaches the boundary of time, while 
society is timebound, it exists only within history, lacking any eschatological 
character. The eschatological character gives community its deepest meaning: it is 
from God to God. Bonhoeffer quickly explains the social significance of this 
eschatological reality: 
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"[t]his is the basis for the 'holiness' of human community life, whether we think of 
physical communities ofblood and clan, historical communities like a nation, or life-
shaping communities such as marriage and friendship. This holiness reveals the 
fundamental indissolubility of all these life structures." (SC 101) 
Society, naturally, cannot bear the marks of this "holiness", and this difference 
also explains "why only a community and never a society can or should become 
'church"' (SC 101 ). The really significant difference, however, becomes visible 
through the involvement of objective spirit into the argument: 
"[t]he most profound difference between the two social forms is that the objective 
spirit of community (but not that of a society) can be ascribed personal character" (SC 
1 02). 
From the stating of the personal character of the objective spirit of a 
community Bonhoeffer builds up the concept of the collective person again, adding, 
that "[ c ]ollective persons are self conscious and spontaneous" (SC 103 ). The personal 
character of community thus has been reinforced again by being contrasted to the lack 
of personal character of society. With respect to I-You-relations, the previous finding 
that I-You-relations cannot be concieved within a society we should extend into the 
observation that a society, unlike a community, cannot be a collective subject ofl-
y ou-relations either. Being at odds with I-You-relations in both respects, society has 
no meaning for Bonhoeffer's understanding of freedom either. 
The second observation considers a tacit reference to the intrinsic ethical 
character of community. The mere fact that Bonhoeffer qualified a condition that 
saves society from being unethical, and, at the same time, he did not make any similar 
reference to community, suggests that he regarded community as an ethical social type 
without any conditions or further qualification. We should remember that we deal with 
the primal state of social being where there is no meaningful understanding of the 
ethical; against this background this uneven qualification is all the more significant. 
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In the short characterisation of community Bonhoeffer lists some noble values 
of social life: it supports vital personal existence, invites even young children to an act 
of love, trust and obedience, provides a home for common feeling, common willing 
and eo-responsibility. It seems that Bonhoeffer attributes a self-evident ethical value to 
these social phenomena without applying to them the sole criterion he worked out for 
the Christian concept of person and will introduce as a general rule for life after the 
Fall: being addressed by a You. This tacit appreciation of community and devaluation 
of society in the social realm that, significantly, does not know about the ethical at all 
reflects, I think, Bonhoeffer's - probably unconscious - preference for community over 
societl5 If we consider the social contents of Bonhoeffer's descriptions of community 
as well as society, we may conclude that he gave preference to organic community 
over open society, given social bonds over chosen social bonds, order based on 
tradition over order based on common consent, in short, a conservative set of values 
over a liberal set ofvalues56 
At this point we can move on to consider the second way to look at the bonds 
between wills, that is, the relation of the strength of the wills to each other (SC 87). 
Bonhoeffer distinguishes a relation of force from a relation of rule. 
55 Clifford Green also recognises the fundamental problem in Bonhoeffer's distinction of comnuutity 
and society with respect to their ethical character. "[T]he most powerful social institutions- of business, 
govermnent, education, labor, communications, etc. - are not constituted as ethically responsible in their 
very essence. ( ... ) Since a great deal of the life of any person consists of instrwuental, rational-
purposive activities - without thereby diminislting one's status as an ethical agent - Bonhoeffer ntight 
have found a way to apply his concept of person in its corporate sense to Gesellschaften." (Green, 
Bonhoe.ffer: A Theology o.fSociality. p. 43, note 57.) I think, it is clear from my analysis ofBonhoeffer's 
way of reasoning why his doubtful distinction was a necessary element of his early social theory, so the 
above possibility was not open for him to choose. I think, Green's critical remark is rather mild, and is 
made further milder by his insistence that Bonhoeffer was not "simply following Tonnies' position, he 
[was] deliberately moving away from the conservative and romantic elements of Tonnies' theory. But 
he did not go far enough at this point, and so the problem remains." (Green, op. cif. p. 44, note 57.) I 
heartily agree with Green that Bonhoeffer's choice of Tonnies' theory is really problematic, however, 1 
cannot see the readiness on Bonhoeffer's side to leave beltind "conservative and romantic elements". 
See also the next note and the coming analysis of Bonhoeffer's treatment of church and proletariat. 
56 Clifford Green notes that Tonnies' Community and Socie~v became broadly read only shortly before 
the First World War in the context of the youth movement's opposition to Wilhelntine society. The pair 
of concepts "was advanced as a popular slogan in the arsenal of conservative social criticism, quite 
apart from Tonnies", albeit the latter prepared the way for this ideological turn. I tltink that Green 
attempts to deprive Tonnies' tlleOI)' from its obvious conservative character just to avoid the supposition 
that Bonhoeffer chose an obviously conservative tl1inker for gaining a decisive insight for his own 
theory. In my view, Bonhoeffer's own texts provide enough proof to recognise the fundamentally 
conservative character of his own thought. (SC p. 87, note 91.) 
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"Whereas in the former the will that is dominated is brought into motion in a purely 
mechanical way by the will that exerts force upon it, in the latter it is presupposed that 
the obedient will understands the meaning ofthe command. Sociologically, this is 
significant insofar as in the association afforce, community is not possible anymore. 
By contrast, a genuine association of authentic rule not only makes community 
possible, but in most cases realises it. These insights will be ve1y important for the 
concept of the church." (SC 92) 
Both excercising force and giving commands presuppose an unequal relation 
of strength. Bonhoeffer argues that equality is possible only in legal terms, in concrete 
instances, however, 
"there is no balance of power among the members of a social form. In every 
community that is apparently based on the dynamic coordination of wills, there exists 
in reality a relation of subordination." (SC 92) 
This sociological principle, however, goes through some important alterations 
when viewed with respect to the church. Including the view of the church as 
Bonhoeffer suggested above, at the same time, creates a constant movement between 
sociological and theological categories in the course of the identification of authentic 
rule. As a matter of principle, Bonhoeffer begins his argument, "in relation to the will 
of an absolute ruler, there is real coordination of those who are ruled" (SC 92), that is, 
ifl understand Bonhoeffer correctly, there is no necessary subordination among those 
who are ruled. Bonhoeffer gives this principle a theological as well as a legal meaning: 
"[t]he idea of equality before the law, but also that ofthe rule ofGod, includes the 
coordination of those who are ruled"; the legal and theological qualification, however, 
gives rule a constructive role over sociology: "the only sociologically new structure 
that remains is the association of authentic rule" (SC 92). An association of authentic 
rule will be, in the next step, applied both to community and society, finally, it will be 
applied also to the concept of the church. 
Looking at this sociological problem from the perspective of the church, that 
is, from Bonhoeffer's own perspective, it is quite understandable why Bonhoeffer 
insisted earlier that in concrete instances the types of community and society always 
exist together, and added to it later that authentic rule applies both to society and 
community. In his description of the church as community and society (SC 262ft) we 
can find all the important elements together: authentic rule personalised by the Holy 
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Spirit that applies to the church both as community and society. Although the 
ecclesiological point of view can be regarded as a legitimate one, the consequences of 
this with respect to Bonhoeffer's general vi eH' ~~the primal state ~~social being 
should not be suspended by this legitimate demand and have to be considered 
independently. 
We have seen that Bonhoeffer applied a genuine association of authentic rule, 
characteristic to community, to society too. An association of authentic rule involves, 
on the one hand, an intrinsic relation of subordination, and on the other hand, 
obedience as a meaningful response to a command from above. These attributes, 
derived from and associated with community, have been made characteristic also to 
society. By involving society into the typical relation of strength that belong to 
community Bonhoeffer refuses to consider the possibility of drawing any meaningful 
consequence from the relation of strength typical of society, namely, the relation of 
force. 
Having finished our review of the social-philosophical and sociological 
contents of the primal state of social being, characterised by I-You-relations pattern 
'B', we can now summarise our findings about the significance of spontaneity that 
Bonhoeffer attributed to social life in the primal state. We have seen that Bonhoeffer 
depicted human beings as 'spontaneous bearers, active members ofthe great social 
nexus' that is embodied in and by the objective spirit. The objective spirit of a 
community, therefore, may be grasped by the individual in a spontaneous way, at the 
same time - naturally - it is the 'social nexus', transferred by the objective spirit that 
can be the material contents ofthe individual's spontaneous acknowledgement ofhis 
or her sociality. Spontaneity is limited by the socially relevant aspects ofthe objective 
spirit. 
When discussing the nature of human will, Bonhoeffer describes spontaneity, 
or, to be correct, the possibility of spontaneity in a similarly limited way. He speaks 
about strife as a fundamental sociological law willed and sanctified by God. In strife, 
in the open conflict of wills spontaneity may manifest itself, conflicting views may 
articulate themselves against each other. Bonhoeffer argues, however, that wills within 
a community may be meaningfully depicted only as wills together but not beside or 
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against each other. Even sinfull will - in the state after the Fall - reveals this 
togetherness by the recognition of the will of the other, and it is conflict through which 
"the will ofthe sinful human being is forced into the holy will of God and thus 
community is established" (SC 86). While spontaneity is given space by the 
introduction ofthe God-willed conflict ofwills, it is limited again by the elevating of 
togetherness into the position ofthe only meaningful relationship ofwills. 
A similar argumentation may be revealed in Bonhoeffer's description of 
community in which young children "are part of their parents' will until they can will 
for themselves" (SC 97). These children take part in the life of the community 
"through an act oflove, trust, or obedience"; these "spontaneous acts" that are parts of 
their parents' will are concieved similarly to what we have seen above with respect to 
the limiting effect of the objective spirit of the community. Any spontaneous 
manifestation of a demand of freedom from the will of the parents on the part of a 
child is inconceivable within this structure of argumentation. 
This recognition of the consistently limited image of spontaneity we can now 
relate to Bonhoeffer's low evaluation of society. We have seen that society is 
described as organised selfishness, a well-balanced mutual inner indifference. We 
have also seen the inconsistency in Bonhoeffer's argument as he placed this society 
within the realm of the primal state of social being. Society as a certain sociological 
type of human sociality has been given a rather marginal place in Bonhoeffer's social 
and theological argumentation. The main line ofBonhoeffer's train ofthought deals 
with community as created, fallen and restored; society appears against this 
background as a necessary complement of a rather relative value. Even the concept of 
person, the most significant cohesive element ofBonhoeffer's social-theological 
theory, cannot be related to society, only to community. Thus, Bonhoeffer seems to be 
rather reluctant to consider the character of social life in society that has, I think, a 
decisive consequence for his concept of freedom. 
What Bonhoeffer attributes to society in the primal state of being can, in fact, 
be most closely compared to community in the fallen state. About fallen community 
we read: 
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"[w]hereas the previous spirit-form grew out of love, the fall replaced love with 
selfishness. ( ... )Whereas in the primal state the relation among human beings is one of 
giving, in the sinful state it is purely demanding. Every person exists in complete, 
voluntary isolation; everyone lives their own life, rather than all living the same life in 
God." (SC 1 07f) 
If we consider again what Bonhoeffer wrote earlier about society in the primal 
state (SC 91), we will see that this description of society is nothing else than a well-
managed, pacified version of the relation of "pure demanding", characteristic to the 
community ofthe fallen state. Had Bonhoeffer attributed a continuous significance to 
society for human's living together, he probably would have considered the difference 
between social relations organised by pure demanding on the one hand and governed 
by contract on the other. In this case, he would also have discovered the significance 
of negative freedom, born out of unqualified human spontaneity, for the transition 
from social relations controlled by naked force to relations shaped by mutually 
respected agreement. 
Society as Bonhoeffer describes it, indeed, can be regarded as a rather 
advanced development on the long road that begins with people's desperation to live 
out their spontaneity in the form of negative freedom. When speaking about society, I 
add the epithet 'unqualified' to spontaneity, to reveal its difference to spontaneity as 
Bonhoeffer understands it with respect to community in the primal state: spontaneous 
participation in something already given either in the objective spirit or in the parents' 
will for a child. "In principle a society has no tradition" (SC 91 ), as we have learned: 
spontaneity in a society, therefore, cannot mean a participation in a "great social 
nexus" but it expresses the person's self-awareness as well as the person's perception 
of his or her relations. This spontaneity, nevertheless, seems to be unknown to the 
author of Sanctorum Communio, as well as its related phenomenon, negative freedom. 
Their absence, at the same time, was not necessarily a real lack for Bonhoeffer, 
since he did not regard the difference between a fallen community and its prospective 
version (in my perspective and not in Bonhoeffer's, naturally) a decisive one either. 
Here the interrelationship between his 'qualified' understanding of spontaneity with 
respect to the community in the primal state, his low valuation of society and, most 
importantly, his lack of interest to establish a negative understanding of freedom 
reveals itself 
5. Vicarious Representative Action and the Ethical Collective Person 
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Following the logic of the main argument, now we move on to the concept of 
the ethical collective person, discussed with respect to the broken community, where 
the issue ofvicarious representative action is raised again. 
Beginning the discussion of sin and broken community, Bonhoeffer first 
announces his return to I-You relations pattern 'A', designed with respect to the 
concept of the Christian person, presented in chapter 2. As we have seen, the Fall 
creates a fundamental change in human relations: " [ w ]hereas in the primal state the 
relation among human beings is one of giving, in the sinful state it is purely 
demanding" (SC 108). In the status offallenness the "ethical" is born: 
"Human beings, hearing the divine law in solitude and recognising their own 
sinfulness, come to life again as ethical persons, albeit in ethical isolation. With sin, 
ethical atomism enters history. This applies essentially to the spirit-form. All natural 
forms of community remain, but they are corrupt in their inmost nature." (SC 1 08) 
We have already seen that, as a preparation for the developing of the concept 
of collective person, Bonhoeffer spoke about the old humanity of Adam and the new 
humanity ofChrist. A link to biblical theology has, therefore, been established this 
way. An establisment ofthe ethical nature ofthe collective person, however, is 
equally important, and it happens by referring to biblical theology as well. Being 
ethical, as Bonhoeffer worked out earlier, is being addressed by a You: thus, "the 
'people of God', which only arose from being ( ... ) called by God, by the prophets, by 
the course ofpolitical history, by alien peoples" (SC 118) emerge as the ethical 
collective person. "The call comes not to the individual, but to the collective person" 
(SC 118), Bonhoeffer argues, probably not feeling it necessary to explain whether 
Abram was also called already as a representative ofthe people of God. 
In the subsequent argumentation the content ofthe "call" refers to two topics: 
either to repentance or to some collective purpose. Regarding the latter, Bonhoeffer's 
example reflects his conviction that the status of being called is a more decisive 
determinant ofthe ethical than the material content ofthe act itself 
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"Where a people, submitting in conscience to God's will, goes to war in order to fulfill 
its historical purpose and mission in the world - though entering fully into the 
ambiguity of human sinful action - it knows it has been called upon by God, that 
history is to be made; here war is no longer murder." (SC 119) 
The original variant ofthe closing statement, "here war is more than murder" is 
an equally ambiguous statement, as Seeberg was right in stating. 57 This example 
clearly shows the structure of the ethical as Bonhoeffer constructed it with respect to 
the Christian concept of the person: the ethical is solely derived from the status of 
being called upon by a You. 
It is, however, the first topic, repentance, that carries the argument towards the 
appearance of vicarious representative action, as action that involves the ethical 
collective person as well as the individual. It is the people - as the humanity of Adam -
that had fallen into sin, but it is the individual prophet who hears the call and does 
penance for the people. 
"If the 'people' must repent, it does not matter how many repent, and in actuality it will 
never be the whole people, the whole church; but God can regard the whole 'as if all 
had repented. 'For the sake often I will not destroy them.' (Gen. 18:32) God can see 
the whole people in a few, as God could see and reconcile the whole humanity in one 
man." (SC l19f) 
It is telling to note here that the quoted sentence has gone through a twofold 
shift of meaning in Bonhoeffer's interpretation. The first one is also noted by the 
Editor: Scripture refers to the city and not the communitl8. The second one is more 
important: there is no hint in the text that "the ten" would do penance, rather, they are 
the "righteous" over against the "wicked", and the purpose of the negotiations is to 
save the "righteous" from being killed together with the "wicked". It seems, therefore, 
that while Bonhoeffer applied this biblical reference, he was already looking ahead to 
the soteriological actus, the vicarious representative act of Christ. The argument 
finally reaches "'Adam', a collective person, who can only be superseded by the 
collective person 'Christ existing as church-community"' (SC 121 ). 
57 se p. 119, note 24. 
58 se p. 120. note 28. 
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Having completed the review of the social-philosophical argument, now we 
turn to the exploration of the theological content of the social-philosophical 
framework. 
c. A Detailed Discussion of the Theological and Sociological Content of 
Vicarious Representative Action 
1. Sin and Culpability 
The succint theological content ofvicarious representative action is given in 
the section whose 'heart' reads: "what characterises the Christian notion of vicarious 
representative action is that it is vicariously representative strictly with respect to sin 
and punishment" 59 The related argument itself is not original, rather it is a close 
reproduction ofthe relevant thoughts ofLuther and Bonhoeffer's teacher, Seeberg60; 
however, Bonhoeffer's choice of theological content must be regarded as his higly 
important personal decision that reflects as well as has a crucial influence on his wider 
social thought. Before we consider the detailed theological content of vicarious 
representative action that is built on and around Christ's vicarious representative act, 
we will concentrate on its relationship to the social-philosophical argument again. 
2. The Two Patterns of !-You-relations Joined Together- a Hypothesis 
Following the social-philosophical and theological argument up to this point, 
we could perceive some elements that serve as inevitable prerequisites for an 
understanding of vicarious representative action as taking the sin and punishment of 
others upon oneself The concept of ethical collective person is a necessary social-
philosophical antecedent in the argument that, as we have seen, centers on the 
59 se p. 155. see also the broader contex1 of this sentence. 
6
° Considering Luther's influence see note 87. in p. 155; about Bonhoeffer's reliance on Seeberg see 
note 49. in p. 146 and note 88. in p.l55. 
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theological theme of culpability and repentance (SC 118ft). At the beginning of 
chapter 5 Bonhoeffer stated that he was going to unite lines of argument that had been 
pursued independently so far; here we are most interested in the encounter of the two 
different patterns ofl-You relations. At first it does not happen in an explicit manner, 
rather, their specific social backgrounds have been drawn together: 
"On the one hand, there was the line of thought about the ontic basic-relatedness of 
human beings to one another as persons. On the other hand, there was the discovery of 
the pre-volitional sociality ofthe human spirit, and the subsequent investigation ofthe 
forms of empirically existing communal relations, which always require intentional 
social acts in order to manifest themselves as personal social relations. The antic-
ethical basic-relations in the state of sin not only are fundamental for all personal 
social relations, but also condition even their empirical formation. When they are 
modified, or re-created, in the concept of the church, the concrete form of the 
community must change as well; indeed this provides the possibility and necessity of 
developing a unique empiricalform qf community (italics mine). Since we recognised 
certain basic forms as belonging to the created order, we now must ask about the 
extent to which the church as a social form participates in them, and even whether in 
the synthesis of them all might be found." (SC 124f) 
The I-You relations, typical to the Christian concept of person and the antic-
ethical basic-relations in the state of sin (pattern 'A'), and the I-You relations that 
belong to the created order (pattern 'B'), will be joined together in 'a unique empirical 
form of community', the church. Regarding vicarious representative action, both as a 
turning point between the old and the new and "the life-principle ofthe new humanity" 
(SC 14 7), we can find the first reference to the I-You relations as follows: 
"The cord between God and human beings that was cut by the first Adam is tied anew 
by God, revealing God's own love in Christ, by no longer approaching us in demand 
and summons, purely as You, but instead by giving God:rs own se(f as an I, opening 
God's own heart. The church is founded on the revelation of God's heart. But since 
destroying the primal community with God also destroyed human community, so 
likewise when God restores community between human beings and God's own self, 
community among us also is restored once again, in accordance with our proposition 
about the essential interrelation of our community with God and human community." 
(SC 145f) 
God's self as an I that reveals Godself acts according to the order of pattern 'A'. 
Here the You has been given the role ofthe barrier, the Other who encounters me to 
turn me into an I, who, if it happens to be God, may represent a pure demand or 
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summons to me. This Y ou-ness, as we have seen, becomes manifest in a purely ethical 
being and its act can be understood as a purely ethical act. However, it may happen 
that God, as a You, turns into an I, and this metamorphosis fundamentally changes my 
relationship also to the other human person. (SC 56) After this fundamental change of 
human relationships the original (primal, created) community ofhuman beings will be 
restored again, where personal relations will follow a different order, I-You relations 
pattern 'B'. 
At this point of our investigation we may formulate a working hypothesis 
about the relationship ofthe two patterns ofi-You relations with respect to both 
Bonhoeffer's understanding ofvicarious representative action, the 'life-principle' ofthe 
church and, per definitionem, his wider social theory. For human beings who belong to 
the sinful state ofbeing, the realm where the 'Christian concept of person' is also 
rooted, the order of the I-You relations follows pattern 'A'. Even God acts according to 
pattern 'A', entering into relationship with the human being as the divine You, the 
ethical barrier, but, unlike humans, God is capable of revealing God's self as a loving 
I. The theological content of God's self-revelation is the vicarious representative 
action, executed by Christ, as Bonhoeffer depicted it. Christ's vicarious representative 
action restores human community after the order of created community, where 
humans are capable ofliving according to the I-You relations pattern 'B'. Therefore, 
from the perspective of the 'real community', that is, the church, I-You relations 
pattern 'A' characterises becoming, while pattern 'B' describes being. Participating in 
the phase of becoming is necessary for all human beings after the Fall, that is, the 
historical and ethical person. There is no way between the One and the Other apart 
from pattern 'A'. However, by the vicarious representative action of Christ, that is the 
theological content of God's revelation, living in accordance with pattern 'B' will be a 
simultaneous possibility, as a fruit of Christ's salvific work. 
3. The Theological and Social Consequences 
of the Togetherness of the Two Patterns; a Test 
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In the following section we will test this working hypothesis on Bonhoeffer's 
detailed description ofvicarious representative action and its social implications. First 
we will have a closer look at the texts that discuss the peculiar relationship of the two 
different patterns ofl-You relation in more detail. This is the fundamental explanation 
of the transformation of the I-You relations: 
"Faith acknowledges God's rule and embraces it; love actualises the Realm of God. 
Love is therefore not an actualisation of the metaphysical social-relation, but rather of 
the ethical social-affiliation. But, as we saw, in the state of sin this ethical social-
affiliation exists only in a broken form, which became intelligible when we considered 
the reality of the ethical personality and of sin. As a theological proposition it is 
founded on the doctrine of the primal state. Every human social formation is an 
actualisation of the metaphysical social-relations. What is unique about the 
actualisation effected by the Holy Spirit is that it links both basic-relations [that is, the 
metaphysical and the social-ethical basic relations61 ]. In every previous social 
formation the ethical-basic-relations continue to exist in their brokenness. Here they 
are renewed and as such actualised, thereby producing a concrete from ~f community. 
The person living in the community ofthe !-You-relationship is given the assurance of 
being loved, and through faith in Christ receives the power to love also, in that this 
person, who in Christ is already in the church, is led into the church. For that person 
the other member of the church-community is essentially no longer claim but gift, 
revelation of God's love and heart. Thus the You is to the I no longer law but gospel, 
and hence an object of love. The fact that my claim is met by the other I who loves me 
-which means, of course, by Christ- fulfills me, humbles me, frees me from bondage 
to myself, and enables me- again, of course, only through the power of faith in Christ 
- to love the other, to completely give and reveal myself to the other." (SC 165£) 
We can summarise the structure of the above statement as follows: Love is the 
actualisation of the ethical-social relations described in accordance with pattern 'A', 
and is nothing to do with pattern 'B', which is related to metaphysical social-relations. 
However, the brokenness of ethical-social relations (pattern 'A') can be recognised 
only in the perspective of the primal state, that is, metaphysical social-relations 
(pattern'B'). Pattern 'B', therefore, has been elevated into the position of the norm of 
social relations, but it is not enough: "eve1y human socialformation is an 
61 See note 120 in SC 166 
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actualisation ~~the metaphysical social-relations". This statement hangs within the 
text without any supporting argument. Here Bonhoeffer cannot refer to love, since its 
role has been made exclusive with respect to pattern 'A'. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer 
finds an argument from higher above: "what is unique about the actualisation effected 
by the Holy Spirit is that it links both basic-relations": metaphysical social relations 
become influential in the restored community, therefore, not by "love", but by "the 
Holy Spirit". Securing a place for the metaphysical social-relations and pattern 'B' by a 
reference to the Holy Spirit, Bonhoeffer now is free to explore into the meaning of the 
transformation of pattern 'A'. They are the ethical-basic-relations that are transformed 
into a mutually loving relationship by the work of Christ. The self-centered I will be 
freed from "bondage to" him- or herself for a complete self-giving love. This is a 
radical transformation ofl-You relations pattern 'A', that, as we have seen, is already 
linked to pattern 'B' by the Holy Spirit. 
The social role of Christ and the Holy Spirit within this transformation is 
important to be clarified. We have seen that the person of Christ has been related to!-
You-relations pattern 'A', while the person of the Holy Spirit has been mentioned with 
respect to I-You-relations pattern 'B'. Their role is different according to the structure 
of the given I-You-relations. In pattern 'A' persons live in ethical isolation; the person 
of Christ, acting vicariously for them, sets them free from themselves for being able to 
love each other, thus, Christ mediates between them. The mediating act of Christ is 
related to two extreme ethical possibilities: in isolation there is an absence of love 
while in mutual relationship there is a fulfilment oflove. The role ofthe Holy Spirit 
with respect to pattern 'B' is quite different. In pattern 'B' no mediation is needed since 
there is a mutual relationship of persons characterised by given social factors; this 
given set of social values is carried by the Holy Spirit in its effect in linking the two 
basic relations, the metaphysical and the social-ethical one. An intrinsic reason for 
making the Holy Spirit a carrier of the social values ofthe metaphysical basic relations 
may be that the latter depicts the sociality of human spirit; subjective spirit, objective 
spirit and Holy Spirit are related to each other in a way that makes the relation of the 
social values, attributed to them, easier. The point is, that the characterisation of the 
human sociality of the primal state of being is fully transferred to the renewed 
Christian existence by the carrying of the Holy Spirit, in inseparable relation to the 
ethical-social relations transformed by the vicarious, mediating act of Christ. 
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A special significance of this argument is that Bonhoeffer involves in it the 
Lutheran distinction between law and gospel: "the You is to the I is no longer law but 
gospel, and hence an object of love". The suspensation of the presence of the law in 
the person ofthe You marks the utmost radicality ofthe transformation ofthe !-You-
relationship. 
A decisive observation from the perspective of our research is that the two 
kinds of social relations, represented by 1-You-relations pattern 'A' and pattern 'B' do 
not only exist simultaneously, but are related into a single concrete social existence, 
thus, they mutually determine and limit each other. Their simultaneous existence 
within a single Christian existence is affirmed by Bonhoeffer in a characteristically 
Lutheran manner62 ; on this theological basis the mutually limiting relationship of the 
two different social relations appears as a social consequence. The detailed description 
of the theological content of vicarious representative action reflects the way 
Bonhoeffer added a strong theological affirmation to this socially significant 
consequence. 
In the following section we will pursue a straight line of argument. First I refer 
to our previous findings about the conservative set of values that characterise 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of the primal state of social being. In the second step I will 
show how this conservative social framework serves as a social preconception of the 
theological concept of vicarious representative action, as the latter is intended to 
provide a remedy for the hopeless social and ethical isolation that characterise social 
life in the sinful state. Thirdly, we will see the function of the conservative set of 
values with respect to the empirical church, already embedded into the theological 
framework of vicarious representative action. 
62 se p. 161. note 108. 
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4. The Theological Application of a Conservative Set (?f Values 
Considering the primal state of social being, now we recall Bonhoeffer's 
distinction between community and society as two different possibilities of relations of 
wills, and the distinction between a relation of force and a relation of rule, as two 
different possibilities of relations of strength. In relation to both pairs of concepts 
Bonhoeffer created the concept of the genuine association of authentic rule, the power 
that is characteristic to community, but, it is also applicable to society too. Authentic 
rule presupposes an unequal relation of strength and establishes a relation of 
subordination (SC 92). Subordination and the related social unequality are 
characteristic to the primal state of social being, willed by God as good and necessary, 
1 f . 63 not mere y consequences o sm . 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of subordination at a social level is related to a 
theological interpretation as well. The source of subordination is authentic rule, and 
authentic rule is understood by Bonhoeffer, first of all, as God's rule: the "association 
of authentic rule between God and us in revelation is paradoxical because God rules 
by serving; this is what the concept of the love of God entails" (SC 1 77). In his 
formally purely social-philosophical argument Bonhoeffer characterised the relation of 
rule as based on conscious obedience: "the obedient will understands the meaning of 
the command" (SC 92), thus it does not simply surrender to bare force. Obedience is 
given a theological significance too by an extension of the logic of the social-
philosophical argument. Obedience to God may mean the fulfilment of the law "in 
spirit through the spirit", "through perfect love", by "an unbroken will" (SC 149). 
Obedience to the word of Christ requires us to "give up all claims whatsoever on God 
or on our neighbour", so we may "understand our love to be the love of God given to 
our hearts by the Holy Spirit, and our will conquered by God and obedient to God's 
will for our neighbour" (SC 168). Similarly, "[c]hristian community of love between 
human beings means unrestrictedly surrendering to the other out of obedience to God's 
will" (SC 176). Finally, the absolute obedience to the word or to God exempts one 
63 See Bonhoeffer's long 'Historical Excursus on Social Theory in Patristic Writings and Thomas 
Aquinas', SC pp. 96f[ note 116. 
188 
from the demand of the relative obedience to the church (SC 250ft). We can see that 
God's authentic rule demands obedience as the only possible answer: this theological 
thesis may be understood as the extension of the social-philosophical thesis. A 
significant difference between them, however, is that while the social-philosophical 
argument speaks about conscious obedience, theological obedience is not necessarily 
conscious. Community based on obedience to God's will, Bonhoeffer argues, "is not 
consciously intended: rather the You is willed while giving up the I. But this is 
precisely what proves and establishes the new I in accordance with the will of God." 
(SC 176) 
In the following step we will see how the demand of obedience and the related 
demand of subordination originating in the social-philosophical argument and 
affirmed by theological reasoning, would present a social order for the renewed 
community too. The origin of the new order is Christ's vicarious representative action. 
In the explanation of vicarious representative action the motif "God's rule as service" 
plays a significant role. 
5. The Constitutive Role of the Conservative Set of ·values; 
Unequal Relation of Strength 
Vicarious representative action, first of all, is based on the unequal relation of 
strength. "[W]e ought to let our sin be taken from us, for we are not able to carry it by 
ourselves; we ought not reject this gift of God." (SC 156) This fundamental insight, 
closely connected to Bonhoeffer's conviction about the central importance of 
culpability and punishment, will be elaborated after Bonhoeffer reintroduces the 
motifs of with-each-other and the being-for-each-other into the discussion of 
sanctorum communio, originally worked out with respect to the primal state of being. 
The insight will go through a twofold extension, both with respect to the participants 
of the relation and the contents of the relation. 
The unequal relation of strength, previously applied to the relation of God and 
human beings, is first extended to human-human relations in a characteristically 
Lutheran manner: "[ w ]e are God through the love that makes us charitable toward our 
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neighbour" (SC 178). It is telling to consider the background of this thought in the 
theology ofthe early Luther: "any Christian should acknowledge himself to be great, 
because, on account offaith in Christ who dwells in him, he is God, a son of God and 
infinite, since God is now in him"64 The original idea that referred to the taking away 
of sin, has been extended also in terms of its contents. "Christians can and ought to act 
like Christ; they ought to bear the burdens and sufferings of their neighbor. 'You must 
open your heart to the weaknesses and needs of others as if they were your own, and 
offer your means as if they were theirs, just as Christ does for you in the sacrament'." 
(SC 178t)65 
The idea of unequal relations of strength, that at the beginning of the train of 
thought was applied to the taking away of sins and reflected in the sacramental 
encounter of Christ and the human being, has also been given a general ethical 
understanding: the strong should open his or her heart to the weaknesses and needs of 
the weak. This direct relationship between sacramental and ethical life is present 
already in the theology of the early Luther whose thoughts were not only consciously 
used but also explicitly referred to by Bonhoefer. Luther applied the analogy of faith 
and love. "We are God's children through faith that constitutes us heirs of all divine 
blessings. But we are also 'gods' through love that makes us beneficent towards our 
neighbor. The divine nature is simply pure beneficence ... "66 . Following Luther, 
Bonhoeffer sets up the close analogy between unequal relations of strength in 
sacramental life and unequal relations of strength in social-ethicallife as a central 
thesis of his understanding ofvicarious representative action. 
64 se p. 179. note 161. 
65 SC 178f. See the utmost importance of Luther's early sermon, 'The Blessed Sacrament of the Holy 
and True Body of Christ, and the Brotherhoods' (1519) in the argument on the sacramental aspect of 
vicarious representative action, as noted by Bonhoeffer himself (note 41. in SC p. 179.) and also by the 
Editor, who JXlYS attention to the fact that the sermon was a part of Bonhoeffer's argument against 
Ritschl's theory. Ritsch1 found Reformation theology's concept of community ethically inadequate: 
Bon.hoeffer's rejection of this opinion reflects on the heart of the problem we face in Bonhoeffer's 
argument. See editorial note 160. in SC p. 178 .. 
66 Quoted by the Editor in note 161. in SC p. 178f. Bonhoeffer's ow11 reference is note 40. in the same 
page. 
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6. The Problem of the Distinction Between the Theological-Sacramental and the 
Social-Ethical Understanding of Unequal Relation of Strength 
This analogy appears in the following discussion several times. We can see, 
however, that in the course of the exposition the structure of the analogy may loose its 
clarity. If we insist that unequal relations of strength have been originally established 
with respect to God-human relations and with respect to sacramental life, we also 
maintain that this beginning gives the analogy a solid structure: social-ethical aspects 
have to be derived from the sacramental aspects, at the same time, the two aspects 
have to be distinguished from each other. Bonhoeffer does not seem to follow this 
logic. 
Proceeding in his argumentation, Bonhoeffer applies the analogy by referring 
to Luther again: "the weaknesses, needs, and sins of my neighbor affiict me as if they 
were my own, in the same way as Christ was afflicted by our sins." (SC 180) Luther's 
sentence referred to here shows that the Reformer began the analogy with the 
sacramental side: "our sins assail him [Christ], while his righteousness protects us"67, 
expressing here a variant of his famous image of happy exchange. Bonhoeffer - not 
contrary to the Reformer's intention - completes this thought with the social-ethical 
sidt~, saying that "[i]t belongs to the sociological structure ofthe church-community" 
(SC 180). When Bonhoefer arrives at his normative statement, however, the original 
order is reversed. "Three great, positive possibilities of actingfor each other in the 
community of saints present themselves: se(f-renouncing, active work.fm· the 
neighbor; intercessory prayer; and finally, mutual .forgiveness of sins in God's name." 
(SC 184) Here the social-ethical side of the analogy comes before the sacramental 
side, but precisely because of this change of the order we should not forget that the 
unequal relation of strength has originally been established as a sacramental relation. 
The second issue is the distinction between the sacramental aspects and the 
social-ethical aspects of the unequal relations of strength. Vicarious representative 
action, if regarded first of all as a sacramental relation, is considered as a mutual 
67 se p. 180. note 44. 
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possibility within a community, characterised by the structures of being-with-each-
other and being-for-each-other. "Bear one another's burdens", Bonhoetfer quotes Gal. 
6,2 (SC 180). This possible mutuality within a community would hide the 
fundamentally unequal relation of strength if we would overlook that a single, 
concrete vicarious representative act is always one-sided and based on unequality: one 
gives and the other receives. The strong gives and the weak receives. The subject of 
the vicarious representative action can only be the strong one, never the weak. The 
strong one is the one who has something to give. What is possible to give can 
determine what we may understand by strength. Let us consider the wide scale of what 
Bonhoeffer regarded as 'something to give': 
"All of these involve giving up the self 'for' my neighbor's benefit, with the readiness 
to do and bear everything in the neighbor's place, indeed, if necessary, to sacrifice 
myself, standing as a substitute for my neighbor. Even if a purely vicarious action is 
rarely actualised, it is intended in every genuine act of love. 
It is apparent that in self-renouncing work for the neighbor I give up happiness. We 
are called to advocate vicariously for the other in everyday matters, to give up 
possessions, honor, even our whole lives. With the whole strength that we owe to the 
church-community we ought to work in it. The 'strong' do not have their abilities for 
themselves, in order to consider themselves superior to the church-community; they 
have them 'for the common good' (!Cor 12,7).Every material, intellectual or spiritual 
gift fulfils its purpose only when used in the church-community. Love demands that 
we give up our own advantage. This may even include our community with God 
himself" (SC 184) 
In this exhaustive list of possessions that make one strong and put him into the 
position to give and so exercise vicarious representative action for the neighbour, 
Bonhoeffer does not distinguish between sacramental gifts or benefits and social-
ethical gifts or benefits. Accordingly, he does not distinguish between different 
qualities of strength that make the one unequal to the other either in a sacramental or 
in a social-ethical respect. Rather, all kinds of strengths are gathered together, and, as 
Bonhoeffer argues, all these the person owes to the church-community and, having 
been made strong by them, one has to give them back to the church community. With 
the disappearance of the distinction between different qualities of strengths the 
analogy between unequal relations of strength in sacramental life and in social-ethical 
life is suspended as well. The analogy is replaced by a totality where all social-ethical 
aspects of life are included into the sacramental life of the church. 
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The suspension of the analogy that is given in the theology of the early Luther 
and, potentially, in Bonhoeffer's reception ofLuther too, has a crucial consequence for 
Bonhoeffer's concept of freedom. For the sake of the clear understanding of this point 
we will now examine the way the two distinct patterns of !-You-relations 'behave' 
with respect to vicarious representative action. 
We have seen that I-You-relations pattern 'A' create a purely ethical relationsip 
between persons. Here the ethical means being encountered by the other, who poses a 
barrier to the I, represents a demand, and the mere personhood of the I is born out of 
the encounter with the You. Ethical personhood is used by Bonhoeffer as a limiting 
concept: "the ethical personhood of the other is neither a psychologically 
comprehensible fact nor an epistemological necessity" (SC 54). Consequently, the I 
does not know about the I-ness of the You and also my 1-ness is hidden from the other 
to whom I pose a You: epistemologically or psychologically comprehensible qualities 
do not play any role in the encounter. God also enters this relationship as a You, with 
the decisive difference that God, in the revelation of God's love, reveals God's I-ness 
to me, as "enters into the person as I" (SC 56). This is the structure of personal 
relationship that provides a framework for the possibility for one person to become 
"Christ for the other" (SC 55), that Bonhoeffer learns from Luther and applies to his 
understanding of vicarious representative action. 
I-You-relations pattern 'A' serve Bonhoeffer to describe the sacramental 
relationship between both Christ (God) and the human person and between one human 
person and the other. The church-community as an ethical collective person also 
participates in this relationship, in both ways: in the relationship with Christ (God) in 
the place of human beings, and also in the relationship with human beings in the place 
(~{Christ (God). An example for the first type of relationship: "[t]he unity of the 
church as a structure is established [by Christ] 'before' any knowing and willing of the 
members" (SC 199). The second type of relationship, in which the church-community 
occupies the place of Christ, is expressed in the famous definition: "Christ existing as 
church community" (SC 199)68 , therefore, a personal relation to Christ is identical to 
68 Note the Hegelian background of this expression, referred to in Bonhoeffer's long note 68. in Se p. 
193ff and also the Editor's note 218. in se p. 198. that refers to the mediating role of Seeberg's 
Dogmatik between He gel and Bonhoeffer. 
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the personal relationship with the chruch as an ethical collective person. The two types 
of relationships meet in Bonhoeffer's dense definition of Christian existence: "[b ]eing 
in Christ means being in the church" (SC 199). As a result, the nature of Christ (God)-
human-relationship and human-human-relationship, concieved within I-You-relations 
pattern 'A' is entirely homogenised by the introduction of the church as an ethical 
collective person. 
Now we will see how I-You-relations pattern 'A' appears as a framework for 
sacramental relationship. First I shall clarify what I mean by sacramental relationship 
with respect to Bonhoeffer's understanding of vicarious representative action. 
We begin with a reference to our finding that the central question of God-
human relationship for Bonhoeffer is sin and and the remedy of sin. We have also seen 
that Bonhoeffer gained decisive insights for expressing his thoughts from a sermon of 
the early Luther on the body of Christ as sacrament. Sacramental relationship, 
therefore, is the personal relationship between both Christ (God) and human beings as 
well as that of one human being to the other that is centered on the sacramental means 
ofthe church that participates in Christ's (God's) salvific work to set humans free from 
the bondage of sin. 
In Bonhoeffer's exposition of vicarious representative action we don't find a 
thematic treatment ofthe sacraments (either in a Catholic or in a Protestant sense), and 
we also have to keep in mind that even the early Luther's thoughts about the sacrament 
does not reflect the 'official' Protestant view ofthe two sacraments, that was 
formulated years later. Therefore, instead of looking for any thematically correct 
sacramental theology here, we concentrate on the identification of the function of the 
sacraments in the above sense. 
To avoid any conceptual confusion it has to be noted here that Bonhoeffer 
explicitly states that he does not discuss "every function of the church community, 
such as preaching, sacraments" in this context, rather, he is concerned "only with the 
social acts that constitute the community oflove and that disclose in more detail the 
structure and nature of the Christian church" (SC 178). Thus, what I call sacramental 
in this section, Bonhoeffer labels as social act. His identification is necessarily derived 
trom his general understanding of person as social-ethical personhood, while my 
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identification refers to the sacramental contents in the above sense, thus, the two 
different identifications of the same acts are not contradictory to each other. At the 
same time, my underlying interest, that is, to show the distinct behavior of the two 
different patterns ofl-You-relations, which is not Bonhoeffer's concern here, does not 
allow me to overlook the relationship between the sacramental contents and I-You-
relations pattern 'A'. The expressions we find that bear this meaning are forgiveness of 
sins, intercession, the priesthood of all believers, and, above all, being in the church. 
All of these concepts refer to the salvific work of Christ in the taking away of 
sins, and the possibility of the human being to participate in Christ's salvific work, 
being a Christ for the other. If we return to the first appearance of the problem of sin 
and salvation in the context ofthe discussion ofvicarious representative action again, 
we will find a clear description ofthe distinction that here I call the distinction 
between the sacramental and the social-ethical. 
"[H]uman sin cannot be viewed by the true God 'as if it did not exist'; it must truly be 
'undone', that is, it must be wiped out. This occurs not by reversing time, but through 
divine punishment and re-creating the will to do good. God does not 'overlook' sin; 
that would mean not taking human being seriously as personal beings in their very 
culpability; and that would mean no re-creation ofthe person, and therefore no re-
creation of community. But God does take human beings seriously in their culpability, 
and therefore only punishment and the overcoming of sin can remedy the matter. Both 
of these have to take place within concrete time, and in Jesus Christ that occurs in a 
way that is valid for all time. He takes the punishment upon himself, accomplishes 
forgiveness of sin .. '' (SC 155) 
This definitive description of taking away - or forgiveness - of sin is followed 
by its application to the structure of vicarious representative action (as we have 
already seen), after which Bonhoeffer asks the following question: 
"Is this Christian view ofvicarious representative action for sin ethically tenable? As 
ethical persons we clearly wish, after all, to accept responsibility ourselves before God 
for our good and evil deeds. How can we lay our fault upon another person and 
ourselves go free? It is true, the doctrine of vicarious representative action includes 
more than our ethical posture, but we ought to let our sin be taken from us, for we are 
not able to carry it by ourselves; we ought not reject this gift of God. It is God's love 
that offers it to us, and only for the sake of this love ought we abandon our ethical 
position of responsibility for ourselves - a position that counts for nothing before God 
- thereby demonstrating precisely the necessity for vicarious representative action. The 
idea of vicarious representative action is therefore possible only so long as it is based 
on an offer by God; this means it is in force only in Christ and Christ's church-
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community. It is not an ethical possibility or standard, but solely the reality C?,[the 
divine love for the church-community; it is not an ethical, but a theological concept. 
Through the Christian principle of vicarious representative action the new humanity is 
made whole and sustained." (SC 156) 
This is the broader context of the sentence that has established our statement 
that vicarious representative action, first of all, is a relation of unequal strength. 
Inequality here is based on God's love that enters the relationship, unparallelled by any 
human qualities conceivable, so far that it annihilates the human person's position of 
ethical responsibility. (With respect to Bonhoeffer's understanding of the ethical, that, 
as we have seen, is not consistent enough in Sanctorum Communio, a human being 
without an ethical personhood is concievable only outside of the sinful state ofbeing, 
either in the primal state or in the restored state. We must also keep in mind, however, 
Bonhoeffer's repeated assertions that social-ethical basic relations, that is, I-You-
relations pattern 'A' remain valid simultanously with the person's being in Christ.) In 
any case, the extreme inequality of God's strength in God's saving encounter with the 
human person forces Bonhoeffer to make a distinction between a theological and an 
ethical possibility, a rare piece of argumentation in Sanctorum Communio. On the 
basis of this distinction we can establish our own distinction between the sacramental 
and the social-ethical, and we can extend our investigation to the other expressions of 
sacramental contents, intercession and the priesthood of all believers that are 
manifestations of being in the church. However, before we proceed in this direction, 
we stay for a moment to observe Bonhoeffer's struggle to identify an ethical meaning 
of vicarious representative action immediately after he deprived the latter of this 
meaning. In a footnote, explaining the above distinction, he writes: 
"There is, however, also an ethical concept ofvicarious representative action; it 
signifies the voluntarily assumption of an evil in another person's stead. It does not 
remove the self-responsibility of the other person, and remains as an act of human 
heroic love (for one's country, friend, etc.) even within the bounds C?f the highest 
ethical obligation. In acknowledging it we do not put our ethical person as a whole at 
stake, but only as much as we owe (body, honor, money) to the person who acted 
vicariously on our behalf; we acknowledge Christ, however, as vicarious 
representative for our person as a whole, and thus owe everything to him."[italics 
mine] (SC 1 56) 
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In a comparison of a theological (sacramental) and a (social)-ethical 
understanding of vicarious representative action, we may highlight the following 
findings. Theological vicarious representative action is based on an extremely 
(absolutely) unequal relation of strength: on the human side an ethical position counts 
for nothing and we owe everything to Christ (God). Ethical vicarious representative 
action is based on a relatively unequal relation of strength, in which the ethical self-
responsibility ofthe person who is acted upon remains intact to some extent, and one 
owes to the person who acted vicariously only a limited part of one's personal 
properties, proportional to the act itself The relation between the theological and the 
ethical understanding of vicarious representative action may therefore be described as 
a relation between the limitless and the limited, the unconditional and the conditional, 
the whole and the partial, or, to apply a distinction used by Bonhoeffer later, the 
ultimate and the penultimate. In this section the nature of the relation is not explained, 
only the difference between the theological and the ethical understanding of vicarious 
representative action is underlined. 
7. The Theological-Sacramental Understanding of Vicarious Representative Action; 
an Affirmation qf Christian Equality 
Now we continue to explore the content of the theological-sacramental use of 
vicarious representative action as intercession and priesthood qf all believers. In both 
cases forgiveness of sins happens on the basis of being in the church. I have already 
argued that these acts fit into the framework ofl-You-relations pattern 'A'; we will test 
this hypothesis now. 
Intercession can happen only in and through the church-community, moreover, 
it is also limited by the church: "[ w ]here there is no possibility for the person [for 
whom intercession is offered] to be incorporated into the church-community, 
intercession is futile and sacrilegious" (SC 186). Intercession as the prayer of the 
church that leads a single life in Christ is the ultimate criticism of individualism that 
would prefer personal prayer to intercession. When he begins to explain of the 
personal aspects of intercession, however, Bonhoeffer seems to represent a view that 
contradicts my hypothesis that I-You-relations pattern 'A' is at work here; he states 
that "it is not meaningless and unimportant who prays" (SC 186). The following 
explanation, nevertheless, does not support this assertion. 
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"For the positive form of intercession has a positive meaning: intercession must be 
viewed from two angles, namely as human action and as divine will. The first makes it 
manifest that the members of the church-community belong together. A third person is 
drawn into my solitary relation with God, or rather, in intercession I step into the 
other's place and my prayer, even though it remains my own, is nonetheless prayed out 
of the other's affiiction and need. I really enter into the other, into the other's sin and 
affliction; I am affiicted by the other person's sins and weaknesses. It is not as if I, 
through my gift for empathy, would have to share or reproduce in myself what hurts 
the other. If this were necessary, intercession for all people as a whole would not be 
possible, of course, and especially I could not pray for a person living in complete 
isolation. Here, all psychologism has to vanish. The sins of the unknown sailor, for 
whom intercession is offered, in the pastoral prayer following the sermon, afflict me 
no less than those of my closest friend. For the affiiction springs from the recognition 
of my own culpability for the sins of the world, or, what is the same thing, my own 
culpability for the death of Christ Once this culpability is recognised, a person can act 
upon humanity as a Christian, that is by praying for it. In our intercession we can 
become a Christ to our neighbor. In intercession we are thus not given the cold 
comfort that others are also in the same situation, but that, if God wants it and we 
accept it, our debts are canceled, our sins are forgiven. ( ... ) Like any other form of 
prayer, intercession does not compel God, but, if God does the final work, then one 
member of the community can redeem another, in the power of the church. This 
conclusively eliminates the ethical self-confidence of one human being towards 
another" (SC 186f) 
This passage reflects a radical shift from the assertion that it is not meaningless 
and unimportant who prays, that is, from intercession as human action towards a 
purely Christological understanding of intercession where, as Bonhoeffer understands 
it, the human factors do not play any role. At the beginning Bonhoeffer states that the 
praying person is affiicted by the other's sins and weaknesses; the role of the other as a 
characterisitc human being is, nevertheless, later suspended and the source of the 
affliction changed: the affliction springs from the recognition of my own culpability. 
From this point onwards both the other as a concrete character and the praying person 
as an irreplacable individual are excluded from the act of intercession, understood 
purely in terms ofthe encounter of Christ and the sinner. Consequently, the only 
recognisable result ofthe intercession is placed into the relationship of Christ and the 
praying person: the latter's debts are canceled. In this christological act the ethical 
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position of the participating human persons are eliminated, humans become changable 
agents of the act of God, carried out in the power of the church. That is all that 
Bonhoeffer says about intercession as human action; in addition to that he continues 
his explanation ofintercession.from God's standpoint. 
The priesthood~~ all believers, the second type of theological-sacramental 
vicarious representative action, is explained in a similar way. Priesthood is understood 
as the capability of forgiving another's sin with priestly authority, that only Christ can 
do, "which for us means his church as the sanctorum communio. The individual 
Christian can do it only by virtue of membership in the church-community, and in that 
capacity ought to do it. The Christian takes sin from the other's conscience and bears 
it; but clearly one can do that only by laying it in turn on Christ." (SC 189) 
Consequently, its effectiveness is not dependent on any one of its members, its 
possibility is based on the existence ofthe church-community. Again, personal 
characters do not play any role in it. 
The fact that the theological-sacramental understanding of vicarious 
representative action is described within the framework ofl-You-relations pattern 'A', 
where personal characteristics do not play any role, has an important consequence 
with respect to its social contents. 
Explaining the "Christian idea of equality" within the discussion of the unity of 
spirit of the church-community Bonhoeffer argues that it 
"does not say anything about interpersonal relations, but merely places everybody 
before God's eyes by, first of all, stating the absolute distance separating not only the 
creature from the creator, but even more so the sinner from the holy: the equality of 
human beings consists in their universal sinfulness (Rom 3,23), which also means 
their universal need for redemption and an equal share in God's grace." (SC 204) 
Bonhoeffer calls the "Christian idea of equality" a "formal equality", and it is 
not difficult to recognise the "Christian concept of person" behind this structure. The 
"Christian idea of equality" is related, further, to the doctrine of the priesthood~~ all 
believers: 
"The equality, by which every Christian is a priest, is as such invisible. It becomes 
'visible' only for faith- and can never be deduced without it! -through the unity of the 
gift in word and sacrament. As the whole church now rests on the unity in Christ, on 
the fact of 'Christ existing as church-community', so all Christian community rests on 
the equality of all established by God. All this must be said with respect to the 
perspective from above." (,SC 206f) 
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So far we have followed a straight line to see how a theological-sacramental 
understanding ofvicarious representative action, !-You-relations pattern 'A' as 
personal relations typical to the "Christian concept of person" and the "ethical-ontic-
basic-relations", and finally the "Christian idea of equality" are related to one another. 
At the latest piece of the chain,however, the priesthood of all believers, we witness a 
different line that is connected to the former one. The priesthood of all believers, 
Bonhoeffer argues, expresses a duality in the idea of equality. One component of the 
duality is the "Christian idea of equality", the other one is "the concrete dissimilarity 
of individuals [that] becomes part of mutual service, through which one becomes in 
practice a priest for the other. Thus all we have said above about community of spirit 
applies here too." (SC 207) 
8. Dissimilarity as the Social Contents £if Theological Equality; 
the Peculiar Relationship between Priesthood of all Believers and Patriarchalism 
With the introduction of 'concrete dissimilarity of individuals' coupled with 
the reference to the 'community of spirit' Bonhoeffer has introduced, in fact, the 
system ofpersonal relations in the primal state ofbeing, described by !-You-relations 
pattern 'B'. As we have seen, this set of arguments has already been represented in the 
description of sanctorum communio: unequal relations of strength, subordination and 
obedience, community versus society, and, most closely related to the idea of 
vicarious representative action, being-with-each-other and being-for-each-other. We 
have also seen Bonhoeffer's attempt to distinguish between theological and ethical 
vicarious representative action (SC 156), which we may understand as his venture to 
differentiate between vicarious representative action framed by I-You-relations pattern 
'A' and pattern 'B'. Later we have witnessed, however, that describing the actualisation 
ofbeing-for-each-other, Bonhoeffer grouped social and sacramental strength together, 
and related them all to the church-community. (SC 184) When we arrive at 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of the priesthood of all believers that expresses a duality 
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in the idea of equality, a theologically founded egalitarianism and a socially-ethically 
founded dissimilarity, we can see a similar treatment: the social-ethical argument has, 
first, suspended in the theological argument, than, second, it has been given also a 
theological justification. Let us see these steps in the elaboration of the contents of the 
priesthood of all believers. 
The Christian idea of equality, Bonhoeffer argues, is based on the fact "that 
God is always the same" (SC 205). This concept of equality, however, 
"does not allow for any schematising; rather, it includes concrete dissimilarity of all 
people. It is quite possible, and even necessary, to acknowledge that, from a Christian 
perspective, there are some who are strong and others who are weak, some who are 
honorable and others who are dishonorable, some who are, from an ethical and 
religious perspective, exemplary and others who are inferior; and then, of course, there 
are the obvious social dissimilarities. But this insight can exist only within the 
confines of the very idea of equality before God that is beyond our perception. This 
equality must now also be realised within the framework ofwhat is possible in 
principle, in that strength and weakness, honor and disgrace, morality and immorality, 
piety and impiety exist together and not just in isolation. Thus the idea of equality 
leads us again into the very idea of community." (SC 206) 
This is quite a remarkable piece of argumentation. Bonhoeffer tells us that 
dissimilarity exists in several respects. He adds that it can be perceived "from a 
Christian perspective"; it is an insight that exists only within the idea of equality 
before God "that is beyond our perception". Why this observation needs a Christian 
perspective and the idea of equality before God as a framework is beyond, in fact, my 
perception. Is it necessitated by the "dialectical relation between plurality and unity" 
(SC 206), as Bonhoeffer claimed? In any case, the obvious and perceivable social, 
ethical, religious and anthroplogical dissimilarities are drawn into an unperceivable 
theological framework, in which the former is made contingent on the latter, without 
giving any hint that a theologically conceived equality would alter a socially, ethically 
etc. conceived dissimilarity in any way. This standpoint reaches its final consequence 
in the connection between the priesthood of ali believers and patriarchal ism: 
"The Christian idea of equality does not allow for an egalitarianism but indeed only 
for the acknowledgement of the particular circumstances. And this is where Paul's 
patriarchal ism, for example, finds its justification. This is the difference between the 
Christian and all socialist as well as idealist ideas of equality." (SC 207) 
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It is significant that Bonhoeffer not only acknowledges dissimilarities as 
"particular circumstances" in general in the name of a Christian idea of equality, but 
he also raises the concrete example of patriarchalism. Patriarchal ism does not only 
represent dissimilarities like strength versus weakness, honesty versus dishonesty that 
can be found in persons in several combinations and can also change during someone's 
life; patriarchalism expresses a dissimilarity based on birth and sex, unchangeable 
realities of a concrete human life. This is the social dissimilarity that has been given a 
theological foundation in the 'Christian' idea of equality in general and in the idea of 
the priesthood of all believers in particular. 
In this study Bonhoeffer raises the theme of patriarchal ism several times. 
Discussing the typology of communities in the primal state of social being he asserts 
that although patriarchalism in its perceptible state may be regarded as a consequence 
of sin, subordination belongs to the created order and is "restored to sanctity again by 
Christ" -in this section also the "heavenly hierarchies" and "the divine right of 
emperors" receive their justification (SC 97). Close to the statement about the 
relationship of the priesthood of all believers and patriarchalism Bonhoeffer argues 
that 
"egalitarianism (the communist idea of equality) goes against God's order( ... ), 
it says nothing at all sociologically about the form of church government, e.g. a 
democratic model. Rather, what was created unequal must be accepted as such, and 
this, in turn, sanctions and introduces the idea of patriarchalism." (SC 20St9 
In his next reference to patriarchalism Bonhoeffer relates it to the theological 
thought that God's will as absolute authority invites obedience, and the subordination 
that is based on God's absolute authority, in turn, creates a coordination of wills 
among the subjects (SC 92). This reference is further complicated by Bonhoeffer's 
effort to apply both the type of community and society to the church, therefore, an 
involvement of the work of the Holy Spirit becomes unavoidable. "The Holy Spirit 
combines the claim to authority with the will to establish purpose and to establish 
meaning by drawing the person into the Spirit's own course, thus being at once ruler 
69 It is also telling to see that Bonhoeffer found justification in grouping together Gal 3,28 and l Cor 
14,34, as the sayings of the same Paul. An analysis of this kind of reading of the Scripture would lead 
far away from our present argument. 
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and servant"-(SC 262) We must keep in mind here that formerly Bonhoeffer referred 
to the Holy Spirit as a carrier of the social characterisics, described in the primal state 
of being, into the life of sanctorum communio. As we have seen, patriarchal ism is an 
excellent manifestation ofthese characteristics. Therefore we should not be surprised 
ifwe see that the objective spirit of the empirical church, based on "the act of love 
[that has been] brought about by the Spirit" (SC 262) will be related to patriarchalism: 
"As far as I can see, only the original patriarchal structure of the family is a 
sociologically comparable form, even if only approximately; this is then replicated in 
smaller circles, however. The object of the father's will is community between 
children and servants, and preserving community means being obedient. This is why 
the image of the family occurs most frequently in the Christian vocabulary, and 
furnishes the most common name in the New Testament by which Christians called on 
another, namely 'brother'. It is very significant when Paul in Eph 3,15 says that all 
faterhood on emth derives its name from God's fatherhood. This relation is also the 
reason why the idea of patriarchal ism has played such a prominent role since earliest 
Christianity. Admittedly, the emphasis it received in the Middle Ages was also related 
to developments within the class structure and culture, but it also represents a recovery 
of one of the earliest sociological insights of Christianity. ( ... ) It indeed seems that 
here we have a structure similar to that of the church, and yet it is not possible to 
define the patriarchal family as a pure union of purposeful obedience and true 
communal relation; it is either one or the other. The true interconnection of both 
elements within the church is brought about through the work ofthe Holy Spirit 
alone ... " (SC 263f) 
Here we witness not only a theological affirmation of patriarchal ism again, but 
also an extension of the validity of this theologically founded patriarchalism. On the 
one hand, Bonhoeffer extends its validity historically, from the earliest time of 
Christianity through the Middle Ages until his present time. On the other hand, he 
applies patriarchal structure not only to community but also to society: the pattern of 
the patriarchal family may be defined also as purposeful obedience. Therefore, 
patriarchalism as a sociological structure is given a general validity within the realm of 
living together. 
Patriarchalism appears again in a train of thought where Bonhoeffer explains 
the intrinsic conservativism as well as the principle of progress in the Protestant 
understanding of the church-of-the-people, Volkskirche (SC 269ft). Nothing is added 
to the theological affirmation and the social consequences of patriarchalism, what 
interests us though is the context of its appearance. What Bonhoeffer says about the 
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intrinsic conservativism ofthe church-of-the-people, that is, his own Prussian church, 
contains no surprise. Its intrinsic ability to progress, however, deserves a closer 
attention. 
For Bonhoeffer, it is the Christian appreciation of history that gives rise to the 
princpile of progress within the church: 
"The church ought to be a contemporary church; it ought to accept and test all the 
forces it encounters in life today. Past history is in principle no more right than the 
present. As a contemporary Christian, I have the right and the obligation to wrestle 
with history and to shape the Gospel for today. ( ... ) [T]he progressive element in the 
church finds expression in the concept of organism. All vitality of the community 
derives from the cooperation between its members." (SC 270) 
The question is whether Bonhoeffer's idea of progress can be understood as 
being capable of eliminating the social structure of patriarchalism? Can he concieve a 
historical future with a social life beyond patriarchalism? The answer is no. As we 
have seen, progress is confined within history, it is historical past that may and should 
be overcome by the novelties of the present. Patriarchalism, however, has been 
founded and affirmed, both in a social-philosophical and a theological argumentation, 
from outside history. The principle of subordination belong to the primal state of 
being, and its derivative, patriarchalism is characteristic both to community and 
society, the sociological types that also belong to the primal state of being. Historical 
changes, therefore, simply do not touch the social structure of patriarchalism. 
9. On the Relationship C?fChurch and Proletariat- an Illustration 
Having clarified the constitutive role of patriarchal ism within Bonhoeffer's 
social theory, now we turn to his famous discussion about church and proletariat. Our 
question is what would and could be offered by Bonhoeffer's church, and his social 
theory embedded in his view of the church, to the proletariat? Before answering this 
question, however, I need to make two observations. 
First, the treatment of the possible encounter between the church and the 
proletariat belongs to Bonhoeffer's most passionate texts in Sanctorum Communio. 
The text witnesses Bonhoeffer's genuine interest in the predicament ofthe proletariat 
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on the one hand, but also, and probably more forcefully, a genuine interest in the 
predicament of his church on the other. The proletariat, he thought, needed help, while 
the church, he believed, needed a demanding challenge: these needs would meet and 
mutually satisfy each other. The passion Bonhoeffer shows here is similar to the 
ardour with which he approached the possibility ofthe encounter between his Western 
Protestant Christianity and Gandhi's India years later, or the church's turning to the 
world come of age during his last months in prison. 
At the same time, secondly, Bonhoeffer reveals a great deal of material 
incompetence in discussing this matter. His supervisor's notes are rather telling in this 
respect. I do not only think of Bonhoeffer's ignorance of several attempts of practical 
engagement with working-class people on the side of his own church-body (that, of 
course, betrays a fundamental ignorance ofthe real life of his church as well) but also 
his apparent inability to identify his social position with respect to a possible 
encounter with the proletariat. He labelled Thorwaldsen and Mendelssohn as 
'bourgeois' in a negative sense, yet at the same time he overlooked the same 
'bourgeois' character with respect to Di.irer, Rembrandt and Bach: a blindspot that 
expresses the extent to which the young Bonhoeffer was reluctant to acknowledge his 
own characteristically bourgeois identity. 
Contrary to the uncertanties that come from the combination of passion and 
material incompetence, the text clearly reveals the characteristic social theory that 
Bonhoeffer elaborated throughout his study. 
"The living proletariat knows only one affliction, namely its isolation, and only 
one cry, namely that for community" (SC 272) The proletariat lives in a mass, the 
sociological type of a group of nonpersons, and is waiting for the church that would 
help it to become a community of persons, Bonhoeffer believed. What Bonhoeffer 
acknowledged on the side of the proletariat is this passionate desire ofbecoming 
something different: "[t]he proletariat is after something( ... ) that was never sought 
with such intensity by the bourgeoisie", and he was ready to consider proletariat's 
"desire for discipline and competitive sports" also "a cry for community" (SC 272). 
However, he explicitly refused to take seriously the self-awareness and self-
identification of proletariat itself Bonhoeffer does not only leave the topic of social 
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tension entirely out ofthe scope of his interest in the relationship of his admittedly 
bourgeois church and the proletariat; he overtly rejects a serious consideration ofthe 
proletarian view of social life too. "The church dare not let the proletariat proclaim 
'peace for humanity' without speaking its own word on this subject. It must not let the 
socialist youth movements speak of community without addressing them loudly and 
clearly with its own word ofthe sanctorum communio." (SC 272) Even if these 
statements allow for a two-way relationship- only formally, of course, since 
Bonhoeffer's method fundamentally rejects any mutual relationship between 
sociological-empirical data and social-philosophical-theological doctrine- the next 
one removes all doubt: "We do not seek the proletarian spirit as such, nor to imprison 
freedom within socialist doctrine, but instead want to take the church-community to 
the proletariat, and to transform the 'masses' into 'church-communities'." (SC 273) 
Finally: "[t]he criterion for judging the masses must be the concept of the church-
community, not vice versa" (SC 274). This verdict is not to be understood as merely a 
critique of Tillich's approach to the proletarian predicament, it expresses the 
characteristic voice ofthe whole discussion, namely, the voice of paternalism. 
Paternalism, as a form of behaviour, is derived from patriarchalism, the strongly 
defended tenet ofBonhoeffer's social theory. 
At the end of his discussion of church and proletariat, Bonhoeffer summarises 
the social background as he elaborated before: 
"Our earlier reflections on the problem already made it clear that the socialist idea of 
equality is theologically and sociologically untenable; and this is why the attempt to 
impose equality by force is not only bound to fail, but is also unchristian. The 
Christian community is based on the dissimilarity and inequality of persons that is part 
of creation. But the priesthood of all believers can nevertheless be considered its basic 
sociological principle, as was shown earlier. Those who are free remain free, and the 
servant remains a servant, and yet both are one in Christ" (SC 274)70 
70The selection of Bonhoeffer's writings, A Testament to Freedom, that contains a part of Bonhoeffer's 
treatment of the relationship of church and proletariat, does not quote this paragraph. An 
acknowledgement of this aspect of Bonhoeffer's understanding of the above relationship would, of 
course, make questionable the Editors claim, that "[i]n The Communion ofSaints [a different translation 
for Sanctorum Communi a] we see, too, a statement of the ideal ground of those actions on behalf of the 
oppressed that would become the pulse of Bonhoeffer's own resistance to nazism and of his role in the 
conspiracy." The Editors smmuarises the message of Bonhoeffer's life in a similar way: 'Solidarity with 
the Oppressed: Bonhoeffer the Man'. A claim like that reveals not only a rather superficial theological 
judgement but also an incomprehensible irresponsibility towards especially those whom support is 
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/0. lhe 1heological and Sociological Contents C?f Vicarious Reprsentative Action: 
a Summary 
In our previous analysis of the theological and sociological contents of 
vicarious representative action we have seen that the latter is built on a social-
philosophical basis that provides a framework. This framework is filled with a distinct 
theological content from the very outset: thus, the social-philosophical and the 
theological origins are intertwinned into a complex foundation that represents the final 
characteristics of vicarious representative action. The social-philosophical framework 
is the unequal relation of strengths and its related principle of subordination, 
elaborated with respect to the primal state of social being, while the theological 
content is human culpability, divine punishment and redemption. 
On this complex foundation Bonhoeffer builds up a theological as well as a 
sociological argumentation that are related to each other in a peculiar way. Parallel to 
these two distinct argumentations the two patterns ofl-You-relations are also at work 
at the very beginning of the detailed description of vicarious representative action: 
pattern 'A' is related to the work of Christ while pattern 'B' is associated with the work 
of the Holy Spirit. While relationship with Christ may be understood as the stage of 
becoming a Christian, relationship in the Holy Spirit may be regarded as being a 
Christian. These stages, however, do not follow each other but exist simultaneously. 
The theological argumentation speaks about the relationship of God's person 
(or the person of Christ) and a human person, or the church as a collective person and 
the person of the individual Christian according to the I-You-relations pattern 'A', 
characteristic ofthe "Christian concept of person"- This theological argumentation 
leads, among others, to the notion of "priesthood of all believers", that establishes a 
theological equality among Christians. The sociological argumentation speaks about 
the life of restored community (church, family, nation etc.), in which relations are 
governed by 1-You-relations pattern 'B', characteristic of personal life in the primal 
state of social being. Accordingly, life in the restored community preserves the 
intended to be given, the oppressed. See: Geffrey B. Kelly and F. Burton Nelson, eds.: A Testament to 
J<reedom: The i:_ssentia/ Writings ofDietrich Bonhoeffer, Harper. San Francisco, 1995, pp. I, 55, 60-61. 
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consequences of unequal relations of strength, the principle of subordination that 
receives a characteristic expression ofpatriarchalism within and without the church. 
That the two patterns ofi-You-relations, the theological-sacramental and the 
social-ethical understanding ofvicarious representative action are related to each other 
shows itself most clearly in the association of the priesthood of all believers and 
patriarchalism. We have seen that the distinction between the theological-sacramental 
and the social-ethical understanding of vicarious representative action is not 
consequent, contrary to Bonhoeffer's explicit intention. The distinction may be 
suspended, social-ethical characteristics may be taken up into the theological-
sacramental argumentation, and social-ethical contents may be given the support of 
theological reasoning. The peculiar connection between the priesthood of all believers 
and patriarchalism can be read as an example for the above, while the suspension of 
law in the gospel is a typically Lutheran theological reflection of the same treatment. 
Thus, a conservative set ofvalues, introduced with respect to the primal state of social 
being and transferred to the understanding ofvicarious representative action by both!-
You-relations pattern 'B' and the work ofthe Holy Spirit, receives a theological 
justification and becomes a constitutive social factor for the life of the restored 
community. 
Since our analysis is a part of a comparison of Bonhoeffer and Bib6, we must 
pay special attention to the possibility of negative freedom, 'freedom from the other', 
in Bonhoeffer's theological and social theory. In Bib6's theory, negative freedom is 
rooted in spontaneity; that is why we were looking for the possible place of 
spontaneity within the realm of personal relationships as Bonhoeffer understood it We 
have seen that neither !-You-relations pattern 'A' nor pattern 'B' offer a possibility for 
counting on a manifestation of'unqualified', individual spontaneity. Vicarious 
representative action is elaborated by a combination of arguments that are related to 
one or the other pattern; thus, the same lack of possibility can be stated with respect to 
vicarious representative action too. Therefore, the psychological basis for Bib6's 
negative freedom simply does not exist in Bonhoeffer's understanding of social 
relations, embedded into his notion of vicarious representative action. 
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This summary offers us a straightforward way to proceed towards a 
comparison ofBib6's and Bonhoeffer's thoughts about a post-war order ofEurope an 
Germany's place within it, with special reference to their understanding of freedom. 
First, we will see how the final form of Bonhoeffer's concept of freedom took shape. 
Second, we will examine the role this concept of freedom played in the thoughts of 
Bonhoeffer the conspirator, writing about the future of Germany. 
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Chapten· 4 
Bonhoeffe~r's Concept of Freedom and its Social Implications 
A. The Formation of Bonhoe.ffer's Concept of Freedom on the Basis l~( the 
111eological and Sociological Understanding~( Vicarious Representative Action 
a. Act and Being: God's Freedom as Freedom For 
Bonhoeffer's well-known general definition of freedom, according to which 
freedom is not freedom from something but freedom for something, or more 
emphatically, for someone, received its final shape relatively early, already in Act and 
Being and Creation and fall. John de Gruchy calls Act and Being a theology of 
freedom 1: here freedom refers, first of all, to God's freedom, which is the main theme 
of Act and Being. In discussing God's freedom Bonhoeffer was motivated by a double 
purpose: on the one hand he wanted to overcome his own voluntaristic understanding 
of God, presented in Sanctorum Communio, and on the other he debated the purely 
actualistic idea of God that he observed in Barth's theology. Both interests led him 
towards a comprehensive treatment of God as both act and being; this twinned 
perspective, necessarily, was applied to the identification of human existence as well, 
expressing its final and most succint form in the phrase: "being acted upon"2 This is 
the phrase we have already related to vicarious representative action, and, as we will 
see, the God whose freedom Bonhoeffer describes is no one else than the vicarious 
representative who is able to turn human existence into "being acted upon". The 
definitive statement of God's freedom reads as follows: 
"The entire situation raises the question whether the formalistic-actualistic 
understanding of the freedom and contingency of God in revelation is to be made the 
foundation of theological thought. In revelation it is not so much a question of the 
freedom of God - eternally remaining within the divine self, aseity - on the other side 
of revelation, as it is of God's coming out of God's own self in revelation. It is a matter 
of God's given Word, the covenant in which God is bound by God's own action. It is a 
question ofthe freedom of God, which finds its strongest evidence precisely in that 
1 John de Gruchy: Dietrich Bonhoe.!Jer: Witness to Jesus Christ. London, Collins, 1988, p. 17. 
1 AB pp. I 16, I2L 126. 
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God freely chose to be bound to historical human beings and to be placed at the 
disposal of human beings. God is fi-ee not from human beings but for them. Christ is 
the word of God's freedom. God is present, that is, not in eternal nonobjectivity but -
to put it quite provisionally for now- 'haveable', graspable in the word within the 
church. Here the formal understanding of God's freedom is countered by a substantial 
one." (AB 90f) 
If we apply Bib6's terminology here, negative freedom and positive freedom-
that never occurs in Bonhoeffer's writings in this form - we may say that Bonhoeffer 
here argues for God's positive- substantial- freedom against his negative- formal-
freedom. In Bib6's understanding ofthe general meaning of freedom, positive freedom 
completes the more fundamental negative freedom; here the relationship of the two 
possibilities is not inclusive but exclusive: the formal understanding of God's freedom 
is countered by a substantial one. 
God's freedom ultimately determines human freedom, according to the 
reasoning of Act and Being. Human being is either in Adam or in Christ. Being "in 
Adam means to be in untruth, in culpable perversion of the will, that is, of human 
essence. It means to be turned inward into one's self, cor curvum in se." (AB 13 7) It is 
senseless to speak about the freedom of the human being in Adam. Being in Christ, on 
the contrary, means being placed into the truth (AB 141) and the human being 
becomes free "in the sense of escaping from the power of the I into the power of 
Christ, where alone it recognises itself in original freedom as God's creature." (AB 
150) Freedom in Christ means, first and foremost freedom from myself The 
perspective of.freedom from myse(f is emphatically affirmed in Act and Being, in fact, 
it is the final fruit of God's .freedom for: 
"The echo less cries from solitude into the solitude of self, the protest against violation 
of any sort, have unexpectedly received a reply and gradually melt into the quiet, 
prayerful conversation of the child with the father in the Word of Jesus Christ. In the 
contemplation of Christ, the tormented knowledge of the I's tornness finds 'joyful 
conscience', confidence, and courage. The servant becomes free. The one who became 
an adult in exile and misery becomes a child at home. Home is the community of 
Christ, always 'future', present 'in faith' because we are children ofthe future- always 
act, because it is being; always being, because it is act." (AB 161) 
Freedomfrommyse(f, therefore, means the child's freedom in the father's 
house, at home. This home may be as wide as the new creation itself, and also the 
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child may grow to become a 'disciple' who may experience liberation into 'maturity'3 
Nevertheless, the God-human relationship- as Bonhoeffer knew it- that nurtures this 
freedom, does not change, nor may freedom from be understood as freedom from the 
other. 
Freedom in Christ, secondly, means to act like Christ, since the human being in 
Christ- as a member ofthe church- "may and should 'become a Christ' to the others". 
(AB 113) Here the human being's freedom for has implicitly been established, in the 
likeness of God's freedom. 
b. Creation and Fall: Human Freedom in the Likeness of God's Freedom 
The implicitly stated likeness becomes entirely explicit in Creation and Fall. 
Explaining humankind as the image of God, Bonhoeffer undertakes a detailed 
examination ofthe nature of human freedom. The following train ofthought even 
resembles the affirmation of God's freedom in Act and Being in some details. 
"To say that in humankind God creates the image of God on earth means that 
humankind is like the Creator in that it is free. To be sure, it is free only through God's 
creation, through the word of God; it is free for the worship of the Creator. For in the 
language of the Bible freedom is not something that people have for themselves but 
something they have for others. [italics mine] No one is free 'in herself or 'in himself-
free as it were in a vacuum or free in the same way that persons may be musical, 
intelligent, or blind in herself or in himself. Freedom is not a quality a human being 
has; it is not an ability, a capacity, an attribute ofbeing that may be deeply hidden in a 
person but can somehow be uncovered. Anyone who scrutinises human beings in 
order to find freedom finds nothing of it. Why? Because freedom is not a quality that 
can be uncovered; it is not a possession, something to hand, an object; nor is it a form 
of something to hand; instead it is a relation and nothing else. To be more precise, 
freedom is a relation between two persons. Being free means 'being-free-for-the-other', 
because I am bound to the other. Only by being in relation with the other am I free." 
(CF62f) 
We can see here that Bonhoeffer, similarly to Bib6, argues that a concept of 
freedom is a relational term. The content of this relation, however, is different: 
freedom for Bonhoeffer is understood exclusively as positive freedom. In his final 
argument, the reference to the language of the Bible is remarkable. In Creation and 
3 See Hans-Richard Reuter's 'Aftenvord' to the new Fortress edition of Act and Being, AB p. 183. 
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rail Bonhoeffer analyses Genesis 1-3, where this very reference pertains to the 
creation narrative, but Bonhoeffer neither specifies his reference, nor does he clarify 
that other Bible stories may be read as great narratives of deliverance. It may be safely 
thought that Bonhoeffer attributed to this reference and to the language of the Bible a 
decisive importance, especially if we consider his newly awakened interest in the 
Bible. 4 
"Being-free-for-the-other" as originating from "being-bound-to-the-other" is an 
obvious extension of God's "freedom for" to human relations. Bonhoeffer, however, 
also draws a different conclusion from the nature of God's freedom: 
"Because God in Christ is free for humankind, because God does not keep God's 
freedom to God's self, we can think of freedom only as a 'being free for. .. ' For us in 
the middle who exist through Christ and who know what it means to be human 
through Christ's ressurrection, the fact that God is free means nothing else than that we 
are free for God. The freedom of the Creator demonstrates itself by allowing us to be 
free, free for the Creator. That, however, means nothing else than that the Creator's 
image is created on earth. The paradox of created freedom remains undiminished. ( ... ) 
Created freedom then means ( ... ) that God's self enters into God's creation." ( CF 63) 
The closing expression is familiar from Sanctorum Communio: God's I enters 
my I as an I (SC 56). This creative divine act establishes both the created person's and 
the redeemed person's freedom for God, a "freedom for" whose content is radically 
different from the freedom of one human being for another. Freedom for God does not 
mean service in God's place; rather, it means an acknowledgement of belonging to 
God. This acknowledgement, however, expresses itself in a "freedom for" another 
human being: "[T]he creature is free in that one creature exists in relation to another 
creature, in that human being is free for another human being. And God created them 
man and woman." 5 The distinct meaning of 'freedom for God' will play a role later 
with respect to the relationship of human beings to the rest ofthe creation; here it is 
sufficient to record that while 'freedom for' as the freedom of human beings was 
4 I think ofBonhoeffer's l936letter to Ri.idiger Schleicher (DBW 14: 144-148), in which he explained 
how he started reading the Bible from sometime the swnmer of 1932 onwards. In this letter Bonhoeffer 
speaks about the possibility of sacrificiwu intellectus, thus the Bible for him was elevated above 
rational criticism. Titis ltigh demand makes his apparently selective reading of tl1e Bible - did he ever 
consider the Exodus narrative, for example? - all tl1e more problematic. See the letter also in Martin 
Riiter's and Ilse Todt's 'Aftenvord' to Creation and Fall in CF 153f 
5 CF p. 64. Here Bonhoeffer asks: "in what way does the freedom of the Creator differ from the freedom 
of that which is created?" His answer, I think, does not reveal the difference. 
affirmed in a soteriological manner in Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being, in 
Creation and fall it was also supported by the theology of creation. This contact is 
established by the introduction of analogia relationis. 
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Bonhoeffer interprets imago Dei in the way of analogia relationis instead of 
the traditional analogia entis. It is God, at the first place, who is relational: God 
"is there for God's creature, binding God's freedom to humankind and so giving God's 
selfto humankind- [God] must be thought of as one who is not alone, inasmuch as 
God is the one who in Christ attests to God's 'being for humankind'.( ... ) [Relation] is 
not a human potential or possibility or a structure of human existence, instead it is a 
given relation, a relation in which human beings are set, a justitia passiva. And it is in 
this relation in which human beings are set that freedom is given. ( ... ) [A ]nalogia or 
likeness must be understood very strictly in the sense that what is like derives its 
likeness only from the prototype itself. .. ( ... ) The relation of creature with creature is 
a relation established by God, because it consists of freedom and freedom comes from 
God." (CF 65t) 
By the introduction of analogia relationis as the interpretation of the likeness 
of human beings to God Bonhoeffer is able to transfer all the characteristics of God's 
freedom, established already in Act and Being, to human freedom. The relation of 
creature to creature is a relation established by God, after the relation in which God 
has been engaged with the creature. In other words, there is only one relation, that is 
characterised by freedom for the other, and the created human being is invited to be 
related to the other just like God is related to God's creation. This analogy, however, 
does not apply to the relationship of created human beings and the rest of creation. By 
distinguishing between the two kinds of creaturely relations, Bonhoeffer completes the 
concept of freedom with a new aspect. 
"[W]hereas the freedom of human beings over against one another consisted in being 
free for one another, humankind's freedom over against the rest of the created world is 
to be free from it. That means that humankind is its lord; humankind has command 
over it, rules it. And that constitutes the other side of humankind's created likeness to 
God. Humankind is to rule - though it is to rule over God's creation and to rule as 
having been commissioned and empowered to rule by God." (CF 66) 
Bonhoeffer characterises the relationship between human beings and the rest of 
creation by the dialectic ofbeing bound and to rule: "this freedom to rule includes 
being bound to the creatures who are ruled." (CF 66) While explaining the relationship 
of human being to the rest of created world, Bonhoeffer applies the image of 
subordination in quite an anthropomorphous manner: 
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"The ground and the animals over which I am lord constitute the world in which I live, 
without which I cease to be. It is my world, my earth, over which I rule. I am not free 
from it in any sense of my essential being, my spirit, having no need of nature, as 
though nature were something alien to the spirit. On the contrary, in my whole being, 
in my creatureliness, I belong wholly to this world; it bears me, nurtures me, holds me. 
But my freedom from it consists in the fact that this world, to which I am bound like a 
master to his servant, like the peasant to his bit of ground, has been made subject to 
me, that over the earth which is and remains my earth I am to rule, and the more I 
master it, the more it is my earth. What so peculiarly binds human beings to, and sets 
them over against, the other creatures is the authority conferred on humankind by 
nothing else than God's word." (CF 66) 
As people after the Fall or 'being in the middle', Bonhoeffer continues, we have 
lost our authority over the created world, instead, the world rules over us. The ultimate 
reason for this is that we do not accept dominion over the world as God-given but 
regard it as our own. "There is no 'being-free-from' without a 'being-free-for' [that is] 
there is no dominion without serving God; in losing the one humankind necessarily 
loses the other." ( CF 6 7) The way back to created rule over creation can lead only 
through serving God and the other human creature, as is reflected in the final reference 
to freedom: "[h]uman freedom for God and the other person and human freedom from 
the creature in dominion over it constitute the first human beings' likeness to God" 
(CF 67). 
This is the point where the main thread ofBonhoeffer's discussion of created 
freedom ends and where two observations need to be made. 
c. A Possible Consideration ofFreedom From: Society in a Fallen World 
We have already seen that in Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer did not 
consider seriously social life after the Fall according to the types of society. By 
avoiding a serious account of life in society, Bonhoeffer also avoided the challenge to 
consider the importance of 'freedom from the other' in a social world were the person 
is attacked by the other's illegitimate power. In Creaton and Fall, if possible, 
Bonhoeffer's thinking focusses more exclusively on the dynamic of created 
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community, fallen community and restored community. The only place where society 
after the Fall could be found is Bonhoeffer's short exegesis of Gen 4,1: it is Cain's 
stmy. Cain's story is described as a transitory phase of an entirely negative meaning: 
"Cain is the first human being who is born on the ground that is cursed. It is with Cain 
that history begins, the history of death. ( ... )The new thing about Cain, the son of 
Adam, is that as sicut deus he himself lays violent hands on human life. The human 
being who may not eat from the tree of life grasps all the more greedily at the fruit of 
death, the destruction of life. ( ... ) The history of death stands under the sign of Cain. 
The end ofCain's history, and so the end of all history, is Christ on the cross, the 
murdered Son of God. That is the last desperate assault on the gate of paradise. And 
under the whirling sword, under the cross, the human race dies. But Christ lives. The 
trunk of the cross becomes the wood of life, and now in the midst of the world, on the 
accursed ground itself, life is raised up anew. ( ... ) The tree of life, the cross of Christ, 
the center of God's world that is fallen but upheld and preserved - that is what the end 
ofthe story about paradise is for us." (CF 145f) 
What makes Cain's history endurable is that the fallen world is preserved by 
God. Bonhoeffer elaborates his - frequently interpreted - thesis of orders of 
preservation by explaining the piece of narrative about God's clothing of fallen 
humans: "God does not expose them to one another in their nakedness; instead God 
covers them". (CF 139) God's new action for fallen humankind is one that orders and 
restrains: it shows their wickedness and restrains their obsessive passion, limiting it by 
means of order. While the shift from orders of creation to orders of preservation6 was 
a significant decision on Bonhoeffer's part in 1933, we are more concerned with the 
fact that both images speak about God's order; a tolerable life within Cain's history 
can be preserved by participating in or being obedient to God's - not eternally fixed -
orders of preservation. From this position Bonhoeffer could logically have derived the 
possibility of 'freedom from the other' as the consequence of the insistence on God's 
orders of preservation within a fallen world, however, he did not take this step and did 
not elaborate this possibility. 
6 CF p. 140; see also the secondary literature listed in editorial note 3 in the same page. 
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d The Non-Reflected Presence ojFreedom From - the Bearer of an Office 
The second observation leads us to another document that has been written 
during the months when Creation and Fall was delivered, the broadcasted address, 
'The Leader and the Individual in the Younger Generation'. The link between the two 
texts is created by the appearance of subordination in both writings: what occurs in a 
rather implicit way in Creation and Fall becomes explicit in the address. 
We have seen that Bonhoeffer reintroduced the element of subordination with 
respect to the relationship of humankind to the rest of creation in Creation and Fall, 
and he explained this relationship in a rather anthropomorphous manner. Ruling over 
the rest of the world constituted humankind's freedom from the world; this freedom 
and rule, at the same time, is contingent on humankind's freedom for God, that is, 
serving God. People 'in the middle', as Bonhoeffer reflected on his own present time 
and society, however, do not accept dominion as God-given, but try to get hold of it 
for themselves; that is why they finally fail to rule, moreover, they are ruled by the 
world. This model of rule is applied to Bonhoeffer's contemporary German society. 
In the address Bonhoeffer contrasts genuine leadership, or, in other words, the 
authority of the office with "the political, messianic concept of the Leader as we know 
it today" (NRS 199). 
"The Leader has authority from below, from those whom he leads, while the office has 
authority from above; the authority of the Leader depends on his person, the authority 
of the office is suprapersonal; authority from below is the self-justification ofthe 
people, authority ofthe office is a recognition of the appointed limits; authority from 
below is borrowed authority, authority of an office is original authority. The slogan of 
the authority of the Leader is 'The Reich', the slogan of the authority of an office is 'the 
state'." (NRS 200) 
The typical representatives of the authority of the office are the father, the 
teacher, the judge and the statesman. Their authority is limited by the office they bear, 
their individual freedom is restricted by those whom they serve. The office-holder 
serves his office, being aware of the fact that even the office is "a penultimate 
authority in the face of an ultimate, indescribable authority, in the face of the authority 
of God" (NRS 203). Either the Leader recognises his real position and leads "his 
followers towards a responsibility to the orders of life, a responsibility to father, 
teacher, judge [and] state" (NRS 202), or he becomes a misleader. 
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Genuine authority within human society is described here like human authority 
over the rest of creation, and the danger of deviating from it and the possible way back 
is shown in a similar manner too. The holder of an office acts like God, rules by 
serving, and this identification is in accordance with everything we have learnt about 
human being as the image of God so far. The same arguments also affirm that we 
should think about the freedom ofthe office-holder essentially as a "freedom for". At 
this point, however, we refer back to Bonhoeffer's description of the relationship 
between created humankind and the rest of creation, upon which the "freedom from" 
of humans is established, asking the question whether it is possible that Bonhoeffer 
was simply reluctant to acknowledge the practical negative freedom of the father, the 
teacher, the statesman in their relation to their children, pupils and citizens? 
Describing the negative freedom of humans in their relation to the earth 
Bonhoeffer was ready to apply the relationship of the master to the servant in a 
symbolic way - why did he not acknowledge the negative freedom of a real master in 
his relationship to the real servant? Why he was reluctant to see, as a practicing 
teacher, that the authority of the father or the teacher over their subjects consists not 
merely of awareness of their responsibility and observance the limits of their power, 
but also freedom from their subject to act, to choose, to decide? Why did not 
Bonhoeffer, to put it simply, reverse his thesis of 'ruling by serving' to 'serving by 
ruling'? As we have seen, the complex conceptual framework that Bonhoeffer created 
up to this point is resistant to including a possibility of human freedom from the other 
human being. Within this framework we cannot answer these questions. The answer, I 
believe, lies behind the realm ofBonhoeffer's concepts, in the psychodinamic roots7 of 
7 For the psychodinamic roots see: Clifford Green, 'Bonhoeffer in the Conte:-.1 of Erickson's Luther 
Study, in: Roger A Johnson ed., Psychohistory and Religion, The Case of'Young Man Luther', 
Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1977, pp. 162-196. Also: Green, Bonhoe.!Jer, A Theology of Sociali ty, 
chapter 4, pp. 105-184. Also: Kenneth Earl Morris, Bonhoe.!Jer's Ethic of Discipleship, A Study in Social 
Psychology, Political Thought and Religion, TI1e Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 
and London, 1986. If both the contributions of Green and Morris are considered, we gain a rather 
complicated picture. I personally prefer Morris's reconstruction to Green's. 
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Bonhoeffer's theology. Any investigation of these roots, however, is beyond the scope 
ofthe present study. 
e. The Christological Foundation C?fFreedom From in Life Together 
Having made these two observations we will pursue yet another significant 
element of the early Bonhoeffer's understanding of freedom beyond the early phrase .. 
In our review of Act and Being we have found that Bonhoeffer described the 
fruit of Christ's salvific encounter with the human person as the freedom from the self, 
from myself, the liberation of cor curvum in se. This motif of'freedom from myself 
was later creatively interwoven with created human freedom, elaborated in Creation 
and Fall. In 1939 Bonhoeffer wrote in L(fe Together about those Christians, in fact, 
the ordinands in the seminary, who were able to observe the "discipline of the tongue": 
"Where this discipline of the tongue is practiced right from the start, individuals will 
make an amazing discovery. They will be able to stop constantly keeping an eye on 
others, judging them, condemning them, and putting them in their places and thus 
doing violence to them. They can now allow other Christians to live freely, just as God 
has brought them face to face with each other. The view of such persons expands and, 
to their amazement, they recognise for the first time the richness of God's creative 
glory shining over their brothers and sisters. God did not make others as I would have 
made them. God did not give them to me so that I could dominate and control them, 
but so that I might find the Creator by means of them. Now other people, in their 
freedom with which they were created, become an occasion for me to rejoice, whereas 
before they were only a nuisance and trouble for me. God does not want me to mold 
others into the image that seems good to me, that is, into my own image. Instead, in 
their freedom from me God made other people in God's own image. I can never know 
in advance how God's image should appear in others. That image always takes on a 
completely new and unique form whose origin is found solely in God's free and 
sovereign act ot creation. To me that form may seem strange, even ungodly. But God 
creates every person in the image of God's Son, the Crucified, and this image, 
likewise, certainly looked strange and ungodly to me before I grasped it." (LT 95) 
The structure ofi-You-relations we have discovered in Sanctorum Communio 
can be beautifully demonstrated in this text. By taking seriously the Other through an 
observance ofthe discipline ofthe tongue, I encounter the 'strange', crucified Christ in 
the Other's othemess. This encounter sets me free from myself, from my cor curvum 
in se, and enables me to recognise the Other 'for the first time' not as a trouble but as a 
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gift. The Other's otherness would not force the I into isolation- that may also manifest 
~ -
itself in my intention to dominate the Other - but invites the I into a rejoicing 
relationship. All these happen according to !-You-relations pattern 'A', as we have 
understood the becoming of the Christian person. The result of this saving encounter is 
the restoration of God's created community in which the Other's freedom and 
soveregnity, based upon God's free and sovereign creative act, is emphasised. The 
Other's freedom from me is shown as the decisive contents of God's created and 
restored order, in which the being of a Christian takes place. In the affirmation of the 
Other's freedom from me also my freedom from the other is implicit; however, this 
tacit possiblity was not made explicit by Bonhoeffer. 
The Christological character of the encounter is so dominant that it does not 
allow an emphasis on created differences: there are strong and weak, talented and 
untalented individuals within the restored community, but they are not organised into a 
structure of subordination. "Rather, this diversity is a reason for rejoicing in one 
another and serving one another". (LT95) "Every Christian community must know 
that not only do the weak need the strong, but also that the strong cannot exist without 
the weak" (LT96) But is the strong affirmation of the freedom ofthe Other from me 
and the refusal of rigid subordination on the basis of unequal relation of strengths 
enough to assert the right of the fellow Christian to freely determine his or her place 
and service within the community? "Even in this new situation all the members of the 
community are given their special place; this is no longer the place, however, in which 
they can most successfully promote themselves, but the place where they can best 
carry out their service." (LT 95) Thus, the 'freedom of a Christian', reached in a 
Christological way of reasoning in the framework ofl-You-relations pattern 'A' finally 
encounters its limit in Bonhoeffer's concept of community, created according to 1-
y ou-relations pattern 'B '. 
The 'freedom of a Christian' that shows such promising beginnings in Life 
Together, meets another limit in the argument where the role of the motif of vicarious 
representative action is constitutive. The theme, again, is the Other's freedom from 
me: 
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"First of all, it is the freedom of the other, mentioned earlier, that is a burden to 
Christians. The freedom ofthe other goes against Christians' high opinions of 
themselves, and yet they must recognise it. Christians could rid themselves of this 
burden by not giving other persons their freedom, thus doing violence to the 
personhood of others and stamping their own image on others. But when Christians 
allow God to create God's own image in others, they allow others their own freedom. 
Thereby Christians themselves bear the burden of the freedom enjoyed by these other 
creatures of God. All that we mean by human nature, individuality, and talent is part 
of the other person's freedom- as are the other's weaknesses and peculiarities that so 
sorely try our patience, and everything that produces the plethora of clashes, 
differences, and arguments between me and the other. Here, bearing the burden of the 
other means tolerating the reality of the other's creation by God - affirming it, and in 
bearing with it, breaking through to delight in it" (LT 101) 
Becoming a Christian, thus, happens by acting vicariously for the other in 
bearing the burden of the other's freedom. The active element in this event is my 
vicarious representative action, the other's freedom is the burden to tolerate. What I 
enjoy in the first place is not the other's created freedom, but my perseverance in my 
sacrificial vicarious representative action. The point is that the whole act is viewed 
from the perspective of those who act vicariously for the other in tolerating their 
freedom. Does it, we ask again, mean a general affirmation of human being's created 
freedom from the other? Not necessarily; and the reason for saying no lies in the 
controlling role of vicarious representative action over the possibility of created 
freedom. Vicarious representative action is giving and not receiving, affirming or 
tolerating but not demanding. Just like it is Christologically meaningless to speak 
about Christ's freedom from the human being, vicarious representative action does not 
allow an acknowledgement ofthe "freedom from" ofthose who act vicariously, even 
though elemental experience would affirm it. 
This limit is set explicitly by Bonhoeffer, immediately after the above 
discussion, where applying it to the relationship of the strong and the weak again, he 
states: "Neither must seek their own rights." (LT 101) The other's "freedom from" 
exists to the extent that I acknowledge it by acting vicariously for the other, but it does 
not exist in the other's own identification to establish the other's right to determine 
him- or herself The same applies to my freedom: it exists to the extent that others 
tolerate it as my vicarious representatives (and if they endure me long enough, they 
may delight in my created freedom), but it does not exist as my freedom from the 
other according to which I can live spontaneously as a matter of fact. 
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Bonhoeffer's ambivalent treatment of 'freedom from' is expressed in L(fe 
Together in a different way as well. Discussing the mutual service of Christians to 
each other through personal conversation Bonhoeffer considers not only the fear of 
those who feel responsible to speak but also the fear of those who are spoken to. He 
takes the question seriously: " [ w ]ho has permission to force oneself on one's 
neighbor?" (LT 1 03) He knows that "the spirit of doing violence to others could 
insinuate itself in the worst way" (LT 104). Therefore, 
"others have their own right, responsibility, and even duty to defend themselves 
against unauthorised intrusions. Other persons have their own secrets that may not be 
violated without the infliction of great harm. Nor can they divulge them without 
destroying themselves. They are not secrets based on knowledge or emotion, but 
secrets of their freedom, their redemption, their being. And yet this good insight lies 
perilously close to Cain's murderous question: 'Am I my brother's keeper?' Our 
seemingly spiritually based respect for the freedom of the other can be subject to the 
curse of God: 'I will hold you responsible for their blood.' (Ezek 3, 18)." (LT 1 04) 
I think this is the only place in the whole corpus ofBonhoeffer's writings when 
he so unmistakably affirms someone's right to defend himself (even though this 
someone is always the other and never myself): a manifestation of one's freedom from. 
Nevertheless, even this single expression ofthis possibility has instantly been 
questioned and made suspicious from the perspective of Bonhoeffer's concept of 
Christian community. As we have seen, a responsible relationship between the I and 
the You within a Christian community was made an ultimate characteristic of 
community itself This ultimate demand of responsibility simply cannot tolerate a 
situation in which the Other, being led by his or her claim for remaining free from me, 
however justified and reasonable, could declare his or her freedom from without 
recalling the acute danger of the disintegration of the community itself So, a simple 
"leave me alone" on the Other's side necessarily conjures up the danger of getting into 
the irresponsible Cain's place on my side. 
Although Bonhoeffer refrains from affirming the other's general right and 
possibility for "freedom from", he nevertheless does not want to avoid the problem of 
'unauthorised intrusions' that may be committed in the name of Christian 
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responsibility. His solution given in L~fe Together is a Christological one, just like his 
treatment of I-You-relations in general is pursued in a characteristically Christological 
manner, and framed dominantly by I-You-relations pattern 'A'. 
In the fundamental first chapter of L{fe Together on Community the dominant 
role ofl-You-relations pattern 'A' is easily recognisable. 
"Christian community means community through Jesus Christ and in Jesus Christ. 
( ... ) It means, first, that a Christian needs others for the sake of Jesus Christ. It means, 
second, that a Christian comes to others only through Jesus Christ. It means , third, 
that from eternity we have been chosen in Jesus Christ, accepted in time, and united 
for eternity." (LT 31) 
This relationship in and through Jesus Christ excludes all other kinds of 
relationship among the members of the Christian community. "We have one another 
only through Christ, but through Christ we really do have one another." (LT 34) In 
other words, "Christian community is not an ideal, but a divine reality", and 
"Christian community is a spiritual and not a psychic reality" (LT 35). By "spiritual" 
Bonhoeffer means "what is created only by the Holy Spirit, who puts Jesus Christ into 
our hearts as lord and saviour"; while "psychic" or "emotional" (in a better translation: 
human) means "what comes from the natural urges, strengths, and abilities ofthe 
human soul". (LT38)8 
This thesis is illuminated in several practically graspable ways in Life 
Together. Most significantly, while "[w]ithin the spiritual community there is never, in 
any way whatsoever, an 'immediate' relationship of one to another, ( ... ) in a self-
centered [that is, human] community there exists a profound, elemental emotional 
8 A note on the English translation of Bonhoeffer's expression, seelisch as 'self-centered' or 'emotional' 
has to be made. Both expressions, just like their Hungarian translations, have a strong negative 
connotation in themselves: emotional means something partial and also unethical while self-centered is 
understood as straigl1tforwardly selfish. I think these directly negative words obscure the meaning 
Bonhoeffer intended to give the expression seelisch: in Bonhoeffer's perspective it signifies every 
anthropologically and socially graspable dimension of hwnan life that is not the fruit of the direct work 
of the Holy Spirit, manifested in the Christian commwlity. Seelisch simply means belonging to the 
human soul. An attribution to any self-evidently unetllical meaning to it obscures the ontological logic 
of Bonhoeffer's argumentation, namely that these contents are alien to the Christian community because 
tl1ey are htmlan. Human in Life Together means being part of Creation distorted by the Fall, and not 
having been renewed by the Holy Spirit in the Christian community through Jesus Christ. If we replace 
'emotional' and 'self-centered' by 'human' in the text, tl1e radical distinction between life through Jesus 
Christ and 'immediate' life that corresponds with the difference between sociality according to !-You-
relations pattem 'A' and pattem 'B' will be much clearer. Cf. editorial note 14. in LT pp. 38f. 
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desire for community, for immediate contact with other human souls." (LT 41) In the 
following description of human community we can identify created community as 
depicted in Sanctorum Communio, that has been distorted by the Fall: here love is 
identical with excercising power and influence, as well as "human bonds, suggestive 
influences, and dependences are everything" (LT 41 ). Man·iage, family, and friendship 
represent the human 'layers' in the community in which "the element of self-
centeredness as such already assumes a central importance" (LT 46); these 'layers' 
have to be carefully distinguished from the spiritual contents of a given community. In 
terms ofthe two different patterns of I-You-relationships, in the description of 
Christian community we can witness the overwhelming dominance of pattern 'A' and 
the hardly recognisable presence of pattern 'B'. This is the structure within which the 
Christological solution ofthe defence against 'unauthorised intrusion' without 
declaring a general right of self-defence has been made. 
Spiritual love, Bonhoeffer writes, 
"will not seek to agitate another by exerting all too personal, direct influence or by 
crudely interfering in one's life. It will not take pleasure in pious, emotional fervor and 
excitement. Rather, it will encounter the other with the clear word of God and be 
prepared to leave the other alone with this word for a long time. It will be willing to 
release others again so that Christ may deal with them. It will respect the other as the 
boundary that Christ establishes between us; and it will find full community with the 
other in the Christ who alone binds us together. This spiritual love will thus speak to 
Christ about the other Christian more than to the other Christian about Christ." (LT 44) 
.f Bonhoe.ffer's Concept of Freedom - a Summary 
Our quick review from Act and Being to Life Together testified that 
Bonhoeffer developed a concept of freedom on the basis of vicarious representative 
action, concieved both in theological and social terms. As God's (or Christ's) vicarious 
representative action identifies the being of humans as "being acted upon" as well as 
determines one human's action for the other, God's freedom as freedom for the human 
being informs human freedom as freedom for the other. Therefore positive freedom, 
established on ethical responsibility as its inevitable basis and necessary content, is 
identified as Bonhoeffer's characteristic understanding of freedom. The possibility of 
negative freedom, "freedom from", however, has also been detected in three instances. 
224 
We have found that it is possible to consider negative freedom with respect to 
people's living together after the Fall in a form of togetherness that Bonhoeffer 
described as society. The demand of freedom from the other as a means of defence 
from the excessive power of the other may be regarded as justified, and also 
Bonhoeffer's description of God's orders of preservation might serve as a theological 
basis for self-defence based on negative freedom. In fact, however, life in a society 
was not taken seriously by the writer of Creation and Fall neither were God's orders 
of preservation elaborated in this respect. 
The second instance revealed a situation in which 'freedom from' is tacitly 
counted on without being explicitly treated. We have seen that Bonhoeffer described 
the authority of a bearer of an office within his own German society analogously with 
the responsible stewardship of human beings for earth before God. Regarding the 
relationship between created human beings and the rest of creation that Bonhoeffer 
described as the relationship of master and servant, Bonhoeffer spoke about human 
freedom from creation as a condition of their stewardship. He did not make, however, 
the same explicit with respect to excercising authority from above over the subjects. 
This discussion of power relations- even they are regarded as responsible power-
relations - was conceived according to the description of the primal state of social 
being in Sanctorum Communio, in which we have identified I-You-relations pattern 
'B'. The blatant disregard of the negative freedom of office holders in their relation to 
their subjects I regard as a significant blindspot in Bonhoeffer's view of 
anthropological as well as social factors of human life. 
In the third instance we have followed how Bonhoeffer affirmed the possibility 
of freedom from the other in a Christological mode of reasoning. In Life Together, 
where we witnessed the dominant role ofl-You-relations pattern 'A' in the description 
of Christian community, a strictly theological affirmation of negative freedom reaches 
its zenith. Nevertheless, this theological understanding is not converted into a 
corresponding social understanding: even here Bonhoeffer seems to refrain from 
considering a concept of negative freedom that would establish a general right for self-
defence. 
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B. Bonhoeffer's Concept (!l Freedom and his Vision of a Post-war Germany: 
Bonhoe.ffer's "New Order" in Context 
In this section we will review Bonhoeffer's thoughts on the social and political 
order of post-war Germany. His most direct proposals can be found in two documents: 
his response to William Paton's book, The Church and the New Order9, written 
together with Visser't Hooft, and his recently published letter to his friend Paul 
Lehmann; both texts have been written during September, 1941. These thoughts can 
directly be compared to Bib6's thoughts concerning a new Germany within the order 
of a post-war Europe. 
After this comparative reading, in which Paton's book will serve as a context to 
Bonhoeffer's texts, we will consider some of Bethge's remarks concerning the political 
character of the conspiratorial activity ofBonhoeffer that are intended to provide 
historical and biographical comments on it. Bonhoeffer's concrete proposals will also 
be related to some politically relevant texts from his Ethics. This examination will be 
rather tentative in both cases. In the first case we will look through some of the 
comments that Bethge added to the narration about the time of the conspiracy; in the 
second case we will consider whether patterns ofBonhoeffer's thinking that we 
discovered to be at work during the formation ofthe notion of vicarious representative 
action and his understanding of freedom can also be found at the material of the 
Ethics. 
Finally, we will pursue some selected lines- in a highly tentative way- up to 
the latest phase ofBonhoeffer's theological writings to find out whether any change in 
the possible political implications of his theology may be revealed after the period of 
his life examined here. 
9 William Pat011, The Church and the New Order, London, S.C.M., 1941 
a. Bonhoeffer's "New Order" in the Context C!f 
Paton's The Church and the New Order 
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Bonhoeffer's response to Paton's book10 can be read not only as a Continental -
·or characteristically German- reply to the thoughts of an Anglo-Saxon thinker from a 
different context, but it also discloses a fundamentally different set of political 
principles. At the same time, it reveals several simultaneous thoughts with Bib6's 
ideas, that, as we have seen, have been written partly as a reaction to Anglo-Saxon 
thinkers as well. A careful reading ofBonhoeffer's text, considered together with 
Paton's book and Bib6's ideas, may be able to distinguish between certain elements of 
Bonhoeffer's response that come from his Continental perspective and those elements 
that reflect his particular view of politics. 
A connection between Bib6's and Paton's perspective can be established, as a 
first step of this examination, by referring to their common indebtedness to 
Mannheim's scholarship. We have already discussed Bib6's application ofMannheim's 
images, principles and perspectives at length. Paton lists the name ofMannheim 
among the name of those scholars who made a contribution to a better recognition of 
"the relevance of God's message in the church to the present world order" concerning 
"the preservation of freedom in the face ofthe increasing and inevitable mass 
organisation of society" 11 . Paton's reference to Mannheim's expression, 'planning for 
freedom.I 2 signifies their common understanding of the joint assignment of 
Christianity and democratic politics, a conviction that penetrates Paton's train of 
thought13 . This is the common ground that Bib6 shares with them as well. 
Bonhoeffer, however, does not share this ground. At the beginning of his reply 
he regards it necessary to distance himself from these convictions as a 'Continental 
Christian': 
"Continental Christians are acutely conscious of the fact that the future is in God's 
hands and that no human planning, however intelligent and however well-intentioned, 
can make men masters of their own fate. There is, therefore, in Continental Churches 
w 'The Church and the New Order', in: TP pp. 108-117. 
11 Paton. The Church and the New Order, p. 153. 
12 Paton. The Church and the New Order, p. 156. 
13 See especially the chapters 'Guiding Principles' and 'The Church: Human Worth and Freedom'. 
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today a strongly apocalyptic trend. This trend may lead to an attitude of pure other-
wordliness, but it may also have the more salutary effect of making us realise that the 
kingdom of God has its own history which does not depend upon political events, and 
the life of the Church has its own God-given laws which are different from those 
which govern the life of the world. We are, therefore, glad that Paton emphasises so 
strongly that the life of the Church does not depend upon victory in the war." (TP 1 09) 
This beginning, in fact, is a thorough criticism ofthe fundamentals ofPaton's 
argumentation, despite the apparent agreement it seeks to demonstrate. We have 
already mentioned the central role of planning in Pat on's message. The mere 
possibility of planning from a Christian point of view is based on the conviction that 
neither is the kingdom of God totally independent from political events nor is the 
Church governed by laws that are entirely different from those that govern the world. 
In Paton's argument the repeated - and nuanced - references to the Christian origins of 
democratic politics are to establish this relation. From this self-imposed distance 
Bonhoeffer puts a heavy emphasis on a single thought that appears in Paton's text 
within a balanced argument. Before Paton reached the conclusion that "the Church's 
life does not depend upon victory in war" 14 he discussed the necessity to think through 
peace aims even before the war was won, through several pages; and the whole book's 
objective is to show the difference between a world-order informed by Christianity 
and Hitler's New Order. True, the mere existence of the Church is conceivable also in 
catacombs, as Paton affirms too, but his main problem is not the mere survival of the 
Church but the possible influence that a free Church can exercise to make the world a 
better place. Thus, the 'strong emphasis' is added by Bonhoeffer, probably to lessen the 
difference he felt and also started to express. 
Nevertheless, the difference has been established, and from this different 
vantage point Bonhoeffer embarks upon the discussion of some of the questions that 
Paton raised in his book: "this does not mean that Continental Christians are 
indifferent to the problem of the post-war order" (TP 109). Having implicitly rejected 
the - say: Anglo-Saxon liberal democratic - manner of relating the Church to the 
world, Bonhoeffer first tells about the 'proper' relations on whose basis a consideration 
of the post-war order may be possible: 
14 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 32. 
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"There is very especially a new recognition of the implications ofthe New Testament 
faith: that Christ is the King to whom all powers are subjected. Because the world is 
created 'for him' (Col 1,16), we dare not consider it as a domain which lives by itself, 
quite apart from God's plan. The commandments of God indicate the limits which dare 
not be transgressed, if Christ is to be Lord. And the church is to remind the world of 
these limits. ( ... ) Now the task of the Church in relation to the 'new order' is to be seen 
in the light of this ministry. The Church cannot and should not elaborate detailed plans 
of post-war reconstruction, but it should remind the nations ofthe abiding 
commandments and realities which must be taken seriously if the new order is to be a 
true order, and if we are to avoid another judgement of God as this present war." (JP 
109t) 
It is quite amazing to see how Bonhoeffer is able to operate with two 
differently concieved Church-world relations within a short section of his reply. If he 
wishes to reject a cooperation between the Church and different secular powers in a 
democratic manner, he argues for distinct laws that govern the Church. If he asks 
about the way Christ's rule will prevail over the world, he points at the Church who 
knows the laws the world must obey to. Instead ofbeing a partner in planning for a 
new order, the Church is elevated into the position of a relative moral authority, above 
the secular world, as a representative of Christ. The relationship ofthe Church and the 
world, both fulfilling distinct functions, is unmistakably hierarchical. 
To be sure, Paton also makes distinctions between tasks and competences, in a 
rather similar way: 
"It is not for the Church as such, whatever individual Christians may find it right to do 
in their capacities as citizens and statesmen, to propound new territorial boundaries or 
revisions of treaties. But the churches can give voice to the truth which alone will 
make such change possible without resort to violence, namely, that justice is grounded 
in the will of God. ( ... ) Mankind will not be able to establish a workable world order 
until it realises that on earth, as it is in heaven, it is not itself sovereign, but is only the 
mandatory of God." 15 
Exactly the same thoughts, rather similar words- I think ofBonhoeffer's 
famous expression, mandate, in Ethics- yet the broader implications are radically 
different. Bonhoeffer speaks ofthe authority of Christ and the Church, Paton tells 
what the Church can give voice to. For Bonhoeffer, the limits dare not be transgressed 
15 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 163f 
if Christ is to be Lord, for Paton, God's will has to be considered for the sake of a 
workable world order and avoiding violence. 
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The comments Bonhoeffer adds to Paton's chapter 1, 'Why peace aims?', come 
as genuine reflections from his context not only as a German but also as a conspirator 
who knows about the resistence that emerges within the army. The point that Germany 
needs endurable peace-terms has been made by several observers, Bib6 among them, 
but the idea that "[a] positive statement of peace aims may have a very strong 
influence in strengthening the hands of this group [of patriots]" ( TP 11 0) assumes 
Bonhoeffer's special perspective. The 1941 hopes of the resistance group are reflected 
more directly in the statement that "[t]he only group which can take action against the 
regime is the army" (TP Ill); this strong hope may explain the fact that Bonhoeffer 
payed a special attention to the ambiguous prospect of military disarmament. 
Paton's chapter 2, 'The chaos behind the war' has received a short but all the 
more telling comment from Bonhoeffer: 
"There is an important point which Paton has not mentioned in his description ofthe 
chaos behind the war. The deepest reason for the moral confusion in Germany, and to 
some extent in Europe as a whole, is not merely the opposition against Christian 
ethical convictions (for this by itself might have created clear fronts rather than 
'chaos'), but rather the ability of National Socialism to present its injustice as true 
justice. ( ... ) there was just enough relative justice in some of Germany's claims to 
make it possible for Hitler to present himself as a prophet who came to re-establish 
justice." (JP 111 f) 
The context suggests that Bonhoeffer thought of the obvious injustice involved 
in some of the points of the Versailles Treaty whose remedy had been expected from 
Hitler by many Germans. True, Paton spoke about the Treaty in a rather favorable 
way, giving way to an opinion that "the Versailles Treaty was one of the more 
creditable efforts oftreaty-making" 16, and the only objection he made was that 
unfortunately "the Treaty was completed without any opportunity for discussion or 
negotiation by the Germans" 17 As we have seen, Bib6 was much more critical about 
the Treaty; at this point Paton seemed to be unable to see with the eyes of the loosers. 
(It is a later part of his essay where he expresses a more outspoken collective self-
16 Paton. The Church and the New Order, p. 35. 
17 Paton. The Church and the New Order, p. 36. 
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criticism: "Christian judgement of Germany, in the case of an Englishman, must begin 
with the recognition that some of the diseases of Germany are acute versions of 
diseases which we, like the French, have passed through" 18.) Another piece ofPaton's 
explanation of the Nazi success, that "the masses joined fascism (and national 
socialism) not because they believe in its promises( ... ) but because they do not 
believe in them" 19, Bonhoeffer could quite rightly recognise as superficial. 
There is no sign, however, that Bonhoeffer thought of anything else apart form 
the unjust Versailles Treaty while explaining the material reasons ofNazi success. 
Here Bib6's perspective offers an additional factor. He argued that Hitler's program 
seemed to fulfil three decisive factors of the system ofEuropean values: the right for 
self-determination, democracy and equality. While Bonhoeffer understood the 
seductive profile of Nazism as a promise to re-establish past justice, Bib6 also 
perceived the illusion of social progress that Nazism awakened in many people, and, 
as we have seen, he hoped for a survival of people's interest in democratic values that 
originally was related to the rise ofNazism. 
Interestingly, Paton made a similar pont towards the end of his study. He asks: 
"[a]re there forces of constructive and re-creative power [in Germany] to which we 
can turn with any confidence? 
"No one can say. But there are materials with which men of goodwill will attempt to 
build. I think of the youth movements. Probably it was the generous enthusiasm with 
which masses of German youth entered the Nazi movement that mainly commended 
that movement in its early stages to many English minds. We have seen, as Lord 
Eustace Percy said in his matriculation address at Newcastle, 'generous impulses 
transmuted into wickedness; a Gestapo staffed by young men who in the beginning 
had been nobly intent on national regeneration, on a new equality and a new 
fellowship.' They were mistaken and they were corrupted; but there is still youth, an 
ever-flowing fountain of youth, in all the warring lands. They will get together again, 
they may understand one another better than their elders, they will use directness of 
speech. There may be hope there. "20 
On the basis ofBonhoeffer's 1933 evaluation of the political nature of the 
youth movements' response to the Nazi program in 'The Leader and the Individual in 
18 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 168. 
19 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 53. 
211 Paton, The Church and the New Order, pp. 172f, 
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the Younger Generation' we should not be surprised that Bonhoeffer did not count the 
semi-democratic elements among the seductive features of Hitlerism. 
In our perspective the most important part ofBonhoeffer's response is the 
section in which he replied to chapter 3 ofPaton's book, 'Guiding principles'. In these 
paragraphs Bonhoeffer's perceptive inner understanding of the German situation and 
his political principles are tightly interwoven. 
Bonhoeffer's worries concerning the possible consequences of a sraightforward 
introduction of "full-fledged democracy and parliamentarism" (TP 112) right after the 
end of the war in Germany and in other countries that have not "been prepared by a 
long spiritual tradition" (TP 112) for it, seem to be very similar to Bib6's worries about 
the consequences of a forced social progress in Central and Eastern European 
countries that not only lack the necessary 'spiritual' preconditions but are also 
exhausted by war, and a lost one in many cases. The political content of their 
precautions, however, is far from being identical. Bonhoeffer speaks about "an 
immediate return" to democracy, that refers to the liberal democratic interlude of the 
Weimar Republic. Bib6 considered a socialist development of parliamentary 
democracy that had never been tried out in this area, but could be an organic sequel to 
a highly spiritualised authoritarian rule. Thus, in Bib6's view, a well-established 
monarchy in Germany could have represented a - shorter or longer - transitory phase 
towards a socialist parliamentary democracy. 
When Bonhoeffer promotes an authoritarian rule in Germany, however, he 
does not think of a transitory phase towards something different. He wishes to counter 
"state absolutism", by which he means a totalitarian state of any kind, and for this 
reason he promotes a state limited by law. 
We have seen that earlier in this reply Bonhoeffer identified the task of the 
church with respect to the state as one that reminds the state of God's commandments 
as limits. A detailed description ofBonhoeffer's understanding ofthe divine origin of 
government and the church's task in safegarding this character can be found in his 
study on 'State and Church', that may be related to the reply to Paton's book21 . 
21 E pp. 332-353. Eberhard Bethge suggests that the essay was written together with the study 'On the 
Possibility of the Word of the Church to the World' for the Freiburg plans, that is, during the autunm of 
1942, a year after the reply to Paton's book was written (Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffir, A 
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Keeping this background in mind, let us read Bonhoeffer's criticism ofPaton's 
proposal: 
"The Anglo-Saxon world summarises the struggle against the omnipotence of the 
state in the word 'freedom'. And Paton gives us a charter of human 'rights and liberties' 
which are to provide the norm of action by the state. But these expressions must, as 
Paton indicates, 'be translated into terms which relate them more closely to the life of 
other peoples'. For freedom is too negative a word to be used in a situation where all 
order has been destroyed. And liberties are not enough when men seek first of all for 
some minimum security. These words remind too much ofthe old liberalism which 
because of its failures is itselflargely responsible for the development towards state 
absolutism. 
This is partly a quarrel ofwords, about the realities which lie behind such expressions 
as 'civilian religious liberties', 'freedom of speech' or 'equality of all before the law', 
which must certainly be safeguarded in the new order. But it is also much more than a 
matter of words. For the whole orientation of the post-war states will depend on this 
ideological question. Now we believe that the conception of order limited by lmv and 
re!>ponsibility, an order which is not an aim in itself, but which recognises 
commandments which transcend the state, has more spiritual substance and solidity 
than the emphasis on the rights f.?[ individual men." (italics mine) (TP 113) 
Paton's 'Guiding Principles' are, in fact, a solemn yet nuanced summary of 
democratic principles with respect to the crisis of the time. At the beginning of his 
train of thoughts he states: 
"[T]here is a place of supreme importance for the enuncuation of principle. ( .. ) In a 
sense there is only one ultimate choice to be made in the realm of principle. That 
choice is between the belief that all human things are judged by God and find their 
principle of reference in him, and the beliefthat there is no such transcendent 
standard. From the one belief flows the acknowledgement of an 'ought' in practical 
affairs and public policy; there is still the technical problem of the means to be 
adopted towards the desired ends, and the discernment of the relevance of methods to 
Biography, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 776.). According to Clifford Green's reconstruction, 
however, 'State and Church' was written prior to the begitming of the work on Ethics, that is, before the 
spring of 1940 (Green: 'Tex1ual Research for the New Edition ofBonhoeffer's Ethics', 
in: Guy Carter and others eds., Bonhoeffer~5 Ethics: Old Europe and New Frontiers, Kok Pharos 
Publishing House, Kampen, 1991 p. 36.). A third suggestion is given by John de Gruchy who thinks 
that the essay was written in the second half of 1941, that is, it is contempomneous to the reply to 
Paton's book (de Gruchy, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy', Modern Theology 
12:3 July 1996. p. 349. ). The question of the timing of this outright conservative treatment of the 
relationship of state and church (cf. de Gruchy op. cit. p. 349.) may be significant for a judgement about 
the persistence of socially conservative elements in Bonhoeffer's thought: the earlier one supposes the 
paper was written the more ground one gains to argue that the late Bonhoeffer grew out social 
conservativism. Thus, Green is quite right in asserting that "questions of ordering the manuscripts and 
questions of interpreting the text cam10t ultimately be divorced" (Green, Bonhoejfer: A Social 
Theologv, p. 313.). Although Bonhoeffer's social conservativism is one of the main problem of the 
present study, I cam1ot make a judgement with respect to this particular case, since the investigation of 
the right order has not been finished yet (cf. Green, op. cif. p. 303.). 
concrete conditions- but there is an 'ought'. From the other belief flow both the 
cynical and non-moral attitude in public affairs ... "22 
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Thus, Bonhoeffer misread Paton when he claimed that for the latter either 
freedom or human rights and liberties were to provide the norm of action by the state. 
The norm is unmistakably the judgement of God; freedom and all the related contents 
belong to the contingent sphere, informed by the ultimate 'ought'. On the basis of this 
misreading Bonhoeffer could create a contradiction between a state based on a 
secularly conceived set of individual human rights and another state rooted in divine 
commandments, transcendent to it. This contradiction, of course, does not refer to 
Paton, who, obviously, regards individual freedom as approved by God. He quotes 
Emil Brunner whose words met with an unanimous approval in an 1940 ecumenical 
Geneva meeting: 
"The gospel ... contains directions for life and for the mutual relations that should 
exist between states and nations, which every Christian ought to know and obey. ( ... ) 
Among these principles must be included the equal dignity of all men, respect for 
human life, acknowledgement of the solidarity for good and evil of all nations and 
races of the earth, respect for the plighted world, and the recognition that power of any 
kind, political or economic, must be co-extensive with responsibility. "23 
In Brunner's words the connection between God's will, revealed in the gospel, 
and individual freedom as well as the relation between individual freedom and 
responsible life have been established. In the words of another Christian gathering the 
intrinsic relationship of different aspects of freedom has been expressed. The 
gathering promotes a world order in which 
"the unit ofvalue is not some body corporate or some personification of nation, race or 
class, but the individual human being. Even the least of these should be assured of 
certain fundamental rights, including freedom of thought, of conscience, of worship 
and of expression, and an opportunity for livelihood, without which intellectual and 
.spiritualfreedoms have little practical content. '124 [italics mine] 
Bonhoeffer's overlooking ofthe explicitly expressed divine roots of individual 
freedom can be regarded as his chief mistake in reading and answering Paton's 
proposal. Bonhoeffer's smaller mistakes derive from this major one. 
22 Paton, The Church and the New Order,p. 57f. 
23 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 63. 
~4 Paton, 177e Church and the New Order, pp. 64f. 
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First, he tries to simplify the reason for the differences between Paton's and his 
own views by operating with the traditionally regarded controversy between the 
Anglo-Saxon world and the Continent. True, Paton quotes mainly British and 
American voices, however, his ground of reference is much more inclusive: beside 
Brunner, as we have seen, it includes even Pope Pius XII25 
Second, and more importantly, I have not found in the referred chapter of 
Paton's text a sentence that indicates that freedom and the related expressions must 'be 
translated into terms which relate them more closely to the life of other peoples'. 
Instead, Paton quotes the Pope saying: "[i]f a better European settlement is to be 
reached there is one point in particular which should receive special attention: it is the 
real needs and the just demands of nations and populations, and of racial minorities. "26 
Similarly, in the next chapter, The ideal and the next steps Paton quotes Chamberlain's 
1939 words: "no effective remedy can be found for the world's ills that does not take 
account of the just desires and needs of all countries", and especially, "we desire 
nothing from the German people which should offend their self-respect"27 In a later 
chapter on Britain, America and the Future these thoughts became more direct: "[i]t is 
·a matter of the gravest importance for the world that what the world demands from 
Germany should not be merely what would mean freedom in England or America or 
Sweden, but what meansfreedom in Germany" 28 . 
If I did not overlook the highlighted sentence in Paton's text and it is really not 
Paton's own wording, an important observation can be made. I think, these and similar 
sentences that express Paten's concern about other people's needs, self-respect and 
peculiar political traditions had been turned in and by Bonhoeffer's mind into an 
intention that it is the very expressions of freedom that needed to be applied according 
to the need of others. This misrepresentation may be understood as logical on 
Bonhoeffer's side who was well aware of the fact that, in theory, freedom might have 
different meanings, but, as he believed, in reality freedom should be interpreted 
characteristically as .freedom for and not freedom from. Consequently, if someone did 
25 Paton, 1'l1e Church and the New Order, p. 59. 
26 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 60. 
27 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 72. 
28 Paton, 1'l1e Church and the New Order, pp. 107f. 
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not respect this reality - as, he correctly saw, Paton held a different interpretation - it 
was better to translate freedom into a different term to avoid confusion. Thus, it might 
be Bonhoeffer's concern that he might have projected into Paten's text to create a basis 
for a desired common understanding. In fact, however, this concern can not only be 
not found on Paten's side, but he even directly expressed its opposite. Discussing the 
ideal and the next steps, he asks: 
"How then are we to proceed to the realisation of those higher levels of existence for 
which we are told we are fighting? How, for instance, move from where we are to 
President Roosevelt's famous 'four freedoms'- freedom ofworship, freedom of 
speech, freedom from want, freedom from fear? I believe, that there are three 
intermediate and necessary steps. The first is that it should be made possible to get a 
settlement of which such words as 'freedom' or 'justice' could be used without irony. "29 
Thus, far from indicating a translation of freedom according to the limits ofthe 
perspective of others, he was keen on working for a situation in which the full 
meaning of freedom can be expressed. Having seen Paten's explicit intention, its 
misrepresentation in Bonhoeffer's text is all the more telling. However, this pregnant 
misreading speaks not only about Bonhoeffer's personal limitations but also the 
political culture he was a part of, the uniquely German road to modernity, 
S' d '<0 on erweg· . 
This possible misrepresentation ofPaton's intention placed Bonhoeffer into an 
advantageous position of communication. Once Bonhoeffer identified Paten's concern 
with that ofhis own, he was free to express his peculiar social criticism. We learn 
about the low value of freedom in critical situations, we hear the charge that it was 
liberalism that was responsible for the rise of totalitarian state, and we meet the theory 
that it is order that safeguards freedom and not the other way round. This view is 
elevated into the position of the chief ideological question and ends in a proclamation 
about the state as a guardian of order. We may wonder whether Bonhoeffer 
understood Paten's fine distinction: 
29 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 75. 
30 See two relatively recent studies about the Gemmn Sonderweg, Reinhard Kiilml,~The Gem1an 
Sondenveg Reconsidered: Continuities and Discontinuities in Modem German History' and Lutz 
Niethammer, 'TI1e Gemian Sondenveg After Unification', in: Reinhard Alter and Peter Monteath eds .. 
Rewriting the German Past, History and Identity in the New Germany, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 
1997. 
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"There is here an absolute difference of value between two types of society. Either we 
prefer, on its merits, a society in which, granted the necessities of maintaining the 
security ofthe community, everything is done to increase the range of responsibility, 
or we prefer a society in which the achievements of order and efficiency and 
obedience are set in the forefront of the values admired. In the final analysis one's 
choice is dictated by one's ultimate philosophy oflife, and there can be no doubt on 
which side should be cast the vote of one who believes that reality is unveiled in Jesus 
Christ. "31 -
In order to reveal the simple and unambiguous character of this choice, 
naturally, the meaning of at least two words, responsibility and reality should be 
clarified; as well as the question, who Jesus Christ is, should be answered. With 
respect to Bonhoeffer's theology, none of them are easy questions. At any rate, 
Bonhoeffer voted for a wordly order that is limited by God's law and human 
responsibility, and not an order that is rooted in God's love to increase the range of 
responsibility. In a structure of power like this, the "full freedom ofthe church" that 
Bonhoeffer wishes to be provided may only mean the freedom for being a moral 
authority in interpreting the meaning of God's law to a government that - as proposed 
in 'State and Church' - is not only conscious of its divine origin but in which the latter 
is also clearly apparent (£ 352). 
When Bonhoeffer's text arrives at the comments on Paten's chapter 4, 'The 
ideal and the next step', it is already burdened by the above - possible- misreadings 
and misrepresentations. Therefore, we have good reasons to read his introductory 
sentences that express agreement with Paton with a faint suspicion: 
"We agree whole-heartedly with the conception of international order which is given 
in Paten's chapter on 'The Ideal and the Next Steps'. We are especially glad that he 
makes it clear that this order cannot be a mere restoration of the pre-war political and 
economic system. For it has become very clear on the Continent (and is understood by 
many who did not understand this a few years ago) that there must come drastic 
changes in these two domains. In the political domain there must be effective 
limitation of national soveregnity. In the economic domain there must be limitation of 
economic individualism, in other words, planning for economic security of the 
masses." (TP 114) 
Our first question may be what Bonhoeffer might mean by the pre-war 
political and economic system that had to be drastically changed. I think he meant the 
31 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 69. 
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inter-war period that he regarded as an especially low point of German past also in 
comparison to the period before 1918. The two phenomena he refers to, a demand for 
national soveregnity and economic individualism, became significant factors of 
German political and economic life after 1918; Bonhoeffer wanted to see a drastic 
turning back from these features. An indirect evidence for this view may be that, 
wishing to prevent a return ofNational Socialism, he also wanted to "safeguard the 
world against a repetition of the psychological process which has taken place in 
Germany between 1918 and 1933" (TP 116). It seems again that Bonhoeffer located 
the roots of the present misery within the interwar period. This finding may give a 
rather concrete meaning to his sentence that is intended to express the most pressing 
need ofhis and his eo-conspirators' predicament: "There remains the question as to 
how Germany may find its way back to a system of government which is acceptable to 
the Germans and also be an orderly member of the family of nations" (TP 115) I am 
convinced that this 'way back' indicates a direction beyond 1918 and a system of 
government that resembles the Germany prior the First World War. 
From this perspective it is clear that Paton and Bonhoeffer do not talk about 
the same thing again. Bonhoeffer quotes Paton: "the ultimate settlement is bound to be 
influenced profoundly by the nature of the temporary measures which are taken in the 
interim period, and upon the proper shaping of those measures the future may depend" 
(TP 114i2. The "temporary measures" that Paton suggests are regarded insufficient by 
Bonhoeffer, so the latter offers his own solution instead. 
What Bonhoeffer wants to see is a 'positive policy' on Britain's side that 
counterbalances the restrictive measures, not only by assuring that the mistakes of the 
Versailles Treaty will not be repeated, but by helping the opposition get into a position 
in which the latter is able to safeguard German integrity, either by being provided 
acceptable peace terms to negotiate on, or by making a genuine peace offer on its own. 
This prospective government of a distinctly conservative character would demand a 
strong support from the Allies - through being offered such terms - that would make it 
acceptable for the German people; otherwise people will regard their predicament as a 
"complete collapse of German integrity", and will not support this prospective 
32 Cf Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 75. 
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government and either they will prefer Hitler to them or they will chose an even worse 
future33 . In short, Bonhoeffer asked the Allied Powers to make a simple choice: either 
they support a conservative opposition that would restore the old spirit in Germany or 
they expose Germany and also themselves an even worse evil. This is the simple 
content of Bonhoeffer's solemn words: 
"We believe that it is possible to find men in Germany who have shown by their 
attitude during these last years that they are not infected with National-Socialist ideas, 
and who can be counted upon as loyal collaborators in a European community of 
nations. And we believe that they should be given a chance for the sake, not only of 
Germany, but of Europe as a whole." (TP 116) 
In the closing section of his reply, 'The Russian problem', Bonhoeffer even 
proposes the Eastern-European export of his peculiar solution. Referring to the 
Bolshevik menace, he continues: "[t]his is then another very strong confirmation of 
the necessity for authoritarian, though non-Fascict, regimes in the post-war era, and 
also of the necessity of strengthening the hands of those non-Nazi elements in 
Germany which would be able to form a new government in that country." (TP 116f) 
Does not one face a political Drang nach Osten in this proposal? 
The offer Bonhoeffer made in the name of the opposition circle did not receive 
a substantial answer not only from government representatives but- apart from a 
polite reply - from William Paton either. The thoughts Bonhoeffer expressed were, in 
fact, incompatible to those ofPaton. First, Paton could not imagine any negotiations 
without a precedent victory34; temporary measures in his vocabulary did not mean 
actions to be taken before the end of the war but after the Allied victory, during the 
interim period before a permanent settlement would take shape. Second, Paton had a 
rather different image about the contents of the temporary measures. To some extent 
his words are parallel to those ofBonhoeffer: "[i]f'freedom' means only a return to the 
economic organisation ofEurope between the wars, even Hitler's new order may seem 
to have its points"; but later he makes it obvious that he thinks about more than simply 
going back beyond 1918: "[w]e shall be compelled (but surely not against our will) to 
33 Bethge tells us that some in the opposition might push Bonhoeffer to represent a 'strong' Gennanv 
that appeared in his public view (Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 743.); at the same time he privateiy 
expressed his famous words: 'I pray for the defeat of my country ... ' (Bethge, op. cit. p. 744.). 
34 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 77f. 
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move towards a genuine new order worthy of civilised men, and we should recognise 
in that compulsion and in the inevitable destruction of so much that was old and 
familiar, a challenge to find new and better ways of human living" 35 . 
A third point may reveal yet another similarity in Paton's and Bib6's thinking 
that may highlight a peculiar element in Bonhoeffer's political thought. We have seen 
the great emphasis Bib6 put on the importance of continuity in the development of 
European societies and especially with respect to the post-war reconstruction of 
healthy German social life. Paton expressed a similar concern: 
"I am not urging revolutionary change for its own sake ( ... ) The tension between the 
conservative and the reformer is a fruitful thing; the one recognises the necessity of 
change, welcomes it, labours to make things more nearly into the image of an ideal 
which he sees, while the other understands that growth is organic and gradual, that we 
must work with what we have and within its limiting conditions and that we can do 
harm by trying to do too much good. "36 
Against the image of organic growth it may be telling to point out Bonhoeffer's 
claim of "drastic changes" in the inter-war political and economic system. We have 
seen that the revolutionary character was related to a distinct set of conservative values 
in his proposal of the new world order. The coexistence of conservativism and 
revolutionary attitudes is characteristic ofBonhoeffer's way ofthinking in general, as 
James W. Woelfel revealed a long time ago37. With respect to political thought, and 
especially in a Central and Eastern European context, this characteristic may 
strengthen the possibility of a reactionary revolution, that Bib6 called one of the most 
menacing absurdities of Central and Eastern European political life: a revolution that 
stands up for traditional values by applying revolutionary feelings that rejoices at the 
destruction of traditional methods and conventions. I think the overall character of 
Bonhoeffer's political thoughts is dangerously close to this feature. 
Within the context of the discussion ofBonhoeffer's 'New Order' we will now 
turn to Bonhoeffer's letter to Paul Lehmann, written in the same month, September 
1941 from Geneva. We have already seen that Clifford Green built up a statement on 
35 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 85. 
36 Paton, The Church and the New Order, p. 86f. 
37 James W. Woelfel, BonhoeJJer's Theologv: Classical and Revolutionary, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 
1970; especially the chapter on 'Conservative, Radical, or Liberal?' p. 290ff. 
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this letter, saying that Bonhoeffer would personally approve Anglo-Saxon liberal 
democracy. I think this assertion cannot be justified even on the basis of the letter 
itself; when we see it also in the context of the reply to Paton, the groundless character 
ofthe assertion will be all the more obvious. 
The prospect of US domination over Europe, Bonhoeffer writes, is 
troublesome, even if it would be one of the best solutions of the crisis. 
"But what is to become of Europe? What, for instance, of Germany? Nothing would 
be worse than to impose upon her any anglo-saxon form of government - as much as I 
should like it. It simply would not work. The four liberties of your President seem to 
indicate something in this direction. As far as I know Germany, it will just be 
impossible, for instance, to restore complete freedom of speech, of press, of 
association. That short of thing would throw Germany right into the same abyss. I 
think we must try to find a Germany in which justice, lawfulness, freedom of the 
churches is being restored. I hope there will [be] something like an authoritarian 
'Rechtsstaat' as the Germans call it. I[t] will need a long process of education before 
the people as a whole will be in the position to enjoy all the liberties it used to have. "38 
All the details of the political standpoint that Bonhoeffer expresses in this letter 
are identical to those we have found in the reply to Paton's book - if one thought that 
the eo-authorship ofVisser't Hooft included elements into the reply that were alien to 
Bonhoeffer, the letter could be read as a counter-argument. The letter itself reveals a 
contradiction. Bonhoeffer expresses his problems with a possible Anglo-Saxon form 
of government in post-war Germany; he expresses his personal sympathy for this 
government; finally he expresses his wish that the German people will enjoy all the 
liberties it used to have. It is obvious that these liberties are not identical to President 
Roosevelt's four liberties that Germans had never enjoyed before, thus Bonhoeffer 
does not indicate that after a long process he would welcome the 'four essential human 
freedoms' in Germany. Likewise, his reference to the "long process of education" 
indicates that he does not think of a democratic process from below, rather, a process 
of Bildung through which his family and his wider upper middle class, the 
Bildungsbiirgertum39 received its world-view together with a peculiar understanding 
38 Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 20 September 194lletter to Paul Lehmann, in: Green, Bonhoeffer, A Theology 
ofSociality, p. 345f. 
39 For a short and perceptive analysis of Bildungsbiirgertum see Frits de Lange, 'A Particular Europe, a 
Universal Faith- The Christian Humanism ofBonhoeffer's Ethics in its Context,' in: Carter, van Eyden, 
van Hoogsraten and Wiersma eds, Bonhoeffer's Ethics- Old Europe and New Frontiers, pp. 811f. 
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of freedom that Bonhoeffer would readily pass on in the same way he himself 
received. Thus, there is a real contradiction between the personal view Bonhoeffer 
expressed and his view of the favorable shape of post-war German government and 
political life. 
This contradiction, however, can be resolved in the context of the reply to 
Paton. We have seen that Bonhoeffer expressed his agreement with Paton more then 
once, but his agreement was not supported by the material contents of his declared 
views. I think we face the same problem here. In his 2 August 1941 letter Lehmann 
wrote his friend about his committed, yet nuanced democratic views with 
enthusiasm40 ; Bonhoeffer might have wanted to express a friendly agreement with 
him, but, as in the case of his encounter with Paton's thoughts, the friendly gesture 
simply did not correspond with the objective contents of his thoughts. 
b. Bonhoe.ffer's "New Order" in the Context ~fBethge's Biography 
Commenting on Bonhoeffer's reply to Paton's study, the 'highly political book 
review', Bethge expressed its significance both with respect to Bonhoeffer's own past 
and the present state of his church. "Ten years earlier he would barely have been able 
to endure the secular Anglo-Saxon tone of the resolutions. Now, in contrast to most of 
his friends at home, he was preoccupied with that very secular future which might 
soon have to be shaped. "41 
This remark echoes the keynote ofBethge's understanding ofBonhoeffer's 
activity as a conspirator: it can be seen as a gradual moving away from his church and 
most of his friends, as well as a gradual ability to join ways of thinking that he would 
have considered too secular before. Against this background some particular 
comments reflect Bethge's view of the direction in which, he thought, Bonhoeffer was 
movmg. 
In his reply to Paton, Bethge tells us, "Bonhoeffer ( ... )attempted to discourage 
expectations that the revolt would make it possible for the 'other Germany' to 
40 The letter is printed in Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theulvgv ofSociali~v. p. 337ff. 
41 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 739. 
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immediately establish a government that would be democratic in the western sense. 
The government that would emerge from a military coup 'might be formed 
suddenly'"42 These sentences contain words from the original German draft of the 
reply, especially those that refer to the urgency of the proposed action. Thus, using the 
adverb 'immediately' is harmonious with the original text, but using it in the above 
way may suggest that Bonhoeffer thought of a non-democratic government that would 
be, after a time, capable of developing into a democratic one. 
Several ofBethge's comments suggest that the political character of 
Bonhoeffer's thought was transient, or that its conservative aspect was only apparent. 
These comments are usually made in connection with the discussion ofBonhoeffer's 
political relations. While relating the events of the autumn of 1941 Bethge introduces 
the 'Kreisau circle', a recently emerged 'intelligent group', that pursued a line that was 
different to that of the already active resistance movement. "They charged that 
Goerdeler's plan were full of reactionary elements, and they naturally rejected the 
monarchist ideas that had recently emerged. "43 Bethge tells that neither Dohnanyi nor 
Bonhoeffer contacted the Kreisau group, although, he suggests, the latter "had enough 
grounds, intellectually and personally, to have done so. One reason was that 
[Bonhoeffer] was already too deeply involved elsewhere in practical preparations for 
the revolt. Another was that by the time the Kreisau group became more active 
Bonhoeffer already faced the possibility ofbeing arrested. In addition, the composition 
of the group made him cautious. "44 The Kreisau group comes into the picture again in 
connection with the report on the Sigtuna meeting, June 1942. Analysing some 
particular details ofBishop George Bell's account ofthe meeting and trying to 
determine their origin, Bethge refers to an observation that "the emphasis on the 'truly 
socialist lines' ofthe conspiracy could only have come from Schonfeld, with his 
Kreisau connections; since, at the time, Bonhoeffer thought more about the renewal of 
conservative possibilities. "45 However, "[t]he question of the British attitude toward a 
possible restoration ofthe monarchy, with Prince Louis Ferdinand, was probably 
42 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 740. 
43 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoe.!Jer,. p. 750. 
44 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoe.!Jer, pp. 750f. 
45 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 761. 
raised by Bonhoeffer, who knew about such considerations through his brother 
Klaus." 46 
243 
The plan of a possible monarchy is referred to later in the Biography in a more 
concrete from. Bethge narrates that in 1942 several resitance groups became active 
and made concrete proposals, but "Bonhoeffer himself did not outline or advocate any 
special form a future government should take"47 . Nevertheless, he told Bell in Sigtuna 
"that the resistance was considering a Hohenzollern because of the royal family's 
popularity, stability, and potential authority to issue the order. "48 Bethge's comment 
says: "The Bonhoeffer brothers assented to these considerations mainly on pragmatic 
grounds, not royalist motives. Bonhoeffer did not seek the restoration of the monarchy 
through a revolt; but if a monarchical beginning could offer advantages when the 
revolt was launched, it should be considered a possibility. "49 
The monarchical plans are related to another circle of the resistance that 
Bonhoeffer did take part in, the 'Freiburg group'50 . The group worked on a 
memorandum that was to be issued right after the war at an ecumenical conference. 
Surviving parts of the text finally were edited by Gerhard Ritter in July 1945 under the 
heading: 'Political Ordering ofthe Community: An Attempted Self-Reflection ofthe 
Christian Conscience in the Political Troubles of Our Time. "Ritter confirmed that the 
work was a German reply or preparation for a reply to Paton's and Bell's 
suggestions. "51 
As a conspirator remembers, " ... a consultation about the draft of the 
memorandum that had already been worked on took place at the beginning of 1943 in 
the Bonhoeffer home; and I met with Bonhoeffer at Dibelius's home once, and another 
time with him and Waiter Bauer in a restaurant. "52 
46 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoe[for, p. 762. 
47 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoe[for, p. 772. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
5
° For references to the members of the Freiburg group as well as the destiniy of some of them see 
Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, pp. 775, 902, 907. 
51 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoe.!Jer, p. 776. 
52 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, pp. 775f. 
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Bethge suggests that two essays, 'State and Church' and 'On the Possibility of 
the Word of the Church to the World' Bonhoeffer concieved for the 'Freiburg plans' 5 3 
Therefore, according to the logic ofBethge's reconstruction, the politically relevant 
contents ofthese writings are higly informative about Bonhoeffer's personal political 
standpoint that he took within the personally and politically complex branch ofthe 
resistance he seemed to belong to. We do not have the space to undertake a thorough 
analysis ofthese writings here, but we can select some passages that characterise 
Bonhoeffer's political views. 
About 'The Church and the Form of the State' we read: 
"In both Protestant and Catholic political theory the question of the form of the state is 
always treated as a secondary problem. Certainly, so long as government fulfils its 
assigned mission, the form in which it does so is of no great importance for the 
Church. Still, there is justification for asking which form of the state offers the best 
guarantee for the fulfilment of the mission of government and should, therefore, be 
promoted by the Church. ( ... ) [Even] relative differences may be of great practical 
consquences. 
a That form of the state will be relatively the best in which it becomes most evident 
that government is from above, from God, and in which the divine origin of 
government is most clearly apparent. A properly understood divine right of 
government, in its splendour and in its responsibility, is an essential constituent ofthe 
relatively best form of the state. ( ... ) 
b That form of the state will be relatively the best which sees that its power is not 
endangered but is sustained and secured (i) by the strict maintenance of an outward 
justice, (ii) by the right ofthe family and oflabor, a right which has its foundation in 
God, and (iii) by the proclamation of the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
c That form of state will be relatively the best which does not express its attachment to 
its subjects by restricting the divine authority which has been conferred upon it, but 
which attaches itselfto its subjects in mutual confidence by just action and truthful 
speech. It will be found here that what is best for government is also best for the 
relationship between government and church." (E 352f) 
Unmistakably, the 'relatively best' form of a state for Bonhoeffer is a monarchy 
of a very high ethical standard where government is appointed by the monarch. This 
text, I think, questions two ofBethge's assertions. Bonhoeffer did, in fact, advocate a 
rather identifiable form of a future government, and it is not likely that he considered 
monarchy mainly on pragmatic grounds; on the contrary, his words sound much more 
determined. Not to mention the fact that 'considering a monarchical beginning' with 
53 Bethge, Die/rich Bonhoeffer, p. 776. 
respect to a necessarily short-term revolt is a contradiction in itself: monarchies are 
long-term institutions. 
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The second writing, 'On the Possibility ofthe Word ofthe Church to the 
World' may reveal something about what Bonhoeffer might have meant by the well-
sounding "outward justice" as a feature of the relatively best form of state. Entering 
into a debate with an Anglo-Saxon understanding ofthe church's responsibility in and 
for the world - as he himself comprehended it, of course - Bonhoeffer makes some 
unmistakable judgements: 
"Jesus concerns himself hardly at all with the solution of worldly problems. ( ... ) His 
word is essentially determined not from below but from above. It is not a solution but 
a redemption.( ... ) Instead of the solution of problems, Jesus brings the redemption of 
men, and yet for that very reason He does really bring the solution of all human 
problems as well ('All these things shall be added', Mt 6,33), but from quite a different 
plane'' (£ 355) 
This 'quite different plane' however has a regrettably identifiable political 
characteristic. Bonhoeffer goes on: 
"Who can actually tell us that all worldly problems are to be and can be solved? 
Perhaps the unsolved state of these problems is of more importance to God than their 
solution, for it may serve to call attention to the fall of man and to the divine 
redemption. Perhaps the problems of men are so complicated and so wrongly 
formulated that they really are simply insoluble. (The problem of the poor and the rich 
can certainly never be solved otherwise than by remaining unsolved.)"(£ 355t) 
At this point, let us deviate from routine scholarly discourse in the interests of 
illuminating the character ofthis argument through deliberate caricature. This 
statement recalls the high priest of a theocratically ruled organic society, where the 
leader can put himself (rather than herself) into the place of God with full authority 
and self-confidence to represent as well as mediate God's point of view to the people. 
This high priest, secured in his divinely ordained authority that cannot be reached by 
any criticism from below, can refer to such problems like poverty with absolutely 
meaningless formally dialectic statements, undisturbed. From this elevated position 
the 'high priest' gives the Anglo-Saxon understanding of the task of the church its due 
as well: 
"One of the characteristic features of church life in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
one from which Lutheranism has almost entirely freed itself, is the organised struggle 
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of the church against some particular worldly evil, the 'campaign' or, taking up again 
the crusading idea of the Middle Ages, the 'crusade'. Examples of this are slavery, 
prohibition and the League ofNations. But precisely these examples betray at the 
same time the critical weakness of these 'crusades'. The abolition of slavery coincided 
with the coming into being of the British industrial proletariat. (It might be said that 
the world will have its due.) Prohibition, which was forced through mainly by the 
Methodists led to worse experiences than those of the preceding period, so that the 
Methodists themselves supported its abolition. (This experience was of decisive 
importance for the American churches.) The League ofNations was intended to 
overcome national antagonisms, but its result was to intensify them to the highest 
pitch. Such experiences as these must give food for earnest thought in the face of the 
question of the extent to which the Church is called upon to solve worldly problems." 
(E 356) 
This idea appears in a similar form in Sanctorum Communio, where 
Bonhoeffer comments on the 'historical nature' of the church in the following way: 
"Many presumptuous attempts have been undertaken to purify the church, starting 
with the formation of the perfectionist sects in the ancient church, continuing with the 
Anabaptists, Pietism, the Enlightement, and Kant's secularised concept of the 
Kingdom of God; we can further see it in the beginnings of Count Saint Simon's 
socialist expectation of the Kingdom of God, in Tolstoy, and finally in the 
contemporary religious-socialist Youth Movement. In all of these movements we find 
the attempt to have the Realm of God finally present not only by faith but by sight, no 
longer veiled within the strange forms of a Christian church, but clearly manifested in 
the morality and holiness of human beings, and in a perfect solution to all historical 
and social problems. The fact that God's revelation actually takes place in history, i.e., 
in a hidden way, that this world remains a world of sin and death, which also means a 
world of history, and that this history is itself sanctified by the fact that God created, 
entered, and uses it for God's own purpose- for all this there is a lack of 
understanding, a lack of love, which alone is capable of recognising these things. ( ... ) 
The church ought to let the weeds grow in its field, for where should it find the 
criterion for recognising them? ( ... ) [T]he church will never condemn and judge but 
remain conscious of the limits of its historical nature." (SC 222t) 
The limits ofthe 'historical nature' ofthe church in the 1927 text and the limits 
of the church's social responsibility in the late essay are not only identical, but are also 
identical to the limits of the social-historical awareness ofBonhoeffer's socially not 
too imaginative but intellectually eloquent upper-middle class. It is is probably 
understandable that the 21 year-old student, completing his first highly demanding 
intellectual work, was unable to examine his own a priori social determinations using 
some basic tools of the hermeneutic of suspicion to make his own social theory 
transparent. The fact, however, that this early blindspot appears probably fifteen years 
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later in exactly the same shape teaches us a rather sobering lesson. It says that after so 
many rich expreriences, years of study and work in Spain, in the US and Great Britain, 
having been enriched by so many and so diverse personal relationships, friendships 
and ecumenical contacts, the social Weltanschauung of this highly intelligent young 
German bourgeois had not changed. It says that the roots of this social 
Weltanschauung were deeper than either study, travel or personal relationship could 
have reached and altered it. 
In our discussion ofBonhoeffer's "New Order" in the context ofBethge's 
biography we arrived at the essays 'State and Church' and 'On the Possibility of the 
Word of the Church to the World' following Bethge's direction. We suspend the logic 
of this section for a little while now and take a look at some relevant passages of 
Ethics to see whether we find a picture that is different to those that come from the 
above essays. 
c. Bonhoe.ffer's "New Order" in the Context f!.f his Ethics 
Among the particular topics of Ethics there are two places where the question 
of social order directly appears: in the 'Penultimate' in relation to the 'Ultimate' and 
within the 'World of Things'. According to Green's order of the Ethics manuscripts, the 
section on the penultimate and the ultimate was written during the autumn 1940, up to 
10 December, while the section on the world of things sometime between 25 March 
and 25 October, 1 941 54. So, this period roughly overlaps with the time of the 
conspiracy under discussion in this section. 
While discussing the ultimate and the penultimate - the pair of concepts that, as 
we have seen, Bonhoeffer applied already in 193 3 - the most important thing for him, 
it seems to me, is to determine their theologically correct relationship. He sets up two 
extreme solutions ofthe problem as it appears in Christian life: the radical and the 
compromise solution. After discussing several possibilities that may be labelled either 
54 Green, 'Textual Research for the New Edition ofBonhoeffer's Ethics', in Carter, van Eyden, van 
Hoogstraten and Wiersema eds, Bonhoeffer's Ethics. Old Europe and New Frontiers, p. 35. I have 
already noted the relative value of the ordering attempts. 
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as radical or representing compromise, Bonhoeffer summarises his findings in the 
form of dialectical contradictions that reach their zenith in the torm: "(r]adicalism 
hates the real, and compromise hates the word" (E 130). Having announced the total 
collapse of this descriptive kind of approach, Bonhoeffer proposes the Christological 
solution: 
"To contrast the two attitudes in this way is to make it sufficiently clear that both alike 
are opposed to Christ. For in Jesus Christ those things which are here ranged in mutual 
hostility are one. The question of the Christian life will not, therefore, be decided and 
answered either by radicalism or by compromise, but only by reference to Jesus Christ 
Himself. In Him alone lies the solution for the problem of the relation between the 
ultimate and the penultimate." (E 130) 
In the following paragraphs Bonhoeffer speaks about Jesus Christ as the 
incarnate, the crucified and the risen, suspending all the previous social-ethical 
considerations in a formally impeccable Christological solution. 
We can witness a similar treatment in Bonhoeffer's next attempt to determine 
the relationship of the ultimate and the penultimate in his discussion of the penultimate 
as the preparing the way to the ultimate. We witness a dialectical approach again: on 
the one hand, "it is the ultimate which determines the penultimate" (E 133), but the 
penultimate must satisfy "the claim ofthe word to pass freely and unhindered" (E 
134). Within this relation the penultimate has a definite purpose: "[p ]reparing the way 
for the word: this is the purpose of everything that has been said about the things 
before the last" (E 135). This preparation should involve resolute action: "(t]he hungry 
man needs bread and the homeless man needs a roof; the dispossessed need justice and 
the lonely needs fellowship; the undisciplined need order and the slave needs 
freedom" (E 137). These concrete actions, however sacrificial and risky they may be, 
nevertheless remain isolated deeds without developing into a program of social 
progress. Bonhoeffer writes: 
"Certainly one would have misunderstood all this if one were to say that before he can 
become a Christian the slave must have received his liberty, the outcast his rights, and 
the hungry man his bread; in other words that values must first be set in order. This is 
refuted by the evidence ofthe New Testament and of Church history; indeed it has 
perhaps been precisely at times when the world has seemed to be relatively in order 
that the estrangement from the faith has been especially deep-seated and alarming. The 
preparation of the way for Christ cannot, therefore, be simply a matter of the 
establishment of certain desirable and expedient conditions; it cannot be simply the 
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realisation of a programme of social reform. It is quite certain that the preparation of 
the way is a matter of concrete interventions in the visible world and it is certain that 
hunger and satisfaction ofhunger are concrete and visible matters; yet everything 
depends on this activity being a spiritual reality, precisely because ultimately it is not 
indeed a question of the reform of earthly conditions, but it is a question of the coming 
Christ. Only a spiritual preparation of the way will be followed by the merciful 
coming of the Lord. And this implies that the visible actions which must be performed 
in order to prepare men for the reception of Jesus Christ, must be acts of humiliation 
before the coming of the Lord, that is to say, they must be acts of repentance. 
Preparation of the way means repentance (Mt 3,1 ff). But repentance means a concrete 
turning back; repentance demands action." (E 138) 
Just like the Christological interpretation ofthe relation ofthe penultimate and 
the ultimate as radicality or compromise suspended all the describable characteristics 
of either the one or the other possibility, the theological-sacramental interpretation of 
preparing the way, as spiritual preparation or preparation by repentance suspends all 
the socially describable characteristics of the concrete action on behalf of the needy. 
While the denotation of the ultimate is rich in theological substance, the description of 
the penultimate is empty in social substance insofar as any action can satisfy the 
demand of preparing the way. Bonhoeffer certainly does not exclude a possible 
program of social progress, he only undervalues it by stating that social progress alone 
cannot be regarded as preparing the way, while any action that satisfies any need, if 
related to repentance and has a spiritual nature, become part ofthe right preparation. 
In fact, within the seemingly balanced attention to both social and spiritual factors, the 
focus ofthe attention finally has one-sidedly shifted to the spiritual side: "[o]nly a 
spiritual preparation of the way will be followed by the merciful coming of the Lord" 
(E 138). 
We encounter a rather similar treatment of the social-political factors in the 
section 'The World ofThings- Pertinence- Statecraft'. This passage was composed as 
part ofthe essay on 'The Structure ofResponsible Life', that begins with a discussion 
of vicarious representative action as deputyship. "[R]esponsibility is a matter of 
deputyship" (E 224), in turn, "[d]eputyship, and also responsibility, lies only in the 
complete surrender of one's own life to the other man. Only the selfless man lives 
responsibly, and this means and only the selfless man lives. Wherever the divine 'yes' 
and 'no' become one in man, there is responsible living." (E 225) In other words, 
250 
responsible life is life in Jesus Christ, who gives responsibility its origin, essence and 
goal 5 5 
The essay ends in an explanation of freedom. In the opening statement ofthe 
explanation the understanding of freedom as 'freedom for' is clearly recognisable: 
"Responsibility and freedom are corresponding concepts. Factually, though not 
chronologically, responsibility presupposes freedom and freedom can consist only in 
responsibility. Responsibility is the freedom of men which is given only in the 
obligation to God and to our neighbour." (E 248) 
Like responsibility, also freedom participates in the divine nature: 
"[t]he man who acts in the freedom of his own most personal responsibility is 
precisely the man who sees his action finally committed to the guidance of God. The 
free deed knows itself in the end as the deed of God; the decision knows itself as 
guidance; the free venture knows itself as divine necessity." (E 249) 
This freedom also serves as a basis for a proper historical perspective: 
"[i]t is in the abandonment of knowledge of his own good that a man performs 
the good of God. It is only from this last point of view that one can speak of good in 
historical action." (£ 249) 
Thus, the first and the last sections of the essay endow both responsibility and 
freedom with the attribute of divine nature. We must keep all this in mind when we 
examine the function of 'free responsibility' in the discussion of 'The World of Things 
- Pertinence - Statecraft'. 
Bonhoeffer calls the relation of the responsible person to the domain of things 
pertinence. This relation is understood in two ways: "this attitude to things is pertinent 
which keeps steadily in view their original, essential and purposive relation to God 
and to men" (E 235), and that considers "in every thing its own law of being, no matter 
whether this thing is a natural object or a product of the human mind, and no matter 
whether it is a material or an ideal entity" (E 236). Statecraft, or political science 
"also has its technical side; there is a technique of administration and a technique of 
diplomacy; in its widest sense this technical side of statecraft includes all positive 
legislation, all positive treaties and agreements, and even all those rules and 
conventions of internal and international political coexsistence which are not legally 
defined but which are sanctioned by history. Finally, it even includes all the generally 
accepted moral principles ofthe life ofthe state.( ... ) Pertinent action will conform 
55 Cf. E p. 226. 
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with these laws and conventions; ( ... ) it will regard them as an essential element in all 
order." (E 23 7) 
This description of political science is very close to Bib6's 'European system of 
values and methods', and the continuation ofthe description even resembles 
Mannheim's understanding of'paradigmatic experiences' as ultimate roots ofhuman 
sociality. Bonhoeffer continues: 
"[P]ertinent action will be incontrovertibly compelled to recognise that the essential 
law of the state comprises something more than these rules and conventions of 
statecraft. Indeed, precisely because the state is indissolubly bound up with human 
existence, its essential law extends ultimately far beyond the range of anything that 
can be expressed in terms of rules. And it is precisely at this point that the full depth of 
responsible action is achieved." (E 238) 
This remarkable correspondence is further strengthened by Bonhoeffer's note 
in which he interprets pertinent action in a much broader way than it was understood 
in Germany, so giving to it a rather 'democratic' basis instead of confining it to the 
world of a professional elite. 56 However, the following argumentation gradually 
brackets and finally suspends all that was said up to this point. 
First Bonhoeffer considers the demand of an "extraordinary situation of 
ultimate necessities, a situation which no law can control" (E 238). These necessities, 
that Bonhoeffer relates to Machiavelli, "no longer leave a multiplicity of courses open 
to human reason but they confront it with the question of ultima ratio. In the political 
field this ultima ratio is war, but it can also be deception and the breaking of treaties 
for the sake of one's own vital needs." (E 239) Following Baldvin Bonhoeffer clarifies 
that the ultima ratio as irrational action cannot be converted into a rational law, in 
other words, lawlessness cannot be turned into law. Rather, the extraordinary necessity 
demands an extraordinary answer: it "appeals to the freedom of the men who is 
responsible" (E 239). 
Here we may remind ourselves of our previous findings that being free and 
being responsible is understood as participation in the divine nature in the argument of 
this section. Now we listen to Bonhoeffer: 
56 See Bonhoeffer's note 4. in E p. 238. 
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"There is now no law behind which the responsible man can seek cover, and there is, 
therefore, also no law which can compel the responsible man to take any particular 
decision in the face of such necessities. In this situation there can only be a complete 
renunciation of every law, together with the knowledge that here one must make one's 
decision as a free venture, together also with the open admission that here the law is 
being infringed and violated and the necessity obeys no commandment. Precisely in 
this breaking of the law the validity of the law is acknowledged, and in this 
renunciation of all law, and in this alone, one's own decision and deed are entrusted 
unreservedly to the divine governance of history." (E 239f) 
Thus, 'free responsibility' is simply understood as a direct relationship with 
God and a direct participation in the divine governance of history. This understanding 
bears two consequences. On the one hand, a 'free responsible deed' receives its 
justification solely from God, being undisturbed by any control that is manifested in 
law. On the other hand, a 'responsible man' remains infinitely closer to God than a 
law-abiding person who may seek cover behind the law. If a personal relationship to 
God is the highest value for Bonhoeffer as a Christian theologian, which we have no 
reason to doubt, the person offree responsibility, understood this way, is 
incomparably highly regarded within this value system. In this light we must pay close 
attention to the last paragraph of this section. 
"There can be no theoretical answer to the question whether in historical action the 
ultimate goal is the eternal law or free responsibility in the face of all law but before 
God. Great nations are opposed in this in an insurmountable and ultimate antinomy. 
The greatness of the British statesmen, and I am thinking here, for example, of 
Gladstone, is that they acknowledge the law as the ultimate authority; and the 
greatness of German statesmen- I am thinking now of Bismarck - is that they come 
before God in free responsibility. In this neither can claim to be superior to the other. 
The ultimate question remains open and must be kept open, for in either case man 
becomes guilty and in either case he can live only by the grace of God and by 
forgivenes. Each of these men, the one who is bound by the law and the one who acts 
in free responsibility, must hear and bow before the accusation of the other. Neither 
can be the judge of the other. It is always for God to judge." (E 240) 
First of all we must recognise that here Bonhoeffer seeks a theoretical answer 
about the ultimate goal C?f historical action. The two epithets, theoretical and 
historical give a concrete as well as a limiting scope to the question and the possible 
answer: this scope is relative to the ultimate that Bonhoeffer approaches by 
theological questioning while asking about God or reality. We have seen that with 
respect to God or reality Bonhoeffer already answered the question of free 
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responsibility: the person of free responsibility acts "in accordance with reality" (E 
238) and the person's "decision and deed are entrusted unreservedly to the divine 
governance of history" (E 240). Bonhoeffer already had his ultimate word about it; it 
is not this question that is opened up once again. 
Accordingly, it is the theoretical question about the ultimate goal~~ historical 
action that cannot be answered at its own level. It is this level where the 'ultimate 
antinomy' can be stated and the greatness of Gladstone and the greatness of Bismarck 
can be compared and mutually contrasted to each other. This comparison is valid only 
at this level: before the ultimate, that is, God's reality, the acknowledgement of the law 
'as the ultimate authority' that Bonhoeffer attributes to the politics personified by 
Gladstone, is simply untenable. Likewise, only at this level can it be stated that neither 
view can claim to be superior to the other. Nevertheless, as we know, this level 
represents a limited scope of relative validity. 
It should also be considered what Bonhoeffer might mean by saying that "in 
either case man becomes guilty". We know what guilt means for the person of free 
responsibility: it is breaking the law for being obedient to God's reality. But what is 
the guilt of the law-abiding person? It logically cannot be anything else than keeping 
the law even if God's reality demands to break the law, keeping the law against God's 
will, being disobedient to God, regarding, indeed, the law as an ultimate authority 
instead of accepting God's ultimate authority. For the person of free responsibility 
guilt means guilt for the sake of God and the other. It is, indeed, the acceptance ~~ 
guilt that Bonhoeffer discusses immediately after this paragraph. It is Jesus' 
acceptance of guilt in which "lies the origin of every action of responsible deputyship. 
lf it is responsible action, if it is action which is concerned solely and entirely with the 
other man, if it arises from selfless love for the real man who is our brother, then, 
precisely because this is so, it cannot wish to shun the fellowship of human guilt." (E 
241) The guilt ofthe person offree responsibility is guilt out of self-forgetting love for 
the other, guilt for God; on the other hand, the guilt of the law-abiding person is a guilt 
out of a self-centered observance of the law that withdraws from loving the other, a 
guilt against God. Against this background, God's final judgement can boldly be 
presupposed. 
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Nevertheless, this background cannot be seen behind the stage where 
Bonhoeffer looks for an answer to the theoretical question about the ultimate goal of 
historical action. It is the quite limited perspective of this stage that allows the 
spectator to wonder about ultimate political antinomies, contradicting greatnesses, 
apparent equalities and mutual bowings before mutual accusations, before God as 
Deus ex machina will finally come down and announce God's judgement. This is for 
the spectators and all the excitement of the play is only for the spectators too. We, the 
readers ofBonhoeffer, having the same perspective of God and reality as he has, being 
able to look beyond and above the stage of theoretical questions and history, we do not 
have to wait for God, we already know which one of the great statemen will be 
announced as the obedient servant of God. 
Have I gone too far? In his 21 February 1944 letter to Bethge Bonhoeffer 
discussed the question of resistance and submission, treating the figures of Don 
Quixote and Michael Kohlhaas as symbols of resistance carried to the point of 
absurdity. His solution is characteristically dialectical: " [ w ]e must confront fate ( .. ) as 
resolutely as we submit to it at the right time" (LPP 217). He closes the letter with the 
following words: 
"It is therefore impossible to define the boundary between resistance and submission 
on abstract principles; but both ofthem must exist, and both must be practiced. Faith 
demands this elasticity ofbehaviour. Only so can we stand our ground in each 
situation as it arises, and turn it to gain. 
Would differences between theological and juristic existence emerge here? I am 
thinking, for instance, of the extreme contrast between Klaus and Riidiger within a 
'legalistic', juristic approach ( ... ) on the other hand our more flexible, livelier 
'theological' approach, which has this character because in the end it is more in accord 
with reality." (LPP 217t) 
Therefore, those who are in accord with Bonhoeffer's reality, do not have to be 
disturbed either by the apparent contradictions that appear at a political level nor by an 
uneasy choice between opposing ways: reality has already made its testimony for 
those who are in accord with it. 
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Bonhoeffer interpretation is well equipped by critical analyses of Otto von 
Bismarck's poltics57, so we may have a rather detailed knowledge of what Bonhoeffer 
might mean when he personifies the theological expression 'free responsibility' in 
Bismarck. Against this background, it is all the more telling to see how Clifford Green 
takes pains to show a Bonhoeffer with a rather different view of Bismarck. In the new 
edition of his Bonhoe.ffer: A Theology ~f Sociality Green makes a single reference to 
Bismarck. Discussing Bonhoeffer's July 1932 address, The Theological Basis of the 
World Alliance, Green tells us: 
"Significantly, Bonhoeffer refers to Bismarck, as symbolic of the demonic 
development found in modern warfare. Despite efforts late in his career to out-flank 
and repress socialists with sweeping social reforms, Bismarck deservedly earned the 
name of 'iron cancellor'. He was a symbol of Prussian military imperialism, 
constitutional arbitrariness, and reactionary military imperialism - in shmt, militarist 
I. . ,58 power-po Ittcs. 
Here Green's words about Bismarck end. In a note he also adds Barth's post-
war words to his own, suggesting a common substance of Bismarck's and Hitler's bad 
heritage: "Bismarck- not to mention Hitler- was (in spite of the Daily Bible Readings 
on his bedside table) no model statesman because he wanted to establish and develop 
his work on naked power. "59 
Bonhoeffer's text that Green refers to, however, does not suggest that even the 
young, pacifist theologian distanced himself from Bismarck. What he distanced 
himself from was the perspective ofwar that burdened his own time. His reference to 
Bismarck may suggest that Bonhoeffer thought that cifter Bismarck modern warfare 
had taken a dangerous turn rather than, as Green believes, a conviction that Bismarck 
was part ofthe "demonic development". Here are Bonhoeffer's words: 
"There is, however, a very widespread, extremely dangerous error about today that the 
justification of struggle already contains the justification of war, affirms war in 
principle. ( ... ) Anyone who has seriously studied the history of the concept of war 
from Luther to Fichte and Bismarck and then on to the present, knows that while the 
word has remained the same, its content has become something absolutely 
incomparable. War in our day no longer falls under the concept of struggle because it 
57 See for example John A. Moses: 'Bonhoeffer's Germany: the Political Conte:-..1' In: de Gruchy ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, pp. 3ff. 
58 Green, Bonhoe_ffer: A Theology o.fSociality, p. 129. 
59 ibid. note 50. 
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is the certain self-annihilation of both combatans. ( ... ) No word of condemnation of 
past deeds even in the last war - that is not permitted to us, 'thou shalt not judge' - but 
all the power of resistance, of refusal, of rejection of the next war." (NRS 170) 
This text simply does not allow us to argue for a Bonhoeffer who was a critic 
ofBismarck in any sense. How Green interprets the 1942 reference to Bismarck as the 
model German stateman, we do not know. Although he quotes part ofthe relevant text 
of the Ethics within his discussion of responsible action in extraordinary situation in 
his same book, he carefully avoids mentioning Bismarck's name in relation to 'acting 
in free responsibility'60 
One more remark before we turn back to Bethge's biography. Interpreters of 
Ethics usually agree that elements like war, deception and the breaking of agreements 
as deeds of free responsibility refer to the extraordinary situation of the conspirators 
and, indeed, Germany in general, thus they belong to a distinct 'ethics in the boundary 
situation'. This opinion is certainly justified on the basis ofthe historical context as 
well as Bonhoeffer's own awareness and evaluation ofthe context. However, the 
question remains, whether the context was the only reason for Bonhoeffer to conceive 
a distinct ethics for the boundary situation or there may be found other reasons in his 
thinking and theology? This question is justified in our comparative reading ofBib6 
and Bonhoeffer, since, as we have seen, Bib6 did not show any interest in an 
extraordinary ethics as he was planning the way out of the chaos and war towards a 
new, feasible order. He explicitly mentioned, not knowing about the conspiracy in 
which Bonhoeffer was involved, that the success or failure of a possible coup against 
Hitler did not bear any significance with respect to the post-war order of Germany. 
I think that besides the pressure of the situation there is another, intrinsic root 
in Bonhoeffer's theology proper from which his inclination to think in terms of an 
ethics in the boundary situation might have developed. We have seen that already in 
Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer understood the ethical - with respect to the ethical 
collective person- as created by God's call. God's call, however, does not only create 
the ethical, but it may also create the extraordinary situation itself, moreover, the call 
60 Green, Bonhoe.ffer: A Theology ofSociali~v. p. 316. 
may originate the means by which the obedient should answer the extraordinaly 
situation: 
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"Where peoples are called, God's will for their purpose in history is at work ( ... ) 
Where a people, submitting in conscience to God's will, goes to war in order to fulfil 
its historical purpose and mission in the world - through entering fully into the 
ambiguity ofhuman sinful action- it knows it has been called upon by God, that 
history is to be made; here war is no longer murder." (SC 119) 
Here are the theological roots, I think, of the freely at the same time obediently 
responsible deed whose embodiment, as we have seen, Bonhoeffer saw in the 'iron 
chancellor'. 
Having finished our excursion to Ethics, now we return to Bethge's biography. 
Towards the end ofthe discussion ofBonhoeffer's participation in the conspiracy, 
Bethge explains Bonhoeffer's position with respect to the different branches this way: 
"In the course of his collaboration on the [Freiburg] memorandum, Bonhoeffer did not 
contact the members of the Kreisau group, nor did he attempt to work out an 
agreement with them. Apart from the fact that the Kreisau circle's work reached its 
climax somewhat later than that of the Freiburg group, Bonhoeffer believed that the 
conclusions related to the period after a coup belonged in the ecumenical forum that 
had emerged out ofthe direct responsibility ofthe Confessing church. Despite his 
demand that the Confessing church, which was dangerously narrow, should open up 
and expand its horizons, Bonhoeffer still found it difficult to cooperate with church 
people who had not made the sacrifices that characterised the provisional leaders of 
the Councils of Brethren. And the Confessing church, to the extent that it stood by 
Barmen and Dahlem, could not regard the Protestant churchmen in the Kreisau group, 
such as Schonfeld, Gerstenmaier, Harald Poelchau, or even Steltzer, as its own people. 
It was somewhat tragic that the Kreisau and Freiburg groups did not seek out and 
complement each other at the time. Bonhoeffer did not live to see what doors opened 
in that direction. "61 
Bethge's narrative ofBonhoeffer's role in the conspiracy in general and this 
section in particular clearly expresses Bethge's regret that Bonhoeffer did not get 
closer to the socially and politically more progressive Kreisau group. We have 
followed Bethge's efforts to explain it with outward, incidental factors; at the same 
time, it has become clear enough from Bonhoeffer's texts that his vision of a post-war 
Germany was fundamentally at odds with a Germany that set out on the road of 
thorough social progress. In short, the 'other Germany' that Bonhoeffer tried to 
61 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoejfer, pp. 776f. 
represent in ecumenical circles, was not an 'other one' in comparison to the Third 
Reich only, but also opposed a prospective democratic state. 
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Whatever personal or other reasons Bethge might have had to present a 
Bonhoeffer whose theology and its social implications could be understood as open 
and inspirative to social progress, its effect on Bonhoeffer scholarship has been 
tremendous. The crown witness of Bonhoeffer's life, the mediator number one in the 
manner ofPlato and Socrates, not only provided the highly valuable biographical 
details for Bonhoeffer's written theological legacy, but he also created an interpreted 
biography- necessarily, to be sure, since all biography and all autobiography is a 
conscious interpretation- that is attractive for people who need- for whatever reasons 
- an authority figure for supporting a theory or movement of social-politicalliberation. 
Bethge's 'offer', that has been accepted by several interpreters, is, however, a deceptive 
one. On the one hand, it is relatively easy to find weapons for a short-term theological-
ideological warfare on the side of social progress in the arsenal that Bethge presents 
by his interpretation ofBonhoeffer, but it is all the more problematic, on the other 
hand, to identify plainly what Bonhoeffer might mean by social liberation, if not only 
his selected works are considered in the perspective ofBethge's interpretation, but the 
whole of the corpus of his writings, etsi Bethge non daretur. (Here the improper 
character of the Socrates-Plato analogy becomes clear: we do hm7e direct access to 
Bonhoeffer's writings.) 
This 'deception', I think, may deeply hurt people who really seek theological 
support for a thorough social-political change and seek more than merely weapons for 
a short-term strategic warfare. Disillusioned voices that express the limits of the 
liberating capacity ofBonhoeffer's theology can be met here and there in Bonhoeffer 
scholarship; it would be instructive to gather them together once and interpret them 
comparatively. I mention here only a relatively recent instance that appeared at the 
highest forum of international Bonhoeffer scholarship. In the Seventh Bonhoeffer 
Congress, Cape Town, 1996, Korean theologian Chung Hyun Kyung expressed with 
unmistakable clarity how little Asian women can gain in their 'way to freedom' from 
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Bonhoeffer's theological legac/2 Her critical questions may be best summarised by 
these sentences: "We ask not what we can die for, because our children's lives are 
dependent on us. We ask rather what we can live for?" 63 But one swallow does not a 
summer make: John de Gruchy still found it possible to avoid a critical discussion of 
the Asian women's perspective, maintaining instead that Chung Hyun Kyung 
contributed to the picture of Bonhoeffer as a popular theologian64 
C. A Look at the Prison Theology: can any Major Changes 
in Bonhoeffer's Awareness of Sociality be Expected? 
This closing section of our examination of Bonhoeffer's concept of freedom 
and its social implications should be brief and tentative: instead of entering into an 
analysis of the several relevant data of the prison literature, that is impossible within 
the limits of the present study, I will only hint at some crucial points. 
It has become common to argue that the prison experiences and reflections had 
changed Bonhoeffer so much that he would probably have left behind his 
characteristically conservative Weltanschauung. 65 In other words, the remarkable 
continuity of the peculiar awarenes of human sociality that we could witness from 
1927 to 1942, that no outward experience, friendship, metanoia, 'turning from the 
phraseological to the real', participation in the resistance could break, would have 
ended while Bonhoeffer was in prison to give place something different. I 
fundamentally disagree with this view. 
What I propose here is no more than an outline for my possible argument, 
indeed, an outline for another book. 
62 Chung Hyun Kyung: 'Dear Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Letter' In: John de Gruchy ed., Bonhoe.fferfor a 
New Day:A Theology in a Time o.fTransition, Eerdmans 1997, pp. 9fi. 
63 ibid. p. 17. 
64 Jolm de Gruchy, 'The Reception of Bonhoeffer's Theology', in de Gmchy ed, The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 104. 
65 See for example de Gmchy, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy' in .Modern 
Theologv 12:3 July 1996; de Gruchy: 'Bonhoeffer, Apartheid, and Beyond: The Reception 
of Bonhoeffer in South Africa' in de Gmchy ed. Bonhoefferfor a New D~y;and C1ements, 'Commwtity 
in the Ethics ofDietrich Bonhoeffer', in Studies in Christian Ethics, 10. (1997) 
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The starting point is that during his prison months the immediate mental and 
spiritual context ofBonhoeffer personal life had not changed: he continously lived 
and encountered the outside word in and through his family. The dominant influence 
ofBonhoeffer's family and its long and rich traditions has been discussed by several 
Bonhoeffer scholars, sometimes with enthusiasm66, at other times showing a rather 
critical attitude towards its authoritarian structure67 The characteritics of the 'primal 
state of social being' as appeared in Sanctorum Communio and bear such a lasting 
effect on his social awareness, are, in fact, the characteristics of his own family life, as 
he perceived and understood it68 . 
Apart from the several and deeply personal letters to and from members of his 
family, including, naturally, Eberhard Bethge and Maria von Wedemeyer, we have 
two large-scale works that present us with Bonhoeffer's understanding of the nature 
and perspectives ofhis family. In the Drama and the Novel we can see the family, 
including Dietrich himself, through the eyes ofBonhoeffer. In 'the prison theology 
proper', concieved after 30, April, 1944 under the label 'Christianity in a world come 
of age', we can witness how Bonhoeffer rethinks the intellectual heritage of his own 
particular social class and draws from this rethinking theological conclusions that, he 
thought, had general validity69 In both instances he remains confined within the limits 
of his inherited social perspective. 
Both the prison fiction and the 'new theology' need a careful interpretation in 
whose course authorities of previous Bonhoeffer interpretation are questioned. I 
mention here the most important points. With respect to the drama and the novel, 
several attempts have been made to mitigate Bonhoeffer's strong patriarchal views, 
first of all by Renate and Eberhard Bethge and, following them, several other scholars. 
These arguments have to be reconsidered. Further, Bethge's belief that in the figure of 
Christoph Bonhoeffer presented conservative opinions that were characteristic not of 
66 See for example Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology ofSociality, especially pp. l45f. 
6
; I think of especially Thomas I Day, Dietrich Bonhoeffor on Christian Community and Common 
Sense, The Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 1982; and Kenneth Earl Morris, Bonhoeffer's Ethic of 
Discipleship. 
68 See for example chapter 6, 'The Prison Letters and the Theology of Sociality' in Green, Bonhoeffor: A 
Theology ofSociality 
69 See Ralph K. Wtistenberg, A Theo/ogv of Life, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Religionless Christianity, 
Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Cambridge, U.K. 1998. 
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him but his brother Klaus70, which, as we have seen, is not necessarily justified on the 
basis ofBonhoeffer's own texts, has to be scrutinised too. This particular opinion 
serves as a supporting argument for Green's belief that Bonhoeffer voiced his own 
views through the major's words71 . If it was true, a Bonhoeffer committed to social 
justice and peace as, on the basis ofthe Anglo-Saxon democratic tradition it could be 
understood today would be a tenable opinion. 
The problem is that the novel's Christoph distances himself from the novel's 
major in a remarkable way, and if the reader does not accept that the Christoph of the 
differing opinion may be other than Dietrich Bonhoeffer, he cannot accept either that 
it is the major and not the arguing Christoph who expresses Bonhoeffer's own 
thoughts. However, if the reader is able to suspend Bethge's and Green's beliefs for a 
while, she can recognise a remarkable accord in the views of the conversation partner 
ofWilliam Paton and Paul Lehman, the author of 'The Structure of Responsible Life' 
and Christoph who argues with the major. On the other side, a similarly remarkable 
accord can be found in William Paton's and Paul Lehman's texts and the major's 
views. If it can be revealed, even the otherwise enigmatic fact that Bonhoeffer placed 
the major into South Mrica, that is, a country of Anglo-Saxon political traditions, may 
gain some relevance. In short, it may be presented that in the discussion and partial 
disagreement ofthe major and Christoph Bonhoeffer, in a way, re-enacted his 
discussions with his Anglo-Saxon friends. 
A particular element ofthe prison drama, I think, gains a great theological 
significance within the 'new theology'. "[T]he difference between the two types of 
people is that the rabble only know how to live, but the noble also know how to die." 
(FTP 36) We confine ourselves to the perspective ofBonhoeffer now and will not 
wonder whether Bonhoeffer ever considered people who did not know how to live; 
here the point for us is to recognise that Bonhoeffer identified readiness to die or 
suffer with the high values represented by the elite. Suffering and dying is a theme to 
which Bonhoeffer paid a persistent attention from the very outset of his theological 
career and, as it is frequently discussed, suffering and dying became one of the central 
70 Quoted by Green in his 'Editorial Introduction' in FTP p. 7. 
71 ibid. pp. lOf. 
262 
interpretative motifs in his prison theology. God's suffering in a godless world, 
participating in Christ's suffering in Gethsemane, and, most closely related to our 
theme, suffering and death as the third and the fourth stations on the road to freedom 
are the most important examples. 
Interpreters who are otherwise critical about the social contents of Bonhoeffer's 
theology, tend to think that his prison theology, centered around the theme of 
suffering, finally became more open to relate to other people's experiences through 
sharing their suffering72 We cannot ignore the possibility, however, that Bonhoeffer 
regarded suffering at least as much of a distinctive characteristic of the noble as a 
possibility of participating in other people's human predicament in a broader sense 
than he shared the destiny of his social class. The thesis of his drama is probably 
reversible: it is not only that the noble one is the one who is ready to die but also the 
one who is ready to die is the noble one. He probably considered suffering and dying 
as a merit that creates nobility and authority, establishes leadership. Bethge was 
probably in accord with Bonhoeffer's own understanding of suffering when he 
actualised it with respect to 'right and possibility' more than twenty years later: 
"We as Christians in Germany, for instance, have lost in our generation the right and 
power to speak words of faith to the Jews. We are not to evangelize them. Western 
Christianity might have lost the power to speak words of faith to people behind the 
Iron Curtain. Christ may not use our present form of proclaiming him. Only he who 
participates in Jesus' suffering may speak the renewing word of his participation. "73 
There is, however, an element in the prison literature that can be regarded as a 
possibility for a really new beginning in Bonhoeffer's thinking: his joyful reflections 
on his own personal spontaneity. These reflections belong to the two most intensive 
human experiences he was presented with in prison: love and friendship. He ventured 
to enact his love ofMaria in the relationship ofRenate and Christoph in the prison 
novel, while his friendship with Eberhard Bethge is nicely documented in the letters. 
72 For example Thomas I. Day, Dietrich Bonhoe.ffer on Christian Communi~v and Common Sense, see 
the closing section of his book. 
73 Eberhard Bethge: 'The Challenges ofDietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Theology', in Ronald Gregor 
Smith ed., TYorld Come o,[Age, London, Collins, 1967, p. 81. 
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Most significantly to the present study, his reflections on spontaneity are consequently 
related to his renewing understanding of freedom. 
"The first thing that happened all by itself was that the two began to talk, 
carefree and open to each other. ( ... )In this way began one of those rare and delightful 
conversations in which each word is received as a gift freely given from one to the 
other." (FTP 131) The awakening spontaneity between Renate and Christoph is 
probably still reflected upon within the limits ofthe old concept of freedom, but an 
approaching change can be perceived already here. 
Bonhoeffer's 23 January 1944 letter to Bethge may represent the next station to 
his road to a new understanding of freedom. Here we are given a promising, albeit 
still ambiguous account. Friendship, he wrote, ""in contrast to marriage and kinship, 
has no generally recognised rights, therefore depends entirely on its own inherent 
quality" (LPP 192). Together with culture and education, friendship "belongs not to 
the sphere of obedience, but to the broad arena of freedom" (LPP 193). In the 
following highly exciting sentences we can witness Bonhoeffer's struggle to gain a 
new understanding of friendship within as well as without his old conceptual 
framework, indeed, for gaining a new understanding of the meaning of the 'freedom of 
a Christian'. 
The last station on this road is his poem, written to Bethge, 'The Friend'. The 
opening lines are remarkably unambiguous: 
"Not from the heavy soil, I where blood and sex and oath I rule in their hallowed 
might, I where earth itself, I guarding the primal consecrated order, I avenges 
wantonness and madness - I not from the heavy soil of earth, I but from the spirit's 
choice and free desire, I needing no oath or legal bond, I is friend bestowed on friend." 
(LPP 388) 
Here, I think, a new direction may open up: form the recognition and 
acceptance of my spontaneous freedom there is a way leading to the acceptance of the 
same freedom in the other as well. 
Nevertheless, it is only a possbility, and even at the latest phase Bonhoeffer's 
writings remain ambiguous. In his 8 July 1944 letter he still operated with his 
distinction of the peasant and the bourgeois, related order to the first and free 
responsibility to the second (LPP 345). His famous 'Stations on the Road to Freedom' 
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still begins with discipline only to arrive at, through action and suffering, "the greatest 
of feasts", death (LPP 370f). Thus, his own peculiar way to freedom, lacking a clear 
affirmation of individual negative freedom rooted in spontaneity, leaves an ambiguous 
legacy with us. 
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Cmnchnsnoll] 
In chapter 1 I discussed the relationship of freedom and democracy. In the first 
section I examined the two concepts of freedom, then I made an attempt at interpreting 
democracy under four headings: democracy as tradition, as vision, as system and as 
process. At the end of this chapter I proposed that all four approaches can be related to 
a search for the meaning of freedom. In the course of the investigation ofBib6's and 
Bonhoeffer's texts I followed the logic of the texts themselves and did not try to apply 
the proposed framework to them too soon. Now it is time to examine our findings 
against the background ofthis approach. 
The Two Concepts of Freedom 
We have seen that it is common both for theologians and political theorists to 
regard freedom as negative and positive, a "freedom from" and a "freedom for". The 
interpretation ofthe relationship of the two concepts as well as the exact description of 
each concept may vary widely; a certain combination of the two concepts, however, 
seems to be a minimal requirement for a complex understanding of freedom. 
Having briefly introduced some theological approaches, we paid attention to 
Isaiah Berlin's seminal essay. Berlin was resolute in arguing that a sense of negative 
freedom is necessary to avoid the danger for positive freedom to turn into paternalism 
or even despotism. We have found a similar approach in Bib6's works. Although the 
definition of negative as well as positive freedom ofthe two authors is not identical- a 
closer look at their differences would deserve a separate study - their insistence on 
negative freedom as unavoidable is remarkably harmonious. 
In Bonhoeffer's case, however, we have witnessed a different standpoint: he 
regarded only positive freedom as true freedom. We have seen that there are both 
theological as well as social arguments in Bonhoeffer's theory that lead to his one-
sided understanding of freedom. The motif of vicarious representative action and the 
related concept of person provides the theological argument that corresponds to the 
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collectivist as well as patriarchal-paternalistic social theory that Bonhoeffer learnt in 
his own family. 
Democracy as Tradition 
During the examination ofBib6's and Bonhoeffer's texts I had to restrain 
myself from discussing the inherited traditions of the two thinkers in detail, but here I 
shall engage them in a deliberately brief and general manner. 
Bib6 inherited the tradition of an elite whose life had long been determined by 
attempts to gain independence from great powers, the Ottoman Empire and the 
Habsburg Empire on the one hand, and efforts to control ethnic minorities within the 
borders of their country on the other. This long historical tradition naturally nurtured 
an intensive sense of being free from, first of all in one's own self-awareness, and, in 
people who were capable of identifying themselves with others, a respect for the 
demand of negative freedom ofthe other one. On the other hand, the endless and 
repeatedly failed independence struggles nurtured a different sense as well, a sense of 
the command to survive at all costs, and a corresponding awareness that freedom, 
either my declared freedom or the other's respected freedom may damage the basic 
conditions of life. It was part of Bib6's tradition that each generation had to make a 
clear choice between freedom and safe survival. Those who chose the first were 
usually looking for political examples from the West, while those who chose the 
second were always convinced that any Western pattern of political life cannot be 
emulate in this part of the world. Almost a hundred years ago the poet Endre Ady 
wrote: Hungary had always been a "ferry-country", always moving between the East 
and the West. Bib6 belonged to the tradition that usually opted for the West, he 
inherited a sense of political life that was able to keep up with the development of 
democratic theory and practice. At the same time, he was able to consider the fear of 
those who chose survival instead. His Calvinist-Protestant Christianity, whose 
Hungarian reception had been deeply interrelated with the struggles ofthe elite from 
the XVI. century onwards, provided him with a theological background, that, he was 
convinced, was self-evident. 
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Bonhoeffer inherited a rather different tradition. The elite he belonged to 
regarded itself as a guardian of great intellectual, cultural and scientific traditions 
whose continuity it felt to be responsible for. This elite was well aware ofthe fact that 
these achievements were partly due to the relative tranquillity of German domestic 
life, and tranquillity was supported by a strongly centralised order, earlier in the 
territorial units, later in the Kaiserreich. This elite followed the beginnings of Western 
democratic development with suspicion, and the coherent web ofpolitical theories we 
know as the Sonderweg did not only express a different historical awareness but also a 
different ontological awareness oflife itself The main line ofXIX. century German 
theology, intellectually liberal and socially conservative, provided theological support. 
With respect to the understanding of freedom according to this awareness of life, the 
concepts of freedom and obedience overlapped: spontaneous freedom that did not 
respect a given order was regarded as an ethically irresponsible, rebellious, arbitrary 
act. Bonhoeffer's theological reflections on freedom were nurtured by this tradition 
and remained within the limits of this tradition. 
Democracy as Vision 
We have seen that a democratic vision bears the influence ofthe inherited 
tradition and builds its image ofthe future out of inherited elements. Both Bib6's and 
Bonhoeffer's vision of a post-war Germany can be seen as an organic outcome of the 
traditions they received and thought through. With respect to developing a particular 
vision we discussed the importance ofthe awareness ofthe nature of ideology, utopia 
and the necessarily autobiographical character of a vision. We have found that it is 
rather difficult to determine a way that helps us to distinguish between ideology in a 
broad sense and a restrictive sense, concrete utopia and abstract utopia, and, let us say, 
the inclusive or exclusive autobiographical character of the vision. However, it can be 
established as a general rule, that the more a thinker is ready to engage in a critical 
discussion of his or her own theory with others, the more he or she will be able to 
recognise his or her blindspots and control the negative possibilities that lay in the 
ideological, utopian and autobiographical character of one's vision. Within our 
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comparison ofBib6 and Bonhoeffer we shall also add that a theoretical standpoint that 
respects the other's spontaneous reactions is more promising, at least in theory, with 
respect to this self-controlling process. As far as I can recognise, Bib6's way of 
reasoning invites the reader to this critical exchange while the manner ofBonhoeffer's 
discourse is rather discouraging in this respect. 
Democracy as System 
Ifwe consider democracy as a system, the possibility of a comparison of 
Bib6's and Bonhoeffer's theory is reduced to the minimum. If the system is based on 
certain democratic principles, the consideration of any details is meaningful only if 
these principles are intact and alive; if not, individual elements of the system represent 
something different from elements of a democratic system. Therefore, I think it is 
misleading to discuss some elements ofBonhoeffer's ethical theology, like free 
responsibility, acceptance of guilt, sharing the destiny of others, as meaningful to think 
through with respect to a democratic system: they are meaningful, indeed, in their own 
right, but neither do they reflect the necessary coherence of a democratic system, nor 
do they mediate the meaning that they would contain if they were conceived in the 
perspective of a democratic system. I think Bonhoeffer's understanding of free 
responsibility may serve as a chief example: freedom for the elite, order for the rest. (It 
may be added here that the notion of socialist democracy that was developed by the 
leaders ofthe Soviet satellite states meant something similar: the proclamation of 
selected and rather distorted democratic practices without the support of the generally 
acknowledged basic principles; a falsification that Bib6 rejected time and again.) As 
far as Bib6 is concerned, besides the basic principles all the discussed nuances of 
democratic principles can be recognised even in his early writings. 
Democracy as Process 
It is this section of my study where the autobiographical (utopian, ideological) 
character of my approach is most obvious. While highlighting some features ofthe 
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democratic process, I kept in mind not only the most pressing needs ofHungarian 
society in transition towards democracy, as I understand them, but also the possible 
contribution that Bib6's legacy could make. In other words, and using a lighter 
language, this section is the nucleus of my coup against Bonhoeffer, or, more exactly, 
against the possibility of the authoritative position that Bonhoeffer's legacy may gain 
if interpreted with respect to the Hungarian transition without keeping a necessary 
distance. Thus, the themes that are discussed here, fighting with one's own shadow and 
the lessons of improper imports of democratic doctrines are considered as a means of 
achieving a more organic understanding ofthe roots of the difficulties Hungarian 
society- and, I believe, not only Hungarian society- faces in trying to establish 
democracy on the one hand, and of creating a necessary distance from the political 
message ofBonhoeffer's theological legacy on the other. I believe, ifBonhoeffer's 
theology is made transparent in the light of these approaches, some shortcomings of 
his legacy will be visible that are not necessarily obvious in different perspectives, but 
that may be menacing if they serve as a vantage point for thinking through the 
democratic transformation of nascent democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. A 
detailed elaboration of this could be a subject of a separate study. 
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